What is it like to be a Bat by Thomas Nagel - Research Paper Example

Thomas Nagel wrote in his essay, “What Is It Like to be a Bat?” about the concepts of reduced mean, consciousness, and physicalism. After exploring his essay and a discussion of the topic, I shall attempt to explain in my own words the meaning of these terms. I will define his terms in his words and mine, giving examples from his writing. I will conclude with my understanding of the next step of Nagel’s thought, “What does this mean in my life?” Reduced Mean For something to be reduced, to be made less than what it begins, we must use “reductionism,” a presenting problem for Nagel.

Nagel says, reducing is to be “based on an analysis of what is to be reduced. If the analysis leaves something out, the problem will be falsely posed.” (158) Subjective viewpoint says that all of these descriptors are components necessary to be like something, for example, what we need to be “like a bat.” We need to take all factors into consideration, the physical properties, the mental characteristics, the mode of reasoning, the essence and “is-ness” of it, but when we reduce these properties in an objective viewpoint, we have lost the ability to “be like.

” Not having a completeness of all factors reduces the experience and essence, therefore eliminating the complete knowledge of what is. Without the complete knowledge, we cannot perceive the phenomena of being. Consciousness For Thomas Nagel, for something to be conscious, to have consciousness, is to be like one in all aspects of being. To be a bat, for example, would mean to think like a bat, feel like a bat, and have all the physical characteristics of the bat, to consume like a bat, to experience like a bat, to inhale and exhale like a bat, to be the total essence of “like a bat”.

However, as we cannot truly transform ourselves into a bat, we cannot “be a bat.” Likeness is not the same as “is-ness”. Nagel stated, “but no matter how the forms may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism.” (155) We can imagine through our own consciousness what is similar to being a bat, we can try being blind and depending on our ears, we can imagine what it is like to fly with wings, we can become nocturnal creatures, but we are still using our imaginary skills and not creating a consciousness of “bat-ism”.

We are being subjective observers, using our logic and reason, imagination and creativity to discern what we think a bat would be. Even when we use all resources available to our creative mind, we cannot, however, become another being, although that would be true consciousness to Nagel. We are limited by our imagination and consciousness of who we are, and therefore, cannot be someone else. Physicalism Nagel argues that on the grounds of “physicalism” we cannot really know, physicalism is still too inexact.

We can change our appearance, we can explain the physical-ness of being a bat, we can explain how sonar works and what bat ears look like, but we cannot tell subjectively what it is to be a bat. We cannot explain the essence of “bat-ness,” because we are not bats. We cannot tell from the objective and physical point of view the consciousness of that bat. Nagel posits, “At the present time the status of physicalism is similar to that which the hypothesis that matter is energy would have had if uttered by a pre-Socratic philosopher.

We do not have the beginnings of a conception of how it might be true.” (160) As we describe “physical-ness” from a third person point of view, objective, we can not combine them with the first point of view, subjective, and be complete. To have all the physical characteristics is still not “knowing” in the subjective. Conclusion Nagel’s concepts are somewhat difficult to discuss, quite like his dilemma with consciousness. They are more a subjective, “be” type knowledge. Standing on the outside, with the objective view, Nagel appears to use the same words over and