Critical Role and Effectiveness of the European Police Office - Essay Example

Critical role and effectiveness of the European Police Office Number Department European Police Office European Police Office (Europol) is the police organization attached to the European Union and is responsible for criminal intelligence. The agency began its operations in July 1999, but its establishment traces back to 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty was signed by EU Member States. Previously known as the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU), the agency rolled out its policing programs, though, with a limited mandate in 1994 (Safjanski, 2013; Tzifakis, 2013). Four years later, the EU Member States expanded Europol’s mandate by ratifying the Europol Convention; a treaty that became fully operational in July 1999. The agency, from its seat of power in The Hague, deploys its assets including about 800 officers to combat crime in the whole of Europe (Deflem, 2009). The scope of Europol contradicts the fact that it is in constant cooperation with several law enforcement organisations working within the EU member states. As of 2013, Europol has jurisdiction in all states within the European Union. Nuthall and Paun (2013) have noted that for the agency to effectively curb organised crime across national territories, Europol liaises with several countries and police agencies within EU and neighbouring countries (Emanuel, 1999; Resodihardjo, Eijk and Carroll, 2012). Notably, when there is need to liaise with non-EU members Europol’s Europol External Strategy established the parameters within which the agency should work in its effort to fight organized crime that might compromise the safety of EU citizens (Berdal, & Serrano, 2002). Europol has undergone major transformations over the years to become an EU agency with more powers to gather criminal intelligence and act upon them (Ladenburger, 2008). Today Europol has the full backing of the European Parliament that addresses its budget. History of Europol Europol can be traced to 1975’s TREVI, an internal organization that was responsible for ensuring a better liaison amongst European Commission members on security issues (House of Lords European Union Committee, 2008). In 1993, however, the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty replaced it (Mounier, 2009). Prior to its establishment, Germany had made proposals to the EC, pressing for the establishment of an international police agency. In 1991, the state formally proposed the establishment of a European Police Office in Luxembourg before member states of the EU (Deflem, 2009). And by the end the year, the Intergovernmental Conference was convinced that by establishing Europol under the Maastricht Treaty, the whole of EU region would be more secure. The result was the formation of a rather weak Europol, whose primary purpose was to facilitate the sharing of intelligence amongst police agencies under the European Union (Nuthall, & Paun, 2013; Santiago, 2000). Delays in enacting the Maastricht Treaty prompted TREVI officials to form the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU) Agreement in mid-1993 (Mounier, 2009). The EDU, being unconstitutional led to the setting up of a lean team of law enforcers led by Jurgen Storbeck. The team immediately embarked on policing campaigns from temporary structures in a Strasbourg neighbourhood, while lasting solutions were being sought. After the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty, EU member states began to deliberate upon legitimising a Europol Convention. Meanwhile, the mandate of Europol Drugs Unit (EDU) was expanded between 1995 and 1996 to encompass several trafficking crimes (Gregory, 1998). Back then, police officers could only share information bilaterally, as the establishment of a joint database for the entire EU membership was not possible without the prior passage of the Europol Convention (Andreescut and Keeling, 2012; Byrne, 2013). Eventually, the Europol Convention became functional in late 1998 after its ratification by more than half of the 28 member states. Nonetheless, certain legal issues such as the protection of primary data and judicial oversight had to be set straight before the agency could begin its operations in 1999 (Mounier, 2009; Emanuel, 1999). In 2009, the passage of the Council Decision paved way for the creation of a more powerful Europol complete with the much needed legitimacy and authority to fight organized crime across states under the EU (Tryfon, 2012). Besides, unlike the previous EU policing bodies that depended upon the support of the legislatures of the member countries, Europol operations are legally and directly reviewed by the European Parliament. Lisbon Treaty Europol's primary objective under article 88 of the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 is to enhance the efficiency and liaison between the equally capable law enforcement agencies of the member countries by sharing and collating intelligence reports to deter and or address serious cases of organized crime across borders. Nonetheless, as Nuthall and Paun (2013) have argued, Europol lacks any executive authority over member states. It complements the effort of custodians of law under individual EU member countries (Hufnagel, 2013). This implies that Europol officers are not allowed to carry out criminal probes in the member states or apprehend suspects (Mounier, 2009). Despite the limited mandate, Europol uses a number of tools at its disposal in addition to executive orders by national bodies to make Europe safer(Europol 2013; Gooch, 2013). It boasts of important tools including information sharing, intelligence gathering and analysis, and officer training to achieve its goals (Mounier, 2009). These qualities project Europol as a complete law-enforcement agency consisting of regular law enforcement agents and staff members contributed by each of the 28 member states (Tryfon, 2012). The multi-disciplinary agency has officers who are in charge of customs, borders issues, immigration, and financial services among others. Apart from the tools, Deflem (2009) points out that Europol guarantees member states a smooth inter-state police communication, which was previously a major challenge due to language barrier. Today, any police officer from any EU member state is at liberty to raise any security issue with the Europol National Unit (ENU) using the local language and obtain the response in the same language (Gregory, 1998). Notably, Europol survives on three-tier levels of liaison: a) the first one is the provision of better drills on security issues; b) assistance in strategic liaison aimed at sharing knowledge on common forms of organised crime and the best approaches to making EU safer; and c) the sharing of the outcomes of threat evaluations. The primary level of co-operation encompasses the sharing of personal information and demands for the meeting of Europol's thresholds in protecting data (Klapproth, 2013). Data preservation is important not only to the citizens of individual EU states, but to policing operations in general. Authorities The Europol’s highest decision-making organ is formed by the Council of the European Union (CEU). Notably, CEU is comprised of ministers who are in charge of Justice and Home Affairs dockets. According to Berdal and Serrano (2002) Europol through its Management Board reports to the Justice and Home Affairs Council. The Council is responsible for the nomination of Europol’s Directorate and the Deputies. The Council is also responsible for providing an oversight role on Europol's budget and political direction in law enforcement initiatives. The Europol Management Board comprises of officials from the Interior Ministries with representation from the member states (Fig. 1). The Council convenes regular meetings throughout the year and implements political decisions concerning more staffing and pecuniary issues. Deflem (2009) notes that the Joint Supervisory Body is charged with oversight responsibility when it comes to data protection in the EU police agency and is staffed with two officials from each of the 28 member countries (Santiago, 2000). Financial oversight over Europol falls within the mandate of a team of auditors sourced from the parties to the European Court of Auditors. The body is referred to as the Joint Audit Committee (JAC).The JAC is distinct from the European Court of Auditors because the Europol financial matters are clearly delineated from the EU budget (Nuthall, & Paun, 2013). In light of structure, De Moor (2012) has suggested that it safeguards the reputation of Europol in the international spheres and guarantees it of autonomy in security operations. Moreover, to preserve Europol’s independence, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has limited authority over the agency; the ECJ’s mandate is confined to providing only the legal clarification of the body of law that established Europol (Klapproth, 2013). The European Ombudsman, acting informally under the Europol Convention, appears to have acquired the bona fide status on arbitration in Europol matters related with submissions for access to important documents and resolution of Europol employee disputes (Ladenburger, 2008). Limitations of national police services Cross-border organised crime has become a serious threat in the current world than before (Emanuel, 1999). The situation has been aggravated by the presence of cutting-edge information communication tools; the rising movement of people and commodities across national territories; and globalization (Tryfon, 2012). Today criminal gangs smuggle firearms, and traffic migrants as well as drugs and engage in fraudulent deals across national borders than was the case in 1980s. In light of the seriousness of the modern-day transnational crimes and the inability of national law enforcement agencies to carry out cross-border raids, the EU sought to tackle the problem by establishing a law enforcement agency whose mandate transcends national borders. Differences in the structure and operations of police agencies of EU member states also called for a synergized and cohesive force that would make adequate responses to criminal acts across national borders (House of Lords European Union Committee, 2008). Europe’s 1.2 million custodians of law are very diverse and cannot achieve the needed cohesiveness in fighting crime. Countries like Denmark and Finland each have a centralised structure of national police service led by an individual. But in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands the law enforcement agencies are decentralised to tens of police units for greater efficiency (Klapproth, 2013). In some states, the custodians of law have the autonomy to carry out investigations whereas in other states, they fall under the national prosecutors (Europol 2013; Gooch, 2013). According to Nuthall and Paun (2013), when law enforcement agencies take orders from the prosecutors when handling investigations, their powers to deter or control crime is severely curtailed. This difference in functions implied that law enforcement agencies and prosecutions from different EU member states would split into two categories when dealing with transnational crime. These structural differences compounded by language barrier between states remarkably complicated cross-border effort to curb transnational crime, and justified the need to form a unified and cohesive force such as Europol to undertake law enforcement across national borders. Klapproth (2013) has pointed out that EU nations also have diverse procedures for starting probes and collecting evidence. These diverse regulations justified the formation of Europol because individual states found it more difficult operate seamlessly on criminal probes in an integrated manner (De Moor, 2012). In the UK, for example, phone call recordings are illegal and inadmissible in courts of law, but law enforcement officers can and do present evidence gathered from closed circuit television (CCTV) videos to support prosecutions. In France, however, phone-call recordings are admissible in court as pieces of evidence, but outlaws haphazard footages captured by CCTV cameras as violating individual privacy. In some European nations, such as Denmark the use of CCTV cameras in public are either unknown or have been outlawed to protect individual privacy. These differences in policing and investigations called for the establishment of an overall law enforcement body with uniform procedures regulating collection of evidence and prosecution of the suspects. Cross-border successes According to Ladenburger (2008) Europol’s formation may have been motivated by the successes that were registered by cross-border operations in Schengen. In these countries, national police agencies have additional authority to cross the border in pursuit of criminals and or carrying investigations. In Dutch, for instance, police officers have the powers to undertake surveillance on criminal suspects in Belgium, without notifying the local enforcers beforehand (De Moor, 2012). Similarly, Italian law enforcers can pursue a suspected drug trafficker into Austria under the doctrine of hot pursuit before handing over the operations to local police officers. Europol’s formation was arguably based on the spirit of collaboration amongst police officers in the Schengen area who share intelligence reports on criminal suspects, and property crimes through the Schengen information system (SIS). SIS is a transnational police database that helps even the UK and Ireland to track criminal suspects. As is the case in the Nordic states, Europol’s effectiveness and wide mandate to crack down on organized crime across the borders of nation-states arguably originated from the successes of the joint operations between and among EU member states (House of Lords European Union Committee, 2008). Spanish authorities have also worked together with their French counterparts in policing operations around the Pyrenees. In light of these successes of joint police operations, EU law enforcement leaders have integrated their efforts to neutralise some of the continent’s most dangerous architects of organised crime through the transnational European police chiefs’ task force (PCTF) (Klapproth, 2013). Safer EU citizens Nuthall and Paun (2013) have pointed out that the informal organization meets regularly in a year at Europol’s bases in the Netherlands and Belgium too make EU citizens safer. The organization organizes common European raids against elements of organised crime with the help of Europol and Interpol (Andreescut and Keeling, 2012; Byrne, 2013). Initially, these conventions were less formal in approach to organized crime in the region; the top-ranking EU police officers have transformed them into serious sessions for fighting crime through intelligence sharing and vital strategy formulation (Rogers and Gravelle, 2013). The seriousness of the PCTF has been felt in the whole of the EU since mid-2005 following the successful Swedish-led Operation Callidus campaign in which hundreds of police officers from eight EU countries working under the banner of the Europol reduced cases of child pornography in the region. Operation Tex For eight years now, Europol has backed the Comprehensive Operational Strategic Planning for the Police (COSPOL), a unit that cracks down on drugs within the EU region. In early 2010, COSPOL sought the authority and legitimacy from Europol and several EU member states to carry out an operation in one particular 'high-value target' (HVT) with the region. Belgian, German, and the Dutch forces integrated under Europol for a joint crackdown on an organised crime gang that was spearheaded by an identified HVT used in the heavy processing of synthetic drugs within the region. In May 2010, intelligence reports revealed that the suspects had settled for a place in Belgium for the production process. Europol's assets were called in by the country’s national police service to bring down the illegal plant. Europol accurately deployed adequate support to the officers at the site (De Moor, 2012). Europol also provided comprehensive technical and intelligence needed for the investigation process. As a consequence, the Belgian Hasselt Federal Police’s close collaboration with Europol enabled it to dismantle the huge, complex illegal drug laboratory that was capable of producing several kilos of the product whose value would have been worth millions of euros. The operation led to the arrest of high-profile suspects in the country and the seizure of large stockpiles of chemical reagents there and elsewhere in the region. The operation corresponded with another one in Dutch, where the country’s judiciary ordered searches and seizures of more similar high-value targets. As a result, cocaine, large amounts of currencies and chemicals were recovered (De Moor, 2012). Europol, through its Europol Illicit Laboratory Comparison System, has also enabled individual EU member states to pursue other outlawed synthetic drug production sites in Germany and Dutch (Occhipinti, 2003). Europol officers provided the technical assistance in this effective crackdown from the beginning, with more than a dozen analytical intelligences and one professional report to the probe team being given. Two workable internal conventions and direct technical support to the team on the ground were also availed. Eventually, the six suspects were netted and handed six-year jail terms. Challenges facing Europol Despite having made remarkable progress in fighting transnational organized crime within the EU, Europol faces some challenges that may hinder its smooth operations. A number of EU countries still withhold crucial information that Europol needs for its work (Nuthall, & Paun, 2013). There have been cases of some states sharing detailed intelligence reports with Europol while others give only scanty information that cannot be of much help in fighting crime in the region. Some countries within EU send law enforcers to assist Europol with its work while others do not act upon requests for police officers with the needed swiftness. According to De Moor (2012), these incidents pose massive challenges in building trust and making co-ordination in cross-border investigations successful. Such dalliances limit cohesiveness within the police force because they are sure about how far they should go in fighting crimes and still owe allegiance to their native countries or worse, retain their job. The same challenge impedes the services of Eurojust (Klapproth, 2013). Only a small number of Eurojust prosecutors wield real authority to dispatch official requests for the delivery of evidence, phone-call recordings and clandestine operations among other forms of evidence. Europol’s usefulness is also impeded by the bodies of law that led to its creation; laws which make the organization difficult to operate. This is especially true because every directorial decision requires the unanimous endorsement of all 28 EU member states (Fig 2). The challenges may be as a result of sovereignty issues, nonetheless. Additionally, the Europol Convention stipulates that the body’s investigators and universal law enforcement agents can only operate together through the liaison officers stationed in The Hague (De Moor, 2012). The liaison officers are in turn attached to other special forces based in police headquarters in the EU member states. This has led to an immensely bureaucratic structure that cannot work effectively in the current environment where the fight against organized crime should fall under one police chief for a swift and easier micro-management of cases of insecurity. Recommendations For a greater role in law enforcement, Europol should be given a wider mandate and investigative authority over more crimes in EU. It should also have the bureaucracies replaced by a clear chain of command for easier expending of orders. Additionally, Europol should be empowered to gather and manage more intelligence information such as DNA data and set up a database that would enable it to crack down on a wider range of crimes. Europol should be given full police authority to begin investigations and bring suspects of transnational crime before the European Court of Justice for trial (Klapproth, 2013). That cannot happen in vacuum, however. The EU parliament should pass a legislation that is similar to the US federal criminal statute which set up the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and empowered it to conduct investigations across semi-autonomous states in the country. This would enhance Europol’s efficiency and power over national law enforcement agencies. Nonetheless, the problem might arise when national police agencies feel that they have equal operational capacities to prosecute such crimes (De Moor, and Vermeulen, 2010). To resolve such an eventuality, EU parliament should pass laws that clearly delineate the two jurisdictions in order to avoid conflicts which may energise criminal gangs in the region. Conclusion Generally, Europol is an international police agency that helps to fight organized crime across the borders of EU member states. Despite the significant progress and achievements it has made in the region as far as fighting crime is concerned, Europol’s mandate is severely stymied by sovereignty issues. These impediments have resulted in the creation of a bureaucracy which hinders smooth law enforcement operations in the region. The body seems to be playing a second fiddle to national police agencies in an effort conserve national sovereignty and avoid cases of competing interests. Nonetheless, there should be a more proactive Europol that has a clear chain of command and own officers who can respond more swiftly and effectively to cross-border threats of crime that fall within its mandate. Appendices Fig. 1 Europol’s Organizational chart Fig2. Europol’s staff per country References Andreescut, V. and Keeling, D.G. 2012. Explaining the public distrust of police in the newest European Union countries. International Journal of Police Science & Management, 14(3), pp.219-245. Berdal, M.R., & Serrano, M. 2002. Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: Business as Usual? London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Byrne, P.G. 2013. Increased globalization of organized crime and terrorism: Europol and the EU perspective. The Police Chief, 80(8), p.64. De Moor, A., and Vermeulen, G. 2010. The Europol council decision: transforming Europol into an agency of the European Union. Common Market Law Review, 47(4), p.1089. De Moor, A.2012. Europol, Quo Vadis? 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