Air Safety System and Investigation - Essay Example

Air Safety System and Investigation Name Institution Introduction Article 44 of the Chicago Convention of 1944 provides that the main goal of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is make sure the safe and systematic growth of international civil aviation globally (Huang, 2009; Trogeler, 2014). Within the context of civil aviation, safety is an outcome of intricate activities that cover all domains of aviation. According to ICAO, an incident refers to an event linked to the aircraft operation that affects or potentially affects the safety of operation. It is different from an accident based on the results (Sleight, 2012). ICAO came up with a broad structure for managing safety at airports and airlines. The structure is called Doc. 9859 Safety Management Manual (SMM). The framework assists the airport workforce to manage safety based on the systems theory or holistic approach. The approach further recommends Group System model for organising instigative activity (OSHA Academy, 2013). This essay outlines the Group Structure System, it also provides details on the focus of the parts, or sub- group parts as well as the possible specialities of the personnel in managing an effective investigation. Further, it provides comments on the role of the Investigator-in-Charge in managing an effective investigation. Additional areas explored include the ways in which any differences in how national legal systems can play a part in investigation. The Group System The Group System model is an effective means to managing accident investigations. The ICAO advocates for the system under the Manual of Aircraft Accident Investigation [Doc 6920]. It involves employing a large based of investigators and experts who have the skills and capacity to support the investigations. The Group system approach of investigation is based on the Systems Theory, which hypothesises that accidents result from any defects or causes within the system and therefore requires many specialists specialising in various components of the system to take part in the investigation (OSHA Academy, 2013). The holistic or systems approach encourages all stakeholders to take part in the investigation at the early stages of the investigation, which further persists all through the investigation process (Sleight, 2012). The objective is to allow gathering of safety information and facts regarding the accident systematically, ahead of methodological analysis, and sharing to all stakeholders. For this reason, immediately after the accident, the likely parties become notified of the accident and their roles. For cases requiring large-scale investigations, the investigator-in-chief forms the initial group system made up of specialists to lead in investigation operations, and records management (US Department of Energy, 2013). Those taking part in the investigations are coordinated in into groups that have defined domains of responsibility where each expert is employed based on his speciality. The investigator-in-charge is in charge of the group. He has to organise and coordinate the group to enable the selected members of the group to direct their tasks and efforts towards the success of the investigation (Air Safety Investigation Branch Melbourne, 1970). A simple group system may only comprise two groups, such as Engineering and Operations while in an intricate investigation, a greater sub-division of responsibility within groups is created and assigned individual tasks concerning managing the engines, air-traffic services, structures, interviewing the witnesses, managing human factors. Possible examples of groups may include the Operations Group, the witness group, structure groups, weather group, power plant group, systems group, human factors group, flight recorders groups and maintenance records groups (US Department of Energy, 2013). In the Group System mode, the investigator-in-charge sets up and manages a set of standard groups. The groups have own chairman who is also an investigator originating from the Safety Investigation Authority (SIA) of the State of Occurrence (ICAO, 2010). He has expertise in the domain area that group is assigned a role. Other appointees in the investigation may include media liaison, airworthiness authority, the senior police chief, participants from other states, and accredited representative of State Registry. They all directly report to the investigator-in-chief (Sleight, 2012). The investigator-in-charge reports to the Chief Investigator of Accidents, who is the Appointed Head and has the authority to create policies and procedures that guide how the investigations are conducted. The Chief Investigator of Accidents also sets up investigations into accident and incident circumstances. He may also delegate the investigations to another State, rather than just the State of Occurrence (Sleight, 2012). He also assigns the investigator-in-charge an investigation, who in turn has the exclusive authority to manage an investigation under the Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (AIG) Act (Air Accident Investigation Branch, 2013). Accredited Representatives and Advisors and Investigators are then assigned into each of the set up groups to collect and offer factual information regarding the group chair. Each of the established groups is given the role of collecting evidence strictly for their specific area of expertise. They also generate ‘field notes’ collectively agreed to by the members of the group, which are then presented to the investigator-in-charge. The advisor provides technical advice to the investigator-in-chief and the Accredited Representatives, who may be affiliated to the advisor. The accredited Representatives represent the interests of their various organisations (US Department of Energy, 2013). The police may investigate on behalf of the police department in the event that the accident happened due to sabotage or crime. For instance, in the Boeing 747 accident at Lockerbie in December 1988, the investigator-in-chief had to integrate all aspects of investigator to show that an explosive device had case the accident. He further provided recommendations on the likely measures for research and development, including the need to harden the cargo containers against possible blasts. On the other hand, the police dealt with the criminal aspects of the accident, include investigating the details of the explosive device and its origin (AAIB, 2013). The members of each group become isolated from other domains of investigation. For instance, the Advisors from regulators and manufacturers may fail to acquire the full information on the specialist areas that may seem to be outside of their areas if investigation, although they may be important to the overall understanding of the contributors to the accident. Often, analysis is not undertaken within the groups. Analysis only gets to happen once all the facts have been collected and group reports have been generated. Afterwards, the analysis happens in some situations without reviews separate from the immediate Accredited Representatives or the SIA team.’ The advantage of the Group System includes the fact that the entire factual evidence is documented for utility by the investigator-in-charge, whether pertinent or not. In this way, it is more likely that nothing remains unrecorded. What this also means is that a full analysis of the evidence gathered takes place. The Group System does also have a disadvantage. For instance, it takes a long time for the investigator-in-charge to analyse all the information shared by each group. This also means that it is labour intensive, and consumers plenty of resources. The fact that the system of specialist groups gets to only deal with the facts of their specialist areas potentially creates ‘silo’ attitude, where each group only gets to focus what they have been assigned to do and may fail to communicate effectively or pass pertinent information o other groups. The Groups System model has been applied successfully by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) in most of its investigations (AAIB, 2013). It has been useful as a means for timely proactive safety action undertaken in preventing the accident from recurring. This is specifically the case that happened in 2004 while investigating the Airbus A340 G-VATL, in 2008 while investigating the Boeing 777 G-YMMM accident at Heathrow, in 2009 while investigating the AS332 L2 G-REDL accident and in 2012 while ditching the EC225 G-REDW. Role of investigator-in-charge Of the many individuals and agencies taking part in the investigation, there are some who are supported by the state authority like the police as well as the accredited advisors and official representatives of other States, of representatives of the airplane manufacturers and the airline operator, all of who have personal interests in the investigations that may tend to assume or usurp the investigator-in-chief’s authority (Huang, 2009). Beyond the likely confusion that may emanate regarding whose authority should be supreme, the investigator-in-charge has to establish emerge as the sole individual with the statutory authority to lead the investigations on the areas if aviation accident. Indeed, the investigator-in-chief’s authority is supported by provisions in Annex 13. The role of an investigator-in-charge is confined within the areas of managing the investigations rather than being involved actively in the detailed investigations (OSHA Academy, 2013). The investigator-in-charge has the overall responsibility of managing the investigations. He is in charge of organising and controlling the individuals taking part in the investigation. He also co-ordinates the work of those taking part in the investigations, and organises each individual input, which he integrates into the final report. The key role of investigator-in-charge is to lead in investigating of an incident or accident with the sole objective of preventing incidents and accidents. The initial challenge that investigators-in-charge face is deciding the degree of investigation appropriate for an accident or incident. The reason for this is since the investigative resources will often be limited and therefore must be applied efficiently. At the same time, the investigations for the aircraft accidents tend to be expensive and therefore have to be credible and cost-efficient (AAIB, 2013). The investigator-in-charge decides the scope of investigation for a certain accident or incident. An essential resources necessary for an aircraft investigation is the number of inquiries that have to be made. The size of the site also increases the scope of investigations. For instance, in December 1988 the wreckage the Boeing 747 that broke at 31,000 feet over Lockerbie spread over 80 miles long as well as covered some 845 square miles. Although the number of investigators was to be kept at minimum, many police were deployed to keep people away from the wreckage. This needed the extra scope of coordinating the police force. Again, an aircraft may get lost at the sea, such as was the case for Air India Boeing 747 in the Atlantic Ocean in 1987 and Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 that disappeared in March 2014 in Indian Ocean, may increase the scope of investigation, including coordinating the air force and marines to assist in the search of the debris. When the process of collecting of evidence proceeds, the investigator-in-charge constantly assesses the nature of the evidence while anticipating to make a discovery of the "pointers" to the accident’s root and underlying causes. However, this does not mean that the investigator-in-charge strives to limit the scope of the investigation. One reason for this is that focusing on an seemingly apparent cause may be tempting although employing such an approach ensure that certain important aspects remain undiscovered (US Department of Energy, 2013). The investigator-in-charge also receives regular updates and reports from those leading the investigations and may sometimes stop investigation when it is considered to have generated relevant information pertinent to the investigation. The investigator-in-charge leads to investigative team and makes critical decisions regarding the areas of investigation each member of the team should pursue. The balance of the team will tend to change when the areas of enquiry becomes combined or fragmented. As a consequence, one a report on the peripheral issues is adopted, the focus of the assigned to work in the specialised areas bearing directly on the underlying accident causes will remain. However, narrowing the investigation will need due leadership, as the scope to be investigated have to be addressed methodically. This requires the investigator-in-charge to assign each scope of investigation to the members of the investigative team and to keep them motivated, since once the evidences pursued are limited, the cause of the accident will still remain unknown (AAIB, 2013). The investigator-in-charge has to stay on high alert to keep the members of the team adequately inquisitive and alert to search for the lead that can help determine the cause of the accident. At this rate, the investigator-in-charge must not conclude the investigations until each possible and conceivable cause is made. The investigator-in-charge ensures that the services based on which help necessary at short-notice, specifically the government, will help determine size of the task in addition to the international obligations to the investigation. However, this is when the investigator is intended to possess the authority to enlist the needed support necessary for securing the site, locating and collecting evidence, handling the casualties’ dependants as well as making press releases that get released to the media (Heilbronn, 1990). The investigator-in-charge maintains control of the investigations. After the investigator-in-charge requests for the required resources for addressing the immediate needs and the authority for obtaining is approved, he has to ensure that he maintains control of the investigation. For instance, since is also the information manager as he communicates the information located, he should also direct the investigation suitably even as the data on the accident or incidence accumulates. The investigator-in-chief’s authority extends to the on-site examination of the wreckage. He ensures the safety of the team carrying out the investigation from the start. Many hazards often exist during the on-site examination of the wreckage. It is the role of the investigator-in-chief to guard against the hazards (US Department of Energy, 2013). The investigator-in-chief carries at work appraisal of the investigating team. In the process of the investigation, the investigator-in-charge evaluates continually, the significance, value of team undertaking the investigation. For instance, during some instances, the work of a certain team may seems to be more important to the investigation compared to that of others, although this may actually be a reflection of the comparative stages of progress when a team’s is completed it should be disbanded (ICAO, 2010). During this stage, the investigator-in-chief makes the critical decision regarding whether the team should be disbanded. Disbanding of teams is generally a natural process that allows the investigation to concentrate on the remaining stages of the work in order to proceed with the investigation to a completion. The investigator-in-charge in turn reports to the Chief Investigator of Accidents and may propose findings as to the causes and contributing factors, as well as the safety recommendations linked to findings of the investigations. He also writes the accident investigation report. The report has to ensure that the root and surface causes of the accident are considered in the analysis. The report covers the underlying factors that contributed to the accidents and designed to remove the hazardous practices or conditions that may cause an accident in future (AAIB, 2013). The investigator-in-charge also makes the recommendations necessary for correcting hazardous work practices and conditions as well as he factors that contributed to the accident. While the surface causes will often be corrected on the spot, the investigator-in-charge makes the recommendations to correct the conditions for long-term health and safety. For instance, in the Boeing 747 accident at Lockerbie in December 1988, the investigator-in-chief had to integrate all aspects of investigator to show that an explosive device had case the accident. The investigator-in-chief went on to recommend the need to harden the cargo containers against possible blasts. This has become the standard for today’s planes (Jupp, 2014). How differences in national legal systems play a part in investigation Article 26 of the Chicago Convention obligates the State of Occurrence, depending on its legal system, to play a role instituting an inquiry into an accident in conformity with the ICAO procedures and emphasises that the States involved have to cooperate (Huang, 2009). Accordingly, Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention was adopted in 1951 to recommend Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for investigating aircraft incidents and accidents. In view of the fact that various authorities and agencies are likely to participant in the investigation, Annex 13 emphasises the need for coordination with the national or judicial authorities. Despite the call for cooperation, the differences in how national legal systems may delay, hinder or enhance investigations. The differences hinder the effectiveness of investigations. Indeed, the supremacy of domestic law over the investigative procedures that ICAO (2010) seeks to enforce under Article 26 of the Chicago Convention stands in the way of complete autonomy during the investigation process (ICAO, 2010). For instance, a State may following own established procedures, hence undermining and the safeguards ICAO seeks to put into force. An example of domestic interference with investigations is that accident of Air France Concorde F-BTSC at Gonesse immediately after it took-off from Charles de Gaul airport in July 2000. The AAIB carried the investigation alongside Airbus France and in conformity with the ICAO regulations. Once the technical investigation started, the French Minister for Transport directed that Air France withdraw Concorde from Service. Normally, no recommendation on the safety of an aircraft type needs to be made until AAIB concludes the investigation. The French Police later took control of crash site on behalf of the French Judiciary. This led to lack of cooperation between AAIB and the French Police, hence directly contravening the Chicago Convention. Later, it led to delay in investigations by more than three years (Jupp, 2014). The differences in how national legal systems bring about conflicts between the state authorities and ICAO. One of the sources of conflict comes about in the area of disclosing certain kinds of record. For instance, standard 5.12 of Annex 13 stipulates non-disclosure of particular kinds of records that the safety investigation authorities collect. The objective of the Standard is prevention of the misuse of the data by the individuals taking part in concurrent investigations. The national legal systems may however allow for disclosure of safety information when ‘the proper authority that administers justice within a particular State rules that the disclosure prevails over the unfavourable international and domestic impact (Trogeler, 2014). The differences also lead to non-compliance with international Standards by the States. Unlike the provisions of the Chicago Convention, the SARPs specified in the Annexes cannot be applied directly at the national level. They also lack a legal force that parallels that of the Chicago Convention. Therefore, the contracting States are having no obligation to implement or adhere to the standards of an Annex in case they find it unworkable. Hence, the legal systems of the states have the authority to decide what should be considered to be workable during the investigation rather than ICAO. Indeed, the States are only obligated to notify ICAO immediately when they face difficulty in aligning its legal system to the Annexes (Trogeler, 2014). The differences lead to non-compliance with international Standards by the States. In compliance with the Annex 13 provisions on investigation of an aircraft accident, ICAO demands that member states should report all aircraft accidents involving aircraft whose take-off mass are beyond 2,250 kilograms. The ICAO further engages in the collection of evidence on aircraft incidents regarded as crucial for purposes of accident prevention and general safety. However, statistics provided by the Trogeler (2014) show that about one-third of the States have failed to inform ICAO thus violating Standard 5.12 of Annex 13. The differences may bring about an imbalance between freedom of information and privacy during investigation. According to Trogeler (2014), many states seek to guarantee freedom of information (FOI) as a fundamental right. Within the context of aviation however, ICAO along with the accident investigators demand that the State should be subjected to this legislation to avoid the risks that sensitive safety data becomes available in the public domain. Such a situation was showed in the Netherlands in 1991 after a journalist of ‘de Volkskrant’ requested for copies of statements recorded by the Netherlands Aviation Safety Board had recorded while investigating the EL AL Flight 1862 accident that happened in Amsterdam in 1992. While requesting for the statement, the journalist referred to Article 110 of the Constitution, which advocates for fundamental freedom of information. Despite this, AIIB turned down access to the information based on Aviation Accident Act (AAA), which demands that ‘the preliminary investigation of an accident that the Boards undertake should not be in the public domain (Jupp, 2014). Conclusion Within the context of civil aviation, safety is an outcome of intricate activities that cover all domains of aviation. Article 44 of the Chicago Convention of 1944 provides that the main goal of ICAO is make sure the safe and systematic growth of international civil aviation globally. To prevent recurrence of accidents, the investigative process has to have an effective safety reporting system that ensures all accidents and incidents get documented. The investigative processes require the application of a holistic approach, such as Group System model to managing accident investigations. The System employing a large based of investigators and experts who have the skills and capacity to support the investigations. They are led by the investigator-in-chief. The role of an investigator-in-charge is confined within the areas of managing the investigations rather than being involved actively in the detailed investigations. He has the overall responsibility of managing the investigations. He is in charge of organising and controlling the individuals taking part in the investigation. He also co-ordinates the work of those taking part in the investigations, and organises each individual input, which he integrates into the final report. He also makes sure that he contributes satisfactorily to drafting the report of the accidents and offering recommendations to prevent recurrence of such events. In view of the fact that various authorities and agencies are likely to participant in the investigation, Annex 13 emphasises the need for coordination with the national or judicial authorities. Despite the call for cooperation, the differences in how national legal systems may delay, hinder or enhance investigations. References Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB). (2013). Aircraft Accidents and Serious Incidents. Hampshire: Air Accidents Investigation Branch Air Safety Investigation Branch Melbourne (1970). Accident Investigation Report: Boeing 707-321B Aircraft N892PA At Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) Airport, On 1st December, 1969. Retrieved: Heilbronn, G. (1990). Essays on Aviation and Travel Law in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press Huang, J. (2009). Aviation Safety and ICAO. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International International Civil Aviation Organization (2010). Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation. Retrieved: Jupp, J. (2014). Accidents and Agenda. Retrieved: OSHA Academy (2013). Effective Accident Investigation. Retrieved: Sleight, P. (2012). A holistic approach to aircraft accident/incident investigation. Retrieved: Trogeler, M. (2014). Criminalisation of air accidents and the creation of a Just Culture. Retrieved from: US Department of Energy (2013). Volume I: Accident Analysis Techniques. Washington, D.C: U.S. Department of Energy Read More