The from a Criminal Law - Case Study Example

The issues raised in the scenario above centre on whether Anne is liable for her actions since it could be argued that she might have been suffering from a paranoid delusion at the time of the attack as she had not taken her medication. Likewise with Dave it is necessary to discuss whether the courts would allow a defence of intoxication in respect of his actions against Emma. Consideration needs also to be given to the fact that Emma had agreed with the others in the group that reasonable force can be used in the capturing of the group. This included the use of ropes and sticks. In order to discuss the liability of either party it is necessary to examine the law on automatism and intoxication as well as consent to activities that could prove to be dangerous. Automatism Automatism is a defence used when an accused is claiming that at the time the offence was committed they did not have the mens rea for the offence and were not in control of their own actions. The case of Bratty v Attorney General of Northern Ireland1 defines automatism as "connoting the state of a person who, though capable of action, is not conscious of what he is doing ... It means unconscious involuntary action, and it is a defence because the mind does not go with what is being done." In this case Lord Denning also went on to make the comment that “No act is punishable if it is done involuntarily: and an involuntary act in this context…means an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind such as a spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing such as an act done whilst suffering from concussion or whilst sleepwalking…” It was further observed by the LCJ in Attorney-Generals Reference (No 2 of 1992)2 the LCJ that .....the defence of automatism requires that there was a total destruction of voluntary control on the defendants part. Impaired, reduced or partial control is not enough. In this case the court concluded that driving without awareness did not amount to automatism. Where a defence of automatism is raised the onus is on the defence to prove that the accused lacked the mens rea for the offence at the time of their actions. Where the assertion is that the automatism was caused by a malfunction of the mind of the accused through a disease the defence will assert non-insane automatism. This defence can be used where such impairment is only a temporary condition. The courts have entertained such pleas where the accused has received a blow to the head or is under medication that effects the functioning of his mind. The courts are reluctant to accept such a defence where the automatism is caused by the consumption of alcohol or non prescribed drugs. In general terms the courts regard the consumption of alcohol and non prescribed drugs as self induced automatism3. In situations where the defence asserts that the automatism is caused by a disease of the mind the defence can enter a defence of insanity. Once the defence is raised the onus is then placed on the prosecution to disprove the assertion. This was the case in R v Issit4 where the prosecution was able to prove that the malfunctioning of the mind of the defendant was not caused by automatism or insanity. This was partly due to the fact that the defendant had not lost total control. Self induced intoxication is rarely accepted as a defence as it is regarded as reckless behaviour on the part of the accused and recklessness is often regarded as the mens rea for an offence. Automatism caused by intoxication was accepted in the case of R v Tandy (1988)5 as the defence where able to show that the defendant was suffering from long-term alcoholism and as such could not prevent himself from consuming excessive amounts of alcohol. It was decided by the court of appeal that the alcoholism caused the accused to have diminished responsibility, although the judge did caution the jury that they could only find this to be the case if they were satisfied that the first drink of the day was an involuntary act on the part of the defendant as a result of his alcoholism. In the case of R v Lipman (1969)6 the defendant was acquitted of murder as the jury were not convinced that the accused had the necessary mens rea for the act due to his level of intoxication. The defendant in this case had taken LSD and as a result he imagined he was being attacked and to save himself crammed eight inches of sheet down the victims’ throat killing her. The court replaced the charge of murder with one of manslaughter and he was duly convicted. A similar decision was reached in R v Sheehan & Moore [1975]7 where the court found the defendants guilty of manslaughter as opposed to murder as intention was difficult to prove due to their intoxication. Automatism has also been allowed as a defence where the defence can show that the action or inaction of the defendant caused him to act in that manner. Such arguments have been raised in cases where diabetics have not eaten properly after taking insulin. It is possible for the prosecution to defeat such assertions by proving that the accused ought to have known that failing to eat after taking insulin was likely to make him aggressive8. The case of R v Bailey (1983)9 involves an issue were self induced automatism was not recognised as a defence. In this particular case the defendant tried to claim that he committed the assault whilst in a hypoglycaemic condition. The court held that self induced automatism is not a defence were there is evidence that the defendant was reckless. In this case the defendant had failed to eat after taking insulin thereby bringing on the hypoglycaemic episode. In R v Quick & Another 10 Lawton, L.J. said: "A malfunctioning of the mind of transitory effect caused by the application to the body of some external factor such as violence, drugs, including anaesthetics, alcohol and hypnotic influences cannot fairly be said to be due to disease. Such malfunctioning, unlike that caused by a defect of reason from disease of the mind, will not always relieve an accused from criminal responsibility.....In this case Quicks alleged mental condition, if it ever existed, was not caused by his diabetes but by his use of the insulin prescribed by his doctor. Such malfunctioning of his mind as there was, was caused by an external factor and not by a bodily disorder in the nature of a disease which disturbed the working of his mind. It follows in our judgment that Quick was entitled to have his defence of automatism left to the jury and that Bridge J.s ruling as to the effect of the medical evidence called by him was wrong." In cases where the offence was committed under the influence of prescribed medication it could be argued that the defendant is not responsible for his actions, and a defence of automatism11 might be raised. In order to raise this as a defence the accused would have to prove that the side effects of the medication could cause him to react in the manner he did. The accused would also have to show that he had taken the medication in the prescribed manner and had not exceeded the prescribed dosage. If the accused had taken more than the prescribed dosage the court would be likely to infer that the automatism has been self induced12. From the perspective of Anne in this particular scenario she could argue that by forgetting to take her medication she has suffered a paranoid episode as a result of which she attacked Bill. Anne would have to demonstrate that it was out of character for her to react in this manner and that she was unaware of her actions as she was suffering from a paranoid delusion at the time of the attack. In R v Sullivan [1984]13 the court held that the defendant’s actions were as a direct result of the medication he was taking and that he was not in control of his own actions. If the prosecution could show that Anne had taken her medication wrongly or that the medication was unlikely to cause her to react in this manner then she is likely to be found guilty of assault. Taking the wrong dose of the medication or failing to take the medication at all will often be regarded by the courts as self-induced automatism and will not be allowed as a defence in general terms. Exceptions occur where self induced automatism is allowed as evidenced in the case of Tandy where the intoxication was self-induced but the defence was able to show that because the defendant was an alcoholic he was unable to prevent himself from becoming intoxicated. In the case of Dave he is only likely to succeed in a defence of automatism if he is able to prove to the court that he is an alcoholic. With regard to the consent of Emma to being tied reference has been made to the case of R v Brown14 in which the defendants attempted to rely on the consent of the injured parties in order to avoid charges of assault. This case is frequently quoted as an authority that a victim cannot consent to an assault on themselves. This has been affirmed in subsequent cases involving sadomasochism15. The general yardstick by which the law dictates whether consent is lawful is based on whether prosecution is deemed to be in the public interest. It could be argued that Emma consented to the possibility that she might be hurt and carried on regardless. Such considerations could lead to the dismissal of the charges against Dave if the defence can show that the tying up was part of the game and that the injuries suffered by Emma were not intentional on the part of Dave. 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Psychological Medicine, 14, 581–588 Table of Cases Attorney-Generals Reference (No 2 of 1992) 97 Cr App R 429, 434 Bratty v Attorney General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386, [1961] 3 All ER 523, [1961] UKHL 3 R v Bailey (1983)1 WLR 760; [1983] 2 All ER 503 R v Bailey 77 Cr App R 76 R v Boyea (1992) 156 JPR 505 R v Brown (1993) 2 All ER 75; {1994] 1 AC 212 R v Issit 67 Cr App R 44 R v Lipman (1969) [1970] 1 QB 152; [1969] 3 WLR 819 R v Quick & Another [1973] EWCA Crim 1 (18 April 1973); (1973) Q.B. 910 R v Sheehan & Moore [1975]1 WLR 739 R v Sullivan [1984]AC 156, CA R v Sullivan 77 Cr App R 176 R v Tandy (1988) 87 Cr App R 45 Read More