Law of Contract: Analysis of Allcard v Skinner No. LR 36 Ch D 145 - Case Study Example

Running Head: Sur Law of Contract: Allcard v Skinner (1887) Case No. LR 36 Ch D 145 The law of contract isa branch of the legal rules that govern conclusion of contracts and the consequences involved in such contracts. The major tenets of this law include definitions of the requirements and the basis upon which contractual liability lies. Furthermore, it stipulates the rights as well as the duties of the contracting parties. In addition, it is this law that is mandated with the regulation of contract breaches and provision of remedies at the onset of such breaches. This therefore categorically implies that a contract is chiefly entered into in order to make an agreement (between two or many other parties) formal and as they relate to a specific subject. There are a myriad of issues or matters within which contracts can be made including but not limited to: property and goods sale, dispute settlements, employment and/or independent contract relationships, intellectual property ownership, philanthropy, and many others. The focus of this paper therefore is to highlight a few issues relating to the dilemma involved in the contract law with reference to the Allcard v Skinner (1887) LR 36 Ch D 145 (Smith, Charlotte, 2006, pp. 183). In the above case, Miss Allcard had abound herself to the vows of “Protestant Sisters of the Poor” (Smith, Charlotte, 2006, pp.186), a religious sect that was headed by Miss Skinner, implying that she had entered a contract which required her to give all her property or possessions to Miss Skinner in lieu of the obedience and poverty virtues’ submissiveness. However, Miss Allcard decided to leave the sect and claimed back her property. During his ruling, Lindley was of the opinion that it was evident Miss Allcard had been subjected to undue influence but larches had barred the restitution due to her. Furthermore, the position was that it was only possible for her to regain just what Miss Skinner had remaining since in accordance with her (Allcard) will that expressed her wishes, part of had already been expedited (Smith, Charlotte, 2006, pp. 203). As we have observed from the above case, contract law poses some fundamental legal contentions. For example, Judge Lindley interpreted undue influence to mean any unfair, improper pressure, some form of external coercion, overreaching, or some kind of cheating (Smith, Charlotte, 2006, pp. 206). He further argued that though not always, some personalized advantage can generally be obtained by one party who in a way or another has close and confidential relationship to the other who is subjected to such undue influence. The dilemma involved in the law of contract is vivid not only in the case itself but in the ruling that was made. For example, it is my argument at this juncture that the judge himself is faced with this dilemma when he poses questions regarding what carries much weight between: protecting individuals from entangling themselves in regrettable consequences as result of their own incompetence, folly or misinformed contraction; and protecting them from external pressure leading to their victimization by the offending party. Many realms of law contend that if foolishly or recklessly given away (to philanthropic institutions or unworthy objects) property retrieval through restitutions as Miss Allcard sought, then the consequences would be none other than vice and extravagance enhancement. Contrary, all laws has one common legitimate object, protecting all people from potential trick, force, misinformed decisions culminating in loss of property to others. The undue influence equitable doctrine has therefore been incepted and nurtured by the desire to grapple with any such insidious varieties and forms of fraud and tyranny (Smith, Charlotte, 2006, pp. 214). In order for us to have a succinct understanding of the above interpretation, and to what extent it does or it does not influence the discretion of judges and Courts’ decision to set aside contracts which are entered into in the same way as the Allcard v Skinner case, it is imperative to enumerate some concepts that are integral to this law. Any legal engagement between legal subjects with a legal entity that results to creation of duties and rights for a legal objective constitutes a legal obligation. The elements of such an obligation include a creditor’s performance claim right and an equally performance duty on the part of the debtor (Smith, Charlotte, 2006, pp. 209). These circumstances were determinate of the Allcard v Skinner contract but even though undue pressure and/or influence were present, I still would want to differ with the kind of jurisdiction that was met. It is common knowledge that when a fact has been established beyond any reasonable doubt, it ought to be distinguished as either A or B, and not A or B and then C. My argument here is that since in the first place it was established that Miss Allcard was wronged not only by undue influence but also by forced (in the name of a ‘superior being’) misinformed decision (which I interpret to be so since if she hadn’t found out otherwise she have remained and never claimed her property back), then there was no logic of totally denying her at least what could have been recovered on the grounds that she took long to sue for her violated right. I am of the opinion that the legal structures should give explicit distinction between what is the case and what ought to be the case since the two positions will ever remain immiscible. Legal systems, as far as am concerned about the above case study, will always remain less convincing of their own authority and integrity as long as self contradicting will at one time cause justice to one party and injustice to the other, and vice versa at another time. The other point with which I hold that the Courts should have precise non-fault principles regarding contract law is based on the principles of the common law systems. For example, when we talk of an agreement or the offer versus acceptance principle, of course under the statute the parties involved can make individual judgments, there have been some instances where courts have unduly used their discretion to the disadvantage of the offended. A good example of this kind of contract forming is the Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Company case. The medical firm had advertised invention of the smoke ball, wonder drug which as the advertisement claimed, was capable of preventing catching of flu by anyone who used it in accordance to the instructions, and in the event this was not the case, then 100 pounds compensation would be paid to anyone who bought the drug. When this proved to be just a way of pulling increased sales by the company, again Lindley argued that even though proper consideration was done by reasonable men as they got into distinct inconvenience, a distinct promise had been made and that it was with no fault language to decipher, this was a mere invitation to treat, not an offer (Smith, Charlotte, 2006, pp. 214). In conclusion I would say that as much as the courts endeavor to protect all their subjects equally, all law making systems ought to reexamine the contradicting issues in our otherwise long standing and glorified laws if they are to cut across the boundaries of fair justice, since as much as I agree with the importance and applicability of laws, I fully disagree with their double edged contradictions. When this done, then courts would need other forms of evidence to set aside restitution cases with more equitable consensus between the disputing parties. Work cited: Smith, Charlotte. “Allcard v Skinner (1887)”. In Mitchell, Charles; Mitchell, Paul. Landmark cases in the law of restitution. Oxford: Portland, 1972 ed, pp. 180-216 Read More