Police Department and Hypothetical Policy - Term Paper Example

Los Angeles Police Department criminal investigation initiative: Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment implications of the application of racial profilingat roadblocks in the immediate vicinity of ostensibly gang-related shootings INTRODUCTION This report examines prospective considerations and holdings of the United States Supreme Court in a hypothetical case concerning Fourteenth Amendment issues arising from a newly established investigative procedure in Los Angeles. While certain ancillary factors are involved, the major constitutional issues are racial profiling (an inherent component of the procedure) and the degree of intrusion involved in executing the new policy. Underlying the racial profiling matter is the broader issue of finding a reasonable middle ground, one that balances the rights of the individual with equally legitimate interests of the larger society. BACKGROUND: HYPOTHETICAL POLICY AND RELATED CASE The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has instituted a rapid-response geographic area containment policy in cases involving gang-related shootings, in order to prevent perpetrators from fleeing the immediate area. When such events occur, police patrol units seal off the affected area, defined by an 8-block radius, with checkpoints established at radius termini. This initiative was outlined by the mayor and chief of police at a press briefing and was widely reported in the media. All vehicles containing African-American or Hispanic males are subject to search upon leaving the circumscribed area. The overwhelming majority of such shootings in the Los Angeles metropolitan area involve members of those two ethnic groups. Therefore, the LAPD concluded that investigative search criteria were sufficiently narrow and the public safety interest sufficient great that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were not implicated. Recently, in executing the newly established policy, LAPD officers apprehended four suspects in the murder of a gang rival. One of the suspects, arguing an absence of probable cause, challenged the new policy and requested that the Court find any evidence discovered as a result of the vehicle search and seizure be declared inadmissible at trial. He based his argument on both the Fourth Amendment (absence of reasonable suspicion) and Fourteenth Amendment (the equal protection clause). All defendants were convicted (California v. Gangbangers). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, heard arguments, and upheld the verdict of the trial court. PRECEDENTS APPLICABLE TO THE HYPOTHETICAL CASE The LAPD policy implicated both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fourth Amendment provides inter alia that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated…” The Fourteenth Amendment (section 1) provides inter alia that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” In its decision in Gangbangers, the Court addressed Fourth Amendment considerations, adopting a less stringent definition of “unreasonable searches and seizures” than that detailed in United States v. Sokolow (490 U.S. 1, April 3, 1989), while applying the same publicity and public interest guidelines previously established in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz (496 U.S. 444, June 14, 1990). In Sokolow, the Court upheld the defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, reversing a decision of the Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit). Andrew Sokolow was stopped by DEA officers in Honolulu International Airport, after his behavior (e.g., paying for airline tickets with cash, traveling under a false name, failing to check luggage in favor of carrying it on board the aircraft) corresponded to the profile of a drug trafficker. A search of the detainee—begun without a warrant—revealed the presence of the controlled substance. The Court held that any one of “these factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and it is quite consistent with innocent travel. But we think taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion [490 U.S. 1, at 9].” Sokolow also affirmed a measure of flexibility in investigative measures. “The reasonableness of the officer’s decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques. Such a rule would unduly hamper the police’s ability to make swift, on-the-spot decisions… [Id., at 10].” In Sitz, the Court upheld the trial court drunk driving conviction of Rick Sitz, reversing the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals. (The defendant was arrested at a sobriety checkpoint.) The Court held that roadblocks did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Equally important, the Court referenced Saginaw County [MI]’s public announcement of the roadblock sobriety program [496 U.S. 444, at 447], that it was established after careful consideration [Id.], and that the interests of society in this case (reducing the incidence of drunk driving) compensated “the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped [Id., at 455].” However, the Court has placed certain restrictions of the reach of roadblock searches. In Indianapolis v. Edmond (531 U.S. 32, 2000), the Court could not sanction a roadblock program whose “primary purpose … is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, [thereby violating] the Fourth Amendment [531 U.S. 32, at 47].” However, the Court opinion also observed that there are “circumstances that may justify a law enforcement checkpoint where the primary purpose would otherwise, but for some emergency, relate to ordinary crime control [Id., at 43].” The Court’s decision in Gangbangers addressed Fourteenth Amendment implications of reliance on racial characteristics in government programs, relying on Adarand Constructors v. Pena (515 U.S. 200, 1995) and City of Richmond v, J. A. Croson Co. (488 U.S. 469, 1989). It also addressed inappropriate applications. In Korematsu (concerning the upholding the World War II exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry), the Supreme Court held that the government might rely on racial classifications in times of national emergency and to further the nation’s war effort [323 U.S. 214, at 218]. In Adarand (an equal employment opportunity case), the Court held that the state must demonstrate that its racial classification advances a compelling governmental interest [515 U.S. 200, at 227]. Furthermore, in Croson (another employment case) the burden of demonstrating a compelling governmental interest in such matters falls on the shoulders of government; simple recital of such an interest is not sufficient [488 U.S. 469, at 494]. SUPREME COURT DECISION IN CALIFORNIA V. GANGBANGERS The Supreme Court upheld the jury verdict in Gangbangers, reversing a decision of the Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit). The Court first addressed Fourth Amendment issues. Each roadblock in the LAPD program responded to a specific shooting. The Court noted that its decision in Edmond, despite its prohibition on the employment of roadblocks when used no more than as a means of general crime control, considered the legitimacy of such highly specified stratagems in emergency situations. The Court referred to its decision in Sitz, again arguing that the state (California), in establishing such ‘dragnet’ roadblocks, had a compelling public interest (arresting a prosecuting violent felons whose actions inherently place the immediate general public in grave physical danger) that outweighed any modest inconvenience to innocent motorists. Indeed, the Court observed that it was precisely those innocent, inconvenienced motorists that were most likely to profit from the program, if only because they usually lived in the area in which such drive-by shootings were most likely to occur. Since the specific investigative technique was limited to (1) establishing the identity of driver and passengers, (2) ascertaining vehicle registration and insurance data, and (3) using a gunpowder residue detector to determine if any vehicle passenger had been in the immediate vicinity of a weapon as it discharged within the previous 24 hours, the Court held the search to be “reasonable.” The Court’s discussion of Fourteenth Amendment considerations was more convoluted. The Court addressed the LAPD roadblock program’s race specific components. Noting that prior Supreme Court decisions had pointed to the efficacy of roadblock programs (e.g., Sitz, Thomas) and an underlying unwillingness to second-guess law enforcement technique (Sokolow), the Court—noting that the ethnicity of victims correlated very closely with that of perpetrators in drive-by shootings—grudgingly accepted the application of racial criteria. Indeed, the Court noted that, as a practical matter, given the population distribution in Los Angeles, the 8-block radius search area restriction in most cases resulted in all or virtually all drivers and/or passengers in the encompassed area were of the same ethnicity. The Court’s decision referenced Korematsu. After stating that the latter decision was not wrongly decided in its purpose (“to secure the national interest in time of war”), it continued that the application of racial desiderata was flawed in that it was not “narrowly tailored” to meet the government’s goals. However, that failing did not thereby invalidate the application of such desiderata in all cases. The Court continued that the LAPD roadblock program met the test established in Croson that the means chosen “must ‘fit’ this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype [488 U.S. 469, at 493].” (In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia—in his usual sarcastic tone—observed that if the City of Los Angeles was truly motivated by racism, it likely would opt to leave the gangbangers undisturbed as they put a modest dent in the city’s African American and Hispanic populations.) FINAL THOUGHTS There can be little doubt that many opponents of the Court’s decision in Gangbangers will deride it as simply another gratuitous insult of African Americans and Hispanics. And, to be fair, there are probably a fair number of whites who will take a certain satisfaction in seeing persons of those ethnicities singled out for special interest by the police in investigating the homicides in question. This, however, is beside the point. The fact remains that the victims—whether unsavory or not—in particular and the larger public in general deserve justice. To refuse to institute a crime prevention program simply because it is race specific hurts the affected community far more than any prospective derision. There cannot be a civil society in the absence of justice. And there is the matter of deterrence. Available evidence indicates that many of these crimes are ‘spur of the moment’ offenses, ones that amount to ‘tit-for-tat’ or ‘target of opportunity.’ If drive-by shooters are promptly captured as a matter of course, it is possible that at least some would-be shooters may give more thought to the long-term implications of their behavior. Works consulted in the preparation of this report U.S., Supreme Court, Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 1995 , City of Richmond v, J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 1989 , Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 2000 , Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 1944 , Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, June 28, 1982 , Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, June 14, 1990 , Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1968 , United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, April 3, 1989 Read More