History of Juveniles' Constitutional Rights - Report Example

Understanding The History of Juveniles Constitutional Rights in the United s I. Introduction The fundamental rights of minors in the country areenshrined in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Like their adult counterparts, the rights of minors in the country are guaranteed under the Fifth, Sixth and Seven Amendments of the constitution. However, since minors need more protection under the law, the juvenile justice system was instituted to provide extra protection to minor offenders. The juvenile justice system which was created to protect the constitutional rights of minors is considered as one of the most important branches of the justice system in the country. Under the juvenile justice system, children cannot be tried and punished as adults on the premise that children do not have the kind of mature judgment that is usually attributed to more mature people. Since children lack proper judgment, they should be treated different from adults. Under the law, minors are seen to be devoid of the ability to tell what is right or wrong. The legal maxim dolci incapax have been used as defense of minors for many generations. The juvenile justice is not exactly the creation of our modern times. In fact, if we take a look at the history of the juvenile justice system we can see that it had been around for more than 200 years. The first juvenile court appears in Illinois as early as 1899. From then on, the concept of juvenile justice has evolved considerably. The laws of the United States define a minor or a juvenile as a person who is not yet of legal age. Since legal age varies from state to state, the jurisdiction of juvenile courts in the country may also vary. For instance, in the states of New York, North Carolina and Connecticut, juveniles are defined as persons who are 16 years of age and below. This means that if the offender is less than 16 years old, he or she is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court (See Whitehead and Lab 1999). On the other hand, in states like South Carolina, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Georgia, Michigan, Georgia, New Hampshire, Texas, Missouri and Wisconsin where the persons who are 17 years of age and below are still considered as minors, offenders around this age bracket fall under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court (see Whitehead and Lab 1999). To help us understand better the evolution of Juvenile Justice through time, let us take a closer look at its history. II. The Making of the Juvenile Justice System The tumultuous years between 1880 and 1920 give birth to the juvenile rights under the constitution (see Whitehead and Lab 1999). During this time, large waves of immigration hit the country which triggered rapid urbanization in several areas. As a result of the rapid urbanization, many children were left unattended by their parents and were left to wander around the streets (Agnew, Robert 2001). Eventually, these children became involved in series of criminal activities. At first, these children were tried in adult courses and kept in jails with the adult criminals. This situation proved to be unfavorable on the minors. Instead of being reformed for the better, these children who get mixed with hardened criminals become worst (see Whitehead and Lab 1999). Alarmed by the situation, many political activists and politicians sought to separate the minors from the adult criminals. The case of Ex parte Crouse (1838) was considered as applicable on certain cases. The case of Ex Parte Crouse presents a unique scenario where the mother asked the state to incarcerate her daughter for fear that she might become a criminal if left wandering on the streets. The essence of the decision of the court in this case is that the state can intervene and assist families of troubled youths to promote the best interest of the minor in question. The court does not look at the states intervention into the rearing and disciplining of the troubled minor as form of encroachment into the constitutional rights of minors. While the decisions of the court in the case of Ex Parte Crouse mostly remained in force, the decisions of the court in the case of People v Turner (1870) presented yet another dimension on how the constitutional rights of juveniles should be interpreted. In the case of People v. Turner (1870), the court ruled that a minor cannot be detained by the state against his will and the will of the parents even if such detention is made to protect the minor from becoming a criminal. According to the court, the state can only intervene in extreme situations where there is a clear showing that the child or the minor is in real danger. In the absence of an evidences that the minor is in real danger, the state cannot intervene especially when the parents of the minor does not authorize such intervention. On the other hand, where there is clear showing that the child or the minor is in imminent danger, the state has the right to intervene with or without the permission of the parents of the child or minor in question. Although the first juvenile court was established in 1899, it was not until 1944 the juvenile courts were officially instituted. The landmark case of Prince v. Massachusetts (1944) served as the pivotal point in the establishment of the constitutional rights of minors. In this case, the legal doctrine of parens patriae was established. Under this legal doctrine, the state can "act as parent" to the minor and intervene in certain cases to promote the best interest of the minor. In effect, this doctrine broadens the coverage of protection accorded by the state to minors to the point that in some cases, minor encroachments into the rearing of the minor may occur. The 1905 case of Commonwealth v. Fisher proved that the state can go beyond the powers accorded to it by the constitution. In the case of Commonwealth v. Fisher, the court found it necessary to imposed stiffer penalty on minors based on parens patriae doctrine to promote the best interest of the child. Fortunately such ruling was overturn later on in the case of Kent v. United States (1966). In this case, the court said that the ruling of the case of Commonwealth v. Fisher violated juveniles constitutional rights. A year after the Kent case was decided by the court, the court, in the case of In re Gault, took it upon itself to set guidelines in determining the privileges of juveniles under the Fifth and Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution (see In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The case of In re Winship (1970) affirmed the decision of the court in the case of In Re Gault. The In re Winship (1970) case broadened the scope of reasonable standards on establishing the guilt of the minor. Despite the decisions of the court in the case of In re Gault (1967) and In Re Winship (1970), the move to have juvenile delinquents tried by a jury composed of their peers was effectively quashed by the court in the landmark of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971). According to the court, allowing minors to be tried by a jury would make the procedure more adversarial thereby making it more difficult of minors to defend themselves. In essence, juvenile courts are supposed to be less formal and more protective of the rights and privacy of the minor in question and having a jury try minor offenders will strip the minors of the special protection accorded to them by the law. While these aforementioned cases were being decided in court, a move to deinstitutionalize status offenses committed by minors was in motion between the 1960s and 1970s. This resulted in the formal establishment of the 1974 Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act. Under this act, the district attorneys office is given the power to divert a minor offender under the premise that the offenders and their families will be better off if they are being formally processed through the regular courts. At present, diversion is still being practiced. A good example of status offenses committed by minors can be clearly seen in the case of Qutb v. Strauss (1993) which involves the violation of curfew laws. This questioned the constitutionality of curfew laws thus it was tried in the regular courts. On appeal, the court of Appeals ruled in favor of the constitutionality of curfew laws as a means to protect minors. On the other hand, judicial waiver, where the juvenile court transfers the case to the regular courts, is being practiced in many states across the country (see Snyder, Sickmund & Poe-Yamagata, 2000). The case of Breed v. Jones (1975) serves as guide for judicial waiver until the present. According to this case, the minor cannot be tried in the juvenile court and later on waived to be tried in adult court. To do so would constitute double jeopardy which a violation of the minors constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment. Can minor offenders be subject to death penalty? Apparently, the court thinks that they can be subjected to death penalty. The case of Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988) and Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) shows that minors can be subjected to death penalty if they are of certain age during the commission of the crime or at the time of apprehension. III. Conclusion The history of Juveniles Constitutional Rights is filled with contradicting interpretation of the constitutional rights of minors. Various cases decided at different times reflect the courts views of what juvenile rights should be and how the state should protect the rights of these minors. However, a common denominator which is the promotion of the best interest of the minor can be seen through the conflicting decisions of the court regarding the rights of juveniles. The doctrine of paren patriae which allows the state to act as parent of the minor, to some extent, offers more protection to minors. Works Cited Books Ralph Loeber and David P. Farrington, Child Delinquents: Developments, Intervention, and Service Needs. Sage Publications, 2000. Agnew, Robert. Juvenile Delinquency: Causes and Controls. Roxbury Publishing, 2001. Whitehead, John T. and Steven P. Lab Juvenile Justice: An Introduction (Third Edition)., Anderson Publishing, 1999. Snyder, Howard N., Melissa Sickmund, Eileen Poe-Yamagata Juvenile Transfers to Criminal Court in the 1990s: Lessons Learned from Four States., Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2000. Cases Ex parte Crouse (1838) People v Turner 55 Ill. 280 (1870) Prince v. Massachusetts 27 Pa. Super. 175; 1905 Pa. Super. LEXIS 29 (1944) Commonwealth v. Fisher 321 US 158 (1905) Kent v. United States 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045 (1966) IN RE Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) In re Winship 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970) McKeiver v. Pennsylvania 403 U.S. 528, 91 S. Ct. 1976 (1971) Qutb v. Strauss 11 F.3d 488, 490–91 (1993) Breed v. Jones 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779 (1975) Thompson v. Oklahoma 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687 (1988) Stanford v. Kentucky 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969 (1989) Read More