Methods Safety and Risk Management Control Hazards - Term Paper Example

OHS METHODS _SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMNT_CONTROL HAZARDS Name of the Student: Name of the Instructor: Name of the course: Code of the course: Submission date: OHS METHODS _SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMNT_CONTROL HAZARDS Introduction Risk management can be perceived as the process of reducing and controlling the detrimental effects posed by adverse risks which can be confronting an organization. In this regard, risks can be viewed as encompassing all the aspects of organizational losses which are accidental in nature which might culminate in the wastage of the society’s, organization’s or environmental assets (Zimolong & Elke, 2006, p. 3). Risk management has been identified as a fundamental cog in ensuring occupational health and safety. This is based on the fact that it serves as a robust mechanism in the identification as well as assessment of risks and eventually culminates in applicable action aimed at the minimization or total elimination of such risks (Fiedler, 2004, p. 1). Risk management is thus an integral factor to the success of occupational health and safety at the organizational level which calls for a holistic approach to ensure maximum compliance with the set principles and implemented policies. Diverse organizations use different approaches in addressing the effects posed by risks confronting their operations. One of these approaches is the use of the generic model AS/NZS 4360/ ISO 31000 while others opt for approaches tailored to suit the peculiar phenomenon in their organizations. Different rationales are usually forwarded to justify the utility of either of these approaches at the organizational level Against this background, this paper is a profound effort to explore the applicability of the generic model AS/NZS 4360/ ISO 31000 in implementing a risk management approach aimed at efficient assessment of fire risks and control of hazards at the organizational level in a case study organization primarily engaged chemicals manufacturing. In addition, it will analyze the feasibility of using more focused OHS specific method in this organization. Lastly, the paper will demonstrate the rationale of preferring one of the above approaches after considering its positive and negative elements. The generic model; an overview ISO 31000can be perceived as a new standard for risk management that surpasses AS/NZS 4360:2004. It is thus founded upon the processes and practices contained in the preceding standard. The rationale behind this latter standard for risk management was determined by Standards Australia (2009, p. 4) which cited that despite the fact that the practices of risk management have evolved overtime and within diverse economic sectors aimed at addressing different needs, the adoption of processes which are consistent and within a comprehensive structure assists in guaranteeing the risks are managed coherently, effectively and efficiently across organizations. In this regard, the general approach outlined in ISO31000:2009 forwards the guidelines and principles geared towards the management of any form of risk in a transparent, systematic and credible manner within whichever context and scope (Standards Australia, 2009, p. 4). The following diagram shows a typical risk management process taken from AS/NZS 4360:2004 Figure 1.0: Typical risk management process taken from AS/NZS 4360:2004 Source: Barber, R, 2003b. Nonetheless, despite the justifications given to justify the utility of these generic models in the risk management processes of different organizations, it is imperative to be cognizant of the fact that they are endowed with several shortcomings in the risk management processes of various firms. Firstly, it is worth noting that these generic models, for instance, AS/NZS 4360 are not usually implemented to accommodate the processes of risk evaluation (Yusuff, 2004, p. 8). However, the latter process of risk assessment is fundamental in the course of implementing the occupational, health and safety programs in different firms aimed at assessing the reduction of certain risks in that firm. According to Aaronson (2010, p. 1), the process of risk assessment is one of the most paramount tenets of ideal health and safety practice in any firm. This is based on the fact that it permits organizations to engage in profound identification of the areas in their specific institutions where the employees are enormously exposed to risks and thus swiftly and effectively develop and execute strategies which are aimed at the mitigation of these risks in the institution. This makes risk evaluation a central legal obligation to an organization, regardless of its undertakings. In addition, evaluation of risks poses benefits to an organization in the sense that it ensures that the firm has adequately reduced the probability of harm to the human resource to the lowest practicable level as stipulated by the law in specific states. It is imperative to be cognizant of the fact that human resource which is generally unprotected is expensive to maintain as a result of escalated insurance premiums, extended loss of output as well as costs incurred in court processes in case of probable litigations (Aaronson, 2010, p. 1). Thus, the rudimentary fact that these generic models are not usually implemented to accommodate the processes of risk evaluation poses detrimental effects to a firm which utilizes them in the processes of risk management. Secondly, it has been pointed out that one of the major weaknesses of AS/NZS 4360 is that this model is structured as a sub-system which is self-contained. This is based on the fact that its operations can go on without its integration into the broader mechanism which is central in propelling the organization (Barber, 2003b, p. 2). Thus, this deficiency of integration insinuates that the outcomes from the risk management process are in most cases determined by robust external systems or the requirements at the organizational level (Barber, 2003b, p. 2). This is best epitomized by the fact that managers in an organization are bound to be proactive in risk management in case regular risk reports are required. In addition, they can generate risk registers as well as conducting risk evaluation solely because they are required to do so for particular indicators, for instance, when presenting a business case. Thus, the mare existence of a risk management plan does not influence the efforts invested in risk management in an organization. On the other hand, a generic model like AS/NZS 4360 fails in dealing efficiently with ‘soft’ risks, that is, those which are problematic in absolute definition or quantification (Barber, 2003b, p. 2). It is worth noting that there is a requirement under AS/NZS 4360 to identify and document all the risks in the organization. This is followed by effective analysis, evaluation and treatment of these risks. Nonetheless, this process is viable for the risks which does not have high sensitivity, but fails to be effective for the risks in an organization which are unlikely to be written down based on their human sensitivity nature, for instance, a risk which is triggered by the misbehaviors of the manager in the institution. This fact is supported by Barber (2003a, p. 3) who revealed that there are risks which are difficult in registering, for instance, risks which are produced internally in an organization which would consequently be ‘invisible’. Failure to document these risks means that they cannot be effectively managed the processes underpinned in AS/NZS 4360. In addition, Barber (2003b, p. 2) determined that there is usually a heavy reliance on simplistic processes and methods of classification and representation under these generic models. This is best epitomized by the way AS/NZS 4360 outlines the documentation, classification and representation of individual risks. In this regard, each risk is allocated a risk rating which depends solely on factors of probability and impact. Nonetheless, there are many other imperative dimensions to a risk, for instance urgency which determines how soon a decision must be arrived at by the organization on the solution of the risk as well as the most probable cost of the options available for the risk treatment processes. However, despite the fundamental nature of these factors, they do not influence or play any part in the process of risk rating under AS/NZS 4360. Thus, a risk manager who solely relies on this generic model is prone to making less than the required deliberation on which risks to be addresses first and the mechanisms in treating them. The last weakness associated with the generic model is its failure to discuss the problem posed by interrelation of risks. This is based on the fact that most risks in majority of complex institutions tend to be interrelated. This is whereby the impacts or probability of one risk is directly linked to the impacts or probability of another risk (Barber, 2003b, p. 3). This is best exemplified by the risk of shortage of funds in an externally funded OHS program. This risk is closely and directly linked to the risk of schedule extension and if the schedule extends longer than planned, this will mean that the costs will increase and surpass the initial budget of the OHS program in the organization. However, this problem of risk interrelation is not explicitly discussed in the generic models which make them less preferred in such projects. Based on the above reasons, it is apparent that I would less prefer using generic model AS/NZS 4360 or ISO31000 if called to implement a risk management approach geared towards efficient assessment of risks and controlling of hazards) in the firm which is primarily engaged in chemical production. In the place of the generic models AS/NZS 4360 or ISO31000, I would prefer to put into utility a more focused OHS specific method like Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA). This is based on the fact that fire and explosions have been a major impediment confronting chemicals production facilities around the globe, making this phenomenon a major concern in OHS (CFPA Europe, 2008, p. 5). This is paramount in covering some of the loopholes posed by using the generic model in OHS in the organization. Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) According to the Institute of Healthcare Improvement (2004, p. 1), FMEA can be perceived as a proactive and systematic mechanism for assessing a particular process aimed at identifying how it might succumb to failure and eventually evaluate the relative effect of different failures. This is geared towards the identification of the segments in this process that might need to be altered or completely changed in order to minimize or completely eradicate fire risks in the case study organizations. In its most basic sense, FMEA entails several steps. According to University of Western Sydney (2004, p. 104), there are seven primary steps in FMEA. These are outlined in the subsequent section Identification of the probable failures in the process Identification of the potential effects of those failure modes Ascertain the criticality of the failure mode Prioritization of the failure modes which is founded on the criticality assessment Distinguish the most probable causes of the failure modes with high priority Engage in redesigning the processes at each level in order to completely curtail the failure mode or alternatively provide processes controls aimed at detecting the failure modes prior to their occurrence. Execute and test the new control process or design. There are several merits associated with the application of FMEA in the OHS procedures of controlling fire risks in a chemical manufacturing organization as opposed to the generic model like AS/NZS 4360based on several reasons. Firstly, FMEA system is compactly integrated in the chemical production process. This is based on the fact that it puts into consideration each item which is involved in the entire system. In this regard, there is a tendency for the analysis to be made based on opinion of experts as well as historical information on items which have some similarity in regard to how each item or subsystem can fail in the fulfillment of the intended function (Alvanitoyannis & Varzakas, 2008, p. 414). Thus, it has a robust integration to the entire chemical production process and can ensure fire safety. Unlike the generic model like AS/NZS 4360 whose operations can go on without its integration into the broader mechanism which is central in propelling the organization, FMEA system is to a great extent integrated into the operations of the chemical producing organization. The fire risks in the chemical production process can emanate from the exposure of the chemicals to live electrical equipment and equipment failure among others (Avelar, 2007, p. 3). . In the aim to adhere with the OHS standards, the risks are assessed in every phase of production and operations put into place to treat these risks. Thus, the integration of this system in the production process plays a central role in providing efficiency in the OHS efforts in the firm. Secondly, FMEA system uses different dimensions in rating risks as opposed to solely depending on impact and probability of the risks posed by the end result. This is where the dimensions of prioritization and urgency are used in rating risks. This is best epitomized whereby in case a certain chemical is identified of causing high fire risks in the firm and thus becomes a primary priority, it is immediately eliminated or substituted from the chemical production process. This serves as a major approach in mitigating the fire risks in different processes. In addition, unlike the use of AS/NZS 4360 whereby there is limited cooperation and coordination among the implementers in the firm, there is extensive cooperation in the execution of the FMEA system in a firm from different departments in the organization as well as other stakeholders to the firm. This is exemplified whereby cooperation between the overall industry, various departments, environmental stakeholders, law enforcement authorities among other responsible bodies. Consequently, it is possible to adjust the implementation of the FMEA system so as to suit the dynamics in the chemical production process brought about by technological changes as well as environmental concerns over the use of some chemicals in different industrial processes. This entails input from various organizational departments in the realms of chemical production. FMEA has also been cited as being advantageous based on the fact that it allows extended effectiveness in government oversight. This is primarily founded on its record-keeping tenet which is key in allowing the investigators to have a comprehensive insight into the extent to which the chemical producing firm is compliant to the chemical processing fire safety laws over a long period of time as opposed to a particular period. This fact is supported by National Semiconductor Corporation (2011, p. 1) which cited that FMEA provides a clear documentation of the processes enhancement as a result of the implemented collective actions. Thus, this prompts the management in the chemical processing firms to be more proactive in ensuring compliance with the policies set to promote compliance with the fire safety standards in the country. On the other hand, FMEA system ensures that there is more effectiveness in resource use as well as more timely response to risks threatening the fire safety in the chemical producing firms. This is whereby the assessment and analysis of risks in every stage of production permits early realization and treatment of risks before their cause massive damage (TM 5-698-4, 2006, p. 17). Thus, this is imperative in cutting down the costs associated with probable litigation by the affected persons, increased insurance premiums as a result of injured employees as well as reduced output of the firm. This is contrary to the AS/NZS 4360 which is not usually implemented to accommodate the processes of risk evaluation. In terms of timely response to risks, FMEA system permits early recognition of fire risks which gives the organization ample time to make applicable decisions to curtail the detrimental effects posed by this risk, for instance, fire detectors like fire alarms in the firm. In this sense, there is often swift action from the management as well as the employees to mitigate these impacts which gives this approach an upper hand in risk management. FMEA system approach is also endowed with an ideal mechanism for dissemination of OHS training to the employees, the training of personnel in the institution, governmental agencies as embedded in the FMEA principles and applications as well as elevating the level of consumer awareness plays an integral role in the efficient and effective implementation of FMEA in an organization. This concept of training the employees is vital based on the sense that it results in the avoidance of many injuries in the job set-up. This is based on the fact that the employees are adequately equipped with information on how to avoid the outbreak of fire in the organization. In addition, these trainings are ideal channels for equipping the employees with information on how to respond in case of a fire. Moreover, training is integral in ensuring compliance based on the fact that it guides the responsible officers in the recognition of actions which ought to be taken aimed at ensuring that OHS obligations are met as well as repercussions of non-compliance. In addition, it identifies and describes the role of each stakeholder in these efforts, thus limiting instances of role duplication. On the other hand, the employees are enlightened on the other diverse fire related hazards in the workplace and how to avoid them. The importance of training of the employees is embedded in the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 which necessitates that all the employees in the organization be trained on aspects like use of personal protective equipment, safe working procedures, compliance prerequisites and probable hazards in their daily work (Kim, 2004, p. 206). Monitoring procedures as embedded in FMEA plays a vital role in tracking the progress of the OHS programs initiated at the organization. This is integral in making adjustments to these programs based on the periodic monitoring processes. In this regard, monitoring becomes a robust mechanism of ensuring that the OHS programs primed in the organization are achieving the desired targets in reduction of fire incidents as well as the impact of these OHS programs on the chemical-related fire trends overtime. On the other hand, monitoring has a direct link with compliance. This monitoring and reviewing of compliance issues can be done through robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms instituted in the organization which plays a central role in informing the policy making process (UNICEF, 2004, p. 8). Lastly, the process of record-keeping as embedded in FMEA is fundamental for the future risk management of the organization. This is based on the fact that it ensures that the ideal processes in the mitigation of risks are properly documented and these interventions can be applicable in the future of the firm. Nonetheless, despite all the merits associated with FMEA, there are negative elements associated with the application of this system in an organization. Firstly, the setting up of this system in an organization can be extremely time-consuming based on the enormous logistics embedded there in. This can be perceived in terms of establishing the monitoring procedures, instituting collective action as well as establishing procedures for record-keeping and documentation. In this regard, much time can be wasted on the process of setting up the logistics associated with this system and blur the focus on the chemical production process by both the management as well as the employees. This is opposed to the generic model which requires lesser time to implement. Secondly, the cost associated with implementing this particular system can be strenuous to the organization, mostly if the firm does not have sound and concrete capital foundation. This is based on the fact that the cost of conducting the OHS trainings on fire safety can be costly in terms of hiring the training venue, remunerating the facilitators as well as the reduced output when the employees in the organization are preoccupied with the training process. This can greatly strain the resources of the firm. On the other hand, it can be extensively difficult to supervise all the employees as well as the all the processes in chemical production. Thus, the technicalities in implementing the system call for high exercise in the firm which can necessitate external consultation. Thus, this can extra costs to the organization as well as need for recruiting more human resource to facilitate the supervision process. In addition, in case of the need to run the applications for this system in computers, this might require elevated investments in software/hardware as well as external expertise by the chemical company. Thus, this can add toll on the overhead costs in the company which can be detrimental to the capital structure of the company which can go to the extreme of plunging the company into debts. Lastly, the utility of diverse FMEA systems in different companies poses an impediment in the efforts towards the standardization of the OHS procedures in different companies at the international level. The level of compliance in different companies can be difficult to assess but this is a minor challenge to the utility of FMEA in the chemical industry when juxtaposed with other disadvantages previously mentioned. In the efforts to overcome these impediments, it is fundamental for the chemical producing companies to engage and be part of developing and designing the educational software to be used during the implementation process of this system, engage small numbers of trainees in the OHS training programs to mitigate the effects of these programs on the production process as well as consciously invest in the number of reliable computers to run this application. Conclusion From the above discourse, it is apparent that there are different problems associated with the use of generic model AS/NZS 4360/ ISO 31000 in implementing a risk management approach aimed at efficient assessment of risks and control of hazards at the organizational level in the case study of a chemical producing company. This is founded on the major weaknesses associated with these models as expounded in the preceding section in this paper. Nonetheless, FMEA can find extensive utility in this organization based on diverse merits associated with it despite several shortcomings outlined in the latter section. References Aaronson , JA., 2010, ‘The Importance of Risk management in the Workplace’, retrieved 21 September 2012, . Alvanitoyannis, I & Varzakas, T., 2008, ‘Application of ISO 2200 and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) for Industrial Processing of Salmon: A case study’, Critical Review of Food Science and Nutrition, Vol. 48, pp. 411-429. Avelar, V., 2007, Mitigating fire risks in mission critical facilities, White paper 83, rev. 2, Schneider Electric, Rueil-Malmaison. Barber, R., 2003a, ‘Systemic Issues In Risk Management In Projects – Why The AS/NZS 4360 Approach Is Not Enough’, Paper for the AIPM National Conference 2003, Alice Springs, pp. 1-10. Barber, R, 2003b, ‘A Systems toolbox for Risk management’, published in the proceedings of the ANZSYS Conference Nov 2003, Monash, pp. 1-20. 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