Automatism: A Controversy of Connotation - Coursework Example

Automatism: A Controversy of Connotation Automatism: A Controversy of Connotation Introduction As far as the conscious intention behind any crime is considered the primary requirement to convict a person, the defence of automation gives birth to a host of controversies, as the definition of automation complicatedly includes voluntariness and intention with a vague level of consciousness. The manipulation of Automatism as a defense of crime has engendered controversy as it, though has strong medical-ground very often paves the way of acquittal for a person who intends to commit crime (Schopp 24)1. The question that arises here is whether automatism is proved from the medical point of view and, even if it has a strong medical ground, whether it is justified enough to be manipulated as a defense of crime (Angelomatis 132)2. Yet the conflicts between the views of automatism and its manipulation as the defense of ‘actus reus’, the defense of automatism in the law can be justified to a greater extent to defend the true innocent on either parties of any case in the court. The prime tone of automatism is, as Lord Denning (Bratty v. Attorney General of Northern Ireland AC 386) explains it: No act is punishable if it is done involuntarily: and an involuntary act in this context – some people nowadays prefer to speak of it as ‘automatism’ – means an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind, such as a spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing, such as an act done whilst suffering from a concussion or whilst sleepwalking. (409)3 This paper aims to substantiate the fact what automatism is, what medical science asserts of automatism, the points at which controversies regarding the handling of automatism in any court case arise, and the points at which these controversies subside. In addition, the debate that goes on the philosophical implications of the law on automatism will be discussed in this paper. Conflict between Medical Views and Legal Views Since the 1950s the years when the concept of automatism begins to emerge for the first time, it happens that medical evidence comes into conflict with the legal views of automatism. Such conflicts have pushed the law of automatism to undergo amendments and changes for a significant number of times. As according to the medical science the concepts of the sane automatism and the insane automatism do not yield any clear demarcation between them and as they are overlapping largely in most cases, expertise of medical professionals claims a major role in justifying the legality of automatism (Reznek 218-25)4. Handling of automatism as a defence in the law court leads to its divisions based on the internal and external factors causing automatism. As Ritchie J defines automatism, “Automatism is a term used to describe unconscious, involuntary behaviour, the state of a person who, though capable of action is not conscious of what he is doing.” (Rabey v. R 513)5 Medical science asserts that automatism that is caused by some internal factors, commonly diseases of brain, such as islet tumor causing hypoglycaemia, is often considered as insane automatism. However, the hypoglycaemia is caused due to any external factors such the injection of drug, accidental injuries and blow on the head, such automatism is considered as sane automatism. Such factor-based divisions of automatism lead to the arousal of controversies as even if having such marginal difference between the two types of automatisms they receive two different opposite legal verdicts from law courts. As according to some law sane automatism is a subject to an acquittal, there is the possibility that a person committing serious crime receives acquittal, whereas persons with non-violent crimes due to insane automatism receive the verdict to committal to a mental hospital (Brudner 66-69)6. As a result, the law and the verdicts regarding automatism fairly need the technical assistance of the medical professionals in order to detect the concreteness of automatism as a disease. So any law will not be proved satisfactory, if, as Fenwick comments, It does not allow any discretion in sentencing on the part of the judge once a verdict of not guilty by virtue of insane automatism has been passed…This would certainly be satisfactory where violent crimes have been committed. However, it is inappropriate in many cases where non-violent confusional crimes… (27)7 The Philosophical Controversies of the Law on Automatism The fundamental principle of any law claims the concrete proof of the conscious and intentional involvement of any person in order to hold him responsible of any act. As automatism is cited in term of mental disorder that seizes a person’s consciousness keeping his or her intention intact, the philosophical dichotomy between the guilty act due to Automatism and conscious intentional guilt is blurred due to the overlapping of their definitions and the opportunities that the dichotomy provide a scoundrel. In 1992 La Forest J in a court case of R v Parks 75 CCC (3d) 287 defines automatism as “conceptually a subset of the voluntariness requirement which, in turn, is a part of the actus reus component of criminal liability” (302)8. The controversy receives a new twist when the question arises whether the defense of automatism should encapsulate “reflex action”. Indeed, in 1967 in the case Ryan v The Queen 121 CLR 205,9 the underlying question was to what extent automatism should be considered as the justified defence of guilt. However, the irony is that such definition of guilt leaves the way open for the accused to be acquitted even if he violates another law. The defendant attempted to robe a shop with loaded arms and at a moment, he shot the shop due to the reflex action evoked by the murdered. As Barwick C. J. says: That a crime cannot be committed except by an act or omission is axiomatic. It is basic, in my opinion, that the ‘act’ of an accused … must be a ‘willed’, a voluntary act that has caused the death charged. It is the act, which must be willed, though its consequences may not be intended. (213)10 The Irony within the Concept of Automatism Though automatism on insanity, somnambulism, and drunkenness can be judged from the prediction of the loss control, the irony within the concept of automatism is that the idea of unconscious intention behind any guilt consumes itself. Automatism due to the internal factors can be proved on sound medical ground. However, sane automatism often poses opportunity for scoundrels to commit crime purposely that technical assistance often fails to detect the real intention (Roach et al 586)11. As unconsciousness is intended mostly to defend a criminal act, sane automatism offers the chance to manipulate it to defend a crime. In this regard Schroeder comments, “[Automatism is] a defence which in a true and proper case may be the only one open to an honest man, but it may just as readily be the last refuge of a scoundrel.” (R. v. Szymusiak 602)12 According to the US Law, automatism regarding reflex action has been defined from a broader point of view. In the case People v. Decina 2 NY2d 13 3, 143 in 1956 though the defendant was proved to be a victim of epileptic he was convicted of negligent homicide. Decina the defendant killed four people knocking them down while driving his car, as he looses control on the car due to his epileptic seizer while driving. He was convicted on the point that he committed the actus reus when he first neglected his disease and drove his car voluntarily without assistance, though he knew that his epileptic seizer may occur while driving. The point of conviction is as following: Even though a reflex or a convulsion is an excuse, the actor in this instance cannot use this defence because he knowingly undertook the risk of driving while suffering from a disease that is characterized by frequent convulsions, etc. The actus reus was established when he began driving. (People v. Decina 143)13 Conclusion As automatism often offers multiple options to interpret the laws regarding automatism from different levels, there have been controversies on the point that to what extent automatism can be considered, as a proper defense of one’s crime.The concept of automatism requires an act to be unintentional and unconscious. However, as the concept itself is self-consuming, it draws a host of controversies. The concept of automatism is self-contradictory in the sense that it creates the opportunity to be manipulated as intentional unconsciousness. As a result, the laws regarding automatism have undergone changes from time to time to meet the confrontation of reality. Dickson J. points out the frailty of automatism in the Rabey case: Automatism as a defence is easily feigned.  It is said the credibility of our criminal justice system will be severely strained if a person who has committed a violent act is allowed an absolute acquittal on a plea of automatism arising from a psychological blow. (R. v. Stone, No. 2 S.C.R. 290)14 Endnotes 1. Robert F. Schopp, Automatism, insanity, and the psychology of criminal responsibility: a philosophical inquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 24 2. Cheryl S. Angelomatis, “Canadian Insanity Defence Reform: Capturing A New Spirit of MCNaughtan”, (1981) 132, 07 Apr. 2009 < ir.lib.sfu.ca/bitstream/1892/7551/1/b16168252.pdf -> 3. Bratty v. Attorney General of Northern Ireland. No. AC 386. Supreme Ct. of England, 1963, p. 409. 07 Apr. 2009 4. Lawrie Reznek, Evil or ill?: justifying the insanity defence. (Routledge, 1997) 218-29 5. Rabey v. R. 2 S.C.R. 513. Supreme Court of Canada. 18 July 1980. 07 Apr. 2009 6. Alan Brudner, "Insane Automatism: A Proposal for Reform", McGill Law Journal, 45 (2000): 65-85; 7. Patterson Fenwick, “Automatism, medicine and the law.” Psychol Med Monogr Suppl, 17 (1), 27, 1990, Institute of Psychiatry, De Crespigny Park, London. 8. R v. Parks. No. 2 S.C.R. 871. Supreme Court of Canada, 27 August. 1992. 07 Apr. 2009 9. Ryan v. the Queen. No. 121 CLR 205, 219. Supreme Ct. of Australia. 1967 10. Ibid 11. Roach, Kent, Patrick Healy & Gary Trotter. Criminal Law and Procedure: Cases and materials, 9th ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2004). 12. R. v. Szymusiak. No. 3 O. R. 602. Ont. C.A. 1972 in R. v. Bartlett [1984] 5 C.C.C. (2d) 321 (O.H.Ct.) at p. 329 13. People v. Decina. No. 2 NY2d 13 3. Supreme Ct. of the US. 1956, 143 14. R. v. Stone, No. 2 S.C.R. 290. Supreme Ct. of Canada. 27 May 27, 1999. 07 Apr. 2009 Works Cited Angelomatis, S. Cheryl. “Canadian Insanity Defence Reform: Capturing A New Spirit of MCNaughtan”, 1981. 07 Apr. 2009 < ir.lib.sfu.ca/bitstream/1892/7551/1/b16168252.pdf -> Bratty v. Attorney General of Northern Ireland. No. AC 386. Supreme Ct. of England, 1963, p. 409. 07 Apr. 2009 Brudner, Alan. "Insane Automatism: A Proposal for Reform", McGill Law Journal, 45 (2000): 65-85; Fenwick, Patterson. “Automatism, medicine and the law.” Psychol Med Monogr Suppl, 17 (1), 27, 1990, Institute of Psychiatry, De Crespigny Park, London. Rabey v. R. 2 S.C.R. 513. Supreme Court of Canada. 18 July 1980. 07 Apr. 2009 People v. Decina. No. 2 NY2d 13 3. Supreme Ct. of the US. 1956, 143 R. v. Parks. No. 2 S.C.R. 871. Supreme Court of Canada, 27 August. 1992. 07 Apr. 2009 Ryan v. the Queen. No. 121 CLR 205, 219. Supreme Ct. of Australia. 1967 R. v. Szymusiak. No. 3 O. R. 602. Ont. C.A. 1972 in R. v. Bartlett [1984] 5 C.C.C. (2d) 321 (O.H.Ct.) at p. 329. R. v. Stone, No. 2 S.C.R. 290. Supreme Ct. of Canada. 27 May 27, 1999. 07 Apr. 2009 Reznek, Lawrie. Evil or ill?: justifying the insanity defence. Routledge, 1997, 218-29. Roach et al. Criminal Law and Procedure: Cases and Materials. Edn. 9 New York: Emond Montgomery Publication, 2004, 586 Schopp, F. Robert. Automatism, insanity, and the psychology of criminal responsibility: a philosophical inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 24 Bibliography Card Note Cards: Read More