Drug Policy in Mexico and Colombia - Case Study Example

Drug policy in Mexico and Colombia Contents Topic page no. Introduction 3 Policy descriptions and criticisms 4 Mexico 4 Columbia 6 Comparison 8 Valuation 9 Conclusion 10 Introduction South America, in stark contrast to its other counterpart North America or U.S.A, the world of riches as we know it, has long being plagued with the curse of poverty and deprivation coupled with alarmingly low levels of overall development. It is known that poverty, chronic unemployment and underemployment and illiteracy often give birth to crimes and Latin America has been no different. In Mexico, unemployment is around 20% while underdevelopment is just the double of unemployment (Gilbert 22). Drug trafficking, with all its vices in this context has been alleged as the prime concern spreading its “wings” with each passing day not only in Latin American nations but also in the U.S and the whole world. Countries like Mexico and Colombia have been the main architects of drug trafficking throughout the American sub-continent. In the early’80s Colombia used to be the main exporter of drugs and narcotics throughout the world, but with the Colombian government policy getting more stringent, Colombian drug-lords started using Mexico, mainly due to its suitable geographic locations to export drugs through Mexico to the U.S. (Rosin, 2). The governments of these countries backed by U.S are now working more than ever to radically abolish this ongoing problem and have been coming up with policies to fight drug trafficking. The paper attempts to compare the drug policies of Columbia and Mexico. Policy Descriptions and criticisms Mexico One prime social policy taken by the Mexican government towards curtailing the drug trafficking is to decrease violence in the Mexican drug market and reduce increasing crime frequency to controllable levels (Venda Felbeb-Brown,1). The ongoing drug war in Mexico is mainly an armed conflict among the several drug cartels fighting each other for market control and also with the Government armed forces installed to fight drug trafficking. Mexico is the main supplier of heroin in U.S. Major source of violence is the battle amongst the current largest Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) - the Tijuana DTO, the Gulf DTO and the Juarez DTO, the smaller organizations being the La Familia(Venda Felbeb-Brown, 5).Further actions taken by the Presidents Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderon pitted the DTOs against the government as well as raised the competition in the market thereby destabilizing it even more. According to the Government data, this drug related violence has till date resulted in the death of more than 34,000 people in the last four years since President Felipe Calderon took charge. The president has used his army troops to combat the drug cartels. Mexican government said that the figures are proofs of desperation of the mafia getting pressurized by the security forces (“Mexicos drug war: Number of dead passes 30,000”, Dec 16, 2010). Now, the policy taken by the Government to reduce drug trafficking should be constitutional in a way that it should try to bring in some organization in the drug market which is otherwise very unorganized with high transaction costs that undermines the drug market itself. The illegal Mexican drug market really needs an intermediary or regulator to control the frailties of the market. The form of the stabilizer will depend on several factors, one of which is the state itself. There are various possibilities that can be discussed: With the surfacing of one or more DTOs having sufficient control over their territories so as to be able to secure their domains if need be. They should be having adequate control and can impose regulations to carry on their businesses, decrease transaction costs and reach a point of common agreement with newly acquired controls and new-formed boundaries so as to reduce violence. Such territorial division was predominant in Mexico prior to the early 2000s.Such an aspect of evolution is missing from Mexico with the insurgent groups like Revolutionary Party of Insurgent People(EPRI) or Zapatista Army of National Liberation(EZLN) failing to adequately penetrate the drug market. Their participation is very meager and the capacity to become the main driving force is lacking. The state could also take over and thrive to break up the DTOs into smaller and weaker crime entities which could carry on the drug trade, but would not be able to become a monopoly and control markets, so that violence can be toned down. This can be an optimal outcome but it needs to be seen whether the currently undertaken strategy by the Mexican Government fares well. However, this is a long term strategy. In the short term the Government will have to indulge in violence with the DTOs. This however is destabilizing the market and increasing competition which is reaching bottle-neck that is further detrimental to the policies of the State. Moreover, the Mexican police force consisting of local police, state police and federal police are corrupted to the core. Mexico, through ages have not been able to root the corruption out of the administrative system. (Press Release: Council on Hemispheric Affairs; Felbeb-Brown, 6-7) Most importantly, the State could pull back, giving public safety only to certain segments of people of Mexico and certain territories only. In such a case of administrative vacuums, emergence of alternate governance can take place. In such a scenario, the high class elite people could arrange for private body guards, while the bourgeoisies would then be likely to get lesser gentle security from the state. Colombia In particular, areas that are rich in primary export goods have turned out to be regions of disparity and confrontation due to the incentive of taking control over such lucrative areas. Now, coca, the plant from which cocaine is derived, being a lucrative crop, various armed drug cartels often fight it out amongst themselves to gain control over the area of cultivation of coca in order to earn handsome profits. Colombia also has to deal with the challenge of creation of a heavy population of refugees, known as displacement. Scholars often find a positive correlation between displacement and drug creation, although there is very little literature to support the argument. The more important fact that arises out is that with increase in coca production violence is also on the rise (Holmes, 1-9). In order to reduce drug trafficking and violence, the Colombian President Andres Pastrana came up with a grand scheme known as “Plan Colombia”. It is made up of three anti-narcotics battalions, trained by the U.S special forces equipped with 60 helicopters to provide mobility to the force. Based in Putumayo, the plan is to destroy 60,000 hectares of coca. Later on, the plan has been altered a little by building up the Colombian army to eradicate the problem from its roots. In order to reduce violence, the State has taken up a few measures (Felbab-Brown, 9-14): The Colombian Army has planned not to take on guerillas and drug cartels head on. Their plan is to economically destroy them. Aerial fumigations have been used to destroy coca crops by spraying from the air. However this has two-fold disadvantages. Firstly, the environment is getting harmed to a large extent since spraying from 600 feet above will temporarily destroy animal’s habitat, kill birds and contaminate water. Rainforests are also getting destroyed due to this. Secondly, poor people who lose their meager means of income due to fumigation are the prime recruits of illegal armed groups like the paramilitary forces and guerillas. In the design of this plan, steps were to be taken to neutralize the narcotics economy by “reducing cultivation, processing and distribution of narcotics by 50% in six years” (Felbab-Brown 10). However this has not been reached to the fullest till date. Guerrilla acquisitions in the deep forest regions have not allowed the State to achieve its targets with the fact that whenever the guerillas are being attacked they flee inside the deep torrential forests. One great achievement of Plan Colombia has been in the security ground. Throughout Colombia, security has improved to a great extent and the size and strength of the Illegal armed groups has been greatly curtailed down. As a result of U.S training, the Colombian forces have improved to a great extent. Since 2003, the effectiveness of FARC has been on a downslide and the number of active FARC combatants has been reduced to 9,000. However, still there are certain challenges to be met on the security front. Illegal army are still operative in places. The FARC and ELN still continue to operate in rural regions more often in the hilly areas where they are hard to track. Local DTOs are also working in the drug markets. Corruption in the administrative ranks is also a grave matter of concern. (Felbab-Brown 9-14) Comparison of Strategic Policy There has been a few basic differences in the drug policies taken by Colombia and Mexico. Although the drug conflict in Mexico may look similar to that of Colombia, yet the causes and the solutions to Mexico’s drug-destruction problem are very much different. Mexico’s immense rise in drug trafficking can be viewed as the result of the success and loopholes of the U.S. policy originally implemented in Colombia and afterwards in Mexico. U.S have so far handled drug controlling issues within these two nations in very different ways. Colombia has so far largely succumbed to the U.S pressures and have never been able to challenge them publicly. However, this is in stark contrast to Mexico who have have not complied with U.S policies and have often differed to that of the U.S. Despite their respective stances towards U.S, Colombia has been often treated more harshly (Hinojosa 1-2). While Plan Colombia may have been able to provide Colombia with security from guerilla forces, it has failed to become a true drug eradication policy. The policy of the Mexican President to break the bigger drug cartels into smaller factions have backfired. Fighting guerilla groups is not at all the same thing as fighting drug traffickers. Killing guerilla warriors help break morale and the individual fighters are left with no other option than to surrender. But destroying drug mafia only helps to create job opportunities for new amateurs. The Mexican drug traffickers often prefer a short king-size life than a long one. So, mere coming up with a “Plan Mexico” in the mould of “Plan Colombo” is not really going to work. Values: It should be remembered that strict control by forceful combat of drug use or trafficking cannot be a permanent solution because the drug users would then move deeper underground and out of reach. It is far important to address the basic problems which compel the addicts to take drugs and individualized measures towards treatment need to be adopted. If this does not work, the natural and social environment of the individual can be amended to facilitate healthy and proper lifestyles. It is also important to safeguard their human rights and provide them the right to choose the kind of treatment they would opt for. Alternate approaches include “methadone and buprenorphine maintenance” as well as ways of reducing the harmful impact like “needle exchanges, safe injection rooms, and health information sharing” (Platais). This problem is usually a social issue and affects the addict’s family and surroundings. In Columbia the crisis of medical treatments and non-judgmental education schemes lead to the probability of increasing incidence of HIV infection among the drug users. The social stigma and differentiation associated with drug use often lead to segregation of the user whose quality of living will decline (Platais). Sociological issues like race also pay a role in demonization of a Mexican person. According to the white leaders of labor unions and other figures of public authority the Mexicans were generalized as marijuana users and therefore causing violence. Such racial discrimination leads to aggravation of the problem even further (Sterling). Unemployment issues need to be addressed such that the drug dealers and traffickers have their suitable alternative as employment. Conclusion: As of now, there has been no new policy by the governments of both these countries to counteract their previous failures and frailties. Although things in Colombia have been under control of late, the situation in Mexico is declining with every passing day. The alarmingly high levels of blood bath due to frontal collisions of drug cartels and the Mexican State have been a major issue of concern. The standing of U.S government amidst such conditions has not been very clear till now. Things will be more crystalline as U.S comes out with a clearer picture to the world. Until then there is no other option than to sit and watch. Mexico turning into a new Afghanistan will be the last thing the world needs to see. References 1. Rosin, Eileen. Drugs and democracy in Latin America, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005 2. Sterling, Eric E. Drug Policy: a challenge of values, CJPF, May 11 2011 from: http://www.cjpf.org/booksandresources/challengeofvalues.pdf 3. Gilbert, Jeorge “THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND LATIN AMERICA”, Revista de Sociologia Universidad Chile #11-12, 1997. May 11 2011 from: http://academic.evergreen.edu/curricular/latinamericagfmsa/nwoenglish.pdf 4. “Mexicos drug war: Number of dead passes 30,000”, BBC News, December 16,2010,May 10 2011 from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12012425 5. Felbab-Brown,Venda “The Violent Drug Market in Mexico and Lessons from Colombia” Foreign Policy at Brookings, Policy paper 12, 2009, May 10, 2011 from: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/03_mexico_drug_market_felbabbrown/03_mexico_drug_market_felbabbrown.pdf 6. Trevino, Elsa. “Colombia’s Drug Policy Causes Mexican Disaster”, Press Release: Council on Hemispheric Affairs, February 2011,May 10 2011 from: http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO1102/S00830/colombias-drug-policy-causes-mexican-disaster.htm 7. Holmes, Jennifer S. “Drugs,Violence and Development in Colombia: A Deparment Level Analysis”,University of Texas at Dallas School of Social Sciences from: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.129 8. “Colombia changes tactics in drugs war”, BBC News, August 31 2000, May 10 2011 from: http://cdnedge.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/891289.stm 9. “Crime and Violence in Central America Volume II”, World Bank document, Sepember2010, May 10 2011 from: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Eng_Volume_II_Crime_and_Violence_Central_America.pdf 10. Hinojosa,Victor Javier, “Domestic politics and international narcotics control: U.S. relations with Mexico and Columbia, 1989-2000”, New York:Routledge,2007. 11. Platais, Inga. “Why Georgia should listen to its drug users”, Columbia University, 2006. May 11 2011 from: http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ssw/news/mar06/georgia.html Read More