Thomas Nagel and Aristotles Account of the Mind-body Problem - Essay Example

Thomas Nagel and Aristotle’s Account of the Mind-body Problem Thomas Nagel’s piece of work “what is it like to be a bat” is figured around consciousness theme and from it raises other themes such subjectivity, objectivity, and reductionism (Nagel 1). All these themes are directed at understanding the mind-body problem, and Nagel acknowledges that conscious is what makes such understanding intractable or difficult. This is because from Nagel’s perspective, and current discussions always give little attention to the mind-body problem and such reductionist approach have only produced several analyses of mental concepts (Nagel 1). Clearly all through the article, Nagel’s argument is aimed at refuting the wave of reductionism among philosophers. Reductionism is the philosophical approach that a complex system is nothing more than just the sum of its parts (1). Nagel holds that is conscious widespread within our life as well as those of mammals especially the bat. He also argues further that simple organisms have “mental state conscious if and only if something is there to be that organism- something it is like for the organism” (Nagel 2). Nagel picks on a "bat" to illustrate how conscious is important. He chooses the bat to be able to distinguish between subjective and objective concepts of philosophy. Unlike other mammals, Nagel describes the bat as unique from the rest as their senses such as sonar and echolocation are extremely developed that they can be able to detect things (Nagel 2). However, Nagel disputes that even though such is clearly is a form of perception as in human, there is no reason to presuppose the bat’s sonar as our experience. Nagel further states that even if we evolve or try to imagine to a bat, we would never feel the experience of a bat. Such is because we do not possess the internal physiological composition as that of a bat. Such scenario is what to Nagel’s argument brings out the difference between subjectivism and objectivism. He relates subjectivism to our mental activity which is the only crucial element of our experience. Consequently, he admits that subjective and its forms mean a conviction in the existence of facts beyond the reach of human understanding (Nagel 3). Reflecting on Nagel’s article, he draws a number of benefits of having conscious. Conscious can extract evidence from the reality of something we cannot comprehend. Nagel uses caterpillar as an example to illustrate this idea. In a lab study, someone is unfamiliar with insect’s metamorphosis or transformation “locks them in a sterilized safe, after some weeks the safe is opened and a butterfly is evident. If an individual has been vigilant although the experiment and attests that the safe was shut the whole time, he has no course not to believe that the butterfly was once a caterpillar (Nagel 6). Throughout the article, Nagel’s position is apparent. His idea that organisms have special conscious experience brings out the subjective nature of experience, and this is what tears the reductionist’s theory apart. His position is that consciousness can never be explained without the subjective nature of experience and neither can the subject be explained by reductionist approach. Its mental state can never be summarized to some variety of materialism (Nagel 1). Nagel contemplates that for conscious to be explained from a reductionist view, it could deficiently exclude the subjective character experience idea. This will in turn make the reductionists theorists’ arguments completely improbable for one cannot carry out an evaluation and leave some parts out of context (Nagel 2). Another position held by Nagel is that, just as a reductionist theologian’s approach cannot explain the themes of conscious neither will a psychiatrist. In concluding his article, Nagel wraps up by emphasizes that the mystery of how consciousness is like could be nothing than a physical activity within our brain. Aristotle’s Account of Soul and Mind-body Problem. In giving the definition of the soul, Aristotle starts by disputing several claims or definitions by his predecessor. He starts his inquiry through exposition by defining that all affections of soul entail a body-passion, calmness, panic, shame, courage, happiness, loving, and hate; all of which concurrent with body affections (Aristotle 3). Such concurrence of affections demonstrates that the body and soul are inter-dependent. Elsewhere, he says the soul is not an independent substance for it is linked more directly with the body. It can never be divorced for it is always contained in the body and hence totally inseparable (3). In another part, Aristotle views the soul of all human, as having nutritive value, can guide, initiate, and nourish most basic human functions. These functions include food digestion and absorption, growth and reproduction of its kind. He further acknowledges that human possess a rational soul that allows thinking and representation which is uniquely from animals and plants (23-24). Undeniably, Aristotle provides extensive definitions of the soul. However what concluded his entire is the description of the soul as the source life of living body. Concept of the soul. Aristotle’s concept of the soul rests significantly on three major functions. First one is the reproduction of which he explains growth and nutrition. Second is the movement aspect, where again Aristotle combines locomotion and perception of the body and soul, and third activity is intellect or aspect of thinking. As part of nutritive function having nutritive, Aristotle’s talks of how the soul can nourish most basic human functions. These functions include food digestion and absorption, growth and reproduction (Aristotle 22). From the three main functions, Aristotle draws us to different living things. He describes the soul by invoking not only humans, but also all animals as well as plants. For instance, he says that plants are also thought as living for they seem to possess the power to increase or decrease in spatial directions (19). According to him, anything that can grow, can increase its bulk and continues to grow as long as it has nutritive support (Aristotle 19). Criteria followed. In classifying living things into different categories, Aristotle retaliates that the soul is what supports life and so all living creatures possess a soul. He draws a criterion that classifies a soul into three, because from his point of view, and the living potential is dependent on what type of soul it possesses. He then categorized the first soul as vegetative or nutritive and is possessed by plants. This soul then facilitates growth, food digestion, and whole reproduction process (Aristotle 15). The second category is the sensitive soul and is held by animals. According to Aristotle, animals possess both vegetative and sensitive soul unlike plants which own only nutritive soul. In animals, the vegetative soul will facilitate growth whereas the sensitive soul enables stimuli response to the environment, pain, pleasure, and memory. The final category is a rational soul that is uniquely possessed by human being only. Aristotle adds that even though the rational soul exhibits the other two functions, it also permits thinking or rational thought (Aristotle 15). Part of Nagel and Aristotle’s account tend to differ at some instant according to how each has conceptualized the mind-body problem. From Nagel’s position, it is difficult and unimaginable for one to understand what an organism experiences from just one point of view (Nagel 9). What Nagel means is that, no one can claim to understand what an organism experiences by just assessing the physical outlook. Contrary to this account, Aristotle illustrates the mind as a component of the soul that acquires knowledge and understanding. Unlike Nagel, Aristotle objectively gives the mind some definition. He restates that possessing mind in human is similar as having any other sensory organs (Aristotle 52). Faculties. Aristotle’s account the knowledge about soul and mind contributes deeply to the advance of truth in general and the understanding. He states that if one looks around and considers our affections there seems to be no instance where the soul can act without the involvement of the body (Aristotle 3). He further states that the soul manifests its functions in what he calls faculties or parts, which in a way relate to stages of biological development. According to Aristotle, the faculties resemble arithmetic numbers in which the higher includes the lower. He then divides the faculties into classes. On the faculty of imagination, Aristotle disputes imagination as a kind of thinking, but rather a process that is contrary to knowledge for it does not invoke thinking or calculation (Aristotle 51). He further connects imagination with two events; appetite and mind, both of which are capable of invoking some movements. Through such approach, he defines mind as that which calculates the end and appetite as that which stimulates the mind to action (51). Since that which is last in thinking process is the start of action, Aristotle justifies that the two events form the source of movement. This is because as an object of appetite begins a movement, and the appetite becomes the stimulus. Such scenario is similar to that of imagination, for when imagination invokes a movement, it automatically involves object of appetite (51). In summarizing, and Aristotle reiterates that as much as an animal can exhibit appetite and self-movement, it is incapable of invoking appetite without imagination attribute (Aristotle 52). In drawing the meaning of the objects of sense, Aristotle covers three types of objects. The first two are highly noticeable and entails common understanding or what Aristotle calls our language whereas the third is a by-the-way. He further illustrates that the first is special as it is a special sight object, flavor of taste and sense of hearing. He calls it special because any other sense cannot suppose it, or neither is it prone to errors (Aristotle 27). He refers the second as common combination of senses such as emotions, movements, magnitude, figure, and rest. He attests that these are not strange for they are widespread to all senses (27). The third object of sense is a supplementary, and it actually modifies the special sense. For example, from the instantaneous sensation of white we are directed to know a person or object that is white (27). There are five primary senses. Among them, touch is the most elementary, hearing the most informative, and an ennobling sight. Aristotle notes that the taste is some sort of touch and a nutrient for touch unlike color and odor which he refers as innutritious for they neither grow nor decompose (Aristotle 55). Both touch and taste are, therefore, indispensable, and he attests that without them, no animal would exist. The rest of the senses support the sense of touch and for that course they are not owned by every animal but only those that are capable forward thrust. He adds that for such animals to survive, they must distinguish not only by direct contact but also at distance objects (54). In concluding, Aristotle reinstates that despite the sense of touch being peculiar, the other senses are also significant. Sense of sight enables animals in both air and water to see, and taste because of what is pleasing or painful. Hearing allows transfer of communication and finally a tongue to makes it possible for fellows to converse. Works cited Aristotle.,. On The Soul. Raleigh, N.C.: Alex Catalogue. Print. Nagel, Thomas. AOL Lifestream : Login. Members.aol.com. N.p., 1974. Web. 2 Nov. 2014. Read More