Crime, Underclass, and the Threat to Stability and Welfare - Coursework Example

CRIME, UNDER AND THE THREAT TO STABILITY AND WELFARE by 19 December Crime, Under and the Threat to Stability and Welfare Introduction The growing interest toward the study of the social causes of crime exemplifies one of the most dramatic shifts in social criminology in the 20th century. The concept of underclass has become a routine feature of numerous criminological studies. Contemporary scholars seek to understand and evaluate the relevance of the crime-social status relationships and their effects on the broader social trends. Needless to say, different scholars treat the link between social position and crime in entirely different ways. More often than not, they readily accept the view that “the emergence of a class or stratum of people with quasi-criminal, anti-social, anti-work cultures of welfare dependency who now threaten the happy security and ordered stability of wider society” (McDonald 1997, p.1). Put simply, the underclass is the product of the interrelationship of numerous social forces, characterized by high levels of crime and the development of criminal morality, and partially excluded from the most important social processes, due to their social belonging. Underclass has already become one of the most popular topics of scholarly analysis in British criminology. However, more important are the changing patterns of crime in Britain, which could have created the foundation for increased rates of crime in the British society. The second half of the 20th century in Britain witnessed a dramatic increase in crime rates. In 1955, the rates of crime in Britain had been mostly equal to those in the middle of the 20th century (Dennis 1993). Simultaneously, the crime rates were slowly approaching the point of 1,000 crimes per 100,000 of the British population (Dennis 1993). By the end of the 1950s, Britain had 700 crimes per 100,000 of the population (Coleman & Moynihan 1996; Dennis 1993). By the beginning of the 1970s, Britain had made a serious leap forward in its crime rates, with 1,700 crimes per 100,000 of the population (Dennis 1993). Apparently, it was during the period between 1955 and 1970 that Britain lost the grip of control over the crime situation in the society, and in 1980s, 2,600 crimes per 100,000 of the population became a newly accepted norm (Dennis 1993). The explanations to the growing rates of crimes in Britain were numerous: some scholars referred to the growing economic affluence (Dennis 1993). The post-war period in America and Britain witnessed the rapid expansion of welfare state ideas, which had to eliminate poverty, provide affordable housing and, consequentially, eliminate poverty (Lea 1997). However, the growing amount of money in pockets also eliminated individual responsibility and obligation to live one’s life prudently (Dennis 1993). Another set of explanations linked crime rates to the quality of the criminological science and achievements – the so-called revelation of invisible victims and the exposure of invisible crime victims to the state processes of criminological analysis and justice automatically resulted in the dramatic rise in crime rates (Young 1999). However, these scholarly controversies do not deny the truth that crime rates in Britain are constantly rising and, to a large extent, it is due to the rapid changes and dramatic social transformations that crime is becoming a routine reality in Britain. These data are suggestive of the presence of some form of social disorder in the British society. The logic is simple: the changes in the construction of criminal activity in Britain apparently date back to the middle of the 20th century and coincide with the dramatic social transformations in the country, including the growing social cleavage between the upper and lower social strata (Clutterbuck 1980; Lister 2004; Smellie 1955). Those changes further expanded to affect the conventional norms of family formation and operation – in the 1960s, the formal and informal arrangements within families shifted toward (a) tightening control for who would bring up children and (b) fixing responsibilities for the process of rearing children (Dennis 1998; Haskey & Kiernan 1989; Morgan 1995). However, is it possible that those changes were directly related to the emergence of the underclass? Is it possible that the British underclass is the main symptom of the British crime disorder? Social underclass has already become one of the principal elements of contemporary sociology and criminology research. Yet, how to define and describe underclass is still a problem. Generally, “the basic features and symptoms of the British underclass include (a) crime, (b) illegitimacy, and (c) economic activity” (Murray 1996, p.24). In terms of crime, property rights violations exemplify one of the most problematic aspects of social underclass in Britain (Murray 1996). Illegitimacy adds complexity to the underclass issues and means that the growing numbers of children in the lower social strata are being born outside marriage (Murray 1996). Finally, the lack of economic activity for objective and subjective reasons is the distinguishing symptom of underclass in Britain (Murray 1993). Following those trends, public opinion in Britain is gradually changing toward accepting the emergence of the underclass as an inevitable byproduct of the broad social forces in the British society. In 1989, the idea that Britain had been developing a social underclass faced harsh public opposition and skepticism (Murray 1996). Today, scholars and the general public are growing sympathetic toward the meaning of the underclass and even accept the idea of the underclass having some kind of moral character (Bowles, Durlauf & Hoff 2006; Townsend 2000). Briefly, the moral character of the underclass can be characterized by the following features: a person from the underclass “is distinguished from the civilized man by his repugnance to regular and continuous labor – by his want of providence in laying up a store for the future – by his inability to perceive consequences ever so slightly removed from immediate apprehensions – by his passion for stupefying herbs and roots, and when possible, for intoxicating fermented liquors” (Murray 1996, p.24). In many instances, this representation of the moral character of the British underclass coincides with that of Murray (1996), who claims that underclass is equally criminal, illegitimate, and economically inactive. However, it is at least incorrect to say that the underclass is the major source of the contemporary social and criminal problems in the British society. Undeniably, the underclass is eroding stability in the British state and repudiates the values of the respectable society (Dennis 1998). However, the underclass often serves a reliable reflection of the broader societal shifts, as long as it lacks resources and means needed to mould public opinion to pursue such an end (Dennis 1998; Minton 2009). Yet, even when an underclass falls victim to the broader social changes and fails to control the effects it produces on other social strata, exclusion and rejection remain the principal features of their daily routine. Social exclusion is a multifaceted concept that reflects the binary structure of the contemporary society and contributes to the current understanding of the underclass. According to Young (2007), social exclusion is characterized by a number of features, with each reflecting the dynamics of the social exclusion phenomenon and the dualism of the socially excluded situation of the underclass. Young’s social exclusion thesis claims that the British society is “divided into an inclusive and socially satisfied majority and despondent, excluded minority” (Young 2007, p.4). Spatial exclusion means that the longer minorities are excluded from the major social processes, the more problematic it becomes for them to re-establish themselves as an integral component of the existing social structures (Heath & Smith 1991; Young 2007). Moral exclusion means that the underclass is disorganized and operates in the atmosphere of crime and disorganization (Young 2007). This, in part, explains the dysfunctional moral character of the British underclass and the moral threat it poses to the values of the respectable majority. Underclass is dysfunctional by its nature, and as long as its values of hedonism, dependency, and criminal decisions do not coincide with the law-abiding norms of the functional majority, they cannot be its part (Young 2007). However, the conventional picture of social exclusion of the underclass is too idealistic and does not reflect the dynamism of the majority-minority interrelations. Were it not for the constant interactions between the underclass and the “moralistic” majority, the latter would never perceive the eroding effects of the former on their values and beliefs. Social exclusion is never complete, nor is it stable. Rather, the social dualism implies that “the borderlines are constantly crossed, the underclass exists on both sides anyway, but those who are clustered in the poorer parts of the town regularly work across the tracks to keep the well-off families functioning” (Young 2007, p.30). Thus, the social exclusion of the underclass is possible and realistic only to the extent, which gives the better-off majority a chance to benefit from the socially disadvantaged position of the socially excluded minority. However, social exclusion and the absence of sound morality in the underclass do not mean that this underclass is the primary source of criminal issues in the British society. Underclass is the direct by-product of the rapid economic and social shifts, but crime is penetrating in the better-off social strata, creating a criminogenic picture of capitalism. White-collar crimes represent a relatively new form of criminal activity in finance, commerce, and other advanced areas of social performance. Recent developments in commercial activity and finance favored the emergence of new fraud opportunities (Croall 2001). Crimes among the bourgeoisie turned into one of the essential features of criminogenic capitalism, with its long tradition of “muckracking” (Croall 2001). Croall’s thesis about criminogenic capitalism and white-collar crimes denies the relevance of Murray’s (1996) assumption about the immoral character of an underclass and its criminal intentions. The current state of knowledge leaves many questions without answers. First, is it possible that the underclass erodes traditional values of the respected majority and favors the integration of the criminal intentions with the basic norms and principles of the better-off majority? Second, it is possible that the growth of crime is nothing but a reflection of the broader social trends that affect all social strata? If that is the case, crime can hardly serve as the symptoms of the emerging underclass in Britain. Third, can crime in an underclass be the result of partial social exclusion (partial, because absolute exclusion in contemporary society is virtually impossible)? These questions require a detailed investigation and must direct the course of the future research. Based on the available information, several conclusions can be made. That the emergence of an underclass has already become the distinctive feature of the postmodern British reality is undeniable. The respected majority perceives an underclass as a concentration of individuals from the lower social strata, which are characterized by the high levels of crime, illegitimacy, and employment inactivity. The underclass is believed to erode the values of the respected majority and is being excluded from the most important social processes, e.g., employment activities and decisions. The moral character of the underclass comprises several important features, including inattentiveness toward the anticipated consequences of the individual actions and repugnance to continuous labor. It would be fair to say that the moral character is a common feature across the numerous members of the British underclass. Despite the relevance of the social exclusion, the underclass produces a variety of effects on the better-off majority in Britain, most of which are negative and rather demotivating. The underclass reflects the criminogenic nature of the capitalist trends in the British society and signifies the presence of a complex social disorder (Nelken 1994). The latter, in turn, results in the development and expansion of the crime and threatens the social stability in Britain (Marcuse 1974). Given that absolute social exclusion is never possible, and the underclass and higher social strata constantly interact, it is natural that the underclass will continue threatening the security and welfare of the better-off individuals and groups in society. Unfortunately, the right, Victorian ideologies have not been successful so far. These neo-liberal policies attempt to roll back and reverse the validity of the social contract, pushing the members of the underclass beyond the limits of the social reality (Young 1993). The poor lack opportunities to obtain quality education, access quality health care, and fail to protect their legal rights (Young 1993). Crime is the ultimate form of rebelling against the unbearable conditions of social survival among the members of the underclass. Crime is not dangerous in itself, but only within the limits, which turn crime into a symptom and consequence of the growing social inequality. Underclass is the product of numerous social forces, characterized by criminal morality and excluded from the major social processes. However, underclass is also the symptom of a larger social disorder, which hinders the moral and social evolution of the British society and denies the importance of inclusion and social understanding at all levels of the social performance. Conclusion The emergence of an underclass has become the distinctive feature of the postmodern reality. An underclass is characterized by high concentration of crime, illegitimacy, and economic inactivity. The underclass is the product of the interrelationship of numerous social forces, characterized by high levels of crime and the development of criminal morality, and partially excluded from the most important social processes, due to their social belonging. The underclass looks like an inevitable byproduct of the capitalist development and increasing social cleavage between the rich and poor. 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