Offences Against the Person Act - Case Study Example

Sharon is criminally liable for homicide for the Danni's death. Homicide is the general term given to the unlawful killing of a person which usually takes the form of either murder or manslaughter. To be convicted of either murder or manslaughter, the following common elements1 must be present: 1. the killing must be unlawful; 2. to be homicide, the victim must be a "life in being" (i.e., not a fetus); 3. for a person to be convicted of murder or manslaughter, it must be shown that the defendant's action actually caused or brought about the death of the victim and that death occurred within a year and day of his action. The three elements are present in the given problem. First, the killing of Danni was unlawful. Based on the facts presented in the given problem, Sharon does not have any lawful reason to kill Danni. Second, Danni who is the victim in the given problem is a life in being. Finally, Danni could be liable for murder or manslaughter because her act of sending a mail bomb (though merely intended to frighten Gordon) actually caused or brought about the instant death of the victim Sharon. Thus, in R. v Smith (1959)2, where the victim was stabbed and died shortly afterwards, the fact that adequate medical care was not available could not be relied upon by the defendant, even though such care, if available, would probably have saved the victim's life. As long as the stab wound remained an operative cause of death, the defendant was guilty of murder. In the given problem, the mail bomb sent by Sharon was the operative cause of Danni's death. Hence, Sharon is criminally liable for Danni's death. In the case of R. v McFeely [1977] N.I. 149, the accused waited in a car while two men planted a bomb at an inn and carried out a robbery. After the two men warned the occupants that a bomb had been planted, the accused drove the two men away. As a result of the explosion, a police constable was killed. The accused was charged with murder and robbery. In its decision, the court held that the accused was not guilty of murder as although he knew the bomb was to be planted he also knew that a warning was to be given and that he didn't knew that it was probable that serious personal injury would result. Since the unlawful acts of the two men involved a risk of injury and as death had resulted, the accused was held guilty of manslaughter only. Applying McFeely, Sharon cannot be guilty of murder but for manslaughter only because even if Sharon knew the mail bomb was to be delivered to Gordon, death could not probably be the result as Sharon only intends to frighten Gordon. In R. v Loudon3, the accused drove a van containing a bomb into the premises of newspaper establishment. He shouted a warning before running off. When the bomb exploded, one was killed. The accused was charged with murder. He contended that there was no evidence that he intended to kill or cause serious injury to anyone and that no necessary mental element was present. The trial judge convicted the accused, holding that the accused knew that there would ensue from his actions a serious risk of death or grievous bodily harm to someone and with that knowledge deliberately drove the van into the loading bay with the intention of exposing someone to that risk. On appeal, it was held that when the accused drove the van into the loading bay and left it there, he knew it was probable that someone would be seriously injured or killed. In the given problem, Sharon could argue that she only intended to frighten Gordon and had no intention of inflicting any bodily harm or death. Thus, she could only be held guilty of manslaughter and not murder. In R. v Bateson4, the accused was only convicted of manslaughter and not murder because according to the court, to be guilty of murder a person must know that it is probable that as a result of his or her actions someone will suffer death or serious personal injury. In Bateson, the trial judge convicted the accused of murder holding that she knew that there would ensue from the explosion a serious risk of death or serious bodily harm to someone and with that knowledge she deliberately and without lawful excuse placed or abetted another to place the bomb with the intention of exposing someone to that risk. On appeal, the conviction was reduced to manslaughter ratiocinating that to be guilty of murder a person must know that it is probable that as a result of his or her actions someone will suffer death or serious personal injury. Hence, in the given problem, Sharon should only be convicted of manslaughter because her intention was merely to frighten. Sharon could also be convicted under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. Section 28 of the said Act provides that "Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously, by the explosion of gunpowder or other explosive substance, or do any grievous bodily harm to any person, shall be guilty of felony." Furthermore, Section 29 of the same Act provides that "Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously cause any gunpowder or other explosive substance to explode, or send or deliver to any person any explosive substance put at any place to any person, any destructive or explosive substance, with intent in any of the cases aforesaid to disable any person, or to do some grievous bodily harm to any person, shall, whether any bodily injury be effected or not, be guilty of felony ." Moreover, Section 30 of the same Act further provides that "Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously place near any building, any gunpowder or other explosive substance, with intent to do any bodily injury to any person, shall, whether or not any explosion take place, and whether or not any bodily injury be effected, be guilty of felony." There is therefore basis to convict Sharon under the said Act. (2) Sharon could not be liable of homicide for Danni's subsequent death but she can be guilty of acts causing to cause danger to life or bodily harm under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (c.100). In R. v Jordan (1956)5, when an accused wounded a person who later died as a result of a drug that was administered during treatment, and to which the victim was intolerant, the victim was not held guilty of murder. The court held that the treatment of the victim was not normal and such abnormal treatment were the direct and immediate cause of death. In the problem, Danni was still alive when taken to hospital in an ambulance. The operative cause of her death was the failure of the ambulance staff to strap her in and the doctor's failure to monitor the malfunctioning machine. Hence, by the Jordan case, Sharon could not be held guilty of homicide. Section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (c.100) provides that "Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or inflict any grievous bodily harm upon any other person, either with or without any weapon or instrument, shall be guilty of an offence and liable." Sharon could be convicted under said Sections 28 and 29 of the same Act. The ambulance driver, on the other hand, may invoke the defence of necessity. Thus, in the case of Buckoke v GLC (1971)6, it was held that a fire engine driver who "shot" the traffic lights in order to hasten to a dangerous fire should not be punished. In the given problem, the ambulance driver was lawfully navigating the roads, though at a faster speed, because it was justified to save the life of the victim by timely arriving at the hospital. The ambulance staff and the doctor, however, could be held guilty of involuntary manslaughter either by an unlawful omission or gross negligence. The ambulance staff is guilty of involuntary manslaughter by unlawful omission because such staff had the legal duty to strap the victim in the vehicle which legal duty was omitted. The staff could also be held guilty of involuntary manslaughter by gross negligence because the staff negligently omitted to strap the victim in inside a fast moving vehicle. The doctor can be guilty of involuntary manslaughter by unlawful omission because the doctor had the legal duty to observe the required level of care to his patients under the circumstances which legal duty he omitted to perform. The doctor can also be guilty of involuntary manslaughter by gross negligence because he negligently omitted to notice when the oxygen machine malfunctioned. Thus, in Andrews vs. DPP (1937)7, it was held that where an act, though otherwise lawful, is done with such disregard for the lives and safety of others could amount to an offence. BIBLIOGRAPHY Andrews v DPP, 1937 WL 8114 (HL), [1937] A.C. 576, (1938) 26 Cr. App. R. 34 Buckoke v GLC [1971] 2 All E.R. 254, [1971] Ch. 655, [1971] 2 W.L.R. 760, (1971) 115 S.J. 174 R. v Bateson, 1980 WL 148401 (CA (Crim Div)), [1980] 9 N.I.J.B. R. v Jordan, 1956 WL 17659 (CCA), (1956) 40 Cr. App. R. 152 R. v Loudon, 1980 WL 148321 (CA (Crim Div)), [1980] N.I. 1 R. v Smith [1959] 2 Q.B. 35, [1959] 2 All E.R. 193, (1959) 43 Cr. App. R. 121 Redmond, P. and Shears P. General Principles of English Law (7th ed., Pitman Publishing, London, 1993) Section 20, Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (c.100) Section 28, Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (c.100) Section 29, Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (c.100) Read More