Legally-Enforceable Contracts - Assignment Example

Part A 1) Judge Salmon agrees with the other judges that arrangements between close relations are not normally presumed to involve legally-enforceable contracts. However, in this case, Salmon takes account of the special circumstances—Ms. Padavatton having left an established home and career in the United States to study for the Bar in England at her mother’s request and concludes that such a drastic upheaval in Ms. Padavatton’s life in response to her mother’s offer of support leads to a reasonable inference that a contract has been created. However, Judge Salmon believes that even though a binding contract exists, Ms. Padavatton has breached it by failing to complete her studies for the Bar in a reasonable time rather that the promise of support was only for a reasonable time? was contingent on this. To the extent that Ms. Jones and Ms. Padavatton amended their contractual relationship (which Judge Salmon does not believe that they did) did they according to Salmon? when Ms. Jones bought a house and gave Ms. Padavatton permission to live in it rent-free, Judge Salmon is not convinced that this change alters Ms. Smith’s obligation to complete her legal studies in a reasonable time. 2) Ms. Padavatton’s statement describing her feelings towards her mother after her mother had begun legal proceedings to evict Ms. Padavatton from her domicile are not a reliable indication that the arrangement between her and her mother did not constitute a contract. For one thing, six years had passed between the beginning of the arrangement and Ms. Jones’ commencement of legal proceedings against her daughter. The passage of that much time is sufficient to alter the character of most relationships, and significantly to color recollections of past feelings and attitudes Fair enough. Further, there is no reason to believe that the existence of a legal contract between mother and daughter would in any way abrogate their pre-existing familial relationship are these your own words?; thus Ms. Padavatton’s emotional reaction to her mother’s actions were appropriate for a daughter involved in a serious dispute with her mother, but do not contradict the existence of a legal relationship in addition to their familial relationship. 3) In return for her agreement to relocate to England, Ms. Padavatton gave up a good job with pension rights, and of course put herself and her son through the difficulty and inconvenience of a long distance move OK. Assuming that she had been working as an attorney in the United States why assume this? , it is also worth noting that Ms. Padavatton gave up much of the value of her experience and seniority, as even had she completed her legal studies in England, she would have been a novice in English law. 4) In Todd v Nichol, the Todds left their home in Scotland, sold their furniture and belongings, paid their travel expenses from Scotland to Australia, and, in Grace’s case, gave up gainful employment. OK 5) Judge Mayo believes that Ms. Nichol’s letters to the Todds constitute an offer, in the sense that the Todds’ acceptance of Ms. Nichol’s proposal created a legally binding contract. While the judge admits that the circumstances are ambiguous, the extent to which the Todds disrupted their lives and incurred expenses, making no provision for a convenient return to the status quo ante, in order to take up residence with Ms. Nichol is evidence that significant consideration so? - there was consideration, but whether there is an intention to create legal relations is an other matter isn’t it? was given in return for the right to reside with Ms. Nichol. While he does not state this explicitly, it is possible that the absence of a close familial relationship and of personal acquaintance between Ms. Nichol and the Todds weighed in favor of his view that their relationship was contractual. Further, he reasons that just as Ms. Nichol’s amendments to her will to benefit the Todds constitutes a legally-binding protection, her intentions were to create a contractual relationship with the Todds while she was still alive. Anything else? 6) Judge Mayo agrees with plaintiffs that there is a legally binding contract between them and Ms. Nichol; however, he agrees with Ms. Nichol that even if such a contract exists, it includes, by implication, the provision that the Todds should behave in a “reasonable and decent” manner. As the elder Ms. Todd did not in fact conduct herself “reasonably and decently”, Judge Mayo ruled that she had breached her contract with Ms. Nichol, and thus had forfeited her right to live in Ms. Nichol’s house. OK 7) In both Jones v Padavatton and Todd v Nichol, a contract has been created by virtue of one party’s acceptance of an offer to relocate internationally, said acceptance including the abandonment or sale of home, possessions, friends, employment, and so on, in return for the provision of new living arrangements. There are two significant differences between these cases: First, Ms. Jones’ offer to Ms. Padavatton was explicitly based upon the latter’s commitment to study for the U.K. Bar, while Ms. Nichol’s offer to the Todds was not predicated upon any such specific commitment. Second, Ms. Jones and Ms. Padavatton were mother and daughter, and thus had a close and intense relationship quite apart from their contract; while Ms. Nichol was related to the Todds only by marriage, and was not well acquainted with them at the time their contract was created. 8) In order to support an argument for equitable estoppel, several things must be shown: the recipient of a promise must have a clear and reasonably held belief that the person who made the promise will follow through on it; the person making the promise must encourage this belief; the recipient of the promise must affirmatively rely on it; the recipient must suffer in some way if the promise is not kept; and breaking the promise must be in some way unconscionable. In Todd v Nichol, there would have been a strong case for equitable estoppel had Nichol refused to allow the Todds to live with her immediately upon their arrival in Australia. However, the fact that Nichol had indeed set out to fulfill her promise, and that she had evicted the Todds only after they had lived with her for several years, seriously weakens this argument. After all, was it reasonable for the elder Ms. Todd to expect to continue to live rent-free when her behavior was clearly objectionable to her host? OK Regarding the Todds’ loss or detriment from having moved to Australia, as a matter of equity it could be argued that this detriment was clearly outweighed by the benefit of the several years rent free accommodation they had already received. more doubtful Finally, under the circumstances, Ms. Nichol’s eviction of the Todds can hardly be considered unconscionable; after all, it would be completely unreasonable to expect her to live the rest of her life uncomfortable in her own home. Accordingly, an argument for equitable estoppel should be firmly rejected. Part B 1) It would appear that there is in fact a contract with between Wilson and Deborah requiring him to pay her an annual dress allowance of $80,000 for the duration of their marriage. As part of the couple’s pre-marital negotiations, Deborah insisted on such an allowance as a condition for their marriage; and Wilson agreed to this condition. In return for this allowance, Deborah offered her marital favors—consisting, presumably, of companionship, exclusive sexual relations, and so on— meaning exactly? as a consideration. While this may seem reprehensibly mercenary, it is a common sort of arrangement among the wealthy and socially prominent; and Wilson’s acceptance of Deborah’s terms can be taken as an indication that he felt the consideration was adequate. so? Does that mean it is good consideration? Given the tenor of the couple’s premarital discussions, it is apparent that Deborah was suggesting a contractual arrangement; she made it quite clear that the marriage would not proceed without Wilson’s agreement to pay her clothing allowance. why? Explain Wilson, as a qualified, successful, and wealthy brain surgeon, can hardly claim that he was unaware of the nature of what was being arranged. Hadn’t they already agreed to marry prior to the arrangment about the dress allowance? 2) Even if we posit that a binding contract does not exist, Deborah has a reasonably strong case for equitable estoppel. Wilson, after all, made a promise at the outset of their relationship; and his payment of the first years dress allowance was a clear indication that he took his promise seriously. Deborah, then, had every reason to rely on Wilson’s promise. While last year’s clothes are presumably still in wearable condition, Deborah obviously embarked upon this relationship on the basis that she would be able to continue to dress herself in the best and latest fashions. For her to be seen in last year’s dresses would significantly damage her social standing, and thus would constitute a genuine and severe detriment; and, as Deborah married Wilson only on condition that he promise to provide her clothing allowance, she obviously placed reliance on Wilson’s word to that effect. How does D rely on the promise to her detriment? The only weak point in this argument is the question of unconscionability: since Deborah is no longer living with Wilson, and is no longer being faithful to him, Wilson can claim with some justice that as she is no longer keeping her marital vows he should no longer be held to his promises. In effect, Wilson must claim that his promise to provide a clothing allowance “as long as the marriage lasted” referred to the state of living together as husband and wife, and not merely to the continuation of the marriage as a legal situation. he is no longer receiving the consideration for which Deborah is demanding payment consideration is not necessary for an equitable estoppel. That is the point. If it were then you would have a contract!. Thus for Deborah to establish a claim for equitable estoppel, she must persuade the Court that Wilson’s promise referred to the legal state of marriage, and did not refer to anything beyond that. consideration she offered Wilson in return for his financial support was the fame and public esteem he would gain as her husband, and not any of the more mundane benefits of marriage. 3) The final set of hypothetical circumstances would considerably strengthen Deborah’s case for equitable estoppel. Here, she has made a large purchase of clothing based not only upon Wilson’s initial promise made before their marriage, but also upon his apparent, albeit grudging, rude, and possibly ambiguous confirmation that he was still bound by his earlier promise Is that what he is saying?. Further, having relied upon Wilson’s promise by ordering $80,000 worth of new dresses that she otherwise could not afford how? - explain, Deborah will now incur a concrete and material financial loss. The most that Wilson can claim is that his response to her request for payment of her clothing allowance was not meant to be understood as assent; but it will be difficult for him to persuade a Court that “You can do what you damned well want” is a clear and effective way of saying “no”. hardly indicates support Further, Wilson’s reference to Deborah as “ungrateful” can be taken as his reaction to giving her the new installment of her clothing allowance, since Deborah did live with him for a year after he paid the initial installment and thus can be presumed to have shown some gratitude at that time. Deborah’s argument is weakened, of course, by the fact that Wilson did not pay her clothing allowance at the end of their first year of marriage; Wilson will claim that this eliminated any reasonable claim she could make that she relied on his promise when making the new purchases. Deborah must persuade the court that it was reasonable for her to interpret Wilson’s response to her telephone call as a promise to pay at least the current installment of her clothing allowance. Read More