Criminal Law: the Trial of John W. Hinckley - Case Study Example

Topic: Criminal Law Style: APA Language Style: English UK Answer: In order to commit a crime three elements are required these are actus reus (the 'external' element of a crime such as conduct, circumstances and, in the case of a result crime, the consequences), mens rea (the 'internal' element of a crime such as intention) and absence of defence. In order to answer this question it is necessary to discuss Kirby J's view with reference to the scope of liability under principles of common purpose and the group or collective dimension of criminal activity have to the formulation of principles of liability. To understand and assess the question, it is necessary to know about the doctrine of common purpose or joint enterprise where two or more people embark on a project with a common purpose that results in the commission of a crime. However, Australian law takes a similar approach to English law with respect to the mens rea requirement for complicity. Before attempt to Kirby J's view to the scope of liability it need to discuss McAuliffe v The Queen1 and the most important case Gillard v The Queen2. In McAuliffe v The Queen3, The High Court of Australia states that each of the parties to an arrangement or understanding is guilty of any crime falling within the scope of the common purpose which is committed in carrying out that purpose and it is sufficient to found a conviction for murder for a secondary party to have realised that in the course of the joint enterprise. The culpability of the secondary participant in the event that the primary participant shot and killed or with intent to cause grievous bodily harm the victim would depend upon the scope of their common design that means joint criminal venture. In this case the participants are jointly liable for all that results from the acts and omissions occurring in the scope of their agreement. Kirby J's view with reference to the scope of liability under principles of common purpose in Gillard v The Queen4 extended the doctrine of common purpose, and accessorial liability. Kirby J said that the doctrine of common purpose imposes criminal liability upon secondary offenders in a way that sometimes appears to offend fundamental principles of our criminal law. G, and a co-accused Gerald Preston, were convicted of the murder of 2 men and the attempted murder of one more. G contends that the judge disastrous to leave manslaughter to the jury as a possible verdict in relation to each of the 2 men who were killed, and that this constituted a wrong decision on a question of law. The case against P was very clear-cut. It was also the case against G, as it was left to the jury. The prosecution alleged that G was a party to the plan to kill and that he was well aware of the intention which P acted, the prosecution invited the jury to accept that G must have known that P was armed with a loaded gun. There was evidence as to the process involved in loading and cocking the weapon. P intended to show that it was very unlikely and he was well aware of the intention with which P acted. The proposition that G did not know that P was armed was implausible. Thus it was the case against G, as it was left to the jury. The trial judge directed the jury that in order to convict G, the prosecution had to establish that P and G shared a common purpose to kill Knowles and had to exclude as a reasonable possibility of participating in robbery. The essence of G's complaint is that the case against him having been put to the jury as murder or nothing. There was a miscarriage of justice because the jury were deprived of the opportunity of considering an intermediate prospect of manslaughter. In this case two issues were raised. The first issue arises is whether, contrary to the ruling of the primary judge, and of the Full Court affirming that ruling5, the jury should have been instructed that it was open to them to return verdicts of guilty of manslaughter in answer to the counts of the indictment charging the appellant with murder. And the second issue arises if the first is decided in the affirmative. It is whether the appeal should nonetheless be dismissed by the application of the "proviso" Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 353(1) which provides that the Full Court on any such appeal against conviction shall allow the appeal if it thinks that it is unreasonable or that the judgment of the court before which the appellant was convicted should be set aside on the ground of a wrong decision on any question of law on any ground there was a miscarriage of justice. This section is compatible with the general rule of joint liability. Section 353(2) of this Act provides that if Court allows an appeal against conviction, quash the conviction and either direct a judgment and verdict of acquittal to be entered or direct a new trial. These sections are important because G was relied in this section. The trial judge directed the jury that in order to convict G, the prosecution had to establish that P and G shared a common purpose to kill Knowles and had to exclude as a reasonable possibility of participating in robbery. The essence of G's complaint is that the case against him having been put to the jury as murder or nothing. There was a miscarriage of justice because the jury were deprived of the opportunity of considering an intermediate prospect of manslaughter. It is established that consistently with the principles stated in McAuliffe, where death results from a joint enterprise involving violence. The stage of violence consider by one participant exceeds that contemplated by another. One may be guilty of murder and the other guilty of manslaughter. Gilbert was such a case. Examples from various jurisdictions were examined in R v Barlow6 and Markby v The Queen7 However, the challenge has been anticipated for a time because of the injustice, irregularity and complexity of the present law. Upon a full analysis of the detailed arguments of the parties Kirby J then gave a lengthy judgment to support his view on this complex subject. Special leave to the appeals should have been allowed. A basic difficulty is raised by the first question that to the extent that courts expand joint criminal liability for offences, by enlarging the scope of the doctrine of common purpose, they expose accessories to full liability for acts, which they did not perform and may not actually have intended. Because manslaughter is an offence that permits a differentiation of culpability for homicide, in that circumstances where it applies, to allow a jury to ameliorate the operation of the doctrine of common purpose. Kirby J suggests that there may be a need to re-express the law relating to complicity. Neither party to the present appeal suggested that this should be done. Both accepted that the principles to be applied are those stated in McAuliffe. Kirby J refers to some criticisms that have been made of the principles stated in McAuliffe. Secondly, the criticisms of principle that are advanced all proceed from a premise that doctrines of complicity should be confined in their operation so as to render one person (X) criminally liable for the conduct of another (Y) only if X has been shown to have agreed to Y engaging in that conduct. Putting the same point another way, the criticisms proceed from the premise that X should not be held criminally liable for the conduct of Y if X foresaw that Y may commit the relevant act but did not agree that Y should do that. It is said that only if X agrees to Y's conduct is there a sufficient coincidence of act and intent to warrant holding X criminally liable for what Y did. In this case the High Court of Australia ordered a new trial for a man who deprived of the possibility of a verdict of manslaughter in South Australian murder trial. The High Court held that G was party to a common design of robbery involving the hostile use of a loaded gun. He has no intention to kill or cause grievous harm, and then he was guilty of manslaughter. The Court also held that the trial judge's refusal to leave of manslaughter to the jury was an error of law and it was not possible to say that despite this error there was no miscarriage of justice. The Court ordered that his convictions be quashed and that there be a new trial. This doctrine imposes criminal liability upon secondary offenders in a way that sometimes appears to offend fundamental principles of criminal law. In the case of the group or collective dimension of criminal activity the prosecution has to deal two types of complicity these is joint enterprise liability (acting in concert) or aiding and abetting (accessorial liability arises where a person provides assistance before or during the commission of the offence). If a person has intentionally assisted another to commit the principles of complicity makes he or she liable for an offence. However, in all case principle offender always held liable for his act with guilty mind where they use an innocent agent to commit the offence. Here need to consider the recent case Clayton v The Queen8 where Kirby J said that by providing a legal footing upon which a jury might find a secondary offender guilty upon proof of mere foresight of the possibility that the victim will suffer really serious harm as a result of the common purpose of the accused, the present doctrine expands the liability of secondary offenders, in the case where a murder is charged, so far that, realistically, there will ordinarily be very little, if any, room left for manslaughter. In Gillard v The Queen9, Kirby J held that an accused is liable for mere possibilities that were contemplated and the scope of accessorial responsibility for murder is extended. So the scope of manslaughter is arguably diminished. In Clayton v The Queen introduced the present test, which needs to align better with notions of moral culpability. The subjective approach that one is only responsible for one's own moral wrongdoings and shortcomings, and not those of others, is reflected in the fundamental principle of criminal liability. The criminal actions (actus reus) and intentions (mens rea) must normally co-incide. So, the criticism has been made that joint liability for extended common purpose is cast too widely and catches co-participants who did not shared no intention perform the critical acts concerning the consequences caused by those acts. The present subjective test of foreseeing the possibility of murder in extended the doctrine of common purpose cases. In Clayton v The Queen, Justice Kirby provides reason that foresight of what might possibly happen is ordinarily no more than evidence from which a jury can infer the presence of a requisite intention. However the majority in Clayton v The Queen arguing that a person who does not intend the death of the victim, but does intend to do really serious injury to the victim, will be guilty of murder if the victim dies. It did not find the criticism of the inconsistency between legal and moral responsibility of a secondary participant persuasive. In Clayton10 justice Kirby explained the reason to considers the test is an exception to the normal requirements of criminal liability a principal offender were to kill the victim, and the foreseeing only the possibility rather than the probability that his/her actions would cause death or GBH (grievous bodily harm), so as to the person would not be guilty of murder. However, on the current law, the secondary offender with a common purpose could be found guilty of murder of the same victim on the basis of extended common purpose liability. Its adoption present subjective test for the presence of the mental element necessary (for a secondary participant) to be guilty of murder amounts to a seriously unprincipled departure from the basic rule that is now generally reflected in Australian criminal law that liability does not attach to criminal conduct of itself, unless that conduct is accompanied by a relevant criminal intention. The most important criticism of the present possible foresee-ability test for extended common purpose liability in New South Wales is that it is too wide. It has been referred to as the overreach of criminal liability. In conclusion it can be said the current position of common purpose places trial judges in difficulty explaining the law to juries, and results in a great number of appeals for secondary liability in murder cases. It creates serious disparity between the subjective element (aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring) required of a secondary participant in murder and the subjective element required of secondary participant in the case of "extended common purpose" liability in a murder though he had lesser form of mens rea. This decision increase undue complexity in the conduct of the group or collective dimension of criminal activity with failing to correctly identify the foundational crime in extended common purpose trials. Bibliography: 1) Smith & Hogan, Criminal Law, Cases & Materials, 11th edition, Butterworths Lexis Nexistm UK, Pg-332-365 2) Bernadette McSherry, Bronwyn Naylor, Australian Criminal Laws: Critical Perspectives Oxford University Press (2007),[ ISBN-13: 9780195507904] 3) Colin Howard, Australian criminal law, 4th edition, Melbourne publication, (2007) 4) Clarkson, C.M.V. and H. Keating Criminal law: texts and materials. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, (2006) sixth edition [ISBN 0421947802]. 5) Odgers, "Criminal Cases in the High Court of Australia (McAuliffe v McAuliffe)", (1996) 20 Criminal Law Journal 43. 6) Farrier, D. 1990, "Criminal law and pollution control: The failure of the Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989 (NSW), Criminal Law Journal, vol. 14, 7) A Case Study in the Insanity Defense- The Trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr., 3dBy John C. Jeffries, Jr.; Richard C. Bonnie; Peter W. Low; Anne Coughlin Publisher: West/Thomson/Foundation Press (March, 2008) ISBN: 9781599413846 8) Cases and Materials on Criminal Law and Procedure, 3d (Casebook) By Rollin M. Perkins; Ronald N. Boyce Publisher: West/Thomson/Foundation Press (October, 1982) ISBN: 978-0882770673 9) Cases and Problems in Criminal Law, Fifth Edition By Myron Moskovitz Publisher: Lexis Publishing/Matthew Bender (2004) ISBN: 1593459033 10) Criminal Law: Case Studies and Controversies By Paul H. Robinson Publisher: Aspen Publishers (2005) ISBN: 0735550751 11) Criminal Law: Cases And Materials, 5th (Casebook) By John Kaplan; Robert Weisberg; Guyora Binder Publisher: Aspen Publishers (April, 2004) ISBN: 0-7355-4036-5 Read More