Criminal Liability - Assignment Example

Criminal Liability Neil, Annabelle and their unborn baby died sometime after the incident with John at the local bar. Different circumstances surrounded the death of these individuals and not all of these circumstances may be pinned directly upon John and make him criminally liable. Based on the facts of the case, there are two acts of John that should be considered in determining his criminal liability, namely, (a) pushing and kicking Neil, (b) pushing Annabelle into the stationary car and subsequently stabbing her with a bunch of keys. To get a clearer picture as to what extent should John be held as criminally liable for the deaths of Neil, Annabelle and the unborn baby, let us discuss each of these instances. a. Criminal liabilities of John towards Neil The fact that Neil died as a result of the scuffle with John, John may be held liable for manslaughter. Note that under the Homicide Act 1957, a person may be charged with voluntary manslaughter if death resulted from the act of another. Note that John came back and confronted Neil and he bodily pushed Neil to the ground then kicked him. Even if John did not intend to kill Neil, he is still guilty of maliciously inflicting bodily harm against Neil. When John came back to the scene to confront Neil, he already showed the elements of a guilty mind or mens rea as he had the chance to think things over when he turned away. The fact that Neil died in the hospital after he contracted MRSA does not excuse John from liability of his death. As stated by the court in the case of R v Blaue1, where the subsequent events that lead to the death of the victim are foreseeable consequences of the incident and such foreseeable consequences would not have happened if not for the unlawful acts of the accused, then there is no break in the causation and the accused may still be held liable for the death of the victim. In the case of John, he may be held liable for voluntary manslaughter under the Homicide Act 1957. However, John may use provocation as a mitigating circumstance to reduce his culpability. In order for John to make use of the defense of provocation, he should prove to the court that he is a reasonable man as defined by the court in the case of R v Ahluwalia2 and he should prove to the court that despite his being a reasonable person, there was sufficient provocation which made him lose control of his action. According to the court in the case of R v James and Karimi3, a reasonable man may be driven to commit hideous acts when provoked and when the degree of provocation is such that the person loses control over his or her actions, such person’s liability over his or her actions may be diminished. However, John may not be held liable for manslaughter if there were supervening events that took place between the time of the assault and the time of the death of the victim. Based on the facts of the case, Neil was already recovering from the injuries he suffered from the incident with John but he contracted MRSA while in the hospital and he died later on. MRSA is an infection caused by drug resistant bacteria and may be contracted through open wounds, the use of contaminated invasive equipments. In some cases, patients may contract MRSA inside the hospital simply because their immune system is too weak to fight off invasive and harmful bacteria. Now, just because it was John who put Neil in the hospital that does not mean that John should be held automatically liable for the death of Neil. Note that only when it is established that there was no subsequent events that caused the infection can John be held liable for Neil’s death. According to the court in the case of Carslogie Steamship Co v Royal Norwegian Government4, an unforeseen incident or an act of God which occur after the first incident causes a break in the events or a novus actus intervenien. Based on the doctrine of novus actus intervenien, once an event causes a break in the causation, the accused may not be held liable for the events that happened after the break in the causation (see R v Cheshire5). In order to break the causation, the supervening events must be such that it increases the risk or caused more injuries to the victim. The supervening events that caused the death of the victim may occur through the contributory negligence of the victim (R v Dear6), through third persons’ negligence (R v Smith7) or through third person’s deliberate acts (R v Malcherek8). If it can be proven that Neil was negligent in caring for himself while he was recovering from his injuries in the hospital, then the flow of causation can be broken and John may no longer be held liable for his death. On the other hand, if the hospital staff committed negligence in caring for Neil, then the flow of causation may be broken. According to the court in the case of R v Smith9, negligence in the care of the patient causes a break in the causation and give rise to another criminal or tortuous act. In the case of Neil, the facts of the case are silent as to the extent of the injuries suffered by Neil in the hands of John. What was mentioned in the case is that Neil was already recovering nicely while in the hospital before he contracted MRSA. If it can be proven that the negligence of the doctors and the hospital staff exposed Neil to infection, then John will not be held liable for voluntary manslaughter. Note that in the case of R v Smith10, the court ruled that once there is a break in the causation, the accused may no longer be held liable on the subsequent death of the victim provided that the proximate cause of the death of the victim are the supervening events and not the acts of the accused. However, in the event where it is proven that Neil died due to the negligent acts of the hospital staff, then, John will only be liable for assault and battery. On the other hand, if it can be proven that the hospital staff and the doctors exercised due diligence in caring for Neil but Neil still contracted MRSA, there is no break in the causation, thus, John may still be held liable for his death. In the event where the causation was effectively broken and John cannot be held liable for the death of Neil, John may be charged with assault and battery. According to the facts of this case, John shouted at Neil to shut up and then pushed him until he lost his balance and fell to the ground. While Neil was on the ground, John kicked his head and continued shouting at him. Based on the facts presented, John can be held liable for assault and battery against Neil. The fact that John shouted at Neil and approached him menacingly falls under the category of assault. As stated by the court in the case of R v. Gladstone Williams11, assault can be committed when there is a reasonable apprehension of an immediate harmful contact with another individual. According to the court in the case of DPP v. Little12, assault can be committed with or without bodily contact between the accused and the complainant. This means that even if the accused did not actually inflicted bodily harm against the complainant, the fact that the accused is capable of carrying out the threat made is enough to constitute an assault. In the case of John, the fact that John shouted at Neil and moved towards him menacingly is enough to constitute an assault. Can John use the ruling of the case of Fagan v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner13 in this case? Apparently, the case of Fagan v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner14 may not be applicable in this case since John actually inflicted bodily harm against Neil. Note that in the case of Fagan v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner15, the court ruled that when a person is verbally attacked by another and such verbal attacked is such that it constitutes an affront to the dignity of a reasonable person, the person who was verbally attacked may be justified in assuming a menacing attitude towards the perpetrator. In the case of John, assuming a menacing stance against Neil may be justified since Neil taunt John and humiliated him but what is not justifiable in this case is that John actually committed physical assault against Neil and inflicted bodily harm. Since John touched Neil, he may no longer use the defense used in the case of Fagan v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner16. Aside from being liable for assault, John can also be held liable for battery against Neil under Sections 20 and 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. According to Section 20, any person who unlawfully and maliciously inflects bodily harm against another may be held liable for the crime of battery. The crime of battery may be committed with or without the use of a weapon so the fact that the John had not used any weapons in attacking Neil does not excuse him from any liability. What is important in the crime of battery is that accused committed an unlawful act and was able to inflict “grievous bodily harm” against another person. In the case at bar, when Neil fell to the ground, John kicked him in the head and inflicted serious harm. b. Liability of John towards Annabelle The circumstances surrounding the death of Annabelle are different from that of Neil. While John died due to MRSA, a kind of infection that may be contracted through open wounds or through a weakened immune system, Annabelle died because she refused treatment. According to the court in the case of R v Dear17, in order for the accused to be held liable for manslaughter, the cause of death of the victim must be the wound or the blow inflected upon him or her by the accused. In the case of Annabelle, the cause of death is her refusal to undergo treatment and not the severity of the blow or wound inflected upon her by John. The case of Annabelle should be distinguished from the facts of the case of R v Blaue18 where the victim refused blood transfusion because of her religious belief. In the case of R v Blaue19, the court ruled that the death of the victim due to her refusal to undergo blood transfusion is the logical consequence of the act of the accused because the accused knew that the victim is a member of the Jehovah’s Witness and that by virtue of her religious belief, she cannot accept blood transfusion. According to the court in this case, if the accused did not put the victim in such a position where she has to choose to die or violate her religious belief, then the victim would not have to choose to refuse blood transfusion and die. In the case of Annabelle, she refused treatment because she lost her will to live when she learned that Neil died and that she gave birth to a still born child. Given the circumstances surrounding the refusal of Annabelle to undergo treatment, we can say that her act effectively served as a supervening event resulting to a break in the causation. Since there was a supervening event that caused a break in the legal causation, John may no longer be held liable for the death of Annabelle. However, since John did inflict harm against Annabelle, the break in the causation will not totally exonerate him from liability and he may be held liable for assault and battery against her. Assault was committed on the person of Annabelle when John forcibly pushed her unto a stationary car. As enunciated by the court in the case of DPP v. Little20, an assault may be committed by unlawful invasion of personal space or bodily contact between the accused and the complainant, thus, even if Annabelle did not suffer any harm when John pushed her inside the stationary car, John can still be held liable for assault. Note that when John pushed Annabelle into the car, he unlawfully invaded the personal space of Annabelle. As for the act of battery, the unlawful act was perfected when John used a bunch of keys to stab Annabelle in the abdomen. According to Section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, battery may be committed with or without the aid of a weapon of any kind to inflect bodily harm against a person. In our case, the fact that John used the bunch of keys to inflict harm on Annabelle, the bunch of keys became the weapon. c. Liability of John on the Death of the Unborn Baby The death of the unborn child can be traced back to the condition of the mother and events that took place which lead to the untimely birth of the child. In the case at bar, the mother was injured when John stabbed her in the stomach with a bunch of keys. According to the court in the case of Smith v Leech Brain & Co21, where the physical condition of the victim is fragile and the effects of the initial injury inflected upon the victim is foreseeable, the accused can be held liable for all the harm that may befall upon the victim due to the injury inflicted. In the case of Annabelle, she was already heavily pregnant and John was fully aware of her condition when he stabled her in the stomach with a bunch of keys. The fact that Annabelle went into premature labor after the incident and gave birth to a stillborn child is but a logical consequence of the incident. Since the death of the child can be traced directly to the acts of John, John can be held as criminally liable for the death of the unborn child. References: Laws 1. Homicide Act 1957 2. Offences Against the Person Act 1861 Cases 1. Carslogie Steamship Co v Royal Norwegian Government [1952] 1 All ER 20 2. DPP v. Little [1992] 1 All ER 299 3. Fagan v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439 4. R v Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889 5. R v Blaue [1976] 61 Cr App R 271 6. R v Cheshire (1991) 3 AER 670 7. R v Dear (1996) CLR 595 8. R v James and Karimi [2006] EWCA Crim 14 9. R v Malcherek (1981) 73 Cr. App. R. 173 10. R v Smith1959) 2 QB 35 11. R v. Gladstone Williams [1987] 3 All ER 411 12. Smith v Leech Brain & Co [1962] 2 QB 405 Read More