European Union and the Bosman Rule - Research Paper Example

European Union and the Bosman Rule: A research essay Name of the Student: Name of the Instructor: Name of the course: Code of the course: Submission date: European Union and the Bosman Rule: A research essay Introduction Until recent times, there were stringent limits on the transfer of professional football players between European clubs. This was a founded on a rigid system that restricted the functions of free market based on the fact that there were regulations and rules which constrained the terms placed on such transfers.1 Nonetheless, there was a massive paradigm shift in 1990 when a Belgian player named Marc Bosman sued FC Liege, a Belgian club and eventually the UEFA for their continued denial for his transfer request to a French club. In his argument, the player asserted that the transfer rules and system of that time and the clause on nationality was incompatible and thus breached the 1957 Treaty of Rome as well as the free movement of labor principle. This was followed by a dramatic verdict by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which was made in 1995 which inferred that the transfer rules and regulations of the time and the limitations on the overall sum of players from foreign countries at any given time in a team were contradicting the article 48 entrenched in the Treaty of Rome aforementioned. This was founded on the argument that soccer at the professional level should be perceived as an economic undertaking and thus under direct governance of the European Union Law.2 Most of the commentators of the time cited this as the most controversial discourse in the realm of sports, attracting antagonistic debates among scholars and everybody else in the sporting jurisdiction.3However, it is imperative to be cognizant of the fact that this ruling and its aftershock played an integral role in permitting free movement of professional soccer players between clubs in the European Union.4This fact is supported by Nuffel who cited that it’s the first judgment in the sporting realm that received extensive coverage both in the legal and none legal circles.5 Against this backdrop, this paper is a profound effort to explore the discourse on the European Union and the Bosman rule. It is imperative to instigate this analysis by focusing on the nature of rules and regulations that governed professional soccer in the European Union prior to this famous rule. Before the Bosman Rule It is imperative to note that the European Union is an outcome of the political and economic regional integration having 27 member states. This results in the formulation and execution of policies and laws whose jurisdiction is above the national laws of individual states.6Before the Bosman case, the novel transfer regulations by FIFA allowed the creation of individual laws by each confederation at continental level under the wider umbrella of the FIFA regulations on transfers. Against this background, the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) capitalized on this right and enforced its own transfer rules on the associations at the national level under its jurisdiction.7 There are two primary disputes which arose from this reality. Firstly, it has been pointed out that in majority of the cases involving trading between clubs, there was no necessity of official rules, unless in peculiar cases when no formidable agreement was arrived at. In situations where the clubs involved in the transfer failed to agree, then UEFA was permitted to undertake an intervention and declare a fee that the new club was bound to pay if at all it wanted to acquire the player. This fee majorly determined based on the gross income that the player in question earned as well as the age of the player. In a situation whereby the clubs failed to accept the verdict by UEFA, then the player still officially remained and belonged to the old club.8Thus, majority of the cases resulted in most clubs demanding for a transfer fee that was a far above the cost of developing and training the player. This was perceived as major source revenue for the old club but on the contrary, a source of distress for the new one. The second regulation that became a major source of dispute was what was colloquially referred to as the ‘3+2’ rule. This rule obliged the national associations to restrain the number of foreign players on any particular team in the course of first division matches to three players from foreign countries and two players who were ‘assimilated’.9 It is also worth noting that the FIFA regulations at that time also stipulated that a transfer at the international level could only materialize if ‘the previous national association released a certificate of transfer conceding that all the financial liabilities which includes but not limited to any transfer fee has been settled’.10Against this background, a player would not be eligible for a successful transfer in a case whereby the national association that was mandated with the role of governing the club declined to issue the certificate or intentionally withheld it. This regulation was a major impediment for the players’ careers choices and in turn yielded enormous power to the clubs as well as the associations over the players. All these were major points of dispute in regard to the laws governing professional soccer in the European Union before the Bosman case in 1995. Nonetheless, prior to exploring this case and its eventual corollaries on the practices revolving around professional soccer, it is imperative to briefly understand some of the cases that shaped the evolution of sporting laws and laid a foundation for the Bosman Law. Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale The plaintiffs in this case were two professional athletes in the pacemaker race sport. The basic set-up of this sport was that it entails two imperative individuals who are the pacemaker and the biker. Nonetheless, they perceived a regulatory provision of the International Cycling Union (UCI) as discriminatory11based on the fact that it required the pacemakers to be of similar nationality as the cyclists in the team.12 In this particular case, the ECJ made a determination that sport only becomes subject to the laws of the European Community if it is deemed ‘an economic undertakinginside the meaning of Article 2 of the Rome Treaty (1957).13However, one of the chief questions in this case was whether those provisions were directly applicable to private parties.14 Despite the fact that the drivers later withdrew this case in the last minute and the European Court of Justice was not incapacitated with enforcing a final verdict, the rules for these two were changed and from then they were permitted and were at liberty to choose the biker they preferred in disregard of the nationality.15Most commentators have argued that if the last ruling would have been made, even larger changes in regard to the sporting laws would have been realized as a result of this highly charged case. Nonetheless, the viability of this presumption remains debatable. The case of Dona vs. Montero Barely two years after the termination of the Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale case, 1976 saw the instigation of a legal dispute between the president of a certain Italian soccer cluband an Italian talent scout. When this case was brought forward, the rules and regulations of the Italian Football Association at that time specified that only the players whose affiliations were in that particular federation were permitted to participate in matches both at semi-professional and professional levels. In this capacity, the affiliation was principally merely open to players who had an Italian nationality.16 This case was seemingly interesting based on the fact that it had a similar foundation with the Bosman case. This is because the scout sued the Italian league with the motive of allowing more foreign players to participate in each team at both levels mentioned above.17Another peculiar aspect of this case is that the court was in support of more players from foreign countries were being permitted to play in each league. As previously mentioned, there was a limitation at that time that only two foreign players would be permitted to hold a contract in a team. Nonetheless, the court did not arrive at an absolute and binding verdict for the leagues, but instead mandated the UEFA with the role of finding new rules that would permit and facilitate the trickling in of more foreign players in different leagues and be guaranteed of participation. However, a dialogue between the sports clubsand the European Commission in 1978 resulted in the agreement between the teams on the first compromise on the limitation of players. Eventually, the clubs arrived at a consensus that every team was allowed to sign as many players from foreign countries as it wished but could only put in the field three of those at the same time. The Bosman rule This case posed massive impacts on the transfer regulations and the limitation on foreign players among other reformations. It has been pointed out that with the completion of the Bosman case, there were major impediments which confronted the sports authority based on the fact that the widely acknowledged and embraced autonomy and self-regulation of the sports industry was at risk.18 This case has attracted much interest from diverse scholars from different fields of study, for instance, economists like Feess & Muehlheusser 200319, Tervio, 200520and sociologists like Platts.21One of the significant economic studied that was conducted in relation to this case, and was endowed with data on both contract length and wages was by Feess, Frick and Muehlheisser (2004)22 which revealed that among other things, the Bosman verdict can be credited for leading to longer contracts but on the other hand, had no major effect on the post-transfer wages. Nonetheless, it is fundamental to gain some brief background of this case in order to comprehensively understand its preconditions and eventual impacts on the European Union socio-economic and legal realities. Majority of scholarly works have documented the fact that Jean-Marc Bosman was a 2nd player division player based in Belgium and his club RC Liege prevented and blocked his intended transfer to a French club (US Dunkerque ) after his contract had expired. However, these two clubs failed to reach an agreement on a transfer fee since RC Liege was not convinced that the new club was in a position to pay the transfer fee. In this regard, many proponents have argued that the chief objective of blocking this transfer and declining to issue the transfer certificate in accordance with the FIFA regulations for international transfers was based on the fact that the old club wanted to still receive the transfer fee, despite the player’s contract coming to an end and also, it had little interest in keeping the player. It is worth noting that Bosman was entitled to 120,000 Belgian Francs per month and when the original contract was over, RC Liege extended his contract by one season. However, the club lessened his salary to the minimum acceptable monthly salary of 30,000 Belgian Francs. Bosman declined this proposal and was subsequently put on a compulsory transfer list before entering into the free transfer period.6 Therefore, despite the willingness by US Dunkerque to sign Bosman, he was eventually left without having any contract for the subsequent season and to worsen the case, he was suspended for the whole of the subsequent seasonby RC Liege.13 This culminated in a legal case which ECJ ruled in favor of Bosman in 1995. This propelled football to the height of agenda in the European Union23drawing antagonistic perspectives for and against the ruling with majority of the reactions being negative.24Scholars like Oates (2001)25 and Groenendjk (2003)26 among others felt that in cases of external spillover, there will be an increased tendency by the agents to lower the level of the training and other services that they offer based on the presumption that they will eventually benefit on the market, thus no inherent obligation to bear the burden of their faulty decision making in the process of players development. Tervio20 noted that this verdict by the European Court of Justice had two rudimentary effects. In regard to transfer fee, the clubs were prohibited from the collection of transfer fee after the contract of a player came to an end. This elimination of the transfer fee had both merits and demerits. Firstly, it accelerated the differences between the small clubs and the bigger, more established clubs, mostly in talents and economic sense. This is because the smaller clubs were no longer entitled to any form of compensation after releasing their star players in the now open European market. On the contrary, they had to compete with the bigger clubs which had a budget probably 15 times larger than theirs for players in the market.27 In addition, based on the fact that the transfer fee was initially regarded as a mechanism of redistributing wealth from the rich clubs who had the capacity to purchase these talented players to the more smaller clubs who despite having limited financial capacity, had immense potential in assisting these players to achieve drastic development and improvement, the new regulation meant that the smaller clubs were at heightened risk of losing their most talented players to the wealthier teams.28Nonetheless, this rule resulted in longer contracts for the players as the teams made profound efforts to shield themselves from jeopardizing their niche in the market as a result of heightened risk of losing their key players to the wealthier teams when their short-term contracts expired. The above fact is supported by a research cited in Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, et. al. which revealed that there was a drastic increase of the average contract length in the post-Bosman era which is best epitomized in the German Burdesliga which experienced an increase from 2.5 to above 3 years in terms of the average contract length. However, other evidence point to the fact that there was a sharp increase of turnover in the EU and there was also increased discrepancy of the players’ salaries in the first years of this ruling with the star players being able to translate the transfer fee into enormous salaries29 However, this judgment in regard to the transfer fee gave more freedom and power to the players, most of which had previously been amassed by the clubs and the national associations. As a result of this judgment, the players were endowed with the right of free transfer when their contracts came to an end, with the sole provision being that their transfer was from a club under the jurisdiction of one European Union football association to a different club, but also under the jurisdiction of another European Union football association.30 Nonetheless, the elimination of the transfer fee remains a major contributor to the dynamics in the contemporary sports market. This is evidenced by two notable studies by Carmichael and Thomas (1993)31 and Carmichael, Forrestand Simmons (1999)32, which have played an integral role in providing data on how the transfer fee is linked to the observable characteristics of the club as well as the performance of the players. The other effect of the Bosman rule was associated with the increased mobility of players across the European Union market. This is founded on the fact that this ruling played a vital role in providing clubs with the opportunity to absorb the services of as many foreign players from other states in the European Union as they so wished.2 Jordana noted that as a result of the Bosman rule, the talented and players with high potential from the seemingly smaller countries were now endowed with an opportunity to move into teams in the ‘Big 5’ leagues. This is best exemplified by the fact that in Germany, the Bundesliga which is the top league in the country had a gradual decrease of Germans playing in the league from around 70% in 1995 to less than 50% in a span of five years. The Bosman ruling has thus come to be perceived as the cradle of a system whereby there was an increased number of players playing for clubs outside the jurisdiction of their own countries.29 Nonetheless, it is prudent to note that there are still some limitations in regard to the number of foreign players from outside the European Union. Fort and Fizel cited a case in 1998 between Tibor Balong, a Hungarian player, UEFA, FIFA and the EU where the Bosman ruling was outspread to encompass all the players who worked within the jurisdiction of the European Economic Area (Countries from Eastern Europe being included) in disregard of their respective nationalities.28 This fact is supported by Taylor who determined that to a very great extent, the 1995 ruling on the Bosmancase has been perceived as being liable for the increased mobility of players or else the ‘internationalization of football in the European leagues and a new, more globalized system of mobility among players.33 Despite the fact that this has elevated the level of competition among clubs in the European Union, it has also been credited with increased quality erosion of players in the national teams of various countries in the EU, with many foreign players playing a major role in diverse leagues. Some of the proponents have argued that one of the best way to conceptualize this migration of players is through perceiving is as a transfer of the sporting labor from the periphery to the core in the economic set-up. One such interpretation revealed that the European core has been viewed as acting ‘as a magnet for (soccer labor) migrants from other parts of the globe34. In this regard, the impacts of the abolition of transfer fee for players whose contracts have ended and the increased number of players from foreigncountries in diverse leagues in the European Union (after the abolition of the ‘3+2’ rule have been perceived as the major outcomes of the Bosman rule. Nonetheless, it is an apparent fact that apart from the sporting laws, this rule also posed significant effects of the socio-economic as well as the political set-up of the European Union. Against this backdrop, this interrelation is explored in the subsequent section. European Union and the Bosman rule From a historical perspective, authorities in the football sector have argued that the feasibility of the traditional transfer system rests on the fact that it ensured economic viability of the smaller football clubs who earned their money through developing and nurturing players and later selling them to the bigger clubs. This ensures that there is proper circulation of money which eventually trickles down the league structure, through a self-sustaining mechanism of redistributing revenues from the wealthy to the poor within football. In addition, the proponents of the traditional transfer system argue that such fee act as a major motivating factor in encouraging all the teams to engage in seeking and development of talents and thus, the transfer fee can be viewed just as a ‘reward’ for such training and enterprise.35 Nonetheless, recent scholarly investigations have contradicted this presumption and characterized it as being intrinsically malformed. An example of this latter school of thought is Moorhouse who argued that there is very limited evidence to support the assertions mentioned above, in regard to the economic benefits of the traditional transfer system.36 There are also political implications of the Bosman rule in the European Union based on the fact that there is a tendency of politicizing regulatory policies and football regulations are not an exemption.23 Increased number of foreign players in other games in the EU Despite the fact that the Bosman case was purely in the realms of football, its short and long-term effects have spilt over to other sporting activities in the EU as a result of heightened players’ mobility due to limited restrictions. This fact is best epitomized by the fact that from the 1994-95 season to the 2001-02 season, there was a dramatic increase of the proportion of foreign players among other sporting activities in the EU. This is whereby in basketball, handball and hockey, the proportion of foreign players increased from 17.1% to 39%, 12.1%-40.1% and 10.2% to 59% respectively.37This figures from professional sports in the EU sharply contradicts the overall figure of foreign workforce in the region whereby on average, the EU-25 has barely 6.3% of foreign workers.38 This has been a major point of debate both in the political and sports realms, with major concerns being raised in regard to the sustainability of this trend. This is epitomized by the FIFA 6+5 regulation which culminates in direct discrimination of players. UEFA supports this rule by claiming that it is compatible with the European law in regard to nationality discrimination. Nonetheless, there are inherent doubts on whether this rule will withstand a challenge on its legality based on the treaty that established the EC.39 Trend towards social integration in the EU It has been pointed out that despite the fact that football was categorized as an economic activity under the Bosman ruling inside the sense of Article 2 of the Rome Treaty (1957) and thus considered under in the confines of the regulations of the EU, it is imperative to be cognizant of the fact that it also has social and cultural implications. In this regard, it goes beyond the economic issues and the institutions in the EU take part in regulating it in the process of upholding the European citizenship, thus landing in a realm that is more exclusive.40 In this regard, social aspects like cultural integration, mostly propelled by the increased role of the mass media in the promotion of sporting activities resulting in increased social integration between members of the EU and other countries in the global scale. Thus, through the liberalization of the sports market by the Bosman rule, the overall sports sector has become imperative in indirect contribution to societal welfare through the enhancement of the societal health, by promoting national pride and providing ‘free’ entertainment to the populations in the EU.41 Economic implications As previously mentioned, diverse studies have been conducted in relation to the economic impacts of the Bosman rule. This is epitomized by Simmons who determined that there has been substantial increment of the average contract length of the professional football players since the Bosman ruling.42 The economic aspect of soccer have also been explored by both analytical and empirical economists (see Szymanski and Kuypers (1999)43, Dobson and Goddard (2001)44, Clarke and Norman (1995)45 and Koning (2000)46) among others. However, it is worth noting that the economic implication of the Bosman rule in the EU has been subjected to diverse interpretations for instance, there was an argument that the Bosman rule had little impact on the salaries of players, transfer activity or investment into human capital and cited that the increase in salaries to the elevating television revenues. Nonetheless, the Bosman rule posed great impacts on the economic capacity of the European Union, which happened concurrently with a wider trend towards market liberalization. This fact is supported by Szymanski who determined that according to the European Commission’s estimates, the trade in activities which are related to sports now account for 3% of the overall world trade.47 On the other hand, the heightened level of global popularity of European football in the post-Bosman rule epoch has been perceived to have increased the level of sports tourism in Europe.48Against this backdrop, major football events in the European Union have in the recent decades attracted a lot of spectators from different parts of the world and in the process increasing the governmental revenue. Another economic implication in the post-Bosman rule has been the recent concern that the increased movement of the skilled labor is producing detrimental competition in tax, and in the process slowing down the growth of taxation in the EU. This phenomenon of tax competition in the EU has been subjected to antagonistic discourses, as best exemplified after the transfer the much publicized move in 2009 of Cristiano Ronaldo from Manchester United to Real Madrid aiming at benefiting from the commonly referred ‘Beckham tax law’ in Spain presenting a 24 percent flat rate and in the process evading the proclaimed establishment of a 50 percent top tax bracket in the United Kingdom.30 Increased trend towards Foreign Direct Investment in the EU It has been pointed out that recent evidence has pointed to the fact that economic integration at the regional and global level has provided a fundamental stimuli, not only in enhancing the level of commerce but also to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the EU.49 On the other hand, the transformations in the rhythms of integration, FDI as well as heightened globalization have been key in the minimization of the extent of independent fiscal policies in the EU.50 The basic impact of the Bosman rule in increasing the number of foreign players in the European Union played a major role in elevating the exposure of investment opportunities in this region, more than in the traditional system when there was limited sports liberalization. Moreover, the basic fact that foreign players can play in the clubs in these region has attracted the interest of investors, mostly in the sports sector. This has been principle in elevating the level of foreign direct investment in this region. The above phenomenon is best exemplified by the increased acquisition of clubs in the European Union by foreign owner, for instance, the acquisition of Manchester City by an investor from Abu Dhabi. Conclusion From the above discourse, it is apparent that the traditional transfer system was characterized by immense rigidity in regard to the transfer fee and buying of foreign players by the clubs in the European Union among other complications. Nonetheless, the Bosman rule which occurred in 1995 which attracted widespread criticism as well as credit played a major role in changing the ways in which football was regulated in this region. The effects of these changes later spilt-over to other sports. On the other hand, the analysis in the preceding sections has revealed that the Bosman rule in 1995 had massive implications on the social, economic, political and legal set-up of the European Union. This is in regard to increased number of foreign players in other games in this region, heightened trends towards social-cultural integration and increased FDI among other impacts. References Books Bogaert,Stefaan Van Den Practical Regulation of the Mobility of Sportsmen in the Eu Post Bosman (Kluwer Law International, 2005). Brownstone, Jordana, The Bosman Ruling: Impact of Player Mobility on FIFA Rankings (Haverford College, 2010). Gardiner, Simon et. al, Sports Law (Cavendish Publishing Ltd, 3rd ed., 2006) García, Borja, Playing ball: EU regulation of professional football since the Bosman ruling (European Policy Center, 2008) H, Meier Von Bosman zur Kollektivvereinbarung. Die Regulierung des Arbeitsmarktes für Profifußballer (Universität Presse Potsdam, 2004). INEA, Expert Opinion on the Compatibility of the “6+5 Rule” with European Community Law (Institute of European Affairs, 2008) Irina Ivanovna et. al. EC Internal Market Law: Relevant Cases of the European Court of Justice (Latvijas Universitate, 2008) N, Gronendijk, Fiscal federalism theory (CES/UT, 2003) Rodney, Fort and John Fizel, International sports economics comparisons (Praeger, 2004) S Dobson and J. Goddard, The Economics of Football (Cambridge University Press, 2001). S. Szymanski and T. Kuypers, Winners & Losers, The Business Strategy of Football (Viking, 1999). Texts/Articles Antonioni Peter and John Cubbin, ‘The Bosman Ruling and the Emergence of a Single Market in Soccer Talent’ (2002) 9(2) Journal of Law and Economics 158, 157-73 B Dabscheck, ‘Assaults on Soccer`s Compensation system: Europe and Australia compared’ (1996) 13(1) Sporting Traditions 83, 81-107 Bernd Frick, ‘The football players’ labour market: Empirical evidence from the major European leagues’ (2007) 54(3) Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 444, 422-446 Binder John and Murray Findlay, ‘The Effects of the Bosman Ruling on National and Club Teams in Europe’ (2011) 13(2) Journal of Sports Economics 107, 107-129 Discrimination Under the European Community Treaty’ (2009) 20(1) Marquette SportsLaw Review 183, 177-221 E Oates Wallace, ‘Fiscal Competition and European Union: contrasting perspectives’ (2001) 31(2-3) Regional Science and Urban Economics 135, 133-145 Eberhard Feess and Muehlheusser, Gerd, Transfer fee regulations in European football’ (2003) 47 European Economic Review, 645-668 Fiona Carmichael and Dennis Thomas, ‘Bargaining in the Transfer Market: Theory and Evidence’ (1993) 25(12) Applied Economics, 1467-1476 Fiona Carmichael, David Forrest and Robert Simmons, ‘The Labour Market in Association Football: Who Gets Transferred and For How Much? (1999) 51(2) Bulletin of Economic Research, 125-150 Freeburn Lloyd, ‘European Football's Home-Grown Players Rules and Nationality Robert Simmons, ‘Implications of the Bosman Ruling for Football Transfer Markets’ (1997) 17(3) Economic Affairs, 15, 13-18 H, Koning, R, ‘Balance in competition in Dutch soccer’ (2000) 49(3) The Statistician, 419–431. Szymanski, S, ‘Economics of sport: Introduction’ (2001) Economic Journal 111(469), 2, 1–3 Kranz Amikan Omer, ‘The Bosman Case: The Relationship Between European Union Law and the Transfer System in European Football’ (1999) 5 Columbia Journal of International Law 431, 431-435 Lembo Christina, ‘FIFA Transfer Regulations and UEFA Player Eligibility Rules: Major Changes in European Football and the Negative Effect on Minors’ (2011) 25 (1) Emory International Law Review 543, 540-585 M Papaloukas, ‘Sports law and the European Union’ (2007) 3(2) Sport Management International Journal, 40, 40-49 Nuffel Piet Van, ‘Case Law: Bosman’ (1996) 2 Colombia Journal of International Law, 345, 320-340 Papaloukas Marios, ‘The Sporting Exemption in European Case law’ (2010) 6(2) Sports Management International Journal 19, 19-27 R Clarke S and J.M. Norman, ‘Home ground advantage of individual clubs in English soccer’ (1995) 44(4) The Statistician, 509–521 Stefan Kesenne, ‘The Peculiar International Economics of Professional Football in Europe’ (2007) 54(3) Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 341, 338-339 Taylor Matthew, ‘Global Players? Football, Migration and Globalization, c. 1930-2000’ (2006) 31(1) Historical Social Research 20, 7-30 Tervio Marko, ‘Transfer fee regulation and player development’ (2005) 4(5) Journal of the European Economic Association, 957-987 Conference/Discussion papers Brenton Paul Francesca Di Mauro and Matthius Lucke, Economic Integration and FDI: An Empirical Analysis of Foreign Investment in the EU and in Central and Eastern Europe, Kiel Working paper 890 (1998) Croci, Osvaldo ‘Taking the Field: The EU and the Governance of European Football’ (Paper presented at the EASA-USA International Conference, Madison, Wisconsin, May 31-June 2, 2001) Eberhard Feess, Bernd Frick and Gerd Muehlheusser, Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees: Evidence from German Soccer, IZA discussion paper 1180 (2004) Jonathan Magee, ‘Historical Concepts of Football and Labour Migration in England’ (Paper presented at the 18th Conference of the British Society of Sports History, Eastbourne, April 1999) Lang Markus, Alexander Rathke and Marco Runkel, ‘The Economic Consequences of Foreigner Rules in National Sports Leagues, University of Zurich-Institute for Strategy and Business Economics Working Paper no. 103 (2010). Academic papers/Thesis F Miller, Free market football: The effects of the EC law on the professional football industry in Europe with specific reference to the restraint of trade (M.Phil. thesis, University of Coventry, 1993). Daniel Schmidt, The effects of the Bosman-case on the professional football leagues with special regard to the top-five leagues (Bachelors Thesis, University of Twente, 2007). Cases Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5047 Case 36/74, Walrave & Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale, (judgment) (1974) E.C.R. 1405 Others Allan Grant, Stewart Dunlop and Kim Swales, The Economic Impact of Regular Season Sporting Competitions: The Glasgow Old Firm Football Spectators as Sports Tourists (2007) . Bénassy-Quéré Agnès, Lionel Fontagné and Amina Lahrèche-Révil, Foreign Direct Investment and the Prospects for Tax Co-Ordination in Europe (2000) . Chaparro Marrio, The Bosman case and its Implication with European Citizenship (2006) . Haan Marco, Ruud H. Koning and Arjen van Witteloostuijn, Market Forces in European Soccer (2000) . Kleven Henrik Jacobsen et. al. Taxation and International Mobility of Superstars: Evidence from the European Football Market (2009) Mol Mirjam de, The Novel Approach of the CJEU on the Horizontal Direct Effect of the EU Principle of Non-Discrimination: (Unbridled) Expansionism of EU law? (2011) . Moorhouse H.F, The Economic Effects of the Traditional Transfer System in European Professional Football (1997) Platts Chris, The Bosman Ruling and its Unforeseen Consequences for English Professional Football Clubs: A Figurational Sociological Analysis (2006) . Rochefoucauld Estelle de La Collection of Sports-related Case-Law (2002) . Read More