English Legal Method - Essay Example

CASE STUDY Material facts of the case: The defendant in this case was a young girl who had turned 15 in May 1997. On 26th September, 1997, she pleaded guilty to four counts of robbery and one count of assault. On 7th November, she asked for two more offences of robbery and two more of intent to rob to also be taken into consideration in passing sentence. The offences were committed when the defendant was fourteen years old but she was convicted for them when she was fifteen. The judge passed an order for detention of the defendant for a term of two years in a young offender institution for each offence, for which sentence was to be served concurrently. Although the offences to which the defendant pleaded guilty fell within the scope of the judge’s powers under Section 53 (2) and (3) of the Children and Young Persons Act of 1933, the Judge decided to avoid invoking those powers. However, a week later, the defendant applied to the Court for a variation of the order, to substitute an order for detention on the same terms under Section 53(2) and (3) of the Children and Young Persons Act of 1933. But on the basis of earlier case precedent established in the case of Reg v A.M1 the Judge declined to change his order. Secure accommodation was available for the defendant at Aycliffe, which was a reformative institution rather than a punitive institution. An order under Section 53 could have resulted in the defendant being sent there, but under a sentence for detention in a young offender institution, this was not possible. At the Court of Appeal, leave was given to the defendant to appeal against the order of the Judge, which was quashed, to be substituted with an order for detention for two years under Section 53. 2. The main legal issue in the case was the extent of applicability of Sections 53 (2) and (3) of the Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 in the case of an offender aged 15 years. The question raised was in what circumstances and within what limitations could a detention order for two years be issued under Section 53, on the grounds that none of the other modes of sentencing, including two years in a young offender institution is suitable to be implemented. This issue was particularly relevant because the statutory interpretation by the courts of this section hitherto had been on the basis that this Section is to be used only as a last recourse, when the offence was so grave that a custodial sentence was in order and a sentencing term of longer than two years was appropriate. 3. In this case, Lord Bingham used the literal rule of statutory interpretation which indicates that the words used in the statute are to be given their plain, ordinary dictionary meaning. For example, this was the case in London and North eastern Railway Co v Berriman2 where the words “relaying” and “repairing” in the Fatal Accidents Act of 1864 were interpreted literally. In this case, it was held that the word “suitable” in Section 53(2) could not be deemed to mean a synonym of “sufficient”. Applying such a meaning would remove the flexibility available for dealing with young people convicted of less serious offences. Lord Bingham pointed out that since sentencing needs to be tailored to the needs of the young person rather than the powers under which the person is sentenced under Section 53, it is better to retain the flexibility by interpreting “suitable” according to its dictionary meaning. 4. As an aid to interpretation, Lord Bingham used Section 44 of the Children and Young persons Act of 1933 which spells out the welfare of the child as being the first priority as opposed to the exercise of powers. Moreover, Lord Bingham also pointed to the construction of Section 104 of the Children Act of 1908, in which the word used was “sufficient”, but a flexible construction was provided when Section 53(2) of the Act of 1933 was enacted through the use of the word “suitable”, hence the intent behind the statute would appear to be that a literal interpretation of the word “suitable” is adopted to ensure that the dysfunctionality mentioned in the Home Office Report3 is avoided and necessary flexibility provided to the Courts to deal with young offenders. 5. The defendant was first sentenced at the Crown Court in Croyden on 7th November 1997, to two years in a young offender institution. However, due to the initiative of Mr. Graham Cooke, the counsel for the defendant, she reappeared in the Crown Court on 13th November and the Court was asked to rescind its order under Section 47 (2) of the Supreme Court Act of 1981, in favor of the same sentence issued under Sections 53 (2) and (3) of the Children and Young people Act of 1933. Mr. Cooke argued that if there was to be a custodial sentence, an order should have been passed under Section 53, since such a course would enable the defendant to be sent to Ayecliffe, which would be beneficial to her interests, being a reformative rather than a punitive institution. The Judge refused to rescind his order; as a result the Defendant sought leave to appeal the decision of the Judge at the Court of Appeal. The leave was granted and the Court of Appeal quashed the Judge’s order and changed the sentence, on the basis of statutory interpretation of the word “suitable” as being intended to provide flexibility in sentencing of young persons. 6. The Judge refused to rescind his order because he was bound by precedent. The issue in the case was the statutory interpretation of the word “suitable” found under Section 53 (2) of the Act, since this section would apply only when no other suitable sentence was found to be applicable. His argument was that the place or institution where a young offender is sent is not a part of the sentence and was therefore not relevant. He was obliged to issue sentence in accordance with the precedents laid out in existing case law. As per Reg v M the Court set out the circumstances where Section 53 would be applicable in that the word “suitable” could only mean that “a custodial sentence is required” and where the offender in question was 15 years old, as in the instant case, “that a term longer than 24 months is called for.4 The Court is not to exercise its power under Section 53 (2) except in exceptional circumstances, which the Judge could not justify in this case, hence he refused to rescind his order and go against the case law. 7. The ratio decidendi of the case centered around the applicability of Section 53(2) in the case of a defendant above 15 years of age. Earlier cases such as Reg v A.M> had established the principle that a judge was to resort to using his powers under Section 53 (2) only if a custodial sentence was called for and the term of the sentence was to exceed 24 months. This principle was deemed to still hold good for young people below age 15. However, the case of Regina v J (A Minor) established that in the case of a defendant who is 15 years old, it may be possible for a Judge to exercise his powers under Section 53 (2) in passing sentence, especially in the interest of maintaining the flexibility intended under the Act through the sue of the word “suitable” to ensure the welfare of children. The three Judges were Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Brian Smedley and Thomas JJ and leave was granted to the defendant to appeal by the full Court. References: * Home Office report, 1997. “No More Excuses - A New Approach To Tackling Youth Crime In England and Wales" Cm. 3809, November 1997, at pp 19, para 6.2 * London and North eastern Railway Co v Berriman (1946) AC 278 * Reg v A.M. (1998) 2 WLR 165 Read More