United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon - Assignment Example

Student’s Name Course Tutor’s Name Date: Law Assessment: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 1. What is/are the source(s) of authority for the establishment of UNIFIL in UNSCRs 425/426 (1978)? Does UNSCR 1701 (2006) alter this? The first source of authority for the establishment of UNIFIL in UNSCRs 425/426 would be the UN charter, which gives the Security Council the mandate and responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. Following the provisions of the UN Charter, the Security Council through resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) agreed to: back up Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon; re-establish international peace and security in the affected regions; and help the Lebanese government regain its authority in the area (UNIFIL n.pag.). The reason for citing the UN Charter as a source of authority is based on the understanding that it is the same Charter that indicates when and for what reasons the UN Security Council can take action in relation to threats or breaches to peace and acts of aggression. In Chapter VII, article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations, it is stated that: The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, the breach of peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. From the above, it is evident that the Security Council has the mandate to make recommendations and decide on the appropriate action to restore peace and security in affected regions. However, the Security Council is made of representatives from member countries, and how they vote determines whether the resolution will be adopted or not, hence this paper’s argument that the second source of authority in establishing UNIFIL was from Security Council’s member states. The UN member countries that voted for UNIFIL include France, the UK, USA, Bolivia, Canada, West Germany, Gabon, India, Kuwait, Mauritania, Nigeria and Venezuela. The USSR and Czechoslovakia abstained, while China was not a participant in the voting process. Considering that the Security Council needed the support of member countries to establish UNIFIL, it can also be argued that the twelve countries that voted for the proposal validated the Security Council’s mandate to establish UNIFIL. The US is particularly cited as having played a major role in the establishment of UNIFIL by sponsoring the initiative to establish it, and by so doing, was seen as protecting its fundamental interests in the Middle East (most especially in interest of the Cairo Accord – a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt) by trying to ensure safety for its allies (Murphy n.pag.). By Soviet Union (Russia) abstaining from voting, and by China not participating in the voting process, it is also clear that the two countries who may have had differing opinions regarding the necessity of UNIFIL, refrained from using their veto powers and by so doing, enabled the proposal to be adopted as a resolution. The UK and the US on the other hand arguably appear to have given the most support by voting for the proposals, as did the 10 other member countries. Under the UN Charter (article 27), decisions by Security Council on substantive matters must be voted for by nine out of the 15 UN Security Council member states. However, and despite receiving nine affirmative votes, the adoption of a proposal cannot take place if any of the UN Security Council permanent member states (i.e. China, France, UK, US, and Russia) veto against it. In consideration of the above discussed factors therefore, it appears that the source of authority for the establishment of UNIFIL was a combination of factors including the mandate given by the UN Security Council to form such an intervention vehicle in an attempt to protect international peace and security; the willingness of member countries in the UN security Council to vote for the UNIFIL formation proposal, and the decision by permanent member countries in the UN Security Council to either vote or abstain from the same. The latter category (most notably the USSR) especially played a critical role by choosing not to use its veto powers. Resolution 1701(2006) does indeed alter or modify UNIFIL by adding some mandate to the latter. In fact, the former has been described as “a larger UNIFIL” (Pressman 6). UNIFIL’s mandate under article IV of the UN Charter limited its activities to patrolling, observing and monitoring, and reporting its findings to the UN (UNIFIL n.pag). In the first mandate for example, UNIFIL was supposed to confirm the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon. In resolution 1701 (2006) however, UNIFIL has the extended mandate of monitoring the termination of hostilities and disarming groups residing between the Blue Line and Litani. Resolution 1701(2006) further allowed UNIFIL to increase its forces up to 15,000 troops. With the increased troops however came extra mandates and responsibilities. For example, UNIFIL forces are required to “accompany and support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they deploy throughout the South, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon” (UNIFIL 3). Resolution 1701 (2006) further requires UNIFIL to assist the Lebanese government to secure its borders, assist the LAF in disarming the people living between the Litani River and Blue Line, extend humanitarian assistance to civilians, and coordinate with the Israeli and Lebanese governments in order to obtain mutual agreements between the two parties. Resolution 1701(2006) also authorises UNIFIL to take all needful action for purposes of ensuring that the areas in which it operated are not used for any kind of hostile activities (Kneissl 6). In its extended mandate, the UNIFIL troops can use force to resist attempts meant to prevent it from accomplishing its mandate as given by the Security Council. It can also use force to protect UN personnel, installations, equipment and /or facilities, ensure the freedom of movement and security of humanitarian workers and UN personnel, and without prejudice protect the Lebanese civilian population (Kneissl 6). Overall therefore it appears that resolution 1701(2006) did alter resolutions 425/426 (1978) albeit for purposes of expanding UNIFIL’s mandate and discretion to conduct peace keeping missions in Lebanon. It is thus argued that post-2006 UNIFIL has managed to accomplish comparatively more progress in Lebanon than the pre-2006 UNIFIL, whose mandate was limited to the provisions of article IV of the UN Charter. 2. Did UNSCR 1701 enlarge the mandate of UNIFIL, or simply give greater precision to the existing mandate? Explain/justify your conclusions. UNSCR 1701 did not give greater precision to UNIFIL’s existing mandate; rather, it enlarged the mandate to cover issues that had not been addressed in UNSCRs 425 and 426 (1978). Initially, UNIFIL’s establishment was for purposes of: confirming “the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon; restore international peace and security; assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area” (Kneissl 5). UNSCR 1701(2006) however indicated that in addition to carrying out the initial mandate under resolutions 425 and 426, UNIFIL would carry out other duties discussed hereunder. The use of the term ‘in addition’ has significance in answering this question, because it only shows that the UN Security Council was giving greater mandate to UNIFIL, rather than just providing greater precision to an existing mandate. Some of the indicators that UNSCR 1701 (2006) was expanding UNIFIL’s mandate include its new role to “monitor the cessation of hostilities” as indicated in Murphy (n.pag.). While it is arguable that the aforementioned ‘new’ mandate just gave greater precision to the earlier requirement for UNIFIL to confirm that Israeli forces had indeed withdrawn from Lebanon, it is evident that monitoring is a more active role than confirming. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines the word ‘monitor’ as a transitive verb that means “to watch, keep track of, or check usually for a special purpose” (n.pag.). The same dictionary further defines the word ‘confirm’ as follows: “to give new assurance of the validity of: remove doubt about authoritative act or indisputable fact” (n.pag.). The definitions of the two terms are important in answering this question because while UNIFIL’s mandate under the 425/426 (1978) resolutions was to confirm (or give assurance to the UN) that Israeli forces were indeed withdrawing from Lebanon, the same forces stayed put. In other words, the UNIFIL forces could not fulfil their first mandate because the Israelis were simply not withdrawing (at least not until 2000). In the subsequent mandate given under resolution 1701(2006), UNIFIL was to monitor (i.e. keep track of) the end of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon. The latter mandate is more elaborate than just confirming whether indeed Israeli forces were still in Lebanon. Rather, it would involve keeping track of other types of resistance, opposition, and conflict both in thought and in principle. The requirement for UNIFIL to “accompany and support” Lebanese forces as indicated by (Kneissl 5) could also be interpreted as a more precise way of guiding UNIFIL forces on their earlier mandate to confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. Arguably however, it is evident that there were other possible ways that UNIFIL forces could meet the confirmation requirement without necessarily accompanying and supporting the Lebanese armed forces. As such, it is clear that the requirement to accompany and offer support to forces associated with the host country was an enlargement of the earlier mandate that UNIFIL had. The requirement for UNIFIL to coordinate its activities (i.e. when accompanying and supporting the Lebanese forces and as it monitored the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon) with both the Israeli and Lebanese governments can also be viewed as having afforded it greater precision in restoring international peace and security as provided for in resolutions 425 and 426 (1978). However, and despite the fact that support from the two countries was a requirement in setting up UNIFIL, Israel had refused to offer its support to the UN-led forces since 1978. When it eventually withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, Israel had shown mixed signals regarding its recognition of the UNIFIL mandate. For example, the Israeli government (just like their Lebanese counterparts) had acknowledged that they would respect the withdrawal line that would be established by the UN and by extension by UNIFIL (Kneissl 8). In reality however, it would appear that the Israeli side does not acknowledge the same withdrawal line. It was perhaps in recognition of the different dynamics and Israel’s hard stance that UNIFIL was then required to coordinate activities with the two countries after Israel had become a willing player following resolution 1701(2006). Evidently, this was a new mandate given in the full knowledge that both Israel and Lebanon would be willing to cooperate with UNIFIL subsequent to resolution 1701(2006). The requirement for UNIFIL to extend humanitarian aid to civilian populations and assist in the “voluntary and safe return of displaced persons” as indicated by (Kneissl 6) was not an entirely new mandate especially in practice. Though not clearly stated in the 1978 resolutions, UNIFIL had in the pre-2006 Lebanon provided humanitarian assistance to local populations. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 for example, UNIFIL’s roles were limited to offering humanitarian assistance and protection to civilians. Other responsibilities given to UNIFIL under the 1701(2006) resolution include the requirement for it (UNIFIL) to “assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL deployed in the area” (Kneissl 6). UNIFIL was also required to assist the Lebanese government in securing its borders, especially for purposes of regulating and/or stopping the entry of illegal weapons or arms. While the aforementioned two responsibilities can be viewed as giving greater precision to the earlier mandate requiring the UNIFIL to help the Lebanese government recapture its authority in the area, it is the authorisation to UNIFIL to use all necessary action that arguably illustrates a clear case of its mandate being enlarged. As indicated elsewhere in this paper, UNIFIL’s initial mandate was to observe, monitor and report its observations to the UN. Such were passive roles by any means. By authorising UNIFIL to take all needful actions to prevent hostile activities in its areas of operation however, it was clear that the mandate was being enlarged from just a passive role to a more active and defensive role of enhancing peace and security in the region. Overall however, it is important to note that the discretion to interpret UNIFIL’s mandate lies solely with the UN Security Council. This means that UNIFIL is likely to act in accordance with directives and interpretations provided by the UNSC, and this does not necessarily have to be in line with interpretations provided by scholars and analysts. 3. Detail the ‘use of force’ instructions you would have drafted for the Force Commander under UNSCRs 425 / 426 (1978), explaining/justifying your choices a. Individual and unit self-defence One of the critical roles of a military commander is protecting his troops. Additionally, the military personnel in a troop must be informed of the right and obligation to use lethal and/or non-lethal force for purposes of defending self and one’s unit against real or imminent attack (Trumbull 121). Notably however, the UN Charter does not specifically address the rules of using force in troops as a form of self-defence. The closest the Charter has come to addressing the use of force although on an international level is in article 51, where it is stated that “nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security” (quoted in Trumbull 122). Based on this insight, and supposing I was in charge of drafting the ‘use of force’ instructions for the UNIFIL troops under UNSCRs 425/426 (1978), hereunder is what I would indicate: 1. Unit self-defence should always be “an inherent right and not dependent or contingent on a mandate or mission” (Trumbull 122). This instruction would be in line with internationally accepted logic that military units (and commanders) have a right and an obligation to self-defence when faced with a demonstrated hostile intent or an actual hostile act. A hostile act is defined as an attack, while hostile intent is defined as the threat or possibility of an imminent attack (Trumbull 122). 2. Use of force should only be utilised where more subtle approaches are deemed not effective enough to subdue the attacker. Additionally, use of force should only be utilised where the danger is real and/or imminent and as long as the hostile act or intent continues, and in the same proportion of the hostile act or intent. In this case, lethal force should only be used where it is absolutely necessary, and where no other form of force can be used to handle a hostile act or intent. The above instruction is based on the logic that deadly force should only be used “when all lesser means have failed or cannot be reasonably employed” (Trumbull 125). In other words, and as argued by Tsagourias, only when necessary should ‘use of force’ occur (13). Ideally, and if the situation permits, the attackers (or the hostile forces) should be warned and given a chance to withdraw before deadly before can be used. 3. In respect to (1) and (2) above, use of force should only be practiced if there is a: “Threat to peace, a breach of peace or an act of aggression” as indicated in the UN Charter (article 39), but only when persuasion and /or negotiation has failed. The third instruction above is meant to give precision to the second instructions by detailing the circumstances that would lead to the use of force. Again however and like (2) above, the attacker should ideally get a chance to withdraw or retract their advances before the UNIFIL troops can use force against them. b. Use of force to enforce the mandate UNIFIL’s mandate was given by the UN Security Council and revolved around three focus areas namely: confirming “the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon”; restoring “international peace and security”; and assisting “the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area” (Kneissl 5). Ideally, the use of force would mean UNIFIL applying force to restore international peace and security and assisting the Lebanese government in re-acquiring authority within its borders. Realistically though and as indicated by Findlay, UN peace keeping forces cannot become part of the conflict, because if they did, their integrity as peacekeeping forces would be lost (21). With such considerations in mind, hereunder are the instructions I would have drafted for UNIFIL in regard to the use of force in relation to enforcing their mandate. 1. Only employ the use of force if there is an attempt by other parties to remove troops from where they occupy. Specifically, a) UNIFIL troops shall use force only in self-defence (i.e. when the aggressor uses force first, and/or when an armed person, or group with an intention of attacking a UNIFIL post, patrol contingent or officer threatens to do so). b) When an aggressor is seen loitering suspiciously or stealing/pilfering in the proximity of UNIFIL installations. However, officers should try to use non-lethal force first (by apprehending such a person), and only use lethal force as a last resort (and especially if such a person is armed and deemed dangerous to the safety of the UNIFIL personnel). The above instruction would be in line with the standard UN peacekeeping instructions that allow the use of force where there is an attempt to forcefully evacuate troops from areas where they occupy as indicated by Findlay (35). 2. Use force to resist forceful disarmament by an aggressor 3. Use force to resist forceful attempts to prevent officers from carrying out their mandate as indicated by their force commanders. However, officers should avoid any unnecessary exposure to harm and should try negotiation or persuasion tactics before using force. Citing Antonia and Chayes, Findlay notes that an expanded use of force mandate as indicated in (2) and (3) above would permit UN peacekeeping forces to “adopt a more aggressive posture, when necessary, without moving to large scale combat” (93). 4. In all cases, UNIFIL officers will use only the amount of force warranted by individual situations. The above instruction is made in line with the “principle of minimum force” logic as indicated by Findlay (42). This principle is related to the need for UN peacekeeping forces to remain impartial and to gain the trust and support on either side of the conflicting parties, and in UNIFIL’s case, Lebanon and Israel. Overall the instructions of the use of force to enforce UNIFIL as indicated above have been drafted with the recognition that it would be inappropriate or even insane for UNIFIL troops to set about using force against Israelis or even Lebanese (and in the process killing some of them) in the name of restoring international peace and security. Works Cited Charter of the United Nations. “Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of Peace, and Acts of Aggression.” N.d. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml. 27 Feb. 2013. Findlay, Trevor. The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. New York: OUP, 2002. Print. Kneissl, Karin. “Analysis on UNIFIL II Three Years After- UNIFIL: How and Until When Will the “Interim” Continue?” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung November (2009):1-32. Merriam-Webster.com/dictionary. “Monitor/ Confirm”. 2013. Murphy, Ray. “The Political and Diplomatic Background to the Establishment of UNIFIL in Lebanon and the UITAF and UNOSOM Missions in Somalia.” The Journal of Conflict Studies xxii.2 (2002):n. pag. http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/392/628#a13. 26 Feb. 2013. Pressman, Jeremy. The United States and the Israel-Hezbollah War. Middle East Brief. 1-8. 26 Feb. 2013. http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB13.pdf. 2008. Trumbull, Charles P. “The Basis of Unit Self-Defence and Implications for the Use of Force.” Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 23.121(2011): 121-148. UNIFIL. “UNIFIL Mandate”. n.d. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/mandate.shtml. 27 Feb. 2013. Read More