International Terrorism FARC Organization - Case Study Example

International Terrorism FARC Organization “The FARC calls it popular justice, but what they do is kill people without consulting anyone” (Guaviare resident, May 5, 1997, in Human Rights Watch 1998) 1. Introduction The FARC as an insurgent movement does have political program made public for many years, but it is rarely presented in media reports about the war or in the debates about ways to resolve the war. FARC fails to really articulate its political platform but instead carried out dozens of major military actions and criminal offences. The following section discuss how the ideology of the organization has changed throughout the years, how are they financed, and how they gain and loss their support. 2. The Changing Ideology of FARC The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC had its beginnings in the civil conflict known as La Violencia, which began with the assignation of presidential candidate Jorge Eliecer Gaitan on April 9, 1948. At first a loose association of peasant self-defense groups, this mostly rural movement came increasingly under the influence of the Communist Party and declared itself a revolutionary army in 1964 (Human Rights Watch 1998, p.132) The FARC organization, according to Cragin & Daly (2004), engages in guerilla warfare and fight for control of Colombia to take power and institute socialist reforms. FARC therefore can be considered as an organization having an insurgent strategy as well as a radical socialist ideology. Moreover, it is the combination of both ideology and strategy in this case that galvanizes its members toward a common goal (p.31). However, the virtual disappearance of Communism as an organizing ideology was an important factor in the post-Cold War evolution of Marxist-Leninist groups in Latin America. Leftist terrorist groups in the region lost and suffered from their newly discredited ideological underpinnings. FARC acknowledged the fact that their ideological beginnings have been globally discredited and state sponsorship of terrorist groups declined significantly thus although they continue to espouse political motivations for the sake of group survival, the FARC have focused most of their post-Cold War attention on criminal activities, such as producing and trafficking drugs, and kidnapping for ransom (Siegel et al. 2003, p.162). Imperialism is a main adversary and FARC struggles against globalization. The US therefore is alleged as an imperialist threat and investment in Colombia by US or any multinational is a threat. Eventually the political influence of the US and Latin America is also condemned. Regarding foreign relations, any country interfering with Colombia’s internal affair is an enemy. FARC generally believed that revolution is the only way to get control over the country as to avoid the US’s influence or invasion. During the time of Arenas, FARC developed a policy of gender equality. FARC also believes in people’s education and the movement has courses for its combatants. Generally, they are focused on the evolution of man from a Marxist perspective and give its members guidelines for proper socialist behavior and to organize them to be good citizens of a future communist world (Engeland & Rudolph 2008, p.139). Today, the government of Colombia is calling FARC the “Talibanes” or “Bin Ladenes”. Similarly, the US politicians designated FARC as an international threat despite the fact that the movement activities are located only in Colombia. The reason for being labeled terrorist in a global level is the fact the they are organized in the same style of operation as Bin Laden, organizing in small cells that do not have contact with each other and depend on a central command to organize attacks, in terms of logistics and finance. Although it is evident that FARC never had any international project or attempted to attack other countries, it clearly plays a role in international security as it sells arms to other terrorist groups in the world. In addition, since its political failure, it has come back to the military way and when it stated that mayors, councilors, governors and public functionaries are military objectives, they make it clear that all means are available. (Engeland & Rudolph 2008, p.144). Over the years, FARC has developed significantly, altered its policy, and modified its style. To communicate its goals, FARC fashioned a political wing in 2000, the Bolivariano, to struggle against state terrorism, the discriminations, disparities, unemployment, and the disgrace before US imperialism (Holmes et al. 2009, p.58). The FARC has seen a profound development as an organization in their forty years of life- just as the FARC of 1964 was very dissimilar in terms of its political focus and military power than the FARC of 1984. According to Murillo & Avirama (2004), FARC once maintained substantial legitimacy and support within the peasantry and represented interests as a political and military group. Today, that support has shrink significantly for several reasons such as the responsibility for twenty seven assassinations, direct threats, cases of occupation, dislocation, detention, and force work of indigenous community members of Colombia. Moreover, the FARC is also responsible for brutal and senseless murder of three US-based indigenous rights activist. Consequently, the murder mystified many and sickened even more because a group claiming as the ‘People’s Army’ is executing such dreadful act against three defenseless civilians who were just carrying out work for indigenous (p.75). 3. FARC Finances In the 1960s, FARC was receiving financial support, logistic, training, and military assistance from the Colombian Communist Party and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it is raising extra funds locally through revolutionary taxes (Heiberg et al. 2007, p.71). In the passing of time, drug export rise and restructured FARC’s financial status. The cocaine export enable FARC to access new and higher levels of financial resources. It has also found new bases of social support centered on the peasant coca farmers and the large community of nomadic laborers. In 2003, FARC’s was reported to have income of about 83 million US dollars and they came from annual revenues form kidnapping and stealing cattle. The drug trade, primarily through taxing of coca and cocaine processing, earned FARC approximately 18 million dollars (Heiberg et al. p.72). FARC needs a lot of money to sustain the movement, shelter its members and carry on its actions. The drug trade is a sensible method of funding which according to Engeland & Rudolph (2008), led FARC to commit gross human rights violations by annihilating small communities in order to quiet them and to threaten those who do not support their activities. Moreover, all businesses and companies operating in rural areas, including agricultural, oil, and mining interests are required to pay taxes to protect them from attacks and kidnapping. The financial growth of FARC through the drug market as described by some experts is also the unintentional outcome of a series of strategic successes in US antidrug policies. For instance, by trying to take apart the Medellin and Cali drug cartels and coercing the Colombian government to attack them, the US policy has pushed coca farming in the zone under FARC’s control. Consequently, drug brought further wealth to the movement than looting and stealing goods and robbing motorist at highway blockades (p.138). 4. How FARC is gaining their support Weapons in the FARC’s region routinely move from Venezuela into Colombia. Some of those arms according to Cragin & Hoffman (2003) were coming from the Venezuelan Armed Forces while others are from the black-market. There are evidences to support that members of the Venezuelan Armed Forces who are sympathetic to FARC have supplied the groups with weapons and ammunition (p.29). Various mechanisms for money laundering are used by FARC and some reports according to Cooper & Vargas (2003) believed that they have influence in various banks operating in Ecuador which facilitates the transfer of funds outside of Colombia. From there, FARC manage its finances electronically, using computers and accessing its accounts online from the jungle. Arms shipments have frequently been arranged using this method, making it safe for the rebel group (p.138). Although FARC has the ability to expand its military forces and the areas they operate, the organization has some critical weaknesses. One is its linkage to criminal elements thus its lack of support among the population at large. In fact, the result of opinion polls conducted as Rabasa & Chalk (2001) explains, shows only five percent of the population support FARC. In addition, although it has some support in the cities, its presence in these areas is limited. However, in the areas where it predominates, the FARC has endeavored to institutionalize popular support by setting up political support groups through selective terror and intimidation (p.30). At this time, the FARC has an estimated 10,000 members and retains some military strength, largely due to revenue for drug trade and other criminal activity. However, it has suffered setbacks, both on the battlefield and in its internal organization. Communications have broken down and there have been growing defections, including the high-profile case of Karina, a guerilla commander who surrendered last May 2008 because she was allegedly starving and had not had communication with FARC leadership in two years. Moreover, effective intelligence, counter-terrorism efforts, raid, and air strikes by the Colombian government made FARC operations miserable and disgraceful. FARC according to Lowenthal et al. (2009) has a different sense of time and is unlikely to surrender despite of the setbacks and weakening forces (73). Reference List: Cragin K. & Daly S. A. (2004). The dynamic terrorist threat: an assessment of group motivations and capabilities in a changing world, Issue 1782, US: Rand Corporation, 2004 Cragin K. & Hoffman B. (2003). Arms trafficking and Colombia, US: Rand Corporation Cooper P. J. & Vargas C. M. (2007). Sustainable development in crisis conditions: challenges of war, terrorism, and civil disorder, US: Rowman & Littlefield Engeland A. & Rudolph R. M. (2008). From terrorism to politics: Ethics and global politics. UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. Heiberg M., O'Leary B., & Tirman J. (2007). Terror, insurgency, and the state: ending protracted conflicts, US: University of Pennsylvania Press Holmes J. S., Gutiérrez S. A., & Curtin K. M. (2009). Guns, Drugs, and Development in Colombia, US: University of Texas Press Human Rights Watch (1998). War without quarter: Colombia and international humanitarian, US: Human Rights Watch Lowenthal A.F., Piccone T., & Whitehead L. (2009). The Obama Administration and the Americas: Agenda for Change, US: Brookings Institution Press Murillo M. A. & Avirama J. R. (2004). Colombia and the United States: war, unrest, and destabilization, US: Seven Stories Press Rabasa A. & Chalk, P. (2001). Colombian labyrinth: the synergy of drugs and insurgency and its implications for regional stability, Issue 1339 Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability, US: Rand Corporation Read More