Wounding With Intent and Malicious Infliction of Grievous Bodily Harm or Wounding - Essay Example

 The degree of Stan’s culpable mental state in attacking Helen will be determinative of the crime he can be charged with. The two most serious charges, wounding with intent and malicious infliction of grievous bodily harm or wounding, differ in terms of their mens rea requirement. A charge of wounding with intent under the Offences Against The Person Act of 1861 s.18 requires a specific intent to cause grievous bodily harm, while a charge of malicious infliction of grievous bodily harm or wounding merely requires a general intent of malice, in other words, an intent to do some harm. Because Stan did not intend to cause grievous bodily harm but only intended to instill fear in Helen, his mental state is insufficient to establish the mens rea requirement for wounding with intent. Malice, however, which is the required state of mind for malicious infliction of grievous bodily harm or wounding, can be inferred by the defendant’s conduct and is unrelated to his motive, according to the leading case of Re A (children) (conjoined twins) [2000] 4 All ER 961. While Stan claims that he did not intend to inflict bodily injuries, and his motive was to make her afraid rather than to hurt her, general malice can be inferred by his act of throwing a bottle directly at Helen. Thus, the mens rea requirement for the lesser offenses of malicious infliction of grievous bodily harm or malicious wounding is all that can be established from the facts. Depending on whether or not Helen’s injuries were a wound or were grievous under the Offences Against The Person Act of 1861 s.20, Stan may have committed a malicious infliction of grievous bodily harm or malicious wounding. The Act prohibits the unlawful and malicious wounding of another person (meaning the “breaking of the continuity of the whole of the outer skin, or the inner skin within the cheek or lip”) as well as the unlawful and malicious infliction of grievous, or serious, bodily harm (a jury question). If both a wound and grievous bodily harm exist, R v McCready [1978] 1 WLR 1376 mandates that the correct charge is unlawful wounding. The bottle that Stan threw at Helen caused a deep cut that required stitches. Thus the breaking of the skin requirement for unlawful wounding is clearly met. Grievous bodily harm may also be present since such a deep cut is arguably serious according to the plain meaning of the word, but this question does not need to be addressed since the holding in McCready requires that the charge be unlawful wounding under s.20 if a wound is present. Thus, the crime that Stan probably committed is malicious wounding. Stan could potentially argue that Helen consented to the risk of injury by attending a sporting event that often leads to dangerous confrontations. Consent is typically a complete defense in situations where a victim expressly or impliedly consented to the consequences causing his injury. In R v. Brown, [1992] 2 All ER 552, the issue of whether consent as a defence applied to serious offences against the person was decided. It was held in that case that a victim cannot consent to an activity intended to cause serious injury or that is very likely to cause serious injury. The likelihood of serious injury is the very quality of Stan’s actions that warrant a finding of malice from the facts, so the sheer dangerousness of the conduct would probably prevent Stan from being able to use consent as a defence. Furthermore, the fact that a wound occurred, which constitutes a serious offence under the statute, makes consent even less likely to be applicable in this case. Consequently, Stan probably has no valid defence to his charge of malicious wounding. Oliver may also have committed a malicious infliction of grievous bodily harm with respect to the injuries that occurred when, due to his wheels having been loosened, Coach crashed into another car, injuring several people severely. The rule governing this issue is transferred malice. In the case of R v Latimer [1886] 17 QBD 359, the rule was established that the requisite mens rea (malice) can be transferred from one person to another with respect to the same crime. Oliver did not intend to cause harm to the victims who were ultimately injured by his act of loosening Coach’s wheels, nor did he have any knowledge that would cause him to be substantially certain of injury befalling them. As a result, he did not act with malice toward them. But because malice can be transferred from one victim to another, Oliver has committed a malicious infliction of grievous bodily harm if he was substantially certain that grievous bodily harm would befall Coach. Oliver was angry when he loosened Coach’s wheels and certainly intended Coach to get into a car accident, with serious injuries being substantially certain. Thus Oliver can be charged with malicious infliction of grievous bodily harm for the serious injuries of the victims of the car accident. Furthermore, Oliver may have committed an assault and potentially a battery even though the Coach did not sustain any actual injury. The mens rea requirement for assault and battery is either intent or recklessness. The actus reus requirement for assault is merely causing another to apprehend immediate unlawful violence. R v Martin (1881) 8 QBD 54 (CCR). The actus reus requirement for battery is any act by which a person applies unlawful force to another. From the facts it appears that Coach did not apprehend Oliver’s unlawful contact before his wheels were loosened, although he probably did experience some apprehension in the time preceding the accident. But Oliver did intentionally apply unlawful force to Coach by loosening his wheels with the substantial certainty that Coach would be injured. The fact that Coach was not injured is irrelevant, since he was already a victim of the unlawful act, which is the only act required. Thus, Oliver committed a battery when he loosened Coach’s wheels. The defence of consent could also apply here since the instigation of the confrontation also occurred at a somewhat inherently dangerous activity, the sporting event. Consent is more typically used in common law assault and battery. But consent only applies to the specific activity consented to. In this case, even if Coach somehow consented to fighting over whose team won the match, he nevertheless did not consent to the act done, the loosening of his wheels. Therefore, consent doesn’t apply in this case. If Coach had died, Oliver may have committed either murder or the lesser crime of manslaughter based on his culpable mental state. Murder requires malice aforethought, which can mean either intent to kill or intent to cause grievous bodily harm, according to R v Cunningham [1981] (HL). Murder can be mitigated to manslaughter if a legally sufficient provocation existed. The defendant must not have had a cooling off period after the provocation, and the provocation must have been sufficient to provoke a reasonable person. In Morhall [1995] 3 AER 659 (HL), and R v Luc Thiet Thuan [1997] AC 131 (PC) it was held that no allowance should be given for any characteristics that might have made the defendant more volatile than the ordinary person. As stated previously, it can be inferred from Oliver’s conduct that he intended to cause grievous bodily harm to Coach because he loosened his victim’s wheels with the purpose of causing him to be involved in a car crash, which usually causes grievous bodily harm. Thus Oliver met the mens rea requirement for murder and can be so charged. Oliver was angry when he committed the act because his team lost and he did not have much time after the game to cool off, but this is not a provocation that would be beyond a reasonable person’s control. Oliver’s easy arousal also does not warrant the mitigation to manslaughter, since his particular idiosyncratic temperament cannot be taken into account. Thus, if Coach had died, Oliver would have been properly charged with murder rather than manslaughter. Bibliography CASES Brown v R, [1992] 2 All ER 552 Cunningham v R [1981] (HL) Latimer v R [1886] 17 QBD 359 Martin v R (1881) 8 QBD 54 (CCR) McCready v R [1978] 1 WLR 1376 Morhall [1995] 3 AER 659 (HL) Luc Thiet Thuan v R [1997] AC 131 (PC) Re A (children) (conjoined twins) [2000] 4 All ER 961 STATUTES Offences Against The Person Act 1861, s. 18 Offences Against The Person Act 1861, s. 20 Read More