Analysis of Sandra v Mr. Jordan and Martin Case - Assignment Example

CONTRACT LAW STUDENT NAME TUTOR COURSE Date Sandra v Mr. Jordan and Martin The brief facts of the case are that Sandra had an agreement to hire Mr. Jordan’s white limousine to transport her to her party in a hotel, but a week before the event, Mr. Jordan sold the limousine to Martin. The condition imposed for sale at a lower price was only if Martin would agree to provide it to Sandra for the event. However Martin denied the existence of the arrangement to supply her with the car, and hired another for a higher price. A contract is formed effectively and enforced when two parties create legally binding obligations to perform based on a consideration. In this case, the contract formed by Sandra and Jordan can be said to be a unilateral contract as it is to be performed by Jordan and Sandra would furnish the consideration. Further a contract not made under a seal need to be supported by a valuable consideration as stated in Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10, however it is not stated whether Martin was paid, but one can say that there was a reliance by Sandra that Martin would bring the limousine to her party. It is a general rule in contract law that a third party to any contract is unable to acquire any rights or benefits under the contract as stated in Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 121 ER 762. This doctrine is considered and known as the “privity of contract” and that no person can derive any rights or obligations from contract which one has not given any consideration. There are however general exceptions that do exist in law mainly under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 which provides that a third party has the rights to enforce a contract if the contract expressly states that it is to be enforceable by that third party or if it purports to confer a benefit to him. The Act further provides that the third party’s rights to enforce cannot be taken away without the persons consent once he has informed the contracting parties of his acceptance of the contract or has acted in reliance of the contract. Further Martin knew of the existence of the contract of higher between Jordan and Sandra, and had accepted the terms imposed on him by Jordan during the sale. Further the doctrine of promissory estoppel in contract law as stated by Lord Denning in Alan v El Nasr [1972] 2 All ER 127 that if one party by his conduct leads another to believe that the obligations under the contract will be performed and that the other party relied on that undertaking and acted upon it, then a person cannot refuse to perform. It can be stated that promissory estoppel would compel Mr. Martin to undertake the obligations of providing the transport services, because he knew of the existence of the contract, hence non-performance would be in violation of the agreement to carry out the obligations since Sandra has been prejudiced by the agreement (Central London Property v High Trees). A promise under s 55 (6) is one that does appear to be intended to be legally binding which does create a duty enforceable by a beneficiary. Therefore it is in law that a contractual term does regulate the relationship that does exist between a promisor and a promisee will only be enforceable by a third party if it does amount to a promise to benefit that third part and can create an enforceable duty as was stated in Davis v Archer Park Newsagency Rockampton. In order for a third party to enforce a privy contract first it must confer a benefit under section1(1) a (ii), which is subject to a provisions as stated in Nisshin Shipping v Cleaves. It is not necessary for the third party to be identified expressly by name, answering a particular description. The Act provides that the remedies available to third parties are those provided for to the actual parties to the contract. A contract is frustrated as held in Taylor v Caldwell (1863) 122 ER 309 where a contract cannot be performed based on no fault from either of the parties. However the doctrine of frustration cannot be applied where the supervening event does not render the impossibility of performance but merely causes an extra expense or an inconvenience. This cannot be accepted as a good defence for Mr. Jordan based on the fact that the contract of hire was not impossible to perform since he would have waited and sold the limousine after the event. It can be said that the contract was impossible to perform due to the fault of the parties; hence they are liable to compensate Sandra for the fault. On the other hand Martin can claim that a promisee may enforce the promise under a contract since the third party in not a promisee then she is not privy to the contract as held in Dunlop Tyre Co v Selfridge [1915]. The consideration must move from the promisee under the contract, and since Martin was not the promisee then he would not be liable for the non-performance of the contract. The remedies that are available to Sandra after the reach of the contract under the doctrine of privity would be damages. Damages are imposed where the party suffered a financial loss following the other party’s breach of contract as was held in Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 156 ER 145. Since she had acted upon the promise by Jordan to her detriment, then she can recover losses incurred by her from both Martin and Jordan due to their failure to perform their undertakings under the contract. Sandra v Mr. Drake Sandra had hired Drake to take photographs of the whole evening, but on that day Drake’s camera jammed and the photographs did not come out. The films were not winding up correctly. It is stated under the law of contract that it is effective as long as there is effective acceptance of the terms of the contract. In this case one can say that acceptance of the agreement was by conduct as stated in Confetti Records v Warner Music (2003) that where the conduct of an individual can imply acceptance of the terms of the contract. Therefore the fact that Mr. Drake showed up to take the photos it meant he had accepted the terms provided for under the contract, hence he could not say that there was no contract between him and Sandra. It can also be implied from the conduct of the parties that they had really intended to create a legally binding contract from their conduct as regards taking photographs at the event The law of contract provides that as a common-law rule that a party to any contract is entitled to insist on the other parties’ performance of a contractual obligation as was held in Arcos v Ronaasen [1933] AC 470. It can however be stated in this case that Drake partly performed part of the contractual obligation taken by him, however he failed to complete it. Where there has been a part performance of an individual on the obligation imposed on him, then he cannot claim any form of claim for payment for part performance from the other party as held in Cutter v Powell (1795) 101 ER 573. It can also be said that Drake is expected to provide services that are fit as well as the photographs ought to have been handled with due care. This can be said to be true in consideration of section 13 of the Goods and Services Act 1982. The main reason for the photographs not being taken were based on the jamming of the camera, hence he ought to have taken reasonable care to ensure that the camera was fit and suitable to take the photos during the event. The agreement between Drake and Sandra was on the basis of non-payment of for the services offered by Drake, since she had promised to pay a month before the celebrations. It can be said that if she had not paid any amount then there was no consideration that was provided under the contract Frustration can be considered as a basis of discharging a contract. In law a contract is frustrated where after the conclusion of the agreement an event occurs that makes the performance impossible or gives something different contemplated. In this case the subject matter of the contract “photographs” have been effectively destroyed as stated in Taylor v Caldwell hence the contract can be discharged. This can be considered as a non-foreseeability of the event. On the other hand, Drake can claim that the jamming of the camera was an un-foreseeable occurrence hence excluded from any form of liability and that the contract had been frustrated. In order for frustration to be considered as a defence under the contract, it must render a contract impossible to perform and therefore since the camera was jammed, it was impossible for the contract to be performed hence Drake cannot be held liable for the non-production of the photographs which was the subject matter of the contract between him and Sarah. Further since there had been no consideration provided for by Sandra as regards the performance of the contract. In Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Exch 153 it was stated that a contract not under any seal must be supported by valuable consideration. In consideration of the remedies that are available to Sandra under the breach of contract by Drake, would be that since it was within reasonable contemplation. The damage would be on the measure of the physical loss and the profit loss. The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 at section 1(2) provides that it can entitle person to recover money paid to the prior frustrating event, remove any obligation to pay money that existed prior to the frustrating event or a set off as stated in Gamerco SA v ICM. However since it is not stated whether Sandra paid any amount, then she cannot pay Drake for non-performance of the contract. Further since Drake had accepted the contract by conduct, he can be subjected to pay damages under the contract however Sandra can retain her rights to claim damages under the contract. Sandra v Lindsey Sandra had hired Lindsey to cater for the event, but unknown to her it was contaminated with Salmonella making James and other guests’ violently sick after eating the contaminated chicken. To determine whether there was a valid contract for Lindsey to provide catering services, one can consider the performance of the contract. Generally acceptance of a contract can be by conduct as stated in Confetti Records v Warner Music (2003), therefore since Lindsey catered for the event, then there was a valid contract as the terms were accented to by contract. It can be said that the parties, that is both Sandra and Lindsey had an intention to create legally binding obligations since through their conduct as well as catering for the event would demonstrate their intention to be legally bound as stated in Rose & Frank v Crompton [1925] AC 445. The Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982- Part 1 is considered to apply section 12-25 of the 199 Act to supply of goods. Section 13 provides that in a contract for the supply of a service where the supplier is acting in the course of a business, there is usually an implied term that the supplier will carry out the service with reasonable care and skill. This is usually considered as a concept for the satisfactory quality and fitness for purpose of the goods and services to be supplied under the contract. It was held in the case of Wren v Holt [1903] 1 KB 610 where a customer had become ill from beer supplied to the Pub, due to arsenic contamination, it was stated that the supplier was liable in contract as the beer was not of a merchantability quality. Further the duty of care though used in tort is usually considered essential in contract law in relation to contracts that involve services. In Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 it was stated that the manufacturers had a duty of care to the consumer of their product and hence were considered liable for the negligent in their products. One can say that there was an implied contract that since Lindsey is a caterer, she ought to have given due care to ensure that the food prepared was fit for use and not contaminated by Salmonella. The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 section 2 (1) provides that a person cannot by reference to any contract term exclude or restrict his liability for death or personal injury resulting from negligence. Further the Consumer Protection Act 1987 at section 7 provides that a person who has suffered a loss or damage caused wholly or partly by a defect in a product shall not be limited or excluded by any contract term. In this case therefore Lindsey cannot be excluded from liability, since she had acted negligently, even though she had not known of the existence of Salmonella in the food. It can be regarded that in this case Lindsey had effectively performed her obligations under the contract, however the performance was not to the letter expected from her in consideration of the case of Bunge v Tradax [1981] All ER 513. This can be treated as part performance of the obligations since she provided the food under her catering services, she provided contaminated food hence cannot demand payment as stated in Cutter v Powell (1795) 101 ER 573. However since the contract was performed, then Lindsey would be entitled to payment however her liability in damages would be to the extent of non-performance that is failure in providing the best quality food for the guests. The contract in this case can be stated to have been frustrated however in lieu of the contract, it is not stated whether the payment of the services was paid or not. Under Section15 of the Sale of goods Act 1979 it is stated that where under a contract for the supply of goods and services the consideration for the service is not determined by the contract, then there is an implied term that the party contracting (Sandra) would pay the reasonable charge. It can be argued by Lindsey that she is entitled to be paid reasonably for her services and not be refused based on the grounds of providing the contaminated chicken. The remedies that would be available to Sandra under the contract between her and Lindsey would be damages. A general breach of a contractual obligation arises where the party fails or refuses to perform what is due from him under the contract or performs defectively or incapacitates himself from performing without any lawful excuse. In this case Sandra can choose to affirm the contract in addition a right to claim damages under the contract. REFERENCES Furmston, P.M., 2012. Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston’s Law of Contract. 16th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press Furmston, M., 2003. Law of Contract. 15th ed. New York: Butterwoths. Joseph, C. and Gordon, A., 1983. Chitty on Contracts. London : Sweet & Maxwell McKendrick, E., 2005. Contract Law-Text Cases and Materials. Oxford: Oxford University Press Reynell A. W. 1997. Anson’ s Law of Contract. 27th ed. New York : Clarendon Press Sale of Goods Act 1979 Trietel GH., 1995. Treitel on the Law of Contract, 9th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell Unfair Contract Terms Act (1977) Wilmott, L., Christensen , S., and Dixin, B. 2009. Contract Law, 3rd ed. Melbourne: Oxford University Press Read More