Attempted Crime Should Be Punished Just as Severely as Completed Crime - Assignment Example

Attempted Crime Should Be Punished Just As Severely As Completed Crime Attempted Crime Should Be Punished Just As Severely As Completed Crime A person may be found guilty of attempted crime when, with the intent of committing crime, they engage in conduct that is likely to actualize the commission of the intended crime. Hence, attempt is a criminal law offense which occurs when one is dangerously close to committing an intended criminal act but fails to actually commit it (Davies 2008, p. 15). For one to be found guilty of attempted crime, it must be proven that there was intent to commit the crime and that they were dangerously close to successfully complete the crime but did not complete all the necessary elements. On the other hand, before one is charged and possibly convicted, the completion of a crime in which they are found guilty is usually needed. It may therefore be said that the law’s procedure is to threaten criminal tendencies with unpleasant consequences for the sake of deterrence. From that perspective, this paper will critically discuss the statement that attempted crime should be punished just as severely as completed crime. For the purpose of this discussion, intent may be defined as conscious purpose or objective. Therefore, a person acting with intent to commit a crime does so when their conscious purpose or objective is to complete the crime, whether it succeeds or fails. Viewed from this perspective, it can easily be argued that the punishment for attempted and completed crime should be equally severe (Kadish 2010, p. 508). This can best be explained by the example of, say, a person is approached by a gun-wielding thief in the street. The thief demands that he be given all the money the person has but the person only happens to be carrying a matchbox and tissue paper. Finding nothing of value on the person, the thief runs away. However, it is clear that the situation turned into attempted robbery only because the person did not have anything of value him and not because the thief ran away without stealing anything. The fact that the crime reduced to attempted robbery was not because of the thief’s conscious. Further, his actions were more than merely preparatory to committing a crime. Viewed from that approach, it can be said that for deterrence purposes, he should be charged just as severely as a thief who completed the crime Yaffe (2008, p. 2). The value of threat of criminal prohibitions needs to be necessarily maximised because when deterrence is maximised, the cost of crime is minimised. On the other hand, it is also costly to create and carry out such threats, which implies that the cost of avoiding crime must also be minimised. Therefore, minimising what crime avoidance and actual crime would cost is an efficient and effective deterrent. It may also be argued that if the intended thief above bought the gun and planned the robbery but never actually took steps to rob, that does not enough fulfil the conditions for an attempt.  That is true even if he actually intended to rob. In order for an attempt to be committed, the perpetrator must go beyond planning or preparing for the crime and take steps to actualise the plan. According to People v Perez, 50 Cal. 4th 222, 230 (2010), an attempted crime requires specific intent to commit crime and the commission direct although unsuccessful acts towards completing the crime (Kadish 2010, p. 509). This supports the conventional way of labeling crime by the damage it causes but it can be criticised. For example, the person in the attempted robbery is better off when the thief runs away without stealing anything than if he had had cash on him. However, that should not form the basis of determining the severity of crime because the thief had nothing to do with the results of his actions. Supporters of this argument would opine that robbery and attempted robbery should have the same sentence because when attempted robbery is sentenced less severely, criminals would soon get back to their ways and try to succeed. The key concept supporting this opinion is deterrence. When crime is defined by the legislature, specific punishment is also outlined for persons shown to have acted in certain ways under certain circumstances with certain consequences beyond reasonable doubt. A critical analysis of this definition also defines the concept of attempting to commit crime. Hence, when attempting to commit a crime is also defined as a crime, the criminal justice system is also granted the power to punish attempted crime. But the question of severity is not addressed in the definition of crime and attempted crime, which poses the question as to what problem a system that automatically makes it a crime to attempt a defined crime solves. According to Yaffe (2008, p. 1), the system is an attempt to address inequality because there is no difference between persons who attempt to commit crime but fail and those who attempt and succeed. Therefore, systems that punish attempted crime less severely than completed crime treat their equally deserving subjects differently for no justifiable reason. According to a utilitarian theory of punishment proposed by scholar Jeremy Bentham, the severity of punishment should be incremental at successive stages of the course of conduct of crime (Morse 2009, p. 365). This is a suggestion that the punishment needs to be adjusted such that there is an incentive to restrain potential offenders from actualizing their intent at every stage of their mischief. However, this should not be the case because the incentive is not under the control of the potential offender as much as their intent. An opinion that asserts attempted crime should not be punished as severely as completed crime can be described using the example of attempted murder, which is committed when a person tries to kill another but is not successful. Here, it can be argued that attempted murder fundamentally differs from other serious assault crimes because the defendant must be proven to have had intent to kill, had claimed their intention or threatened the victim with death before the crime. However, if the attempt is not successful and does not result in death, the prosecution often defines attempted murder basing on crime’s nature, which mostly results in incorrect accusations of attempted murder rather than assault (Jacqueline 2009, p. 104). In that case, another school of thought will argue that attempted crime should be punished less severely than completed crime. For example, the elements of attempted murder include taking action towards murdering and the defendant’s intent to murder. Therefore, mere preparation or planning to murder does not constitute the elements of attempted murder which require direct acts such as the use of weapons to inflict serious injury on a person. In such a case, critics would argue that the defendant should receive less severe punishment than one who actually completed murder. In support of the need to have different severities in the punishment of attempted and completed crime, critics often point out that some jurisdictions have different levels of charges of attempted murder (Norman 2010, p. 112). In such jurisdictions, while a charge of first-degree attempted murder will require proof of premeditation, a charge of second-degree attempted murder will entail any unplanned or unintentional act. These two charges are punished with different severity and, more importantly, they both differ from the punishment handed out for completed murder charges. The sole reason for the difference arises from whether life was lost or not rather than intent. However, this approach can be criticised because it does not address inequality. So long as the intent was real, the fact that the attempt failed does not absolve the defendant of crime and there is no incentive to stop them from repeating the attempt with more determination to succeed. When a person has the intent to commit crime and engages in conduct that carries such purpose forward to dangerously close proximity of completion, they are evidently guilty of the attempt to complete the intended crime. That is regardless of whether they complete the intended crime or not. Hence, the punishment should be as severe as that handed out for completed crime (Jacqueline 2009, p. 109). Agreeably, the defendant’s conduct must have gone beyond preparation and be directed at accomplishing the intended crime, but it does not need to be the last necessary act to complete the actual commission. Accepting the justification of punishing attempted crime less severely than completed crime can be said to be a commitment to deny citizens moral luck (Ashworth 2010, p. 69). From the perspective of moral luck, it may be said that an attempted crime and completed crime differ morally by virtue of different aspects that are not determined by the agents of the actions. After all, the difference between completed and attempted crime is purely circumstantial and has nothing to do with the defendant. However, most jurisdictions have more severe penalties for completed crimes than attempted crime without adequately justifying the discrepancy (Davies 2008, p. 14). This is in disregard of moral luck which provides that it is simply a matter of luck when a result occurs from performing an act that is outside the control. When an attempt in crime fails for reasons beyond the control of the actor, that does not warrant less severe punishment and the result must not be used to determine the deserved punishment. Rather, the intent should be perceived as a more significant and substantial component of deciding the punishment. References Ashworth, A 2010, Criminal attempts and the role of resulting harm under the code, McGraw, New York. Davies, J 2008, ‘Why attempts, deserve less punishment than complete crimes’, Law and Philosophy, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 11-16. Jacqueline, M 2009, The English legal system, Oxford University Press, London. Kadish, S 2010, ‘Trying, intending and attempted crimes’. Philosophical Topics, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 505-532. Morse, S 2009, ‘Reasons, results and criminal responsibility’, University of Illinois Law Review, vol. 84, no. 2, pp. 364-435. Norman, B 2010, Criminal law, Pearson, London. Yaffe, G 2008, ‘Trying, acting and attempted crime’, Law and Philosophy, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 8-34. Read More