Issues of a Welfare Law - Report Example

Welfare Law Following Street v. Mountford, it appeared that the legal test to determine whether a residential occupier is a licensee or a tenant is exclusive possession. However, Westminster v. Clarke showed that the real test is the nature of the accommodation. Discuss with references to relevant legal sources. Street v. Mountford is a groundbreaking judgment by the House of Lords. This case set the precedent that the court would use in order to determine if a person’s usage of property was a tenant or a licensee. It is true that “… case law and legislation combined with commentary” will enable one to be able to fully understand the often complicated language of the law (Hughes, et. al., 2005, pgh. 1). It was determined that, “In Street v. Mountford [1985] A.C. 809 [the] House decided that where residential accommodation is granted for a term, at a rent with exclusive possession, the landlord providing neither attention nor services, the grant is a tenancy notwithstanding the fact that the agreement professes an intention by both parties to create a mere licence” (“Bruton v. London & Quadrant Housing Trust 1999, House of Lords,” 2009). Housing in the UK is rather expensive when one compares prices there to the rest of Europe. Speaking frankly, “…in terms of their impact on the disposable incomes of families, housing in the UK is substantially more expensive than in the rest of the European Union. This generates real affordability problems, especially given strong inflationary pressures within the owner-occupied sector. This aspect of home ownership needs to be emphasised, for other housing tenures have lost favour” (Gallent, et. al., 2002, pp. 153). In fact, it is probably not a good idea to buy property in the UK unless one is absolutely certain one wants to. “Many foreign markets are without a doubt more risky than investing in property in the UK market…” (Barrow, 2008, pp. 387). “Unlike fixed-term tenancies, periodic tenancies have no initial limit on how long they will last, since they automatically continue from one period until the next until brought to an end by the appropriate period of notice. A periodic tenancy can arise expressly, but it may also arise by implication…” (Clements, et. al., 1996, pp. 9). In addition, this implication “…may arise when a person has been allowed into occupation of property with the intention of creating a tenancy and rent is thereafter paid on a periodic basis. Payment of a weekly rent in such circumstances may create the inference of a weekly tenancy, although the surrounding circumstances may negate such an inference (see Javid v. Aqil [1991] 1 All ER 243)” (Clements, et. al., 1996, pp. 9-10). The details of the case are as follows. Mr. Roger Street allowed a period of occupancy to a tenant. Her name was Mrs. Mountford. She was renting the place. In the agreement that was signed, there were several allusions to the fact that this agreement was being called a licence. Many other parts of the agreement also allowed Mr. Street to have the ability to enter into and terminate this agreement. Mrs. Mountford had a limited ability to do certain things on the property, such as bringing certain people or animals therein. The agreement was written in order to provide a licence that was not subject to the Rent Act. This was different from a tenancy, which would have allowed Mrs. Mountford the niceties in the Rent Act. Mrs. Mountford wanted rent protection as stipulated in the Rent Act. The case then came to the House of Lords. The House of Lords unanimously decided that the piece of paper which was signed which gave specific possession for a period at a certain monetary value stipulated a tenancy (also known as a lease). This was irregardless of what name was given to the agreement. One of the Lords basically stated that an object is an object, regardless of whatever one chooses to call it. This same Lord proceeded to explicate the theoretical basis for a lease, including but not limited to leases that were periodic in nature. This case is, therefore, very significant in common law with regard to leasing law. Westminster v. Clarke is another historic judgment by the House of Lords. This case also brought into question whether Mr. Clarke, the defendant, was a licensee or a secure tenant. The details of the case are as follows. Mr. Clarke was given some kind of accommodation at a hostel with an agreement that gave him a licence as an occupier. This agreement did not give Mr. Clarke any obligations of a tenant. In the agreement that was signed, it was stipulated that this did not create a situation where Mr. Clarke was a tenant with a landlord. It was stipulated that the licence was able to be terminated at any time by a council, which would then give Mr. Clarke a seven-day notice period in which he would have to move out and find other suitable accommodations. As such, Mr. Clarke agreed to the conditions of the contract, having read and agreed to observe the stipulations as set forth in the contract. There were certain stipulations in the agreement, similar to Mrs. Mountford’s case. For example, Mr. Clarke was not allowed to have anyone stay on the property overnight or allowed to have anyone share the living space with him. Further, the accommodations were to be kept clean, and payment would have to be summarily remitted for any damage caused to the property. Mr. Clarke had a curfew and was not allowed to bother other residents in any way, shape, or form. Additionally, he had to comply with any rules set forth in the hostel where he would be staying. Mr. Clarke would also have to listen to any staff or the director of the hostel where he was going to be living. On a certain date, the council ended Mr. Clarke’s licence. It was cited that Mr. Clarke had violated the stipulation of his agreement that he not bother other residents. Consequentially, it sounded as though he had been making a lot of noise, which was disturbing to other residents. As such, the council prevailed in court. Then the Court of Appeal overturned the council’s decision, deciding that Mr. Clarke was a secure tenant of his property and the council’s claim for possession was thrown out of court. The council then decided that it would, in turn, appeal. The House of Lords decided that Mr. Clarke was occupying his space as his only home. Since he was operating under the agreement of a licence, this then qualified Mr. Clarke as a secure tenant. In addition, it was ruled that since Mr. Clarke was a secure tenant, the council could not get possession unless Mr. Clarke was prior served a notice. The court would only be able to prescribe an order for possession seeing in the case that Mr. Clarke had been considered an offender in the sense of having been a bother to his neighbors. Mr. Clarke was considered a secure tenant. Therefore, the council did not retain the right to obtain possession of Mr. Clarke’s room nor any of the other living spaces allocated to people in the hostel. Whether the occupier were a tenant or a licensee, that person must be given something called “exclusive possession” for one to be considered the following. In this case, Mr. Clarke would have been a secure tenant. In the case Neale v. Del Soto, the Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act of 1949 stipulated that “standard rent is fixed by reference to the letting on the relevant date or the last letting before that date or the first letting thereafter” (Lloyd, 1950, pp. 76). In some cases landlords would charge excessively high rents based on the fact that it was difficult to find accommodations. However, this was considered wrong by the House of Lords and thus they sought to reverse the trend. However, “No guidance is given in the Act as to how…the standard of reasonableness [should be settled with regard to rent]” (Lloyd, 1950, pp. 76). Neale v. Del Soto was explicated, being made distinct in Cole v. Harris [1945] 1 KB 474 “…where the premises consisted of a bedroom, living room and kitchen on the first floor of a dwelling-house together with the use of a bathroom and w.c. in common with the landlord and the tenant of the second floor. The county court judge had understood Neale v. Del Soto to lay down a rule of law…” (“Judgments—Uratemp Ventures Ltd. v. Collins,” 2009, pgh. 14). Cole v. Harris obvious distinguished what constituted a living space and what did not. Therefore, this was a very important precedent set by the court. “When allocation or homelessness functions are outsourced, authorities must have adequate monitoring and quality assurance mechanisms in place to ensure that their statutory duties are being met” (Pawson, et. al., 2003, pp. 10). It is key that people are being “…provided suitable accommodation and care” (Fitzpatrick, et. al., 2000, pp. 1947). The homeless must be given adequate means of ensuring that they can find accommodations. A tenant must be made aware that he is being evicted. “Whenever a tenancy comes to an end…notice to quit must be given…” (Redman, et. al., 1893, pp. 382). “Once an application is made to a housing authority for accommodation or assistance in obtaining accommodation (whether or not the application is specifically made under the 1977 Act), then if that authority has reason to believe that the applicant may be “homeless or threatened with homelessness” it must make “appropriate inquiries,” i.e. the necessary inquiries to satisfy itself…” (Hoath, 1983, pp. 30). “The landlord and tenant relationship gives rise to a number of issues that are 
common to all types of tenancies, whether they be residential, commercial or 
agricultural” (Bright, et. al., 1995, pp. 1). Thus, tenancy is a special status reserved for those who are renters. “When [one] rent[s] a house or flat privately [one] can sign a tenancy agreement or lease” (Jegede, 2009, pp. 27). Tenancy versus being a licensee is complex. The two are, however, distinct. Whereas a licensee has little to no control, the tenant does have some rights to sue. REFERENCES Barrow, C. (2008). The global property investor’s toolkit. USA: Wiley. Bright, S., and Gilbert, G. (1995). Landlord and tenant law: the nature of tenancies. UK: Clarendon Press. Bruton v. London & Quadrant Housing Trust 1999, House of Lords. (2009). Available: http://oxcheps.new.ox.ac.uk/casebook/Resources/BRUTON_1%20DOC.pdf. Clements, L., and Fairest, P.B. (1996). Housing law: text, cases and materials. USA: Routledge. Fitzpatrick, S., Kemp, P., and Klinker, S. (2000). Single homelessness: an overview of research in Britain. US: The University of Michigan. Gallent, N., Shucksmith, M., and Tewdwr-Jones, M. (2002). Housing in the European countryside: rural pressure and policy in Western Europe. USA: Routledge. Hoath, D.C. (1983). Homelessness. UK: Modern Legal Studies. Hughes, D., Matthew, V., and Jones, A. (2005). Text and materials on housing law. Available: http://books.google.com/books?id=5UomHgAACAAJ&dq=a+text+and+materials+on+housing+law. Jegede, E. (2009). A guide to permanent residency & British citizenship test: life in the UK. USA: Lulu.Com. Judgments—Uratemp Ventures Ltd. v. Collins. (2009). Available: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldjudgmt/jd011011/uratem- 2.htm. Lloyd, D. (1950). Landlord and tenant (rent control) act, 1949. The Modern Law Review, 13 (1): 76. Available: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1090150. Pawson, H., and Mullins, D. (2003). Changing places. UK: The Policy Press. Redman, J.H., and Lyon, G.E. (1893). The law of landlord and tenant: including the practice in Ejectment. Available: http://books.google.com/books?id=zjA0AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA382&dq=tenancy+in+the+UK#v= onepage&q=&f=false. Read More