Arrestees DNA Sample and the Fourth Amendment - Case Study Example

 Arrestee’s DNA Sample and the Fourth Amendment One of the most controversial cases which the Supreme Court is about to decide is the case involving the Maryland DNA Collection Act (MDCA) which authorizes law enforcers to gather DNA samples from persons arrested for various crimes involving violence (US Supreme Court Media, n.d., p.1). In this case, DNA was gathered from Alonzo Jay King, Jr. who was arrested for assault charges and later on, the said DNA was logged onto the DNA database of Maryland discovering thereby that the DNA sample of King matched that of a rape case that has been unresolved (US Supreme Court Media, n.d., p.1). Such sample was the lone evidence used to convict King of first-degree rape by the trial judge who disallowed his motion to suppress such evidence, and he was thus sentenced to life imprisonment (US Supreme Court Media, n.d., p.1). He then appealed his conviction positing that his Fourth Amendment right against warrantless searches was violated (US Supreme Court Media, n.d., p.1). The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s findings and held the Act was unconstitutional placing more importance on King’s expectation of privacy than that of Maryland’s pursuit in utilizing the DNA for the purpose of identification (US Supreme Court Media, n.d., p.1). Hence the question raised is to whether the Fourth Amendment authorizes states to gather and examine DNA from arrested individuals but have not yet been sentenced of such serious crime (US Supreme Court Media, n.d., p.1). Analyzing the various decisions of courts would show that the collection and examination of DNA samples from individuals whether convicted or not, and the matching it with DNA samples found in the database comply with the Fourth Amendment based on the totality of circumstances, the reasonableness of such practice and according to the special needs of law enforcement. The Fourth Amendment provides “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (U.S. Const. amend. IV). This provision consists of both the “Reasonableness Clause” which guarantees security from unreasonable searches and seizures and the “Warrant Clause” which states the requirements before the issuance of any warrant (U.S. Const. amend. IV). Further, the Fourth Amendment determines whether the search intrudes into the privacy interest of a defendant and if it does, if such intrusion may be reasonably explained by the government (Gabel, 2010, p. 33; U.S. Const. amend. IV; Dressler & Thomas III, 2010, pp. 211-217; Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973); Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). The issue as to whether a DNA sampling is a search or a seizure has also been discussed in various court decisions. The requirement for a defendant to give a blood sample for DNA analysis constituted as a Fourth Amendment search under the Constitution (State v. Jones, 753 N.W.2d 677 (Minn. 2008)). A buccal swabbing to obtain information as to a suspect’s identity under custody was said to be a search (Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973)). The case of US v. Mitchell, aside from concluding that anything obtained within the body such as blood or other cells, would constitute as a search, it further cited that DNA sample processing and DNA profile creation was a “second search” (Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407). The case of U.S. v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit also held that the required blood extraction for the purpose of DNA profiling necessarily involves the Fourth Amendment guarantee of an individual’s personal security, hence, is considered as a search under the Constitution (Kincade, 379 F. 3d at 821, n.15). Given these various rulings by the lower courts, obtaining a DNA sample through various modes, is considered as a search under the Fourth Amendment. However, there seems to be no required probable cause or warrant in gathering DNA from individuals referred to in the law on DNA database (State v. Hutchinson, 2009 ME 44, 969 A.2d 923 (Me. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 510 (2009)). Hence, it is important to determine now whether such search or seizure in the conduct of DNA sampling by the government can be justified or is reasonable under given circumstances. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the body-cavity searches of pretrial detainees do not violate the Fourth Amendment as there must be a need to balance the institution’s interests considered to be important and lawful with that of the privacy interests of inmates (Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558-560). The Court held that a lesser requirement than probable cause on the said searches can be done and are reasonable (Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558-560). The Court explained that although prison inmates continue to maintain particular constitutional rights, these rights are subject to “restrictions and limitations” (Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 544-562). The Court stressed on the “mutual accommodation” of both the institution’s purposes and needs with that of the constitutional provisions (Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556), which applies to both “pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners” (Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 544-548). Preserving the institutional security as well as “internal order and discipline” are important objectives which necessitates a limitation on their constitutional rights (Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 544-548). The security restrictions and practices do not violate the constitutional guarantees nor can be considered as “punishment” which violate the rights of pretrial detainees, and were considered as reasonable being a legitimate security concern (Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 560-562). In State v. Martin, 184 Vt. at 27 (2008), the Supreme Court of Vermont held that the DNA sampling is constitutional and accepted the four special needs put forth by the state, namely, prevent criminality; precise identification of those responsible; segregate the innocent suspects; and aid in identifying missing persons (State v. Martin, 184 Vt. at 35 (2008). It further held that the sampling and examination of DNA is an exceptional need to help identify persons at forthcoming crime scenes, outside of the ordinary law enforcement (State v. Martin, 184 Vt. at 27 (2008)) and will deter future felons knowing that DNA samples had been taken and indexed, especially if they do something unlawful again (State v. Martin, 184 Vt. at 38 (2008)). In the case of U.S. v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903 (E.D. Cal. 2009), the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California ruled in favor of the constitutionality of the required collection of an arrestee’s DNA if “the arrest was based on probable cause,” reasoning that there is lessened privacy expectation on the part of the arrestee’s own identity after the latter has committed a crime (Miley, 2010, p. 1). The Court stressed that there is no “search at issue” as defined in the Fourth amendment (Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967)). The Ninth Circuit in U.S. v. Pool (621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010)), ruled that “federal defendants charged with felonies” can be required by the U.S. government to supply their DNA samples as a requisite for pre-trial release (U.S. v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213). Judge Hollows considered the totality of the circumstances stating that such DNA testing made on pre-trial detainees is “clearly warranted, if not compelling” as the arrestees’ identity is of lawful state interest and they have lessened expectation on the privacy of their identities (Pool, 621 F.3d at 1216–17). The district court affirmed Judge Hollows’ ruling, stating that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment violation or of any constitutional provision when “a charged defendant” is required to have swab or blood test for identification purposes (Pool, 621 F.3d at 1216–17). The Ninth Circuit Panel also explained that the utilization of the said DNA by the government is mainly for identification purposes nor is it intended to be used for purposes other than what they may legally do (Pool, 621 F.3d at 1228). The Court also explained that the information collected from such DNA evidence “does not contain the genetic ‘code’” which may determine medical or physical characteristics, or also termed as ‘junk DNA’ (Pool, 621 F.3d at 1215–16 (citing Kincade, 379 F.3d at 818–19)). Once this sample is gathered, this is then passed onto the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director examines it and the results added into the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) which is the national database of the FBI for DNA profiles (Pool, 621 F.3d at 1216). Such stored DNA is then compared to those gathered from “crime scenes and crime victims” which when found to match would then be the information that is given “as evidence in court” (FBI, n.d., p. 1). Such DNA samples was said to serve the objectives of solving crimes and deterring future crimes but also provides for restraints particularly on the DNA collection and its logging into the system (Dickerson, 2012, p. 1 in Westlaw). DNA profiles would be logged onto the CODIS only if the laboratory meets the quality standards of FBI and carries out the proper procedure (Regensburger, 2009, p. 329; 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b)(1 to 2)). There are also limitations as to how samples are utilized and its accessibility (Regensburger, 2009, p. 329; 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b)(3)(A to D)). Such samples can only be used for identification purposes by criminal justice agencies in relation to their law enforcement (Regensburger, 2009, p. 329). It also provides for the removal of the DNA sample from the system when the conviction has been overturned, a dismissal of the charge, the defendant acquitted (Regensburger, 2009, p. 330) or that the samples collected at crime scene were later discovered as irrelevant or of no connection to the crime (Hibbert, 1999, pp. 808-12; Gabel, 2010, p. 15). Federal Courts have the “power of judicial review” (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L. Ed. 60, 1803 WL 893 (1803)) to determine if these statutes may be unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment (Agueros, 2012, p. 1 in Westlaw). DNA sample was said not to be more intrusive than “fingerprinting or a booking photograph” for purposes of identification (Rice, 2009, p. 712-713). In New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325, 351, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 21 Ed. Law Rep. 1122 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)), Justice Blackmun stated that “a balancing test” should be employed by the Supreme Court which recognizes a “standard of reasonableness, other than the traditional once a special need had been ascertained (Regensburger, 2009, p. 349). Justice Blackmun further clarified this by saying that an unauthorized search necessitates “a special need” (O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 732–48, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 94 L. Ed. 2d 714, 1 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1617, 42 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 36891 (1987); Regensburger, 2009, p. 349). He further explained that this special needs test provides an exception to the constitutional rights (Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2001)) in that there are “special law enforcement interests” apart from the ordinary ones (Pool, 621 F.3d at 1217–18). Under this test, the court balances the expected privacy of an individual with that of the government interests (Peterson, 2000, pp. 1219 & 1233). The special needs test has lower standards than the required individualized suspicion under the Fourth Amendment (Matejik, 2008, pp. 53, 74-75). Hence, under this “special needs test,” the court determines first if “a warrant is impractical under the circumstances” (Earls, 536 U.S. at 829; Veronia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 646; Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 881 (1987); United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 2004)). The court then weighs this intrusion with that of the interest of the government, and if such balancing favors the search, then individualized suspicion at a lower standard may be had (Earls, 536 U.S. at 829; Veronia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 646; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 881). Most of the circuit courts have also examined the reasonableness of a search to comply with the Fourth Amendment (Rice, 2009, p.705) on the basis of the “totality of the circumstances” (Lynch, 2008, p. 657). On the other hand, federal circuit courts have also preferred the use of “reasonableness” approach to cases concerning DNA collection, and established that the interests of the government prevailed over the individual’s Fourth Amendment Rights (Dickerson, 2012, p. 1 in Westlaw). Thus, in US v. Kriesel, the Ninth Circuit Court upheld the DNA collection as constitutional (Kriesel, 508 F.3d at 946). The court used the reasonableness approach as well as the totality of the circumstances standard (Kriesel, 508 F.3d at 946). State Courts have also analyzed challenges to the DNA collection practices of various states and they have mostly preserved such practice (Miller, 2004, p. 2). Further, Seringhaus reports that most lower courts uphold the reasonableness of the search conducted in the 1994 DNA Identification Act, and thereby considers it as justified (Seringhaus, 2010, p. 19). In Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 114 L. Ed. 2d 524 (1991), the Supreme Court stated that the Congress had the authority “to define criminal punishments” without granting the courts of sentencing discretion, as these are a matter of public policy (Chapman, 500 U.S. at 467). Because of this reasoning, Dickerson opines that the Supreme Court may find justifiable and constitutional the state and public interest in solving unresolved crimes and in preventing criminals from carrying out future crimes (Dickerson, 2012, p. 1). Taking all the rulings of various courts, and applying the same to the instant case, the law mandating that the collection of DNA sample from an arrestee even before his conviction, is certainly reasonable as this is for purposes of identification and is compliant with the Fourth Amendment requirements. The rights of an arrestee are subject to limitations to serve legitimate state interests. The analysis of the DNA sample which in this case was matched with the DNA samples in the database is also considered constitutional under the Fourth Amendment because of the special need for effective law enforcement. Under ordinary circumstances, a warrant is needed for such a search. However, considering that it is impractical to obtain a warrant, there being no other evidence may be obtainable under the circumstances, the crime having been unresolved, there is a special need for effective law enforcement through analysis of the DNA sample submitted. Thus, the need to find a closure on unresolved cases, not only for law enforcement purposes but also for the protection of the community in general, are special needs which over all justify the reasonableness of the collection and analysis of a DNA sample. Reference List 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b)(1 to 2). 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b)(3)(A to D). Agueros, J. (2012). Liberty, Justice, and Technology: Why Familial DNA Searches Must Confront the Rigor of the American Political Process. Criminal Law Bulletin, 4(8). Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558-560. Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967). Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 114 L. Ed. 2d 524 (1991). Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969). Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970). Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973). Dickerson, J. (2012). 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Hutchinson, 2009 ME 44, 969 A.2d 923 (Me. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 510 (2009). State v. Jones, 753 N.W.2d 677 (Minn. 2008). State v. Martin, 184 Vt. 23, 28 (2008). Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). U.S. Const. amend. IV. U.S. Supreme Court Media (n.d.). Maryland v. King. Retrieved from http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_207 U.S. v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004). U.S. Kriesel, 508 F.3d at 946. U.S. v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 2004). U.S. v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407. U.S. v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903 (E.D. Cal. 2009). U.S. v. Pool (621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010). Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967). Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556. Read More