A Warrant of Arrest Issued by a Court - Case Study Example

Warrantless Searches The right to privacy is a constitutionally guaranteed right. The Fourth Amendment to the United s provides that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (US Constitution). Thus, the United States Supreme Court held in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347, 357 that warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment – subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” (qtd. Acker & Brody 172). These exceptions include, inter alia, the following: searches incident to lawful arrests; plain view doctrine; consent searches, and; automobile searches (Scott 535). Exception No. 1: Searches Incident to Lawful Arrests Warrantless searches can be made where arrests are lawful and such searches are incident to such arrests. If the arrest was not lawful then the search becomes unlawful as well (Siegel & Senna 251). Generally, an arrest is lawful if the arresting officer is equipped with a warrant of arrest issued by a court with authority or jurisdiction, on the basis of a probable cause specifying the name or identity of the person to be arrested. However, even this doctrine is subject to the following exceptions: one, when a felony is being committed; second, when a felony has just been committed and the arresting officer or person has knowledge to reasonably believe that a person has committed it; third, all breaches of peace like riots and assaults and batteries for the immediate restoration of order; fourth, in the disorderly conduct of persons violating ordinary police regulations like vagrancy and gambling in public thoroughfares (Tiedeman 102). However, even if the arrest is lawful, the subsequent warrantless search is still subject to certain qualifications: one, the search must be conducted at the time of or immediately after the arrest, and; second, the area subject to the search is confined only to the person lawfully arrested or/and the immediate vicinity where the suspect is being arrested (Siegel & Senna 250-251). The case of Chimel v. California, 395 US 752 (1962), tackled the scope of the area that can be made subject to search as incident to a lawful arrest. In this case, the arresting officers knocked on the door of a burglary suspect armed with a warrant of arrest but not a search warrant. After serving the arrest warrant on the suspect, they conducted a search on the entire house of the suspect against the latter’s wishes. They recovered several items which would link the suspect to the crime. During the trial however, the accused objected to the presentation of the items recovered as exhibits for the prosecution on the ground that they were seized illegally. Although the warrant was actually invalid, the entire arrest and search proceeding was sustained by the trial court as valid. The rationale was that the arresting officers believed in good faith that the warrant was valid and they had showed probable cause in the application of the warrant which made the arrest valid and since the arrest was lawful, then the search qualified as a search made as an incident to a valid and lawful arrest (Chimel v. California 1962). This decision was however, reversed by the Supreme Court. The Court held that a search that was made as incident to a lawful arrest has a limited scope and should be made with one purpose: to prevent that person to arm himself and resist the arrest and endanger the lives of the arresting officers and those within the vicinity. Thus, a search can be made only on the person of the suspect arrested, and the area immediately within the vicinity of the arrest area within the reach of the person being arrested. Distinction therefore must be made between the person and the area within the reach of that person and all other areas; the difference being that the latter requires extensive search and therefore needs a search warrant issued in accordance with the law (Chimel v. California 1962). The action of the arresting officers in conducting a search in the rooms of the house where the arrest was conducted was therefore illegal. Searching every room of the entire house, including drawers and removing the contents thereof went beyond the established principles of conducting search as incident to a lawful arrest. The principle relative to searches enunciated in this case is now known as the Chimel Doctrine (Chimel v. California 1962). The Plain View Doctrine According to authors Acker and Brody, the plain view doctrine does not really qualify as an exception to the Fourth Amendment rule on the right to privacy because “what is exposed for others to see cannot support a legitimate expectation of privacy.” Nevertheless, the plain-view doctrine has always been traditionally considered as one of the exceptions to the general rule of searches with warrants. As the term implies, the doctrine allows an officer to seize anything visible to them that constitutes incriminating evidence (193). The SC has established, through several case laws, the limitation of the application of the plain-view doctrine. The first limitation is that the officer who conducted the search and seizure claiming authority under the ‘plain-view doctrine’ must initially establish lawful presence over the area where the search and seizure was made. Second, the objects seized under this doctrine must be “immediately apparent” to the seizing officer (Acker & Brody 193). The case of Horton v. California, 496 US 128 (1990), however, discussed another supposed to be limitation of the plain view doctrine on top of the two qualifications discussed in the immediately preceding paragraph. In the said case, the police officer applied for a search warrant to conduct a search on the home of a robbery suspect. The officer’s affidavit for the warrant application mentioned the weapons used in the robbery as well as the proceeds of the crime. The warrant however specifically mentioned only the proceeds of the crime. When the warrant was served and implemented the officer did not find the stolen property but saw weapons out in the open and in plain view. He seized the weapons and the suspect was convicted of armed robbery. The issue in this case was that the prior interest of the officer in discovering the weapons during the search had tainted the supposedly plain view doctrine with the element of advertence. Put in another way, the discovery of the weapons was not intentional or unplanned because the officer conducted the search with discovering the weapons in mind. The Supreme Court however ultimately sustained the decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals which sustained its decision. The Court rejected the defendant’s contention that the Coolidge v. New Hampshire 403 US 443 case should be made applicable to the case a bar, where the SC held that the plain view doctrine is applicable only if the discovery of the objects was accompanied by the element of inadvertence or unplanned detection. In expounding its decision, the SC held that the element of inadvertence was not really the reason why the Court rejected the plain view doctrine as justification for the seizure made by the authorities in that case. The real rationale behind the Coolidge case was that the seizure actually violated the Fourth Amendment as the sighting of the ‘cars’ although visibly seen in that case has no outright probative value. In that case, the authorities had to vacuum the ‘cars’’ interior to discover traces of the incriminating gunpowder (Horton v. California 1990). A claim under the plain view doctrine must meet the requirement of circumstances that will validly and lawfully place authorities in the area where incriminating objects are discovered. An obvious application of this doctrine is when the authorities are actually armed with a search warrant to search a specific area and during the search they happened to chance upon objects that are incriminating to a suspect. Another legitimate justification to the application of this doctrine is when authorities are making warrantless arrests under the established exceptions to the rule on arrest warrants. This is known as the prior justification rule. “What the ‘plain view cases’ have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused – and permits the warrantless seizure” (Acker & Brody 194). Automobile Searches Automobile searches can be conducted either as an incident to an arrest with a warrant or even without any warrant so long as the officer doing the searching has probable cause to believe that the automobile has incriminating evidence. The significance of automobile searches has long been established as early as 1925 in the case of Carroll v. US, 267US 132. The US Supreme Court, for the first time, decided and delineated the distinction between searches conducted in homes and searches made on automobiles. In this case, federal officers stopped an automobile crossing along the highway on a mere suspicion. A search made on the vehicle revealed carefully hidden hard liquor which was in violation of the law on transporting intoxicating liquor. The issue here is whether or not the officers had authority to conduct the search without a warrant and on mere suspicion. This precedent-making case established the now known Carroll Doctrine which makes automobile search an exception to the ‘warrant before search and seizure requirement.’ The said doctrine which established the ‘automobile exception’ justified it on the ground of the mobile nature of vehicles which will make prior obtaining of warrants difficult and impractical since the period for getting the warrant might provide opportunity for the vehicle to get away from pursuing authorities. Secondly, vehicles are less private than houses and are used primarily for transportation rather than storage of personal things (Siegel & Senna 250-253). There are however contentious issues that plagued the automobile warrantless search exception and these issues center on how the conduct of the search should be made. For example, should the search be made on the basis of the plain view doctrine where the police officer only confines his search on objects visible to him or is he within his right to open and search glove compartments and even trunks? This is exactly the meat of discussion and decision in the case of United States v Ross, 456 US 798, a 1978 case (Siegel & Senna 253). In the said mentioned case, the arresting officers received a prior tip that a certain person sells narcotics which are being kept and stored in the trunk of his car. After finding the car, the police waited for the suspect to enter the car and drive it whereupon the officers stopped him and searched the interior and trunk. The search revealed a bag of heroin and a pistol. A second search was made after the arrest of the suspect and vehicle was taken to the police station. The second search revealed a bag of money amounting to $3,200 in cash. All of these searches were conducted without the necessary warrant (Siegel & Senna 253). On the basis of the ‘automobile exception’ laid down by the Carroll Doctrine, the SC ruled that the seizure was constitutional and a valid exception to the Fourth Amendment. The case of Delaware v Prouse, 440 US 648, a 1979 case, took up the issue of roadblocks set up to inspect vehicles and check their drivers. The case involved a spot check made by a police officer on a vehicle which revealed marijuana, a prohibited substance. A police officer, who was at that time aboard a police patrol car, saw a vehicle drive past. He flagged it down for the purpose of checking the driver’s license and the car’s registration. Upon a cursory view of the car’s interior he observed marijuana lying on the car’s floor within his plain view. The driver was later charged of illegal possession of a controlled substance. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence based on the fact that the search and seizure was not made on the strength of a probable cause. The officer himself admitted that the driver had not committed any traffic violation or any kind of violation when he flagged the car down. In other words, the stopping of the vehicle was not motivated by any probable cause or based on any established enforcement guideline or standard on search and seizure. The motion to suppress was granted by the trial court and was sustained by the Delaware SC. Upon appeal to the US SC, the decision was likewise affirmed. The Court held that stopping a vehicle to check the driver’s license and car registration is per se a violation of the Fourth Amendment unless such stopping is qualified by probable cause like reasonable suspicion of lack of license or valid registration, or the driver or vehicle is subject to seizure for violation of law. The rationale of the decision were: the stopping unqualified by reasonable grounds constituted “seizure” within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment prohibition and any exception to that prohibition that will amount to an intrusion on the individual person or possession should be a well executed balancing act between the right and legitimate governmental interests; the balance does not automatically tilt heavier to the right of the government to conduct spot checks over the individual’s privacy nor the fact that the individual is not within the comfort of his home strips him of his rights under the said Amendment (Delaware v Prouse 1979). The reason however, why roadblock cases continue to be contentious issues to this day despite the Carroll Doctrine is that several Supreme Court decisions on car stops and roadblocks seemingly contradict each other. The decision in the case of City of Indianapolis v Edmund, 531 US 32 (2000) and the decision in Michigan Department of State Police v Sitz, 496 US 444 (1990) is a case in point. In the former, the City of Indianapolis implemented road blocks as a measure to help curtail illegal drugs and their transportation. Each and every vehicle, whether suspicious or not, passing the road block would be stopped for around five minute, one police officer taking a cursory look at the car interior and another guiding a narcotic-sniffing trained dog around the vehicle. This practice was assailed by some citizens in a class suit before a court of law on the ground of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court ruled against the Indianapolis citizens holding that there was no violation but the Court of Appeal reversed. When brought before the US SC, the Court declared the roadblocks unconstitutional and unreasonable because the implementation of roadblocks to stop illegal drug trafficking cannot be distinguished from other measures used to stop crimes in general (City of Indianapolis v Edmund 2000). On the other hand, the Sitz case involved the putting up for roadblocks as well, which in this case was called ‘sobriety case’ but for a different purpose – to curtail drunken driving. Before the program was implemented, a citizen filed a case for injunction questioning the constitutionality of the measure. The Michigan trial court sustained the petitioner but the US SC reversed. The rationale for the decision was that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment contrary to the contention of the petitioner on the ground that the balance of scale tilted slightly in favor of the need to stop the growing incidences of drunk driving over the right to privacy granted by the Fourth Amendment (Michigan Department of State Police v Sitz 1998). The 1977 case of Pennsylvania v. Mimms and the Maryland v. Wilson case both tackled the case of frisking drivers and passengers of vehicles during routine traffic stops. In both cases, the Court allowed as constitutional the ordering of drivers and passengers from out the vehicles and subjecting them to frisks and searches (Siegel & Senna 254). Consent Searches Consent searches are merely the result of the waiver of rights by an individual of the rights granted by the Bill of Rights specifically by the Fourth Amendment. The grant of rights under the said provisions carries also with them the right to refuse or waive these rights. Thus, the individual may choose to waive them. This is precisely the basis of consent searches where authorities may conduct warrantless searches on the strength of the consent of the individual who is being searched. There are two considerations to take into account in consent searches. The first consideration is what makes for a valid consent and the second concern is who should give the valid consent (Siegel & Senna 254-255). Anent the issue of the consent’s validity, the qualification of “voluntariness” of the consent is necessary. Thus a consent that was given because of coercion and undue influence taints the validity of such consent and renders it invalid. Any governmental authority who claims consent as basis of search and seizure absent a warrant has the burden of proof to show that the consent was made freely and voluntarily. Two cases stand out as illustrative of this requirement: the Bumper v. North Carolina case, filed as 391 US 543 decided in 1968, and; the Schneckloth v. Bustamonte case, docketed as 412 US 218, which was decided in 1972 (Acker & Brody 182-183). In the Bumper case, the accused was tried for rape which under the laws of North Carolina was punishable by death unless otherwise recommended and converted by the jury to life sentence. The facts of the case showed that police authorities went to the house of the accused to search it for incriminating evidence. They found the mother of the accused at home and asked her if they could search the house and told her that there was a search warrant, although in actuality there was none. The mother consented and the police proceeded to search the entire house. The search bore a weapon which was presented during the trial of the case. The case raised two constitutional issues, one of which is the validity of the consent given by the mother of the accused (referred to as petitioner in the SC). It was revealed during the trial that the warrant for the search was really non-existent and the search was merely based on the consent given by the mother. The trial court admitted the rifle and found the accused guilty, a decision which was sustained and affirmed by the State Supreme Court. On a petition for certiorari to the US SC, the Court rendered invalid the admission of the rifle on the ground that it was the fruit of the ‘poisoned tree’ as the search was unauthorized. The consent was granted on the basis of the information that there was an existing search warrant when there was none, rendered that consent involuntary and defective and the whole process of search and seizure a violation of the Fourth Amendment (Bumper v. North Carolina 1968). The Schneckloth case on the other hand, answered the issue as to whether there was a need to inform the person whose consent was sought prior to a warrantless search of his property that he has the right to refuse consent under the law. The Supreme Court held that when such person is not in the custody of the police, there is no need for the government to prove during trial that he was informed of such right. The voluntariness of the consent can be determined from the circumstances occurring during the grant of the consent (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 1973). Conclusion The right to privacy is constitutionally granted and its supremacy upheld by the Supreme Court over and over. Many cases had fallen short and many hard works had gone to naught because of enforcement failures by authorities to observe its substantial and procedural aspects. Although, exceptions to this right are allowed, yet they are few and limited. Some of these exceptions are still subject to debate and Supreme Court decisions showed a lack of definiteness in their application as in the case of automobile searches. It is therefore a must that authorities enforcing warrantless search and seizure proceedings carefully observe all caution in its implementation lest all efforts are later negated by evidence becoming worthless when they are found to be ‘fruits of the poisoned tree.’ Works Cited Acker, James R. & Brody, David C. & Acker. Criminal Procedure. Jones & Bartlett Publishers: 2004. Bumper v. North Carolina 391 US 543 (1968). Altlaw. 2 August 2008. ˂http://www.altlaw.org/v1/cases/406144˃ Carroll v. US, 267 US 132 (1925). Altlaw. 2 August 2008 ˂http://www.altlaw.org/v1/cases/395046˃ Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Altlaw. 1 August 2008. ˂http://supreme.justia.com/us/395/752/case.html˃ Coolidge v. New Hampshire 403 US 443 (1971). Altlaw. 2 August 2008. ˂http://www.altlaw.org/v1/cases/387828˃ City of Indianapolis v Edmund, 531 US 32 (2000). Altlaw. 3 August 2008. ˂http://www.altlaw.org/v1/cases/1387999˃ Delaware v Prouse, 440 US 648 (1979). Altlaw. 1 August 2008. ˂http://www.altlaw.org/v1/cases/401527˃ Horton v. California, 496 U. S. 128 (1990). Justia Supreme Court Center. 30 July 2008. ˂http://supreme.justia.com/us/496/128/˃ Michigan Department of State Police v Sitz, 496 US 444 (1990). Altlaw. 2 August 2008. ˂http://www.altlaw.org/v1/cases/399650˃ Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 412 US 218 (1973). Altlaw. 3 August 2008. ˂http://www.altlaw.org/v1/cases/385555˃ Scott, Hugh. Computer and Intellectual Property Crime. BNA Books: 2001. Siegel, Larry J., & Senna, Joseph J. Introduction to Criminal Justice. Thomson Wadsworth: 2005. Tiedeman, Christopher Gustavus. A Treatise on State and Federal Control of Persons and Property in the United States: Considered from Both a Civil and Criminal Standpoint. The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd: 2002. United States v Ross, 456 US 798. Altlaw. 3 August 2008. ˂http://www.altlaw.org/v1/cases/388372˃. US Constitution. Read More