The Course of How the Judicial System - Essay Example

Neuroscience and Criminal Justice Introduction The of how the judicial system is presently run is constantly being debated upon, with regard to considering the emerging field of neurolaw. Prosecutors have initially junked the the incorporation of scientific and medical advancements in influencing court decisions, but in the recent years experts have shown that differing brain structures, such as in those seen in some offenders, may indeed affect an individual’s behavior and emotions. There are several instances where brain scans are brought as court-room evidences to present that the suspect is somehow mentally challenged and thus cannot, for some reason, be charged with death sentence, and so be given lifetime imprisonment instead. Because of this modernity, criminal justice is challenged, and the issue remains unresolved. Immature Brain Neurolaw is creating a scene in providing judgments, leading experts from different fields in constant debate whether when to consider a brain as normal or abnormal, or when to consider the evidence as a legal mitigating circumstance or as an alibi. One contention raised by neuroscientists is that “adolescents are not as capable of controlling their impulses as adults because the development of neurons in the prefrontal cortex isn’t complete until the early 20s” (Rosen 3). The American Psychiatric Association backed-up this “anatomically-based” claim that there are differences between juveniles and adults, emphasizing that immature regions of the brain are those related with regulation of emotions, impulse control, risk assessment, and moral reasoning (Fagan 14). These are shown with the aid of modern technology which “rationalizes” the deviant behavior of juvenile offenders, and the brain is said to function maturely as the individual transitions into adulthood. This argument was essential in the Supreme Court’s decision for offenders below 18 years old not to be sentenced with death penalty. In addition, this neuroscientific evidence has been recently used several times in juvenile cases to influence the decisions of the judge and the jury. However, the complications neurolaw give our courts do not just end there. Law and Technology It is implied that a bigger concern in integrating neuroscience into the criminal justice system concerns cases where juvenile delinquency is not necessarily involved. There seems to be no clear delineation as to when brain scans may be considered adequate evidences, and how members of the prosecution committee would weigh the gravity of these proofs. However, the influence of neuroscience in the courts does not seem to cease. The law generally regards individuals responsible for their actions, but accommodations are sometimes granted to explain misconduct, and in this course neuroscience enters, arguing that differences in brain activity may influence behavior (Society of Neuroscience 38). High technology has made it possible for functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and positron emission tomography (PET) scans to link who we are and how we behave, as asserted by neuroscientists. Kent Kiehl is a prominent neuroscientist who has added psychopathy to the list of conditions that can be observed in fMRI scans, other than those telltale signs established for schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Haederle). Highly interested in why psychopaths behave the way they do, Kiehl is involved in a research that scanned the brains of prison inmates and conducted interviews. Kiehl is delving on a possibility that “there are developmental differences associated with psychopathic traits,” where “the more severe the traits, the more severe the impairment in the paralimbic system” (qtd. in Haederle). Along with his other assertions based on neuroscience, he believes that it is not a good idea to punish convicted offenders who possess malfunctioning brains. Neuroscience and Criminal Responsibility Another aspect, however, concerns the relevance of neuroscience to criminal responsibility. An argument of some key personalities in neuroscience is that human beings do not have what is termed as “free will,” but rather, individuals act and behave the way they do because of their brains, and therefore certain forms of retribution for offenders may not be appropriate. At the same time, other individuals disagree with these assertions, disputing that responsibility for one’s actions is not based on brain structures, but rather on the norms established in society. Vincent presents this issue in a manner where she delineates the terms very specifically, and hence proposes that the question itself is erratic. There are many things to be considered in linking neuroscience to criminal justice, including the limitations of technology despite its advancement, the concept of ethical principles, how to distinguish evidence from diminished capacity to lack of responsibility, when to consider the person fully mature even in considering their brain structures, the incapacity of neuroscience to assess the capacities of the offender at the time of committing the crime, and following legal procedures which may deem technology to be inadequate for the law to base its decisions upon. Many question what the criminal justice system will look like if the human brain and its neurologic structures are considered responsible for the individual’s action. In like manner, there are also inquiries that concern moral issues if courts would not consider an individual’s incapacity to behave according to societal roles because of his or her malfunctioning brain. These implicitly tell us that despite the emergence of neurolaw, there are still a lot of loopholes that need to be fixed before it can be fully applied in criminal cases. Both neuroscientific technology and the legal system are still limited to fully converge at one point. Conclusion The influence of neuroscience into the practice of law is undeniably increasing despite the many facets considerable for debate. The theory of juvenile offenders having immature brain structures which do not develop until early adulthood has somehow rationalize their deviant behavior and may thus become a basis for lesser punishment. On the other hand, cases which do not concern juveniles also consider brain scan results, where these evidences may mitigate the offender’s crime. In taking into account the relevance of neuroscience and criminal responsibility, different views have been presented, and imply that integration of the two fields may be helpful in making better judgments in prosecutions, but that technology is still far too limited to be taken as a huge factor for implementing the types of retribution “suitable” for an offender. Works Cited Fagan, Jeffrey. “Juvenile Crime and Criminal Justice: Resolving Border Disputes.” Juvenile Justice Foundation. The Juvenile Justice Foundation, Oct. 2007. Web. 08 Feb. 2011. . Haederle, Michael. “A Mind of Crime.” Miller-McCune. Miller-McCune, 23 Feb. 2010. Web. 08 Feb. 2011. . Rosen, Jeffrey. “The Brain on the Stand.” The New York Times Online. The New York Times, 11 Mar. 2007. Web. 08 Feb. 2011. . Society for Neuroscience. “Neurolaw: Neuroscience in the Courtroom.” Plotting the Course FY2008 Annual Report, 2008. Web. 08 Feb. 2011. . Vincent, Nicole A. “On the Relevance of Neuroscience to Criminal Responsibility.” Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (2010): 77-98. Print. Read More