Homicide Criminal Law under United Kingdom Courts - Case Study Example

Sanjay could potentially be liable for murder or manslaughter under the law of homicide. The ic definition of murder under English Law was propounded by Sir Edward Coke1, asserting the two stage definition requiring actus reus and mens rea: “Murder is when a man, unlawfully kills within any country of the realm any reasonable human being under the Queen’s peace, with malice aforethought”. If we consider the first requirement of actus reus, it must be established that Sanjay committed an unlawful act which caused Tom’s death. Both factual and legal causation of death must be established. The factual test applicable is the “but for” principle established in the case of White2. Sanjay will be criminally liable if his conduct was the factual cause of Tom’s death and the consequence of death would not have happened “but for” Sanjay’s conduct. If we apply the “but for” test to the current situation, arguably Tom would not have been in hospital with severe internal injuries if had not been for Sanjay’s actions, therefore under the “but for test”, it is more than likely that Sanjay’s conduct will have satisfied the requirement of factual cause of death. However, it is also evident from the facts that Tom subsequently died of a blood transfusion at the hospital as a result of receiving the wrong blood type, which the doctors failed to notice. As a result, Tom died and this begs the question as to whether Sanjay was in fact the legal cause of death or whether the failure to give Tom the correct blood type in the transfusion was in fact the cause of death. Under the legal causation test, it is not necessary for Sanjay’s conduct to be the sole cause of death however it must be the substantial cause and have made a significant contribution to Tom’s death3. Ultimately, this is determined according to the facts of each case, however case law has established that the original wound must still be operating and a substantial cause at the time of death4. With regard to the current scenario, the doctors failed to administer the correct blood type in the transfusion and therefore one could argue that it was their failure was the substantial cause of Tom’s death. However, UK courts have been reluctant to break the chain of causation in cases where medical negligence is involved. A prime example is the case of Smith,5 where the victim was stabbed by Smith but died due to medical negligence. Despite there being a 75% chance of recovery but for these events occurring, the courts still held that the chain of causation was not broken. Although a different approach was used in the case of Jordan6 where negligent medical treatment was received, the case was distinguished by Lord Parker as being a “very particular case dependent on the exact facts” as in this case the victim’s wounds had almost healed at the time of negligent medical treatment. However, in the current scenario, Tom had severe internal injuries on arrival at the hospital. Additionally, in the Smith7case it was also asserted that only if “the second cause is so overwhelming as to make the original wound merely part of history can it be said that the death does not flow from the wound8”. Ultimately, this will be a question of fact to be determined on a case by case basis. Furthermore, in the case of Cheshire9, Beldam L.J asserted that “it will only be in the most extraordinary and unusual case that such treatment can be said to be so independent of the acts of the accused that it could be regarded in law as the cause of the victim’s death to the exclusion of the accused’s acts”10. If we apply these principles to the current situation, if it could be established that Sanjay’s conduct was merely part of the background and that the intervening medical negligence was so independent to be the substantial cause of death, then Sanjay’s conduct will not constitute the cause of death. However, as a general rule courts are reluctant to hold doctors liable despite the presence of negligence on the basis of the “but for” principle11. Accordingly, ultimately, it will be a question of fact to determine whether the transfusion was “so overwhelming” in order to make the injuries caused by Sanjay merely part of the history. However, it is clear that the severe internal injuries and requirement for the transfusion was a direct consequence of Sanjay’s conduct and in light of the decided case law, it is highly likely that Sanjay’s conduct will be considered to be the substantial cause of death. Accordingly, on the basis of the facts, I do not think that the medical care will absolve Sanjay’s conduct being the cause of death for the purposes of legal causation. Accordingly, I will continue my analysis of his legal position on the basis that the causation test is satisfied. 2) In addition to the requirement of actus reus, it must be established that Sanjay had the necessary mens rea to be criminally liable for murder. The implementation of the Homicide Act 1957 further reinforced by the decision of R v Vickers12 establishes that the requirement of mens rea is not restricted to an intention to kill and that an intention to cause grievous bodily harm will also suffice and constitute malice aforethought. It is evident from the factual scenario that Sanjay clearly did not have an intention to kill Tom however he could still be liable for murder on grounds of having oblique intention13. Oblique intention occurs where the defendant does not desire the consequence and his aim is something else, however his actions have the effect of making the consequence happen14. Moreover, in the case of Hyam v DPP15 it was held that for oblique intention it had to be established that the consequence was highly probable. Lord Diplock held that “one who does an act knowing full well of the consequence, although it was not the object he was seeking to achieve, implies a state of willingness to produce the particular consequence and is in my view intent”16. However, Lord Hailsham distinguished Hyam and added that oblique intention was applicable where a defendant “deliberately exposed a victim to serious risk of death17”. Therefore, where the defendant’s conduct creates a risk of death as opposed to foreseeing death, they will have oblique intention for murder. If we apply this to the current scenario, Sanjay did not appear to subjectively foresee the risk of death or injury by wrongfully assuming that Tom would not cross the road. However, by driving in excess of the speed limit and failing to stop at the crossing, he clearly created a risk of death and injury and therefore may have oblique intention for the purpose of murder. Moreover, in the House of Lords decision in R v Moloney18, set out the following factors to be taken into account when determining whether a defendant has the necessary intent: 1) Whether the death or really serious injury was a natural consequence of the accused’s voluntary act; and 2) Whether the accused foresaw that it would be a natural consequence of his act19. The House of Lords asserted that if the above two stage test could be answered in the affirmative, there would be a presumption that the defendant intended the consequence and therefore had the necessary mens rea required for the offence. Additionally, in the case of R v Hancock v Shankland20, it was asserted that the probability of the consequence occurring is important in deciding if there is evidence from which to infer intention This was further clarified in the case of R v Nedrick 21where Lord Lane asserted: “The jury should be directed that they are not entitled to infer the necessary intention unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant’s actions and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case.22” This was again reiterated in the case of R v Woolin23, where it was asserted that there must have been an intention on the defendant’s part to bring about the series of events and that it was foreseeable that such conduct could cause death. Again, if we apply these principles by analogy to the current scenario, it is highly probable that circumstances satisfy the requirement that serious injury was a natural consequence of his conduct and that he foresaw that this was the case. Alternatively, if Sanjay’s mens rea is not considered sufficient for liability in murder, he could be liable for manslaughter on grounds of recklessness or unlawful act manslaughter. If we firstly consider manslaughter, recklessness is an alternative fault element for manslaughter offence and covers criminal liability for taking “unjustified” risks24. However, the law relating to liability on grounds of recklessness distinguished between subjective and objective recklessness and varies according to different offences25. Subjective recklessness was established in R v Cunningham26, where the defendant was charged with the offence of administering a noxious thing as to endanger life. It was determined that the word “maliciously” meant either an actual intention to do that particular type of harm that was in fact done, or recklessness in the sense that the defendant when acting realised there was some risk of harm occurring, but undertook the dangerous act notwithstanding. The second was subjective recklessness, which required the defendant to have foreseen the risk himself. However, in the case of R v Parker27 it was held that where the accused “closed his mind to the obvious28” he could still be reckless. With regard to Sanjay’s state of mind, he believed that Tom would not wait for him and not cross the pedestrian crossing, which begs the question as to whether he really appreciated the risk of harm occurring or even foresaw the risk in the Cunningham sense. Alternatively, in line with the Parker rationale Sanjay appears to have clearly “closed his mind to the obvious” and is likely to satisfy the test of recklessness for manslaughter. Additionally, the test for objective recklessness was set out in the case of R v Caldwell29, where it was determined that a defendant could still be criminally liable even if he had not appreciated the risk but “an ordinary prudent individual” would have realised the risk. The issue was ultimately up to the jury to determine upon the facts of the case. Moreover, objective recklessness requires a risk that must be obvious to the reasonable man and need not be obvious to the defendant himself. Again, if we apply these principles to Sanjay’s legal position, there appear to be sufficient grounds to argue that he failed to appreciate the risk that “an ordinary prudent individual would”. As such, Sanjay appears to have been both subjectively and objectively reckless. Alternatively, there are strong grounds to indicate that Sanjay will be potentially liable for unlawful act manslaughter. In order to be liable for unlawful act manslaughter, the following must be established: 1) The accused must cause the death of another; AND 2) The killing occurred in the course of the accused’s unlawful act; AND 3) The unlawful act must have been dangerous30. In the current scenario, Sanjay was speeding and in therefore undertaking an unlawful act under English law. Moreover, there are strong grounds for arguing that Sanjay caused Tom’s death. However, this will not lead to a presumption of unlawful act manslaughter. For example in the case of Andrews v DPP31, Lord Atkin argued that there is an obvious difference in the law of manslaughter between doing an unlawful act and doing a lawful act with such a degree of carelessness which the legislature makes criminal32. As such, the act must be unlawful and satisfy the requirement of being dangerous33. For example, in the case of Larkin34, the Court of Appeal held that: “where the act which the person is engaged in performing is unlawful, then if at the same time, it is a dangerous act, that is an act which is likely to injure another person and, quite inadvertently, he causes the death of that other persona by that act, then he is guilty of manslaughter”35. This was further confirmed in the case of R v Church36. As such, in unlawful act manslaughter cases, the test is objective. This was further highlighted by the House of Lords’ decision in DPP v Newbury37. The House of Lords reiterated the Church test of what was dangerous was ultimately an objective test not related to the accused’s state of mind. If we apply this by analogy to the current scenario, it is established that Sanjay committed an unlawful act, which is likely to satisfy the legal test of causation. Moreover, it is further likely that on the Church objective test is likely to be considered a dangerous act to satisfy the requirements of unlawful act manslaughter. In summary, Sanjay is highly likely to have satisfied the legal test for causation of Tom’s death. He may be liable for murder on grounds of oblique intention mens rea. Alternatively, he will be liable for manslaughter on grounds of recklessness or unlawful act manslaughter. BIBLIOGRAPHY Michael Allen (2007) Textbook on Criminal Law, 9th Edition Oxford University Press. C. Elliot & F. Quinn (2006). Criminal Law. 6th Edition Longman. Jerome Hall (2005) Principles of Criminal Law, The Lawbook Exchange Limited. D. Omerod (2008). Smith and Hogan Criminal Law. 12th Edition Oxford University Press. William Wilson (2003), Criminal Law: Doctrine and Theory, 2nd Edition, Longman All UK legislation available online at www.opsi.gov.uk and www.statutelaw.gov.uk Read More