GATT WTO System and Trade Liberalisation - Essay Example

Principal Means by which the GATT/WTO System Promotes or Achieves Trade Liberalisation and the Limitations on its Effectiveness Introduction There has been a growing acceptance of the GATT/WTO over the years in spite of its shortcomings. This is shown by the increase in the number of signatories to the GATT/WTO from 23 in 1947 when the GATT was signed to 99 by the time of the seventh Round and 177 countries during the Uruguay Round.1 Further, by July 1995 there were 128 signatories, and as of May 2008, 151 states were members of the WTO.2 More states have been negotiating for membership, and according to WTO, there were 153 members on 23 July 2008.3 Under the existence of GATT/WTO there has been an exceptional growth in world trade. For instance, merchandise exports increased on average by 6 percent annually over the past 50 years. In addition, total trade in 2000 was about 22 times that of the volume in 1950. Thus there is no gainsaying the fact that the GATT and the WTO have helped to create a more liberal trading system that contributes to unprecedented growth.4 The system was created through a series of trade negotiations, or rounds that were held under GATT. The initial rounds dealt mainly with tariff reductions but later negotiations encompassed other areas such as anti-dumping and non-tariff measures. The last round of GATT – the 1986-1994 Uruguay Rounds – led to the creation of WTO and offered measures for global economic and business liberalisations of very wide scope and ramifications. With the above background information, this paper seeks to discus the principal means by which the GATT/WTO system promotes of achieves trade liberalisation as well as the limitations on its effectiveness in this context. The paper begins by discussing an overview of the purpose of GATT/WTO. Overview of the purpose of GATT/WTO a) Overview of GATT (i) Purpose of GATT GATT was originally created by the Bretton Woods Conference as part of a larger plan for economic recovery after World War II. The main purpose of GATT was to reduce barriers to international trade. This was to be attained through the reduction of tariff barriers, subsidies on trade and quantitative restrictions through a series of a wide array of agreements.5 According to the Preamble of the GATT, the objectives to be attained by contracting parties included raising standards of living, ensuring full employment, having a large and steadily increasing volume of real income and income effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world, and increasing the production and exchange of goods.6 The Preamble also states the contracting parties’ conviction that “reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction in tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce”7 would lead towards attaining these goals. Importantly, GATT did not specify free trade as one of its objectives. GATT also intended to integrate developing countries into an open multilateral trading system. Hence, the increasing participation of developing countries in the GATT trading system and the tremendous support they received through the flexible application of some rules helped them to both increase and diversify their trade. Today it can be remarked that a significant number of these countries have developed to become full members of the system as was embodied by their active participation in the Uruguay Round. Nevertheless, there is still a horrendous task of fully integrating the least developed countries in the system as their level of participation and volume of trade has significantly declined on average since the 1960s. The role of GATT was reinforced through a number of conventions and general principles governing international trade among countries that adhere to the agreement. In essence, the rules of conventions of GATT required that8 Any planned change in the tariff, or other type of commercial policy of a member state should not be undertaken without consultation of other parties to the agreement; and That the states that adhere to GATT should work toward reducing tariffs and other barriers to international trade, which should be negotiated within the scope of GATT. ii) Principles of GATT In order to realise the above objectives, GATT adopted a number of principles which are discussed below: a) Non-discrimination: The principle of non-discrimination stipulates that no member state shall discriminate between members of GATT during the operations of international trade.9 The principle is reflected by two concrete standards: most favoured nation (MFN) and national treatment. As stated in article 1 of GATT, the MFN implies any advantage granted by any contracting party to the products of any other country should be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the products of any other contracting party.10 Hence, all contracting states share the benefits of any moves towards lower tariffs on equal terms. With regard to any quantitative restrictions that are permitted, they too, are supposed to be administered without favour.11 The principle of MFN treatment in international trade is supported by that of national trade in the internal trade of importing countries. Under article III of GATT which is about national treatment, it is required that once goods have entered a market, they must be accorded similar treatment as the equivalent domestically produced goods. The objective of national treatment is to forestall discrimination through domestic tax or regulatory measures, and hence to ensure that imported domestic products are given equal treatment.12 In spite of the provisions of GATT, there are certain exceptions to the principle of non-discrimination.13 For example, GATT does not prohibit economic integration such as free trade areas or customs union, as long as the purpose of such integration is to promote trade between the constituent territories and not to increase barriers to the trade of other parties. GATT also allows the members to adopt measures to counter export and counter dumping subsidies. Nevertheless, the application of such measures is deemed to be restricted to the offending countries. b) Prohibition of quantitative restrictions: Rules of GATT seek to prohibit quantitative restrictions as far as possible and limit restrictions on trade to the less inflexible tariffs. Nevertheless, a number of exceptions to this prohibition are granted to countries that are faced with balance of payments difficulties and to developing countries. In addition, import restrictions were allowed to apply to fisheries and agricultural products in domestic production of the same products were subject to equally restrictive production of marketing controls.14 c) Consultation: By offering a forum for continuing consultation, GATT sought to resolve disagreements through talks among member states. Eight rounds were held under GATT, each taking several years.15 The latest one, the Uruguay Round, took more than four years. This highlights the complexity of the issues involved in trade negotiations. iii) Liberalisation of trade under GATT As highlighted above, the original focal point of GATT was on the “tariffication” of existing non-tariff trade barriers and on reducing tariff levels based on a multilateral MFN scale. This focus was however gradually overtaken by other issues which became more significant as the process of multilateral liberalisation matured in the process of the eight Rounds of GATT negotiations that occurred since 1947. However, the first five Rounds, which were carried out between 1947 and 1961, were dedicated almost entirely to reducing the level of tariffs. Along the same line, tariff reduction continued to be an important objective up through the Uruguay Round. The success with which nations have been able to achieve reciprocal tariff reduction under GATT has been remarkable twofold: first for the level of tariff reductions attained through this process (it is important to note that world tariffs have been reduced by 90 percent, from a mean ad valorem rate of 40 percent when GATT was initiated to 4 percent in 1994), and two, for the extended period of time over which the process has occurred.16 b) Overview of WTO According to the WTO website, WTO is the only “international organisation dealing with the rules of trade between nations.”17 Its overriding aim is “to help trade flow smoothly freely, fairly and predictably”.18 Some of its key features include WTO agreements, which are signed and negotiated by a majority of the world’s trading countries and ratified in their parliaments. Another goal of the WTO is to assist producers of services and goods, exporters, and importers conduct their businesses without hassles.19 The WTO offers a forum for negotiating agreements aimed at lessening obstacles to world trade and ensuring a level playing field for all member states, thus contributing to economic growth as well as development. The organisation also offers a legal and institutional framework for the implementation and monitoring of these agreements, and for settling disputes that arise from their interpretation and application. The existing body of trade agreements that are part of the WTO consists of 16 different multilateral agreements (to which all WTO member states are signatories) and two different plurilateral agreements (to which only some WTO members are signatories).20 Having taken over from GATT in 1995, the WTO has sustained what was sowed by GATT, and has helped to create a strong and prosperous international system, thereby contributing to tremendous global economic growth. Out of its 153 members, 117 are developing countries or separate customs territories,21 and this shows that under it trade has become common to states in spite of the economic status or level of development. The principles that guide the WTO are those that were in existence during the founding of GATT. These are the pursuit of open borders, the assurance of most-favoured nation principle and the aspect of non-discriminatory treatment by and among member states of the WTO, as well as commitment to transparency in the conduct of the organisation’s activities. WTO hopes that the opening of national markets to global trade, with permissible exceptions or with sufficient suppleness, will support and contribute to sustainable development, reduce poverty, raise people’s welfare, and foster peace and stability. The WTO also noted that contemporaneously, such market opening must be accompanied by strong international and domestic policies that contribute to economic growth and development in tandem with the needs and aspirations of each member state.22 Main of activities of the WTO as pertains to liberalisation of trade The main activities of the WTO geared toward liberalising world trade are:23 Negotiating the reduction or abolition of obstacles to trade (such as import tariffs and other barriers trade) and reaching an agreement on rules governing the conduct of international trade (such as subsidies, anti-dumping, product standards and so forth). Administering and supervising the application of WTO’s agreed rules for governing trade in goods, trade in services, and trade-related intellectual property rights. Monitoring and assessing the trade policies of WTO members, and fostering transparency of regional and bilateral agreements. Settling disputes among member states regarding the interpretation and application of various agreements. Building capacity of developing country government officials in international trade affairs. Helping the process of accession of some other countries (about 30) who are not yet members of the organisation. Elucidating to and educating the public on issues regarding the WTO, it mission and its activities. The points above show that the WTO has maintained the role that was initially played by GATT in facilitating trade. The WTO has even gone further to increase membership and the scope of activities pertaining to monitoring trade among countries of the world. The next section will thus look at the principal ways through which the GATT/WTO system achieves or promotes trade liberalisation. Principal means by which the GATT/WTO system achieves trade liberalisation According to Davies, the WTO system has two distinct kinds of trade negotiations that help in liberalisation of trade. These are trade rounds and dispute settlement proceedings.24 Both forms of negotiations fall under the rubric of one international institution and serve the same goal of promoting liberalisation, but they interact with the domestic political context by different mechanisms. Davies further argues that trade rounds apply issue connection strategies to promote trade-liberalising agreements with a detailed scope.25 In contrast, despite settlement proceedings apply legal framing strategies to enforce existing liberalisation commitments and focus on a single policy. Moreover, trade rounds widen the agenda in a bargaining process, but dispute settlement proceedings narrow the agenda for an adjudication process.26 (i) Trade rounds The most significant leap forward in terms of liberalisation of international trade came with a series of multilateral trade negotiations, referred to as trade rounds that were sponsored by GATT.27 GATT trade rounds have been effective in liberalising global trade as well as in extending and promoting a multilateral trading system. Advantages and effectiveness of the trade rounds The package approach to trade negotiations has a number of advantages. To begin with, participants have the opportunity to seek and secure advantages across a wide array of issues. The second point is that concessions which would otherwise be difficult to defend and implement in domestic political terms, can be achieved more easily in the context of a package that also contains politically and economically appealing benefits. Third, developing countries and the other less powerful participants in international trade have a greater opportunity to influence the multilateral system in the perspective of a round than if bilateral relationships between the major trading countries are allowed to dominate. Another point is that overall reform in particular politically-sensitive sectors of global trade is more feasible in the context of an international package.28 In the early years of GATT, GATT trade rounds largely focused on the conversion of quantitative trade barriers to tariffs, and binding and reducing those tariffs through negotiations.29 In essence, average weighted tariff was reduced from 50 percent to 12 percent as a result of the first five rounds. At the time, the countries involved in the negotiations were mostly those with principal supplying interest or developed economies.30 As such, they focused their negotiation efforts on lowering import barriers in other countries that were of primary interest to their own exporters, and they utilised the political trade-off of increased market access abroad for exporting industries against increased market access provided at home to foreign firms and hence the losses to industries competing against these imports.31 The initial rounds were quite significant as the first round of negotiations yielded 45,000 tariff concessions that affected $10 billion worth of global trade.32 Later rounds of GATT commenced the process of revising, reinterpreting or expanding the scope of the original articles of GATT.33 For example, the Kennedy Round ended with an agreement on a new GATT Anti-Dumping Agreement and the Tokyo Round went even much further. The Kennedy Round dealt with problems facing developing countries (as regards special and differential treatment) according to GATT Part IV, articles 36- 38. During this Round, existing customs duties were lowered an average of 35 percent affecting $40 million worth of global trade.34 The Tokyo Round dealt with non-trade barriers and produced the antidumping and subsidies agreement as well as general system on preferences. At the conclusion of Tokyo Round negotiations in November 2009, a major package of tariff concessions was adopted along with a number of new agreements on non-tariff measures and an enhanced legal framework for the GATT. Tariffs were reduced on many industrial and agricultural products. As a result of the reduced tariffs, which were implemented over a period of eight years, the weighted mean tariff (that is the average tariff measured against actual trade flows) on manufactures in the world’s nine major industrial markets dropped from 7 percent to 4.7 percent – which was a 34 percent reduction of customs collection. The level of 4.7 percent can be compared with an average of about 40 percent when GATT was established in 1947.35 The cuts also encompassed a harmonisation element with the highest tariffs being reduced proportionately more than the lowest. Industrial nations made tariff reductions and removed some barriers affecting trade in tropical products such as tea, coffee, spices, cocoa and other goods in raw, processed or semi-processed form – which were of special interest to developing countries.36 In addition, many developing countries made concessions with respect to their own imports. The agreements on non-tariff barriers led to new dimensions in some cases, and interpreted of clarified existing GATT articles in others. Hence, rules were agreed to require and promote international competition for procurement contracts provided by governments and other public bodies; to discipline the use of technical standards, testing systems and certification as trade barriers; to ensure that import licensing procedures do not on their own, act as restrictions on trade; and to create a fair, uniform and neutral system for the valuation of goods for customs purposes.37 Another achievement of GATT was the addition of a new agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures to the existing ones and a further revision of the GATT anti-dumping code. Further, two agricultural agreements covering trade in meat and dairy products were signed while the 9th Tokyo Round code went further to secure liberalisation of trade in civil aircraft.38 The final round under GATT (the Uruguay Round) dealt with tariffs non-tariff measures, rules, services, intellectual property, dispute settlement, textiles, agriculture, creation of WTO and many others.39 The Uruguay Round also changed the GATT agreement greatly by adding the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the General Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). It also contained agreements on agriculture, an Agreement on Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and an Agreement on technical Barriers to Trade (TNT).40 Limitations the effectiveness of trade rounds Although the trade rounds were largely successful, their limitations can be evaluated by dissecting the details of the latest round under WTO - the Doha Round or Doha Declaration. The Doha Declaration was established in 2001 as the new multilateral negotiation round. The WTO member states agreed to set a sign for new market economy and development. Although the Doha negotiations initially were considered as a new round of striking significant changes in world trade and a stronger implementation of developing countries, some analysts have demonstrated that the aims attained so far are quite disheartening. For instance, the desire to liberalise agricultural goods has been one of the most contentious issues and a roadblock that has impeded the Doha negotiations.41 Below are two major reasons that can be attributed to the “failure” of the Doha Round. i) New policy circumstances The Doha Round talks are complex due to the larger number of participants involved, their divergent interests and their intricate agenda. In fact the challenges involved in coordinating negotiations among the large group of 153 members are considerable. Negotiations on agricultural protection and support policies, trade in services and trade preferences have never been discussed so openly before42 (implying that such issues were not emphasised in the rounds that came before the Doha Round). Former talks were characterised by a reasonably small number of states that had both interest and influence in trade negotiations. This fundamentally enhanced the process. The privileged group focused on Europe and the United States, with Japan and a number of other countries also playing crucial roles. However, member states were only interested in commitments from one another. 43 Today there is an emerging multipolar system reflected by the large and rapidly developing economies such as Brazil, China and India, which have an important position in the debate. In addition, for the first time small developing countries form a negotiating bloc, represented for example by the G-90.44 This development has been favoured by the worldwide process of trade liberalisation, which was mainly boosted since the 1980s by the reform of unilateral structures, the development of preferential trade areas, and commitments to the Uruguay Round. Many countries in the developing world (such as South Korea, Singapore and China) have shifted away from purely labour intensive and fairly standardised products towards a wider series of products that are featured by a wider array of factor inputs. Many of these countries have become export-oriented and are hence themselves interested in access to the countries for their competitive industries. In spite of the shared positions of emerging market nations, they also present different negotiating emphases as a result of their varying economic strength. It is true that the significance of the emerging markets has definitely lowered the relative influence of the world's two economic giants, the United States and the European Union. Further, there is a global disenchantment with foreign policies of the United States, with many countries not inspired to pursue Unites States-led policies. 45 ii) Multilateralism versus regionalism The key principle set out in the GATT and reflected in the scope of the WTO were non-discrimination in world trade. Tariffs are the only allowed barrier to imports on based on the principle of reciprocity. However, exceptions to these basic principles in well defined circumstances to protect perceived national interest are permitted. According to article XXIV of GATT, it is required that free trade agreements cover substantially all trade between members, and that barriers to reciprocal trade shall be eliminated in a reasonable duration (within about 10 years unless otherwise specified). But according to Robertson (2007, p. 37), most of the 211 free trade agreements reported to the WTO do meet the requirements of article XXIV.46 Most agreements exclude any trade liberalisation in agricultural products (for instance the Japan-Singapore free trade agreement) or exceed the 10 years adjustment period (for example the United States-Australia free trade agreement).47 General weaknesses of trade rounds Not all burning issues are usually addressed in trade rounds. For instance, the Doha Round Ministerial Declaration stated that “The multilateral trading system embodied in the WTO has contributed significantly to economic growth, development and employment throughout the past fifty years. We are determined, in the light of the economic slowdown, to maintain the process of reform and liberalisation of trade policies, thus ensuring the system plays its full part in promoting recovery, growth and development.”48 But the Doha Declaration could not conceal the dissatisfaction and complaints among the developing countries that the promises of the Uruguay Round were not fulfilled.49 This emphasises the fact that rounds may only be used as a formality, but not much is done in actual liberalisation of trade by member states of the WTO. This is one reason why Bhagwati (1991) criticised the predecessor of the WTO, noting that “A common criticism is that the GATT is in truth the General Agreement to Talk and Talk: It has delivered nothing...”50 Along the same line, Subramanian and Wei identify three asymmetries that have arisen between developed and developing states; between developing countries that joined the WTO before and after the Uruguay Round; and between sectors where the WTO has been effective in bringing down trade barriers and those where it has been less effective.51 These disparities have arisen mainly because of the differences in obligations and commitments during trade rounds. (ii) Dispute settlement proceedings According to Bown, dispute settlement is one of the key aspects of trade liberalisation under GATT/WTO. In fact Bown carried out an economic appraisal of developing country performance in the GATT/WTO system and measured the economic resolution of disputes through the gains of trade liberalisation.52 The results showed that developing country plaintiffs have achieved more success under WTO disputes than was the case under the GATT. The findings are definitely true as according to Drezner and others, the WTO has an enhanced system of dispute resolution and is fundamental in the push for liberalisation in the multilateral avenue. In contrast, the former GATT regime was a system in which any members state, including those involved in the trade dispute, could veto any recommended enforcement action.53 But the current dispute settlement system has greater autonomy in authorising punishment for violating countries. In addition, the creation of the Appellate Body (which has been rightly been noted to represent “the most important systemic outcome of the Uruguay Round”54) offers a useful layer of review that increases legitimacy for and confidence in the WTO institution. Further, the relative speed with which the dispute resolution panels can make decisions is another advantage of the WTO process. But the fact that developing countries have been empowered in the WTO dispute settlement scheme alone is a strong indicator of liberalisation, as power is no longer vested in a few powerful countries trade wise.55 Dispute resolution proceedings are an exemplar of high legalisation. The dispute process begins with a formal complaint followed by a consultation stage and an adjudication phase that produces a ruling on whether the particular policy breaches commitments under WTO rules. The process may result into authorisation of sanctions. Multilateral dispute settlement procedures enhance trade liberalisation by distributing information about violations and aggregating enforcement of power.56 The GATT/WTO theories emphasise the role of dispute settlement to make multilateral liberalisation sustainable.57 Along the same line, an effective dispute settlement mechanism can prevent trade wars and lay the foundation for liberalisation commitments. In many trade disputes, a complaint about a particular trade obstacle could be raised in multiple negotiation forums. In fact, many issues are raised in a number of forums. Looking at several significant trade negotiations between the United States and Japan, one can easily notice this. For instance, the United States’ complaints about Japan’s quantitative restrictions on forestry products were addressed in detailed United States-Japan bilateral negotiations, which led to the formation of the Market-Oriented Sector-Selective (MOSS) agreement in 1986, the Uruguay Round and later cropped up as a central issue in the APEC talks on Voluntary Sectoral Liberalisation at the Kuala Lumpur Ministerial Meeting. Further, the United States concerns about lack of access for its semiconductors in the Japanese market were addressed through bilateral agreements in the 1980s and 1990s, and some issues were also dealt with in the WTO Information Technology Agreement.58 The WTO dispute settlement procedure is preferred by states because it explicitly encourages bilateral settlement and or negotiation through deliberations about trade problems in WTO committees or other avenues. Hence, there is no legal obligation to channel all potential disputes to the formal dispute process. It is therefore entirely consistent with the WTO institutional framework for an issue to be raised in several other forums before it reaches the adjudication stage.59 An as highlighted above, it is not uncommon for an issue to be addressed in multiple forums to reach settlement. Overall, the WTO dispute settlement system is significant from an institutional perspective and it has good public features. It is perceived that appropriate membership participation in the system can generate positive externalities. The dispute settlement systems can act as a public good if it augments property rights (in this case market access rights) and thus improve each state’s ownership in the stake. In addition, improved security of these rights lowers uncertainty, thus increasing the likelihood that companies and individuals in countries on both the import and export sides of international transactions make mutually beneficial, relationship-specific investments.60 Further, active participation in dispute settlement activity by WTO member states can also have benefits if one country’s litigation efforts contribute to the removal of a trade obstacle that adversely impacted the market access rights of other WTO members. This is the essence of liberalisation. Limitations of the dispute settlement procure of the WTO Despite the benefits of WTO’s dispute settlements highlighted above as pertains to liberalisation, there are a number of limitations of this strategy. The dispute settlement system seems to be a preserve of the developed countries, thus neglecting the developing states and totally disregarding the least developed countries. According to Bown and Hoekman, the poorest countries in the WTO system are almost completely disengaged from enforcement of their market access rights through formal dispute settlement litigation.61 Thus, even the point that was mentioned earlier in this paper that developing countries have been empowered in the dispute resolution system of the WTO may be amenable to discussion. Empowerment can only be said of those nations on top of the developing countries list; for instance India has challenged the European Union, and Brazil has confronted the United States – but the least developed countries are almost absent, whether as litigants, respondents or third parties.62 These are the same countries that have not reaped the benefits of the GATT and WTO as they have witnessed very little change in their trade volumes since the GATT was initiated. It is rather perplexing that more groups have not been willing to work with poor developing countries to initiate dispute settlement on their behalf, given that WTO panels and Appellate Body decisions have showed a potential opening for petitioners with their pro-trade emphasis. Poor countries do not engage in the WTO dispute settlement system for a number of reasons. First is that the system works on a “retaliation-as-compensation approach,” but such countries lack the capacity to impose large political-economic welfare losses on potential resident countries that would create the internal political pressure in those countries that may be a requisite element to spur compliance with Dispute Settlement Understandings (DSU). Second, poor countries are more likely to be reliant on larger and wealthier potential respondents for development assistance or preferential market access. This vulnerable situation reduces their willingness to invoke the DSU. Third, developing states may be more likely to face market access restrictions affecting commodity exports both in low volumes and in competitive markets with low profits margins. This makes it difficult to charge mark-ups to cover any non-economic (dispute settlement) costs associated with enforcing or maintaining market access.63 Conclusion This paper has reviewed the role of the GATT/WTO in liberalisation of trade since the signing of the GATT in 1947 with 23 member states to the present day when WTO has 153 member states. Liberalisation efforts are reflected in the principles of GATT which include non-discrimination, prohibition of quantitative restrictions, and the provision of a forum for consultation among countries involved in international trade. WTO came as a successor of GATT and has maintained the goal of ensuring that world trade flows smoothly freely, fairly and predictably and that importers and exporters conduct their business without significant hassles. Trade liberalisation by GATT/WTO is achieved through trade rounds and dispute resolution proceedings. Under GATT several trade rounds led to significant tariff reductions, thus enhancing trade. The limitation of trade rounds however is that some issues are not discussed conclusively, or that the outcomes of the deliberations are not adhered to. For example, the details of the Uruguay Round were not fulfilled before the start of the Doha Round. Hence, from some perspective, trade rounds have perpetuated different kinds of asymmetries in world trade. Although dispute settlement has been enhanced under WTO, it still appears to be a preserve of the developed countries or large developing countries. Least developed countries have been locked out of the system due to their vulnerable economic position. It can therefore be said that the GATT/WTO system has enhanced world trade liberalisation, strongly but not equitably. 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Federico Ortino, Basic legal instruments for the liberalisation of trade: A comparative analysis of EC and WTO law, Hart Publishing, London, 2004, p. 4 Christina L. Davis, “The Effectiveness of WTO Dispute Settlement: An Evaluation of Negotiation versus Adjudication Strategies,” Princeton University, August 2008, p. 1 Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, “WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector,” Journal of International Economic Law, May 2005, viewed 25 May 2010, Read More