Reasons Why Eradication of Corruption in China Has Failed - Essay Example

? Reasons Why Eradication of Corruption in China has failed (Insert Reasons Why Eradication of Corruption in China has failed Introduction Corruption is a major societal ill that the People’s Republic of China suffers from. According to the 2011 ranking, the People’s Republic of China was ranked 75th out of the 178 countries that are in Transparency’s International’s Corruption Perceptions index. The country suffers from various forms of corruption but the most common ones include embezzlement of funds, bribery, nepotism, statistical falsification, patronage, backdoor deals, and grafts. The main reasons why PRC has waged war against corruption is the fact that it undermines the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist party, it fuels societal unrest, and adds to the economic inequality in the country. If the communist party does not formulate policies that will contain the wide spread corruption in China, then it will be spelling doom for the economic future of the country and the political stability too. Analysis and Causes As pointed out earlier, the major forms of corruption in the PRC are embezzlement of funds, bribery, nepotism, statistical falsification, patronage, backdoor deals, and grafts.All these are common and rampant in power positions. This explains why the standard definition of corruption in China is the use of public authority and resources for personal and private interests. When any state functionary takes advantage of their office and appropriates, steals, or swindles public money, or takes it in to their possession by any other illegal means, then it is said that corruption has occurred. Moreover, when a state functionary extorts money or property from an individual for the benefit of another person or illegally accepts money from a person in order to secure benefits for that individual, or the state functionary misappropriates public funds for either personal use, illegal dealings, or for profit making purposes, then corruption has occurred. If any citizen gives money or property to a state functionary, or introduces a bribe to them for the purpose of securing certain benefits, then the two can be accused of being involved in corrupt dealings. All these occurrences are in accordance with articles 382 and 396 of the criminal law of the People’s Republic of China. Combating corruption has been a main agenda for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the last three decades with every transition of government. During this period, two major anti-corruption campaigns were launched; one in the late 1970’s, and the other in 1989 following the Tiananmen crackdown on the pro-democracy movement. This paper will mainly focus on the 1989 campaign and all other attempted reforms that followed as they fall under the 25 year period that is under study. The efforts of China to eradicate poverty are often frustrated by the enforcement constrains in the country. The CCP employed a strategy dubbed enforcement swapping. This strategy relied on intensive periodic campaigns which were targeted at the big fish. This strategy was credited to have successfully lowered the levels of corruption beyond the tipping point; a point which if surpassed, would have resulted in to a crisis of corruption and overwhelmed the parties enforcement resources (Manion, 2004. P.158). This strategy is said to have been employed out of necessity simply because the CCP lacked enforcement resources and the capacity to wipe out corruption. According to Wedeman, (2004,p.899), the campaign style of enforcement is aimed at controlling corruption rather than eradicating it. This is irrespective of the manner in which it is used; randomized or recreational. This is the very first reason why attempts to eradicate corruption in China by CCP have failed. The communist’s party strategy to eradicate poverty was misguided simply because this strategy is formulated to specifically control corruption, not eradicate it. There is also the probability that the CCP knew exactly what the strategy was aimed at. The party’s short term goal was to reduce the rate of corruption by capturing the corrupt officials so that in the long run, there will be a balance between the enforcement capabilities and the rate of corruption because the efficacy of routine policing will be improved due to the lowered rate of corruption. If the CCP was really keen on completely eradicating corruption in the PRC, then what they ought to have done was to implement a zero tolerance policy in their campaign strategies against corruption. The campaign enforcement strategy had other shortcomings alongside the fact that it was aimed at controlling corruption. The campaign enforcement routine checks are practically an on-and-off kind of thing. Routine policing is relatively low and only soars up during the periods of hyper activity such as campaign periods. This therefore means that during periods of low activity, state functionaries and other citizens are under a loose leash of checks and can thereforemaximize on this period and conduct their corrupt dealings. When the periods of hyper activity arrive, people are more careful because they know well enough that at any given time, a random policing check can take place. With this kind of trend, it is easy to know when it is conducive to conduct a corrupt deal and when it is not. It can therefore be concluded that campaign enforcement has, by default, intensified corruption in the PRC. What the communist party ought to do is ensure that the strategy that they employ frequencies routine checks to avoid lapses of time that give an allowance for corruption to take place (Wedeman, 2004). Another major setback for the CCP in its campaign to eradicate corruption is in the anti-corruption agencies which have been formed. The communist party needs to bridge the gap between what they say and what they do ( O’brien&Lianjiang Li, 2006). It becomes difficult to try eradicate an ill with the help of someone that is an active practitioner of the ill. That is exactly the problem that exists in the anti-corruption agencies in China. Some of the members that hold positions in the anti-corruption are involved in corrupt dealings themselves. It therefore becomes difficult to pass anti-corruption laws through these agencies because the unscrupulous members in the agencies act as barriers to the whole process of corruption eradication. Corruption has also permeated the economy of the country and prompted many of the citizens to participate in corrupt dealings. What gave rise to corruption in the economy sector of the country was the centralization of economic resources and surpluses. This activity of centralization took place during the socialist era of state planning control. This act of centralization also meant that all the decision making activities about the distribution of resources were also centralized. This phenomena gave rise to bureaucratic rent-seeking behaviours which arose from the inter-relationships among the people in power. Initially, this reform which was aimed at bringing an end to what was termed as a positions economy (gaining positions by virtue of existing relationships rather than merit), ended up opening up new opportunities for corruption to take place. The CCP had therefore failed since it did not closely examine the possible outcomes of centralizing economic resources and the surpluses (Lieberthal, 2004). Still on the issue of the permeability of the economy to corruption; there was no single economic system that was prevalent during the whole period of reforms. At this particular time of reforms, there were dual economic systems that were co-existing. The two economic systems that were existent during this period were the state planned sector system and the market commodity sector system. The two systems created plenty of incentives in the economy and opportunities for corrupt practices to go on in the market place. The CCP should have made sure that the economy was governed by one system. This way, it would have been rather difficult for corrupt practices to happen because the law governing trade practices would have been tighter and more resilient as compared to having to systems which if one was unfavourable, then the other would have been an appropriate escape route( O’brien & Lianjiang Li, 2006). The CCP, through its governing also failed in eradicating corruption since they were creating circumstances which prompted people to get involved in corrupt practices. The government brokedown the distribution of national income among different social strata. This break down meant that the salaries and incomes of officials were cut down. Considering that PRC was struggling with the problem of corruption, it would have been more prudent if the government had revised the national incomes in a way that would have satisfied the officials since they were already used to extravagant salaries and incomes. What the reduction of incomes did was to drive the government officials other public officers to seek extra income elsewhere. This extra income was for supplementing the fixed salaries which were relatively low for both the officials and their staff members. This in turn gave rise to corrupt practices because the officials started extorting prices, which is a more or less legal way of corruption, embezzling funds, and accepting bribes as this proved to be the easiest way make some extra income. This is another reason why the CCP has failed to eradicate corruption in China since the government is making effort to eradicate the vice on one side while on the other it is creating policies and circumstances that create opportunities for corrupt dealings to take place (Lieberthal,2004). The CCP in 2005 introduced a new approach for its corruption eradication bid through the implementation outline. This new approach is a three way pronged approach. Through this approach, the CCP will eradicate corruption by educating the people, institution building and supervising and finally monitoring. This is perhaps the most promising policy that the CCP has come up with over the last 25 years. The reason for this is simply because this approach puts emphasis on both punitive and preventive measures in eradicating corruption. However, there is not much that can be credited to this policy approach since its introduction in 2005. The main reason why this policy has not been fully implemented is the fact that the enforcement resources and capabilities of the CCP are still not adequate enough to match the corruption levels that are present (Wedeman, 2004). The CCP has not allocated enough resources to the enforcers and thus they have very little whilst the expectations that have been accorded to them are overwhelmingly much. Another issue that has hindered the CCP from achieving the full potential of this policy is the fact that the enforcement officers have not been accustomed to frequent checks. The previous campaign enforcement strategy made them to conduct searches and checks seldom except when there are hyper activities happening. For this reason, there is the likelihood that the policy enforcers carried forward this laxity to the implementation of this policy and have thus slowed down the whole process of implementation. The CCP has also been unable to completely eradicate corruption simply because of the anti-corruption agencies that have been working under them. As pointed out earlier, the agencies have been found to house members who have been involved in corrupt dealings and practices. For this reason, the 2005 3-way policy approach which is a relative zero tolerance policy has come across sever opposition in its implementation simply because the officials know that if the policy is fully implemented, then they will be on the wrong side of the law. The government has not only failed on the issue of the anti-corruption agencies simply because there are members in the agencies that are corrupt, but also because they have been working with two agencies. This has hindered their attempt to eradicate corruption because of the divergent opinions that come from the different agencies about the corruption issues in the country (Manion, 2004). The government has been lax about setting up a central anti-corruption agency which will pass the legislations and laws that will help eradicate corruption and will also oversee the implementation of such laws to the letter. The current anti-corruption agency system of the country is mixed up and therefore contaminates the whole process of corruption eradication. Conclusion The main reason why the CCP has failed to eradicate corruption in the PRC is because it has been lax in its legislations. Its laxity has also contributed to its loss of focus on the main agenda which is to eradicate corruption and has made the party to concentrate more on the controlling of corruption. If corruption in PRC is not eradicated, then it would create a situation termed as a crisis of corruption and recovering from this situation will be a rather steep up-hill task for the CCP. References Lieberthal, K. (2004). Governing China: from revolution through reform. New York, W.W. Norton. Manion, M. (2004). Corruption by design: building clean government in mainland China and Hong Kong. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, pp. 155-199. O'brien, K. J., & Li, L. (2006). Rightful resistance in rural China. New York, Cambridge University Press, pp.50-94. Wedeman, A. (2004). The Intensification of Corruption in China. The China Quarterly, No. 180. December 2004, pp. 895-921 Read More