Offer in Contracts: Fisher v Bell - Essay Example

Offer in Contracts of the case Fisher v Bell Citation 1961 QB 394 of the court QUEENS BENCH DIVISION Judges : Lord Parker, C.J. : Ashworth, J. : Elwes, J. Date of hearing : 10, November 1960 Facts In this case, a shopkeeper had displayed a knife in his shop window. This knife was of the class of the so called flick knives, and it had a ticket attached to it that depicted the legend, “Ejector knife – 4s.” The police charged him with having contravened the provisions of section 1(1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 (Young, 2010, p. 12). As such, this section deems an individual to be guilty of an offence, if that person sells, hires, offers for sale or hire, or lends or gives another person a specific type of knife. The prohibited type of knife has been described by this section as one that has an automatically opening blade (Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act (c.37), 1959). However, in this knife, the blade should open when hand pressure is applied to a button or other device attached to the knife handle. Such offence attracts the following punishment, on summary conviction. For a first offence the offender will be sentenced to prison for a term that does not exceed three months or to a fine that is limited to £50 or to both (Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act (c.37), 1959). In this case, the chief inspector charged the respondent with an offence under the provisions of section 1 of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959. The charge was that on 26 October1959, the respondent had made an offer of sale with respect to a prohibited variety of knife. This knife opened automatically on pressure being applied to a device that was attached to the handle of the knife (Souper, 2008). The respondent consented to the police constable’s request to examine the knife. Thereafter, the latter confiscated the knife and submitted it to the superintendent of police. Subsequently, he returned to the shop and informed the respondent that the knife had been determined to be a flick knife and that he would be reported for offering it for sale (Souper, 2008). In court the appellant contended that the display of the knife in the shop window by the respondent with its price, constituted an offer of sale of the knife, in accordance with the provisions of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959. This was contested by the respondent, who stated that he had never offered the knife for sale, as per the interpretation of the 1959 Act (Souper, 2008). The plaintiff’s main contention was that the display of Knife in the shop window does not amount to an offer. The court held that as this Act was devoid of a definition, the term offer for sale had to be determined from the law of contract. As a result, the action of the respondent had to be construed to be nothing more than an invitation to treat. The court further stated that the respondent’s action did not constitute an offer that would result in a binding contract in the presence of acceptance by a customer (Souper, 2008). If it had been possible for a customer to have purchased the flick knife by selecting it and paying the quoted price, then the respondent would have been guilty of a crime. However, the court ruled that the display of the flick knife with a price tag was nothing more than an invitation to treat by the respondent. In effect, the display merely invited a prospective purchaser to make an offer regarding the purchase of the flick knife, which the shopkeeper could either accept or reject (Boundy, 2010, p. 15). In other words, the offer would emanate from the prospective buyer. Held In this case, Lord Parker CJ made the following observations. The question to be determined was whether the display of the knife with its price on a ticket, in the shop window, constituted an offer for sale of the same, from the perspective of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 (Samuel, 2000, p. 24). It was his considered opinion that the exhibition of an object with its price indicated on it would be construed by the general public to be an offer for sale. However, the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 had not provided any clarification in this regard, which made it indispensable to take recourse to contract law. The latter deemed such display to be a mere invitation to treat and not an offer (Samuel, 2000, p. 24). Since the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act does not accord any clarification in respect of the words “Offer for sale“, the Court, had to interpret the same under the provisions of contract law. Comment In general, the presence of an advertisement in the ‘For Sale’ section of a newspaper does not render it an offer. The courts deem these to be invitations to treat. This was evident in Partridge v Crittenden, wherein the defendant had advertised in a periodical regarding the sale of Bramblefinch cocks and hens for 25 shillings apiece. This was not an offer, because if the demand had exceeded the supply available with the defendant, then the latter would have been liable for innumerable breach of action suits, in addition to being held guilty of an offence, in accordance with the provisions of the Protection of Birds Act 1954 (Mulcahy & Tillotson, 2004, p. 66). Such repudiations are frequently observed in the communications of estate agents, who frequently include the statement, “These particulars do not form, nor constitute any part of, an offer, or a contract, for sale.” This effectively renders it an invitation to treat (Mulcahy & Tillotson, 2004, p. 66). However, there have been recommendations from several quarters that the law would be better served, if displays and advertisements were regarded as offers. If the person responsible for the advertisement or display had no intention of it being understood as an offer, then such person could clearly state that it was an invitation to treat (Mulcahy & Tillotson, 2004, p. 66). As such, Fisher v Bell and Partridge v Crittenden were bilateral contract cases. However, a different type of case, of considerable significance, was that of Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. This case entailed a unilateral offer to the general public. Moreover, on performing the conditions specified in its offer, an agreement would emerge from it (Mulcahy & Tillotson, 2004, p. 67). However, in Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co, the defendant had advertised in the Pall Mall Gazette that they would pay £100 to any individual who contracted influenza subsequent to using the Smoke Ball, which was a medical preparation made by them. Relying on this advertisement Carlill purchased a smoke ball and used it in the prescribed manner. Despite her having used a smoke ball, she was infected with influenza (Mulcahy & Tillotson, 2004, p. 67). The court deemed the advertisement of the defendant to be a unilateral offer and ordered them to pay £100 to the plaintiff. In general, the courts are required to examine relevant legislation and apply it to the case on hand. In this endeavour, an array of rules related to interpretation has been developed by the courts. One such interpretation is the literal interpretation, which entails the application of the ordinary and literal meaning of the contents of a piece of legislation (Statutory interpretation, n.d.). This is aimed at preserving the will of Parliament, and was applied in Fisher v Bell. For example, in Keating v Horwood, a baker’s van was found to contain bread that was less than the weight stipulated by the Sale of Food Order 1921. Part I of this order requires bread to be sold only by weight, and each loaf of bread has to weigh a pound or possess a weight that is in even multiples of pounds (Sale of Food Order, 1921). In this case, Lord Hewart, CJ ruled that the issue at stake was whether on the basis of the facts it could be deduced that there had been an offer to sell, and whether there had been an exposure for sale. He concluded that both these features had been present. This was reiterated by Avory, J, who held that he confirmed the CJ’s decision, without any reservation (Statutory interpretation, n.d.). However, Shearman, J stated that although he was of the same opinion, and that he was convinced that the bread had been exposed for sale, he harboured doubts as to whether the bread could be deemed to have been offered for sale, until a specific loaf of bread was offered to a particular customer (Statutory interpretation, n.d.). Three issues emerged in this case. The first of these related to the order comprising of the words expose for sale, and regardless of the perspective, there had been an exposing for sale. This made the question of whether there had been an offer for sale redundant, in the context of the decision (Statutory interpretation, n.d.). The second issue was that there had been no referral to the principles of general contract law. Finally, the respondent had not been represented and there had been no argument. Consequently, it could not be construed that the display in the shop window was an offer for sale. As a result, it was concluded that the trial judges had come to the right conclusion (Statutory interpretation, n.d.). Therefore, the appeal had to be dismissed. Conclusion As such, in Fisher v Bell, the display of a flick knife with its price in the shop window, was deemed to be an invitation to treat. This case set a precedent, as it enabled the courts to interpret the statute from the point of view of its ordinary and natural meaning. This ensures that the intention of Parliament in making that piece of legislation is achieved in the best possible manner. Thus, the presiding judges decided that the display of goods in a shop window literally indicated an invitation to treat, and not an offer of sale. Even though the allegation in the case is deemed a criminal offence, the court interpreted the meaning of the relevant words under the provisions of contract law. This literal rule decision in Fisher v Bell, established the standards for future interpretation of statutes by the courts, in cases with similar facts. References Boundy, C., 2010. Business Contracts Handbook. Farnham, Surrey, United Kingdom: Gower Publishing Limited. Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company (1893) EWCA Civ 1. Keating v Horwood (1926) 28 Cox CC 198. Mulcahy, L. & Tillotson, J. P., 2004. Contract Law in Perspective. 4 ed. London, United Kingdom: Cavendish Publishing Limited. Partridge v Crittenden (1968) 1 WLR 1204. Protection of Birds Act (c.30). 1954. London: Her Majestys Stationery Office. Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act (c.37), 1959. London, United Kingdom: Her Majestys Stationery Office. Sale of Food Order, 1921. London: Her Majestys Stationery Office. Samuel, G. H., 2000. Sourcebook on Obligations & Remedies. 2 ed. London, United Kingdom: Routledge. Souper, M., 2008. Fisher v Bell [online] Available at: [Accessed 21 November 2012]. Statutory interpretation, [online] Available at: [Accessed 21 November 2012]. Young, M., 2010. Contract Law: The Basics. Taylor & Francis. Read More