Human Factor Program - Pavlovian Airline - Case Study Example

Pavlovian Airline By Student’s Name Course Instructor Institution Date Case scenario Pavlovian Airline entry in into Australia expand the competition in the commercial aviation industry however, this entry comes with a lot of controversy. Although the airline has negotiated with the government and again the permission to operate in the country, the airline embraces a practice that other airline deem as unfair. Pavalovian airline does not include a Human Factor Program for its aircrew or other employees. The other airlines feel that allowing an organization without a human factor program to operate endangers the organizations employees as well as the public since the practice carries an unprecedented risk. CASA support the claims the other airlines and the matter is before the high court for resolution. The following are the points of view from the representatives of the two combatants. Part 1: Support for Pavlovian Airline claim to operate in Australia Human beings make errors not only because they lack proper training but also due to their inability to perform basic tasks even when trained. These human errors occur since the task assigned goes beyond the ability of the individual to undertake them. The work assigned may be past the human capability. According to Cacioppo, Tassinary & Berntson (2007, p. 707) event related brain potentials (ERP) serve as the major central nervous system measure in human factors. The ERP technique gives evaluation of the electrical fields of active neurons observed in the scalp. Electroencephalographic (EEG) data analysis occurs in the frequency area and contains the deduction of differences in power among various individuals. EEG could be recorded in the absence of stimuli. Furthermore, replies that that make EEG important in instances where an operator monitored slowly changing displays that need less intervention could be observed. Both EEG and ERG measures indicate that the possibility of an individual to process information do vary from one human being to another. Even with adequate training, it became difficult to adequately train an employee to optimum level where errors could not occur. Human factors in employees occur due to the employee’s misinterpretation of crucial details regarding the specific task Adams (2006, p. 21). The misinterpretation of important information concerning a particular duty becomes influenced by the workers brain structure. The human brain which influences human behavior changes as a function of a number of experiences. Difference in the genetic composition in people mostly measured as contrast in cortical volume, density, or both could be related performance of a number of cognitive and perceptual tasks. Therefore, the nonintrusive computation of brain structure was a useful converging measure of individual differences in interpretation of information. Methods such as hand tracing and automated segmentation have been employed to show change in brain volume in regionally specific fashion. The link between the hippocampal volumes of older adults and their long-term memory performance was established. This even accounted for the change of age on memory. Human factors do not matter to a large extent but the small details are what matter. With proper training employees could still misinterpret signs leading to accidents and failures. Training alone does not guarantee success in interpretation of instructions. The setting and functioning of the human brain vary from one person to another depending on their anatomy. So the genetic composition plays a bigger and vital role than the human training required in Australia. Pavlovian airlines minimize events taking place during the performance of a task that could change the nature of the duty in a way an employee has never seen before. As a human factor, workers get used to performing tasks in a particular way. It becomes a routine for them such if a slight change occurs during the process of undertaking the duty, total confusion could occur. At Pavlovian airlines, each person gets assigned specific duties. In case of an emergency, a team is always ready to perform the extra work at hand. Avoidance or mix up of duties hinders effective performance by employees. Emphasis should not be on human factors but establishment of an emergency team. The emergency team assumes duty when events do not go according to plan. Application of such a strategy helps in specialization of duties (McKinley, 2015). According to Salas, Jentsch, Maurino (2010), any organization should not take past success as guarantee for future safety. Safe operation in aviation for commercial use required front-line operators to treat their operational environment both as risky and actively hostile. The level of risk should not be misestimated. Even with confidence in cargo and training, there was need operators ensured vigilance all the times. A situation may emerge in which the confidence may be misplaced. For instance the Naskapi Indians who with the help of caribou shoulder bones find game. These Indians hold the bone over fire till it cracks and hunt in the direction where the fractures point. Future decisions here do not depend on past success and past results do not apply as confidence boosters. Pavlovian airlines do not look at other instances of failure in other organizations as not related to them. The Australian government looks at the fact that Pavlovian airlines do not provide a human factors program to stop permission of operation which should not be the case. Immunity to the problem could never be guaranteed but that does not mean the problems would be the same. As long information remains free flowing, then operations ought to run smoothly. Continuous and fast exchange of information related to normal working of the system offers a general idea from which signs of trouble could be spotted. Since airline business includes handovers. During handovers relevant information usually must be passed to the other crew to avoid not being told, forgetting, and misunderstanding of information communicated. Communication levels are clearly outlined to ensure the state of the airplane becomes well known to the incoming crew. In fact a strict policy of crew exchange would be employed. Before departure the incoming crew will have received adequate information from the earlier crew members on the state of the airplane. Within Pavlovian airlines, we have people and functions within our systems that have the mandate, credibility, and ability to go against the ordinary interpretations. These people and function channels make decisions concerning safety and risk. At Pavlovian people put chronic goals ahead of short term goals. Our organization supports people when they say no as it could be beneficial for the long term. Systems that use new ways on problem solving activities become more efficient. Due to Pavlovian’s diverse culture more hypotheses are usually generated, we cover more contingencies, and openly debate rationales for decision making. Instead of employing human factors, all the employees get involved in decision making before implementation. Constant movement of personnel helps introduce new ideas in the organization. Pavlovian airlines the minority group’s views are not easily dismissed. Consideration includes all the employees to avoid further clashes within the organization. Alternatives could give a fresh viewpoint which reveals methods of practice that the mainstream perspectives do not see. In risky situations, the people with expertise on the particular problem are usually employed. No single problem becomes ignored as in the future it could result in greater damages. All these serve to keep the topic about insecurity alive even when things are totally safe. With the encouragement of this behavior, stakeholders discuss risks even with no evidence of risk at present. When discussions about threats take place even without the actual threats, people get confident in the organizations investment in safety standards. The gap between operations as imagined by the management and the practical aspects were determined. Pavlovian airlines leadership does not miscalculate challenges and risks imagined to the actual work on the ground. How safety is really created as employees engage in work, construct discourse, and rationalize sense from it becomes the organizations priority over human factors. At Pavlovian airlines, investment in methods of awareness models of risk is applied. This strategy was put in place to avoid misplaced confidence, and to detect new pathways to failure. Meta-mentoring brings in a new duty for aviation regulation at Pavlovian airlines (Salas, Jentsch, & Maurino 2010, p.131). Part 2: CASA representation support of the claim that health and safety of aircrew and other employees of Pavlovian Airlines as well as the general public It is our mandateas flight regulators to see to it that laws and regulations in the flight industry are applied indiscriminately. Laws and regulations is what protects the world from the inherent nature of humans to cross lines which they are not supposed to cross. In the flight industry, these regulations ensure that hazards which could arise from human error are kept in check. In enforcing these laws, there should be no buffer zone insulating some individuals from the requirements of the law (Sandom & Harvey 2009, p. 21). We are afraid that if Pavlovian Airlines is allowed to operationalize their activities in Australia, the health and safety of the aircrew as well as other employees of Pavlovian Airlines will be put in jeopardy. The general public will also be put in danger because of the unregulated element of human factor in the aforementioned airline. According to global aviation accident statistics, it is estimated that well over 70 per cent of aircraft accidents are usually the result of deficiencies in human factors (Sheridan 2008, p. 11).If these statistics are anything to go by, it is dangerous to allow Pavlovian Airlines to operate without such a key program. Error management falls directly under the scope of the human factor program. It is in light of this that the Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) was issued in 2008 to provide a framework for regulation of the human factor in aircraft operations and reduce safety threats that could be related to the error of omission and commission among pilots (Commonwealth of Australia 2010, p. 18). Without proper regulations, pilots will be bound to engage in violations that will endanger the lives of the crew members and passengers. To maintain acceptable standards in the industry, it is critical that human factors are integrated in to the safety management systems of all airline operators. This should be done at every single available opportunity without exception. The principles set out in the human factor regulations are there to ensure that there is harmonious existence between employees and the system of health and safety (Merritt 2011, p. 15). To ensure accountability in the variations synonymous with human behaviour, all airline operators should have a human factor program. The human factor program ensures that there is transparency in the way the organizations conduct their operations and also that the input of all employees are valued and appreciated (Sandom & Harvey 2009, p. 17). Without the human factor program, risk management will be an issue. Risk management is critical in so far as prevention of incidents and accidents is concerned. The organization will operate without a safety culture. Sometimes human errors arise because of work-related stress and the presence of a human factor program can help deal with this by ensuring that employees are assigned duties that they can manage without the need for pressure. In an organization that lack a human factor risk management plan it is difficult to mitigate human error. If performance levels are not monitored as a way of providing insights in to actions and their associated risks, the safety of employees as well as the general public will be compromised because accidents will be bound to occur more often. The flight environment which contributes heavily to human error will be unregulated if Pavlovian Airlines are allowed to carry out their operations in Australia. Components in the aircraft’s internal environment such as flight controls, equipment, warning and alert devices will be left in disarray (Commonwealth of Australia 2009, p. 4). Recruitment of personnel will not be as per the required standards and expectations with regard to performance will be below par. Without the human factor program, job requirements will be designed at Pavlovian Airlines without the slightest regard to human limitations. In as much as human error cannot be prevented, employing people who are right for the job can help manage the problem. Pilots who are enrolled in training programs can greatly improve their lookout approaches and reduce errors related to human deficiency. It must be acknowledged that factors affecting the ability of a pilot to be always on the lookout fall outside the level of training and airmanship. What really affects this crucial ability is the limitation that is imposed on our visual and information processing faculties as humans (Salvendy 2012, p. 48). This limitation is present in almost all humans and varies markedly from one person to another. Effective training can help eliminate or reduce this limitation and prevent accidents that are preventable from happening. However, without the human factor program, it is impossible to plan and implement continuous training. Allowing Pavlovian Airlines to operate without the human factor program is something the federal government should reconsider as this will bring ramifications to the security of employees and the public. Without the human factor program, complacency is also likely to develop among employees at Pavlovian Airlines. There is need for change evaluations to implement a strategy that can prevent the issue of complacency which come as a result of employees attaining satisfaction in their job positions. Tasks that are deemed repetitive by an employee will be overlooked and this can result in catastrophic results especially if it occurs in an area that is technical such as the engineering department. To guarantee the safety of passengers in an aircraft, it is extremely important to take in to consideration even things that appear trivial. Routine tasks make the concentration of employees to deviate and it is therefore essential than an airline operator has an operational human factor program to help perform job evaluations and reassign duties from time to time to prevent the monotony which is bad for performance. Team work is also important and without the human factor program, it may be difficult to foster communication among employees (Sandom &Harvey 2009, p. 27). Communication plays a key role in the exchange of information that will allow employees to work cooperatively to achieve synergistic results. Sharing information also helps to minimize human error among employees. It is also easy to evaluate risks with a team that is working together. In light of this and other arguments discussed in this paper, it is the recommendation of CASA that the federal government revokes the licence of Pavlovian Airlines until after they have integrated a human factor program in their operations. Part three: Justification of CASA case From the presentation by the Pavlovian Airlines, it is evident that the airline has a right to operate in the country just like its competitors. As a result limiting the airline from operating in the county would be unjust. On the bases of the presentation by CASA, it clear the CASA has a case that require arbitration. It is evident the practices of the Pavlovian Airlines pose risk to the organizations employees and the general public. Lack of Human Factor Program in the airline employment practice reduces the ability of its employees to mitigate against risk. It is evident the human factors contribute enormously to accidents including aviation accidents. There are many accidents that have result for human factors. Indeed, human factor analysis of aviation accident revels that human errors have an enormous role in the many aviation accidents. According to Australian Transport Safety Bureau, (ATSB), (2007, p.1) between 70%-80% of accidents in the aviation industry are products of human error. Therefore the greatest potential for improving aviation safety lay in understanding the role humans play in contributing to accidents. The rate of errors is reduced, the rate of accidents is reduced and the safety levels in the industry are improved. Already there is clear understanding on the human factors in aviation safety the aviation industry has responded to this knowledge by requiring airline operators to include human factor programs in their human resource practices. The human factor programs take into account common human factors that lead to accidents. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has a large database on aviation accidents. The database include all information surrounding this accidents, this include information such as the activities if the crew in the moments leading to the accident. Human factor programs use such information to teach and equip the crew and other employees to enable them avoid the errors (Li, & Harris, 2005, p45). Therefore, by failing to include human factor program in their programs, Pavlovian airline is failing to incorporate a tested and proved tool for minimizing human error and improving aviation safety. Unfortunately, the actions of Pavlovina Airline do not affect the airline alone. There are many stakeholders that get affected. The airline compromises the safety of its crew and the public. It also risks its planes. Pavlovian actions are an act of negligence. The airline is neglecting its duty towards it employees and the public by putting their safety at risk (Mudrić, 2013, p. 1). Negligence is failure to take action against results that are likely to harm other people. Pavalovian Airline is committing negligence because it is failing to do the most reasonable thing it should do. The airline owes it to its employee to ensure their safety, it owes the responsibility to the owners to protect their vessel and it owns to the public safety be ensuring that their activities do not harm the public in any way. Unfortunately, failing to have a human factor program increases the risks of danger The Pavalovain acts also fail to meet occupational health and safety regulations. Under these regulations, an employer is supposed to ensure that his employees are safe by place safety mechanism in place to ensure the safety of the employees (Salvendy, 2012, p.1). However, failure to institute a human factor program, the airline is failing to give its employees the opportunity to ensure safety operations. Finally aviation laws also require the airline companies to enact safety measures that protect their crew and the public (Federal Aviation Administration, 2014, p. 6). The failure of Pavlovian airline to provide human factor program is a dangerous action that must be interrogated. In this regard, the argument presented by CASA is valid and thus Pavlovain has to change it approach or this injunction should proceed. References Adams, D 2006, A layman’s introduction to human factors in aircraft accident and incident investigation, Australian transport safety bureau. Australian Transport Safety Bureau. 2007, Human factors analysis of Australian aviation accidents and comparison with the United States, Atsb Transport Safety Investigation Report. Aviation Research and Analysis Report – B2004/0321. Cacioppo, JT Tassinary, LG. & Bernston, G. 2007, Handbook of psychophysiology, Cambridge University press. Commonwealth of Australia 2009, National Aviation Policy White Paper: Flight Path to the Future, Dept. of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, Canberra. Commonwealth of Australia 2010, General Aviation Activity 2008, Dept. of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, Canberra. Federal Aviation Administration, 2014, Operators Manual. Operators Manual Human Factors in Aviation Maintenance, viewed 7 June 2016 Flin, R 2004, ‘The role of trust in safety management’, Human Factors and Aerospace Safety, vol. 4, pp. 289-306. Li, WC & Harris, D. 2005, HFACS analysis of ROC air force aviation accidents:Reliability analysis and cross-cultural comparison, International Journal of Applied Aviation Studies, 5(1), 65-81. McKinley, M. (2015). Workplace safety and the human factor, viewed June 7, 2016 < http://w3ins.com/workplace-safety-and-the-human-factor/> Merritt, S. (2011). Affective Processes in Human-Automation Interactions. Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 53(4), pp.356-370. 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