Reversal of Legal Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases - Essay Example

Reversal of Legal Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases Introduction Burden of proof onus probandi refers to thelegal obligation that a person in a dispute must provide satisfactory justification up to specific standard of proof in order that the court proves that certain facts in a criminal case are true.1 The ECHR-European Convention on Human Rights of which England is a signatory provides that a person is assumed innocent until proven guilty. This means that the prosecution must always bear the burden of showing to the court that the defendant is liable for the offences stated.2 In the case of Woolmington v DPP,3 the House of Commons declared the decision by the presiding judge of reversing the burned of proof as a fallacy and held that the prosecution should always bear the burden of proof. In criminal cases, the need to prove criminal culpability rests upon the prosecution, which has to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt. However, there are exceptions to the attached to this rule. It is subject to the defence of insanity or any statutory exceptions.4 In other words, if the defense enters an insanity plea, the burden of proofing rests on them or if the parliament using statutes specifically expresses that, the burden should fall on the accused. This paper discusses the circumstances under which the English law allows for a reverse legal burden of proof during a criminal preceding and how the law succeeds in keeping the reversals within reasonable limits. Reversal of Legal Onus of Proof on the Prosecution As already, stated, the burden of proof in criminal acts squarely lays on the prosecution. However, the burden of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt may shift especially when the defendant has the evidential burden of putting up an effective defence. It is worth noting that when the defendant has the evidential burden of proof, the legal onus of proving a crime remains with the prosecution. For instance, a defendant charged for assaulting another person may indicate to the court that he acted in self-defence and therefore the burden of proving the offence will not lie on the prosecution. In certain instances, the legal burden of proof in criminal cases may shift from the prosecution to the defence.5 The most common is when the defendant intends to be acquitted based on an insanity plea. In such cases, it is incumbent upon the defendant to show the court that he is insane and was not in the right frame of mind at the time the offense. Therefore, the defendant will be called upon to prove elements of his defence or alternatively disprove elements that make up the criminal charges. In the recent past, courts in the United Kingdom have relied on the ECHR provisions to evaluate the assumption of innocence until the guilt is proven and this is what determines whether the court will dispense with the burden of proof on the part of the prosecution. The rule on the burden of proof placed upon the prosecution in criminal cases may be reversed under special circumstances.6 This rule is subject to the defence of insanity and any other statutory exceptions that may be placed upon the court through legislations by parliament. The implication of this is that the accused holds the legal onus of showing the court that he is insane if he raises it as a defence or if parliament has stated through a statute that an accused should bear the responsibility of proving case beyond reasonable doubt. The intention of parliament may be implied or expressed, but where the intentions are implied, the judges must use the relevant rules of statutory interpretation. Before the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1988 (HRA), the reversal of legal burdens was automatic especially if permitted by the statutes expressly. The reason for this is the fact that the courts acknowledged the sovereignty of the legislature of creating exceptions to any law. However, section 4 of the HRA changed the initial position as it gave the courts the power to make deliberations of statutory provisions that were deemed contrary to the provisions of the ECHR. For instance, in the case of R v Lambert7where the courts held that they could not retrospectively apply the HRA due to the clause on automatic reversal of the legal burden.8 The courts have also allowed the shifting of the problem of proving a criminal case that is attached on the prosecution in other landmark cases such as McNaughten (1843) and R v Hunt 9 as well as R v Johnstone. In these cases, the courts argued that the HRA as well as the Article 6 of the ECHR did not make the presumption of innocence absolute. In addition, these courts have expressly stated that the law on the reversal of the burden of proof is the same for indictable and summary offences. Further, the courts have also held that the reversal of the burden of proof can be applied even if the punishment for a particular offence should be the maximum penalty as seen in the case of R v Johnstone.10 The courts follow certain guidelines when giving way of the right to reversal of the right to prove a criminal case beyond reasonable doubt from the prosecution to the accused or the defendant. In allowing the reversal, the courts recognize the fact that the parliament did not deliberately intend to shift the burden of proof to the defendant or the accused. Secondly, the court must look at the level of probability the parties will go through in effecting the probative burden. This was shown in the case of Nimmo v Alexander Cowan & Sons Ltd11, where the plaintiff assumed the burden of proof based on a reasonably of practicable course as opposed to the defendant.12 In addition to the aforementioned provisions, the courts also look at the gravity of the offence in order to determine whether to reverse the burden of proof placed upon the prosecution. However, the giving away of the reversal of the burden of proof in criminal matters, the courts have tended to act within reasonable limits. An instance when the court controls this reversal is when the offense is relatively a minor one or does not attract a large penalty as was held in the case of R v. Chargot (2009). It is also important to note that whenever the courts reverse the burden of proof from the prosecution, they restrict it to the evidential burden as held in the R v. Lambert case the honourable court found that it would be prudent to restrict the statutory provision that imposes legal burden on the defence counsels.13 The English courts are also reluctant to push over the burden for proving the intention to commit a criminal act as the case of R v. Keogh shows.14 The courts therefore ensure that the maximum penalties point to the seriousness of the offense. This is majorly applied in order to ensure that an unfair verdict or sentence is not given to an innocent individual that may lead to a harsh penalty because they were unable to prove his innocence. This confirms the provisions of Article 6 (2) of the ECHR that holds that a person is presumed innocent until his guilt has been proven. The implication of this is the fact that the courts will be reluctant to transfer the onus of providing criminal guilt on the accused or the defendant. However, it should be noted that courts do not have clear guidelines for issuing the penalties and each judge usually offers their own opinions when deciding to reverse the burden of proof. This is the position adopted in the Lambert case15 as well as the House of Lords decision in Sheldrake v DPP16 where the court allowed a reversal for a maximum penalty of six months. The courts are at times cautious in granting the reversal of the burden of proof and they achieve this through the adoption of a structured approach in order to reverse the onus. An organized framework that shows the presumption of innocence was demonstrated in the case of Sheldrake v DP17, where the court held that despite the fact that parliament intended to enforce a legal burden on the defendant; he should only bear the evidential burden placed upon him by the circumstances and the rule of law.18 However, despite the actions by the courts to regulate how it exercises the reversal of the burden of proof provisions, they still find difficulties in determining what serious criminality is. This makes this practice of English courts uncertain, as there is no absolute rule that places the burden of the prosecution in the proving of a criminal case beyond reasonable doubt. Conclusion In conclusion, it is important to restate the judiciary has exercised the reversal of the burden of proof in criminal matters in English courts on several occasions but dependent on the onus of proving the evidence. This is premised on the fact that a person is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proven. In such cases, the courts have shifted the burden from the prosecution to the defendant when the accused person intends to claim in court that he committed the offence while in unstable state of mind. Similarly, courts have insisted on giving statutes the meanings which parliament intended them to have and therefore used the rules of statutory interpretation in order to find out on which side the burden of proof exists. However, in the exercise of this power, the courts have exercised due caution in order to ensure that justice is done to both parties in a case that is the prosecution and the defendant’s side. Through such a move, the courts have been able to balance their opinions to ensure that the onus of proving criminal cases is on the right person and according to the laws of evidence. Bibliography Dennis, I.H., The Law of Evidence, 3rd edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2007). Durston, G., Evidence: Text and Materials, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Molan, M. T., Cases and Materials on Criminal Law, 4th edn (New York: Routledge-Cavendish , 2008). Munday, R., Evidence, 7th edn (Oxford:Oxford University Press) Murphy, P., Murphy on Evidence, 10th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) Slapper, G., The English Legal System 2014-2015 15th edn (Routledge, London, 2014,) Tapper, C and Cross, R., Cross and Tapper on Evidence, 11th edn, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). DennisI. H, The Law of Evidence 3rd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2007, 438 Article 6.2 ECHR Woolmington v DPP (1935) AC 462 [2000] UKHL 37. [1986] 3 WLR 1115 [2003] UKHL 28 [1968] AC 107 Read More