Marital Analysis - Case Study Example

Criminal Law CASE-STUDY: Plastered Peeta Martini, the managing-director of Shiraab Plc., and his wife Shami had been married for 15 years. They have a 17 year old step-daughter, Ginni,. For the last 6 months, Peeta and Shami have had a number of violent arguments. Due to the recession, Peeta has been informed by Shiraab Plc. that he may be made redundant. Consequently, Peeta has been under a great deal of stress and has turned to heavy drinking. He now suffers from chronic alcoholism. During their arguments both Peeta and Shami have often been very abusive to each other. Peeta suspects that Shami may be having an affair. He has often taunted her about her looks and she has threatened to leave him saying that he is an inadequate husband. Last week Peeta. was admitted to hospital. On the way home he had another argument with Shami. Shami mocked him about his man-hood and the possibility of him losing his job. On reaching home, Peeta went into the bedroom where he saw Shami’s mobile phone on the bed. He picked it up and saw a text message: “Hi Darling. Had a wonderful time last night………all night. If he is going to stay in hosp. then I’ll come over to-night and we will again xxxxxxx. Missing you lots. Luv and Kisses. Alberto. XXXXXXXX” Peeta felt very dejected, upset and quickly went into the bed-room cup-board. He picked up his cricket bat, went over to Shami in the sitting-room and he clubbed her to death. Ginni, who was in her bedroom, heard the noise and went into the sitting-room where she discovered that Shami was dead. Ginni telephoned the police. Later the police arrived and arrested Peeta. Advise Peeta In order to be able to advise Peeta it is necessary to discuss the possible charges that might be brought against him and then examine any possible defences. The starting point is to consider the necessary mens rea and actus reus of the offence of murder to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to charge Peeta with murder. From this it will be necessary to consider the available defences such as provocation, diminished responsibility and automatism. It should then be possible to advise Peeta on the likelihood of the murder charge being reduced to manslaughter. When establishing a charge for murder the prosecution has to show that the defendant intended to kill the victim or to cause them serious bodily harm. The courts have accepted that the defendant has the necessary intention Where a person of sound mind and discretion, unlawfully kills any reasonable creature in being under the Queens Peace with intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm1. (Archbold: 19-1, 2008). R v Moloney [1985]2 and R v Woollin [1998]3 have removed the need to prove the malice aforethought element of the offence4. There is no longer a need to prove premeditation and charges for murder have been accepted where the prosecution can prove that the defendant intended to cause serious harm to the victim5. In determining the guilt of the accused, juries are generally instructed to consider the foresight of the accused on the basis of what the accused ought to have foreseen not what they actual foresaw as a result of their actions6. The courts have also held defendants guilty were they have been reckless in their actions. This happened in R v Cunningham [1957]7 and Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Caldwell [1981]8. In Cunningham the court held that the accused was reckless because he was aware of the possibility that his actions might cause the death of another yet continued with them regardless. The recklessness application was widened in Caldwell where the accused considered that the risk was only minimal or non-existent and continued in his venture. This was later confirmed by the courts in R v Reid [1992]9 where Lord Keith stated that ‘absence of something from a person’s state of mind is as much part of his state of mind as is its presence. Inadvertence to risk is no less a subjective state of mind than is disregard of a recognised risk’. Murder is generally charged where the prosecution can prove the direct intention of the accused. Where oblique intention is proven the charge will generally be reduced to manslaughter. Oblique intention occurs where the accused does not desire the death of the victim but is aware that his actions could cause their death10. Direct intention occurs where it can be proven that the accused actually wanted to kill that person11. If the police decide to charge Peeta with murder he could raise the defence of automatism. In R v Stone [1999]12 automatism was defined as “a state of impaired consciousness in which an individual, though capable of action, has no voluntary control over that action”. In relying on such a defence the accused essentially admits their actions but claims that they did not voluntarily commit the offence as their stat of mind was impaired. Automatism can be insane where the accused has a disease of the mind13, or non-insane where the actions are as a result of a blow to the head14 or the accused is suffering from delirium15. This defence has also been used where the accused has been suffering from hypoglycaemia16. In Bratty v Attorney General of Northern Ireland17 automatism was defined as "connoting the state of a person who, though capable of action, is not conscious of what he is doing ... It means unconscious involuntary action, and it is a defence because the mind does not go with what is being done." In this case Lord Denning went on to say “No act is punishable if it is done involuntarily: and an involuntary act in this context…means an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind such as a spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing such as an act done whilst suffering from concussion or whilst sleepwalking…” The burden of proof for automatism is on the defence. Generally the consumption of drugs or alcohol will not trigger a defence of automatism as this is often regarded as being self-induced18. However, in R v Tandy (1988)19 such a defence was allowed as the defendant was an alcoholic and was able to show that the first drink of the day was an involuntary action on the part of the accused due to his alcoholism. Similarly, the effects of taking LSD where taken into account in R v Lipman (1969)20. In using the defence of provocation the accused has to show that their actions were as a direct result of the provocation by the victim. Section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 defines provocation as Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find that the person charged was provoked (whether by things done or things said or both together) to lose his self-control, the question whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did shall be left to be determined by the jury, and in determining that question the jury shall take into account everything both done and said according to the effect which in their opinion it would have on a reasonable man. The burden of proof in such a defence is placed on the accused21 and they will need to show that as a result of the provocation the accused lost self control22. The test for provocation also requires the defence to prove that a reasonable man in the same situation as the accused would react in the came manner23. In R v Davies24 the court held that conduct of the wife’s lover could be taken into consideration when determining whether the accused had been provoked. The test for provocation can be an objective or a subjective test. Using the objective test the courts will have to determine whether the actions of the accused could be regarded as the actions of a reasonable man in the same circumstances. This was applied in Bedder v DPP25, where the House of Lords refused to accept that physical or mental infirmity could be regarded as material in considering whether a man had been provoked and whether a reasonable man could have lost his self control in the circumstances. Subsequent cases have refuted the above and considered that the characteristics of the accused are crucial in determining the reasonable man test26. In R v Morhall27 and Luc Thiet Thuan v R28 it was held that the judge ought to direct the jury to consider whether an ordinary person with ordinary powers of self-control would have reacted to the provocation as the defendants did and that no allowance should be given for any characteristics that might have made him or her more volatile than the ordinary person. In applying the subjective test, proof is required that the defendant lost self-control as a result of the provocation. Loss of self control was applied in R v Duffy (1949)29 in which it was determined that the accused had had a sudden and temporary loss of self control. This was not accepted in R v Ibrams and Gregory30 where there was clear evidence that the defendants had been bullied by the victim for a considerable period of time before they decided to harm him. The actions of the defendants in this case clearly showed premeditation. The defence of provocation has also been overruled where there has been a cooling off period between the provocation and the actions of the accused as was the case in R v Thornton31. In this case, the court felt that the accused had had sufficient time to ‘cool off’ before the attack on her husband. However, since this case, the courts have accepted the defence of ‘battered wives syndrome’ which resulted in the defendant being released from prison. If the court feel that Peeta had had sufficient time to ‘cool off’ as in Bull v Queen [1988]32, then he would not be able to rely on provocation as a defence. From the above it would appear that Peeta would be charged with murder, however, he might be able to rely on the defence of automatism if he can show that he is alcohol dependent, this would reduce the charge to manslaughter. He might alternatively be able to prove diminished responsibility or provocation if he can show that his actions were as a direct result of his wife’s taunting and also finding out she was having an affair with another man. If the courts refuse to accept any of the above defences he would be charged with murder rather than manslaughter. Bibliography Allen, C, (2001), Practical Guide to Evidence, 2nd Ed, Cavendish Publishing Ashworth, A and Blake, M (1996), The presumption of innocence in English law, Crim LR 306 Cook, K, James, M, and Lee, R, (2006), Core Statutes on Criminal Law, 2006-2007, Law Matters Publishing Elliott, C & Quinn, F, (2000), Criminal Law, 3rd Ed, Pearson Education Glanville Williams, (1983), Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd Ed, London: Stevens & Sons Glazebrook, P R, (2001), Statutes on Criminal Law, 10th Ed, Blackstone Press Limited Herring, J, (2005), Criminal Law, 4th Ed, Palgrave Macmillan Law Masters Huxley, P, & O’Connell, M, Statutes on Evidence, 5th Ed, Blackstone’s Inns of Court School of Law, (2003), Criminal Litigation & Sentencing, Oxford University Press Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption, Law Commission Report 145 (1997) Murphy, P, (2002), Blackstone’s Criminal Practice, Oxford University Press Smith, J.C. and Hogan, B, (2002), Criminal Law, 7th Ed, London: Butterworths Smith & Hogan, (2005), Criminal Law 11th Ed, Oxford University Press Smith. J C, The presumption of innocence (1987) NILQ 223 Tadros, V and Tierney, S [2004] Presumption of innocence and the Human Rights Act 67 MLR 402  Read More