Corruption in Law Enforcement Agencies - Term Paper Example

Corruption in Law Enforcement Agencies: Police Should Know When to Say ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to Briberies/Tokens Introduction Corruption in law enforcement is unquestionably a severe problem. Several law enforcement agencies have become quite challenged with corruption that the general public regards law enforcers as dishonest. Several authors have proposed that the initial step toward a law enforcer becoming dishonest is the receiving of briberies or tokens. For instance, Lawrence Sherman claims that there exists “a continuum of graft stages from the acceptance of gratuities, to the acceptance of bribes in relation to such things as bar-closing hours, to the acceptance of payoffs from gamblers and prostitutes, to eventual involvement in narcotics” (Ivkovic, 2003, 593). He views the law enforcer who receives a free soda and the law enforcer who is engaged in drug dealing as crooked—it is simply an issue of the level of corruption concerned. Most police agencies nowadays openly forbid gratuities in their code of ethics. The International Association of Chiefs of Police, the peak body, has wholly disallowed gratuities in its code of ethics. To a certain extent, the Code asserts that “I will enforce the law courteously and appropriately without fear or favor, malice or ill will, never employing unnecessary force or violence and never accepting gratuities” (Coleman, 2004, 64). The primary basis for this stance is that gratuities endanger the objectivity of police activities. This is detailed in Article 9 of the Canon of Ethics for Police Officers, which declares that (Coleman, 2004): The law enforcement officer, representing government, bears the heavy responsibility of maintaining, in his own conduct, the honor and integrity of all governmental institutions. He shall, therefore, guard against placing himself in a position which any person can reasonably assume that special consideration is being given. Thus, he should be firm in refusing gifts, favors, or gratuities, large or small, which can, in the public mind, be interpreted as capable of influencing his judgment in the discharge of his duties (p. 64). Different theories and opinions have been made about the acceptability and unacceptability of police approval of briberies/tokens. This essay will consider the conflicting arguments to identify a guideline of best practice that has strong ethical grounds and value situated in the role of the law enforcement. The argument is that, in spite some well-founded justifications for police gratuities, the value of counteracting contentions should head towards a ‘no gratuities’ rule, apart from some minor accompanying tokens. Although several critics are swift to associate gratuities with bribery or dishonesty, most are hesitant to make such sweeping opinions. The issue of whether or not tokens amount to corruption would seem to depend on factors of purpose and outcome (Kania, 2004). From the point of view of Feldberg, “if a gift, reward, discount, or other prerequisite is freely offered by the giver; if it is offered with no intent to deflect or prejudice an officer in the course of his or her performance of duty; and if in fact the gratuity has no significant impact on the willingness of an officer fully to perform his duty, then the gratuity would appear harmless; that is, it has no corrupting influence on the officer” (Ivkovic, 2003, 594). In this sense, the act of presenting or receiving a gratuity should not routinely be regarded as ‘corrupt.’ Rejecting and Accepting Tokens Having given an overview of the theory and practices of gratuities in law enforcement, this essay will now proceed to the practicalities of the issue. This section will discuss the benefits, drawbacks, and potential risk factors of rejecting and accepting gratuities in law enforcement. Rejecting Tokens Primarily, I want to talk about types of scenario that are especially challenging for law enforcers, and to specify that in these types of scenario tokens should consistently be rejected, even when the rules of the law enforcement agency would permit their acceptance. These scenarios are: (1) when tokens are presented because the receiver is a law enforcer (Ivkovic, 2005); (2) when tokens are offered regularly (Ivkovic, 2005); (3) when the worth of the tokens offered is unequal to the services provided (Ivkovic, 2005); (4) when the individual offering the token thinks that particular services will be given only if a token is tendered (Ivkovic, 2005); and (5) when the individual presenting the token is not allowed to do so (Ivkovic, 2005). There are several circumstances wherein individuals offer tokens to people who have aided them, or to people who have rendered service for their sake. Such dealings are an element of human interactions and in many circumstances are very simple. There is apparently the possibility for tokens, discounts, and gratuities to be offered to police officers, in an effort to affect the way in which that police official does his/her duty (Coleman 2004). It could be that the token or privilege is offered to try to persuade the police official to use more time at one specific organization than others. Or it could be that the privilege or token is offered in an effort to persuade the police official to neglect particular behavior or misbehavior of the person offering the token (Coleman, 2004). Regardless of the intention behind the token being tendered, any circumstance where in the token is being tendered because the receiver is a law enforcer should be regarded suspect (De Leon, 1993). In reality, there can be just two motivating purposes here: either the individual tendering the token in trying to manipulate the police official in one way or another—in which case the token should obviously be refused—or the individual offering the token thinks that s/he has to tender a token to a police official (De Leon, 1993). Hence tokens tendered to police officials because they are enforcers of the law should always be refused, either because they are being presented as effort to entice the police official in one way or another, or because they are being tendered through what an individual expects is the misguided thought that it is mandatory to present something to the law enforcer so as to acquire any kind of service (Benson, 1988). Another scenario where in police should consistently reject tokens is when those tokens are tendered regularly. It is fairly common for tokens offered to police officers to fall into both of these first two types (Coleman, 2004); namely, presented to them because they are police officers, and presented regularly. Even when these tokens are not being tendered entirely because the receiver is a police official, there remains a case for rejecting them if they are tendered regularly (Coleman, 2004). Another apparent dilemma for police officers in receiving tokens is when the token is not proportionate to the service provided by police officers. For instance, one can suppose an official who is summoned to a minor robbery at a bookstore and is informed by the proprietor to take a pricey journal as a token (El-Ayouty, Ford, & Davies, 2000).When the worth of the token is not tantamount to the service provided, as in this particular situation, it is apparent that the token can be understood merely as an effort to bribe the police officer, to save recognition for the future, and it ought to be refused (El-Ayouty et al., 2000). Police officers can run into circumstances where in an individual is, or seems to be, under the feeling that either it is essential for them to present a token of some kind so as to ascertain the rendering of particular police services, or that tendering a token would help to ascertain the rendering of additional police services (De Leon, 1993). This could be the situation even where such services would be rendered no matter if a token is presented, or even where police officials are obligated to render those services (Coleman, 2004). Even though it is apparently difficult for a police official to render those services only if a token is presented, it can appear less difficult for a police official to receive a token when the official is aware that the services would be rendered anyhow, whether the token was presented or not (Ivkovic, 2003). An ultimate dilemma with the acceptance of tokens, although seldom acknowledged, is that of tokens being presented by people who are not allowed to offer them (Ivkovic, 2003). Hence, for instance, in accepting a gratis dinner, the police official is in effect ignoring, and even teaming up in, a crime. Police officials are expected to be neutral sentinels of the law, and hence not disregard or get involved in crimes in the form of prohibited tokens, privileges, or gifts (Kania, 2004). If a token is presented by an individual not allowed to tender it, the police official should consistently reject it, whatever its worth. Accepting Tokens Richard Kania (2004) argues that under particular situations, police officers particularly, and also other law enforcers, should be persuaded to accept tokens. He based this argument on the reality that most individuals who present such tokens do not have as their intention the corruption of law enforcement, but rather think that they owe some form of debt to the police force, and are trying to pay off that debt. When tokens are offered in these circumstances, where in the purpose of the giver is merely to pay gratitude to the police officer for the rendered services, and the purpose of the recipient is only to develop good rapport between the police force and the public, Kania (2004) feels there is no ethical dilemma with the acceptance of tokens. It is merely in circumstances where in the provider of the token in trying to accumulate‘recognition’ for future use that these dealings are problematic (Coleman, 2004). Kania (2004) claims that “the perception of the recipient toward the exchange is more critical than that of the giver in the categorization of an exchange as ethical or unethical (p. 55).” If the token do not change the manner in which police officials perform their job, then it is just for officials to accept tokens (Coleman, 2004). Tokens received in this manner are only the ingredients of strong social relations between the public and the police force. Conclusions and Recommendations Some codes try to prevent the problem of tokens by determining a limit on the worth of tokens that can be received. The major dilemma with such a code is that the worth of a small token such as a cup of coffee is very minor that these codes would constantly permit its acceptance; however, the regular offering of a free cup of coffee can pose dilemmas for police. An additional dilemma with such codes is that there appears to be particular circumstances where in it is necessary for police officers to accept tokens of considerable worth. Obviously there is a need for a policy that will deter acceptance of improper tokens, but will permit the acceptance of sincere shows of gratitude. This essay would recommend that the only solution to these kinds of problems is to develop a code that permits officers to wield their own prerogative about the acceptance of tokens. This kind of policy would have to outline the kinds of tokens that should be rejected, and should specify the kinds of circumstances where in they might be allowed. Because one of the primary dilemmas with the acceptance of tokens is their covert character, such a policy should also involve stipulation for the documentation and inspection of tokens of considerable worth. Law enforcers are bestowed with major powers, and are supposed to use sensible judgment within guiding principles in a broad array of situations. This essay would recommend that the most favorable way to cope with the dilemma of tokens is to give law enforcers rules in this aspect, and then allow them to use their own judgment. References Benson, B.L. (1988). ‘Corruption in Law Enforcement: One Consequence of the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ Arising with Public Allocation Processes,’ International Review of Law and Economics, 73-84. Coleman, S. (2004). ‘Police, Gratuities, and Professionalism: A Response to Kania,’ Criminal Justice Ethics, 23(1) 63+ De Leon, P. (1993). Thinking about Political Corruption. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. El-Ayouty, Y., Ford, K.J. & Davies, M. (2000). Government Ethics and Law Enforcement: Toward Global Guidelines. Westport, CT: Praeger. Ivkovic, S.K. (2005). Fallen Blue Knights: Controlling Police Corruption. New York: Oxford University Press. Ivkovic, S.K. (2003). ‘To Serve and Collect: Measuring Police Corruption,’ Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 93(2-3) 593+ Kania, R.E. (2004). ‘The Ethical Acceptability of Gratuities: Still Saying ‘Yes’ after All These Years,’ Criminal Justice Ethics, 23(1) 54+ Read More