Hijack of Air France Flight 139 - Operation Entebbe - Term Paper Example

Section/# Flight 139: Operation Entebbe Asymmetrical warfare is that which is defined by its non-linear approach to conflict. As a direct result of the first and second world wars, individuals and groups around the globe came to understand that it is ultimately impossible for them to resist or groups of states in seeking to effect radical or long lasting changes in global policy. Because these, asymmetrical approaches, such as terrorism and/or hijacking, have come to be represented as core means by which otherwise small groups with very large demands can be noticed and considered. Firstly, the following discussion will provide a background and historical overview of the forces that culminated in the hijacking of Air France Flight 139. This will include a definition and discussion of the different groups involved, their core aims, and the ensuring situation that arose. As such, the following analysis will also be concentric on the operation by Israeli special forces in an attempt to rescue the hostages that had been taken. Through such a discussion and analysis, it is the hope of this author that wider realities concerning global terrorism response and the means through which such antics have continued to be perpetrated within the current era can be represented. Firstly, before delving into an in-depth discussion concerning the terrorist groups in the mall or the response by the Israeli government, is necessary to briefly engage in a discussion of relevant political analysis; surrounding the Europe in which the hijacking of Air France 139 was but a part. In the year in which this particular aircraft was hijacked, the state of Israel has only existed for two decades. However, within these two decades, two large-scale wars fought between Israel and its surrounding Arab/Muslim neighbors. Furthermore, tension between Israelis and Palestinians have reached a climax; due in part to the fact that continued Israelis of building and the displacement of thousands of people in Palestine created a wellspring of hatred and frustration of the native peoples within the region. Furthermore, one must consider the role and impact of the Palestinian liberation organization (one of the terrorists routes that was responsible for the Air France flight 139 hijacking) in terms of reasons political developments that have occurred only one year prior to the hijacking itself. Ultimately, Jordan, nation borders Israel on its south east, was responsible for dismantling and removing the house that immigration organization from within its borders. As a direct result of this clear decrease in operational ability and political power, the Palestine Liberation Organization began to recognize that the only way in which it could engender a further level of and purpose within the communities they it served would be to represent a more hard-line approach to the issue of a Jewish state within the Middle East. As history has shown, the hard-lined approach that the PLO took was one that integrated more and more with acts of terrorism. It should not be understood that the Palestine Liberation Organization, prior to this point, did not engage in terrorism; however, it must be noted that the general trend after 1975 was one in which the Palestine Liberation Organization played a much more visible and violent role with respect to any time prior time within its history. It has long been understood that conflict makes strange bedfellows. This is very much the case with respect to the hijacking of Air France Flight 139. Although many scholars have chosen to focus upon the fact that it was mainly the Palestine Liberation Organization(PLO) that was responsible for the hijacking, there was another group of hijackers/terrorists that were deeply involved in the operational aspects of planning and execution for the hijacking. This group is that of the German “Revolutionary Cells” (or “RZ” as it is known by its German initials) (Rashba, 2009). This particular group was one that analysts claim was funded and directed by radical elements within East Germany as well as the Soviet Union. Accordingly, promoting violence against “capitalist interests”, “Zionism”, and other favorite targets for radical leftists were positions that were supported both logistically and philosophically by the “Revolutionary Cells” (RZ). The involvement between the RZ and the PLO is something that has never been given an actual date stamp; instead, the philosophical agreement between the two began in the early 1970s as both promoted an understanding that the occupation of Palestine by Jewish settlers and the creation of the Jewish state was something that could not be tolerated. Before moving on towards the hijacking itself or the response by the Israeli Defense Force, it should be noted that the groups that have thus far been mentioned only account for 2 out of 3 of the participants in the hijacking. Ultimately, the dictatorship of Idi Amin, in Uganda, provided the logistical and political support that the hijackers so desperately sought. Without the means to hijack and control the plane themselves, the hijackers sought out a sympathetic partner nation that would allow for a degree of logistical security and operational aid for the plan. They of course found this in the regime of Idi Amin; as Amin himself was directly opposed to the state of Israel and had actively supported others that sought to disrupt or otherwise damage the Israeli cause. Within Amin and the resources of Uganda behind them, the hijackers had both the means and the logistical support to effectively carry out the hijacking. The hijacking itself involved two stages. The first stage was with respect to the presence of two of the hijackers boarding the plane in Israel. Yet, these hijackers did not make a move on the plane until the remaining two hijackers boarded the flight in Athens on the flights first and only stop en route to Paris. At which point, after the plane had boarded and had taken off, all four hijackers the proceeded to commandeer the plane and force a change of course towards Benghazi, Libya Upon landing, immediate refueling was engaged and one of the hostages was released; after she pretended that she had a miscarriage. After refueling, the plane set out for Uganda and into the arms of the government of Idi Amin; as he had previously promised to provided immediate security and support for the operations of the hijackers onboard. Moreover, a few hours after landing, the hijackers separated the non-Jewish passengers from the Jewish passengers on board the aircraft. The non-Jewish passengers were ultimately released whereas the pilot (who was not Jewish) was held alongside them. Yet beyond merely hijacking a plane, the hijackers demanded that certain PLO prisoners be released from the custody of prisons around the globe. Naturally, such demands were difficult to response to as different nations felt impacted differently by the overall gravity of the Jewish hostage situation. Seeing that the dilemma was not likely to end without force and that other nations did not feel as if this hostage crisis directly impacted upon them, the nation of Israel called a quick, yet secretive, vote in parliament to determine if force should be utilized in order to rectify the situation. Within hours of the votes being cast, it was clear that an overwhelming majority favored military action as a means of safeguarding the lives of the hostages. The difficulty for the Israeli special forces that engaged in this mission was with respect to the inability that Israel had to refuel the aircraft that would be transporting its soldiers the 1500 miles to the Ugandan airstrip where the hostages were being held. Without air tankers that could refuel in flight, it was obvious that the mission had one of two options: either it could transport the troops over land, a poor alternative no matter what metrics were being analyzed, or it could seek to enlist the aid and support of a nation en route to Uganda. Accordingly, Kenya was approached by the Israelis and originally rebuffed their request to allow the cargo plane to refuel within their territory. However, after possible entreaties from the United Kingdom and possibly even the United States, Kenya acquiesced and allowed the Israelis the right to refuel within their borders. With this logistical problem solved, the hasty team was assembled which would be tasked with neutralizing the threats and returning the hostages to Israel. The raid itself was led by a team-commander Yonatan Netanyahu; the now-deceased elder brother of the current Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu. The team was briefed on the likelihood of Ugandan resistance as well as resistance and reprisals by the hijackers. However, once the team landed in Ugandan airspace, the overall level of resistance from the Ugandan forces was relatively limited. Notwithstanding this fact, the Israeli team set out to rapidly destroy the Uganda an defenses in and around the airstrip; so that the return trip would at a decreased likelihood of failure. All in all the number of destroyed aircraft is disputed between the Israeli special forces and the Ugandan ministry of defense; however, it is realistic to assert that the raid significantly decreased the overall capacity of the Ugandan air defense system to withstand the attack or respond to it effectively. Once on the ground, the Israeli forces proceeded relatively quickly to the zone in the airport in which the hostages were being held. Announcing themselves in both Yiddish and English and commanding the hostages to stay down, the initial entrance of the commandos was marked by a hail of gunfire; both from the commandos and from the hijackers. The results were fairly immediate. All of the hijackers were killed by the commandos and one of the hostages was caught in the crossfire between the two. In all the raid was a resounding success with the remainder of the Jewish hostages being taken out of the airport and transported back to Israel in the cargo plane that had transported the Israeli commandos to Uganda in the first place. The rescue operation itself was one of the most complicated and hastily put together that the world had yet seen. As such, it provided hijackers and nations that dealt with the issue of hijacking a litmus test for the way that a determined force could place extreme pressure and ultimately gain success over those who would otherwise seek to utilize terror and hijacking as leverage in order to accomplish their goals. Whereas it is true that hijackers had long ago sought to leverage such a tactic as a means of effecting concessions, the Israeli response removed the veneer of invincibility that hijackers had previously held to something of a distant memory. Moreover, the military resolve and dedication of the IDF was proven to the global system in a way that even the previous wars with neighboring countries had not affected. As the world was able to witness the decision making structure and rapid deployment that the IDF and its commandos could illustrate, a newfound level of respect for their operational capacity was exhibited. Whereas it is true that the PLO and other groups continued to sponsor terrorism and hijacking as a means of accomplishing their political goals, the hijacking of Air France Flight 139 serves as the high-water mark for the PLO; as a hijacking of this magnitude and/or with the same goals in mind was not again attempted after the result of the failed Flight 139 attempt. Further, the aftermath of the Air France 139 hijacking can be seen with regard to the diminished capacity and allure that the RZ group was able to effect within Europe. Whereas the group had been previously ideologically minded and slow to actually engage in violence, the Flight 139 hijacking exhibited to stakeholders throughout Europe, as well as the rest of the world, that RZ could not be discerned as any different than the most common terrorist organization; as such, the group quickly lost relevance and began to diminish in overall importance and scope throughout the remaining 14 years of its life. Reference Rashba, G. (2009). RESCUE AT ENTEBBE. Aviation History, 19(4), 42-47. Read More