Ratio Decidendi of the - Case Study Example

On R (Hurst) v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (2007) UKHL 13 Ratio decidendi of the case. The appeal made by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis contests the Court of Appeal decision ordering the coroner to resume the inquest in the killing of Troy Hurst by Albert Reid on May 25, 2000. The decision was anchored on Section 3 of the Human Rights Act of 1998, in light of Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights. The majority decision of the Lords of Appeal allowed the instant appeal, in effect precluding the order to resume the inquest. Lord Brown, who penned the majority decision, stated the central issue as: “…whether those seeking such an investigation into a pre-Human Rights Act death are entitled in domestic law to the benefit of the Convention.” The majority resolved the issue in the negative, stating that a death occurring before October 2, 2000 (the effectivity date of the Human Rights Act of 1998) is not entitled to the benefit of the Convention. The ratio distinguished between a Jamieson inquest, under domestic law, and a Middleton inquest, in consideration of the Convention. The House resolved that deaths before October 2, 2000 could be accorded an inquest which, under domestic law, could only determine “by what means” the person died, not the broader scope required in compliance with the Convention, which determines “in what broad circumstances” the death occurred. Since Mrs. Hurst wished an assessment encompassing the latter, but could only be accorded the former, then the coroner is justified in refusing to resume the inquest inasmuch as it would not serve the purpose for which it was undertaken. (wordcount = 260) Appellant’s argument in relation the Human Rights Act 1998 The appellant Commissioner argued that the Court of Appeal which issued the decision had misinterpreted section 3 of the Human Rights Act. (par. 5), in applying Article 2 retrospectively when no provision was made for it. After the Act came into force, section 3 of the HRA modified the reading of section 11(5)(b)(ii) of the 1988 Coroner’s Act so as to include the broad circumstances of the cause of death. The Court applied this standard, and thus ordered the coroner “to resume the inquest at which it would be his duty to return an inquisition setting out ‘by what means and in what circumstances’ Mr Hurst died. An inquest with that scope would be capable of covering the allegations against the public authorities, including the police.” (par 4.) The Court thus ignored the date of the death as controlling in the application of the expanded standard, prompting the Commissioner’s appeal based on retrospective application of Article 2, and that the reckoning date should be the actual death. (wordcount =167) Approaches the Lords took in resolving the point of law raised in this case The Lords sought to resolve the points of law in this case through a combination of stare decisis, statutory construction employing the purposive approach, and an interpretation based on unitary construction. The Lords who considered the appeal happened to agree on many things, among which is the non-retroactivity of Article 2 of the HRA, an error of the Court. However, they disagree on the legal implications of the non-retroactivity. The majority contend that the inquest should not go beyond the determination of the means of death, because the Convention requirements did not then exist. Lord Roger held that where “no potential infringement of Community law is involved,” then a party not entitled to invoke the interpretation may not insist on the legislation being applied as if to comply with Community law. (par. 12) Baroness Hale and Lord Mance opined that, Convention aside, the coroner is duty-bound to exhaust all possible findings in the circumstances of his investigation, and thus would vote to deny the appeal. Baroness Hale stated in pars. 19 and 21: While the Baroness and Mance relied on the above judicial pronouncement to prove the point that Jamieson was not a limitation on the scope of the coroner’s inquest, the Baroness goes on to state: This approach, evident even in the arguments of the other Lords, through facts and concrete situations, applies that purposive approach which looks outside the wordings of the statute. The purposive approach is required for all EC law under s.2 (4) of the European Communities Act 1972. But the manner by which the purposive approach is applied is pragmatic and realistic, and akin to the unitary approach of construction. All the Lords drew from the facts and how they perceive these in the normal course of affairs, in order to find a framework by which to view the present case. As such, they departed from the literal construction of the law, not relying so much on grammar and terminology, but seeking to infer meaning at the pragmatic level – a hallmark of the unitary approach. (Wordount = 340) The appeal mechanism by which this case came to the House of Lords. The case came to the House of Lords through the regular process for judicial review. The case emanated from the Divisional Court, then was appealed to the Court of Appeal before its elevation to the House of Lords. Under direction 10.11(a) of the Practice Directions and Standing Orders of the House of Lords, in cases relying on provisions of the HRA 1998, “if the House is to be asked to consider whether to make, uphold or reverse a declaration that a provision of primary or subordinate legislation is incompatible with a European Human Rights Convention right,” then the Crown has a right to be joined as a party to the appeal under direction 31.2. In this case, the state has assumed the role of respondent to the appeal, pursuant to this direction. (Wordcount = 132) Significance of this judgment in relation to the doctrines of Parliamentary privilege and statutory interpretation. Parliamentary privilege accords Parliament the necessary freedom (from court intervention) to exercise its Constitutional sovereignty as a legislative and deliberative assembly. However, in Stockdale v. Hansard (1839), the court claimed that the determination of the existence and ambit of parliamentary privilege is a justiciable question, although once the privilege is held to exist, the court may no longer rule upon its exercise. Parliamentary pronouncements cannot be too narrowly articulated; their implications could be variable and evolving, depending upon particular developments, such as the introduction of a foreign law, or the emergence of unforeseen considerations. In the instant case, it has become apparent that the original statute’s construction was modified to accommodate Convention obligations. The Lords entertained divergent perceptions, but in the process of deliberation, out of the various constructs was formed the statute’s redefined meaning. Thus, the sovereignty of Parliament resides in its pronouncements – “what it says” – because “what it means” may have entirely different interpretations depending on the conditions obtaining. (Wordcount = 161) Total wordcount – 1,060 References: R (Hurst) v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (2007) UKHL 13 Stockdale v. Hansard et al.(1839) 9 Ad & E 1 R (Middleton) v West Somerset Coroner (2004) 2 AC 182 R v Coroner for North Humberside and Scunthorpe, Ex p Jamieson (1995) QB 1 Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4.XI.1950, as amended by Protocol No. 11 Human Rights Act 1998 Chapter 42 Coroners Act 1988 Griffith, G. Parliamentary privilege: first principles and recent applications, NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service, Briefing Paper No 1/09 Read More