Criminal Evidence Law - Evidential and Legal Burden - Essay Example

Criminal Evidence Law - Evidential and Legal Burden Altin and William have been charged with the murder of Denzil on the basis of joint enterprise. Under the doctrine, two or more criminal suspects could be charged for colluding in the commission of a crime. It is important for the prosecution to prove that the accused were in action together, failure to which both may be acquitted by the court. Owing to seriousness of the criminal proceedings for murder, the prosecution and the defence have burdens of evidence which they must shoulder in proving their respective cases. Evidential Burden Evidential burden is one of the obligations of pre-trial chamber that must be fulfilled before criminal proceedings can begin. In this case, the prosecution has a duty to link the facts surrounding the two parties’ visit to the deceased’s house and to his eventual murder. The facts should prove on the balance of probabilities that actions of the accused may have caused the death. A fact-finder working with the prosecution would be tasked to collect the facts and link them to the crime. A jury would then have the final say on whether or not the murder case should proceed. The evidential burden in this case, which the jury will be tasked to determine is as follows: a) the accused visited Denzil’s house over an unsettled debt; b) William allegedly remained outside, possibly to scare people away within his imitation of a gun while Altin went in; c) Altin immediately attacked the victim; d) the victim died of the injuries sustained in the attack. In this case, there is no gap in the facts, which could have been prompted by a fall, for instance, on his way to the hospital1. Legal Burden Apart from the evidential burden, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), providing for the right to fair trial requires the prosecution to prove beyond the balance of probabilities that the actions of the two parties accused of Denzil’s murder have a legal basis. In this case, the prosecutor must prove that the alleged actions of Altin had a substantial cause on the Denzil’s death, but does not necessarily need to be the only or largely the cause of the death. This implies the two could be charged with the murder of Denzil if the prosecution established that his injury by the accused substantially contributed to his death whether or not he had underlying health conditions. A judge would be tasked to determine whether the legal burden can sustain trial. The Defence Evidential Burden Altin would find it hard to prove that he was acting in self-defence, because he intentionally went to Denzil’s place. In addition, the immediacy of the attack lends credence to a pre-planned murder whose time had come. Yet, he might have no injury to prove that indeed Denzil had attacked him immediately he set foot in the house. William’s disowning of Altin is vital to their defence. Firstly, the charging of the individuals based on joint enterprise could be used as the defence. Legal Burden According to the ruling in the case of R v Lane and Lane (1986) 82 Cr App R 5 R 180, where two individuals are jointly charged with an offense and the body of evidence does not prove one instead of the other party, and the prosecution lacks adequate evidence to show that the accused parties were acting in collusion, the two should be acquitted. This rule is applicable to homicide cases such this case. In light of this principle, should the prosecution fail to prove that William was involved in the murder of Denzil, and that the parties were not acting in collusion, the court could be obliged to dismiss the case. Question # 2 Violation of Rights of the Accused Altin is a prime suspect in the murder case against Denzil and as such he was supposed to be treated as such by the police. However, the officers acted unprofessionally and casting the future of the evidence they collected in doubt on the following grounds: a) denying him solicitor privilege during the interrogation process contrary to the rules of evidence PACE; and b) obtaining a false confession from him regarding the impending murder case through coercion; c) inducing the suspect to self-incrimination. Altin’s denial of legal representation and his police-induced false testimony have the potential of substantially weakening the case on the grounds that the accused will not be given fair trial. Specifically, the forced confessions and police’s threats of force against Altin’s testimony amount to compliant false confessions2. The Law Altin’s is compliant false testimony because police promised him bail, if he agreed to incriminate himself by stating that he went to Denzil’s residence with the sole aim of creating a serious bodily harm on the victim’s person. The defence could argue under Section 82(1) of PACE, that Altin was a victim of self-incrimination by virtue of the confession solicited by the police in an effort to press for the expunging of the evidence, which is set to be presented at trial. Altin’s right to fair trial before a competent, impartial bench in the criminal case is provided for by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In addition, Section 76 of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) regulates courts’ acceptance of confessions to form part of the body of evidence supporting a criminal proceeding and would also apply in Altin’s case. In light of the two provisions, PACE section 76(2) requires courts handling such cases to strike out confession evidence procured by oppression or in conditions which were expected to compromise the credibility of the confession. In this case, therefore, the prosecutors should bear in mind that, whereas the evidence itself may be struck out, the prosecution may be obliged to reassess the credibility of the confession of Alrin under section 76(4). This is especially true in respect of criminal trials for serious offenses such as murder. This clause prevents suspected individuals accused of serious crimes from going scot-free on procedural grounds. In contrast, Section 78 of PACE provides for the exclusion of evidence against a defendant, provided the evidence could be prejudicial to the defendant’s case if the court permitted the prosecution to verify. In this case, Altin’s confession at the police station could be excluded because it is the heart of the case. Authorizing the prosecution to verify the Altin’s confessions would, therefore, be highly prejudicial to his case, thus the evidence could be struck out in its entirety. Regarding Altin’s self-incrimination in the police statements, the Privilege against Self-Incrimination (PSI) is applicable and could as well lead to the striking out of the relevant false confession evidence. PSI was first set in the case of Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd [1942] 2 K.B. 253. The court held that that no individual is under the obligation to respond to any question if the reply thereto had the potential to make him or her vulnerable to criminal charges or sentence or forfeiture which the court could construe as substantial to the trial process. The verdict covers any form of evidence including confessions such as the one Altin made during the police investigations3. Question # 3 Hearsay Evidence The Criminal Justice Act 2003 s 114, defines hearsay evidence as non-verbal evidence that is admissible in criminal proceedings provided it meets certain conditions. If Denzil had recorded a statement with the police prior to his death, the statement could be admissible under Section 114 (1) (d) of the Act, for pursuit of justice in his murder; and under Section 116 of the Act since he cannot be part of the trial. Opinion evidence refers to the evidence given by witnesses about what they saw, but not their subjective thoughts. However, opinion evidence is only admissible as expert evidence or layman opinion providing clearer meanings to certain issues during trial. Admissibility of Expert Evidence An expert witness would be called to provide evidence relating to the deceased’s status of mind prior to his death, especially because Altin is alleging that the deceased had attacked him. Dr Khan is an expert witness by experience and not by formal qualification, since her scientific diagnosis method is purely her own. Her qualification may be inadmissible by the trial chamber on the basis that it does not meet the thresholds for an expert witness as set out in Davie v Magistrates of Edinburgh 1953 S.C. 34, where formal qualifications were preferred over experience. In England and Wales, admissibility of expert evidence is must conform to the Rules of Evidence and specifically meet these three conditions: a) relevance; b) admissibility, and; c) weight. Deciding whether to admit Dr Khan’s evidence at the trial is purely at the prosecution’s discretion. Relevant evidence logically contributes to proving or exonerating a position held about an issue relating to the trial. Admissible evidence touches on the facts of the case or to conditions that inject a sense of credibility or lack of it in the case. Due to time limitations, prosecutors are under the obligation to table evidence which verifies each aspect of the offence. Altin’s case is not absolute offense; therefore the expert’s evidence may be introduced to prove the deceased’s state of mind. This is especially true considering that it would be in the best interest of the defence on the grounds of fair trial4. If the prosecution introduced evidence provided by the expert witnesses, she will be obligated to stick to the factual outcomes of her diagnosis and steer clear of her own opinions. Dr Khan would be expected to adhere to the rules guiding the presentation of expert evidence, which require the relevant parties to practically override individual interests or their masters to provide independent facts at trial. In addition, Altin would have the right to use Dr Khan’s evidence to strengthen his claims about his alleged assault by the deceased on the day the alleged murder happened. These rights were provided for in the ruling on Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC 595. The House of Lords held that the defence would have the right to present medical evidence (Denzil’s in this case) showing his hysterical and erratic behaviour prior to his death. In spite of Dr Khan’s expected assistance at trial, the admissibility of the evidence given by experts in criminal cases in England and Wales is not certain. In criminal proceedings, the bench has the obligation to corroborate contested factual issues. As it is normally the case, Dr Khan could be called to table evidence as one of the witnesses lined by the prosecution to shade more light on the mental condition of the deceased, which the court may be ill-equipped to interpret. As of now, however, the English common law views expert evidence with some contempt. This is especially true considering that courts have realized that the admissibility of too much of the evidence without determining its authenticity could be an injustice itself5. In light of this, potential errors in the expert evidence oftentimes go unnoticed and could compromise the delivery of justice. Even though courts have struck out bad evidence as witnessed in the case of R v Sandhu [1996] TLR 2 January, CA, striking out Dr Khan’s expert evidence on the basis that it might exonerate the accused in this case would be practically impossible because the court may lack an equivalent professional to verify the facts. In addition, the manner in which she arrives at her results appears to be known only to her. Regardless, the recent case of Dasreef Pty Limited v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21 appears to have provided the legal test as to the admissibility of expert evidence. The High Court of Australia held that an expert witness must have the precise knowledge and expertise in the particular area of study and provide a well-reasoned report that should be verified by an expert judge of the court with adequate competency in the specific area in question. In light of this verdict, Dr Khan may be barred from giving her expert evidence if she was a general practitioner. Question # 4 (a) Under The Firearms Act 1982 section 1(5), and in lieu of the ruling Woolmington v D.P.P. [1935] AC 462, 481, William would be expected to enjoy the reverse burden rights based on his innocence until proven guilty. William has an evidential burden regarding his lack of knowledge about the convertible imitation gun he was waving near the scene of crime. What he needs to do is prove to the court that he had no knowledge of the lethality of the firearm and could not have had the slightest reason to suspect that the alleged weapon was adaptable. The he law requires William to allege his lack of knowledge about the imitation and prove it as was evident in the case of R v Williams [2012] EWCA Crim 2162). In presenting such an argument, the prosecution would be denied the opportunity to prove how William could have used the weapon6. (b) The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 §s 34 and 35 applies to the entry of an adverse inference in a case, when the individual does not want to speak as expected by the court following a prior warning regarding the same7. Even though, courts do not have the luxury to enter adverse inferences over a suspect’s silence, they could be prompted to do so against William in the event that he refuses to speak about his alleged participation in the murder of Denzil. (c) Eye-witness misidentification is a common occurrence that could compromise the body of evidence, which courts rely upon to execute cases. The lacuna came up in the ruling on the case of United States v. Wade, 388 [1967] US 218, where the Court held that the credibility of eyewitnesses should be put to test in order to declare as admissible only credible testimonies. In light of this ruling, I consider the eyewitness identification of William suspect, because it was dark and the weather was not fine. These conditions could have substantially hindered the visibility of the witnesses, considering also that the William was spotted within a very short period of time. In contrast, the fact that the police officers found an imitation gun in his possession supports the credibility of the eyewitness accounts of him waving a similar “thing.” Bibliography Stockdale, Michael and Grubin, Don, (2012), The Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in English Criminal Proceedings. Journal of Criminal Law, 76(3), pp.232-253 Gardner, Thomas and Terry Anderson, (2012), Criminal Evidence: Principles and Cases, Cengage Learning, London, p.118 Glover, Richard, (2013), Murphy on Evidence, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.30-31 Ingram, J. Jefferson, (2011), Criminal Evidence, Elsevier, London, pp.111-149 Levy, Jonathan, (2013), ‘A Principled Approach to the Standard of Proof for Affirmative Defences in Criminal Trials,’ American Journal of Criminal Law, 40(3), pp.281-299 Owusu-Bempah, Abenaa, (2013), ‘Defence participation through pre-trial disclosure: issues and implications,’ International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 17(2), pp183-201 Hails, Judy, (2011), Criminal Evidence, Cengage Learning, New York, p.8 Read More