Supreme Court Decisions and Discussions on the Exclusionary Rule - Research Paper Example

?Supreme Court Decisions and Discussions on the Exclusionary Rule - Yarborough v. Alvarado Search and seizures of evidence are essential component ofdetecting and prosecuting criminals. Though the law has the authority to search and seize evidence, it will be essential to protect certain rights of the defendant as far as some of the constitutional rights are concerned. Unrestricted search was practiced before the exclusionary rule was introduced. To protect against arbitrary police activities U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment was designed in 1914 which states, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon Probable Cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (Stimson, 1908, p.87). The exclusionary rule was initiated from the Weeks v. United States 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914) case where a Federal agent had carried out a search without warrant in order to collect proof of gambling in Freemont Weeks’ residence. The evidence proved Weeks guilty but since the search was illegal or warrantless, conviction of the accused was repealed. Weeks was found guilty of fraudulent mail related activities and his house was thoroughly searched and documents seized by the Federal and local officials. Before this case the validity of evidence was judged by its truthfulness. There were two major reasons given for this law. First, it involved the deterrence rationale which specified that ‘the rule was necessary to deter law enforcement personnel from violating the Fourth Amendment or to “police the police”’ (Hensely and Snook, 2006, p.160). The second reason concerned due process argument or the fairness rationale. This included that the federal government cannot attain convictions with the help of lawless actions. Thus any evidence collected unconstitutionally would not hold for a case even if the accused is found guilty on the basis of that evidence. The rule was formed through this case and was subject to controversies since then. The controversies found existence in Warren, Burger and Rehnquist courts. In fact Lee Epstein and Thomas Walk observe “the exclusionary rule provides yet another example of Warren Court’s revolutionary treatment of the rights of the criminally accused” (Hensely and Snook, 2006, p.160). In fact in the Wolf v Colorado case the Vinson Court declined to apply this law because most of the states had not adopted the rule and there were other options to ensure sustenance of the Fourth Amendment. In the Warren Court the case of Mapp v Ohio (1961) enforced the exclusionary rule (Hensely and Snook, 2006, p.161). On the other hand individuals cannot receive Fourth Amendment protection unless they are not able to demonstrate the reasons behind their expectation of privacy regarding the place where searches and seized are happened. According to the Supreme Court of US individuals can have a rational expectation of privacy respect to their own bodies, homes, business offices and others personal properties. Individuals can also enjoy a reliable expectation of privacy in terms of their automobiles. Generally people do not possess reasonable expectation of things like “vehicle location and paint, garbage left at roadside for collection, public place, bank records and the things left open at public place” (LII, 2010). Miranda warnings come into question with respect to the Fifth Amendment where the suspect when retained for any interrogation should be given a warning before questioning. This warning refers to the right of a criminal suspect to remain silent during interrogation and the warning must be given to him with respect to the use of any statement against the person which may be termed as self-incrimination during the trial. this rule can protect the suspect against any “psychological ploys” deployed by the law officials to overcome the stubbornness of the defendant (Dripps, 003 p.91). Thus the exclusionary rule and Miranda warnings are both used to protect individual rights of the suspect. The case of Miranda Warnings application dilemma Yarborough v. Alvarado, (02-1684) 541 U.S. 652 (2004) case was an example of Miranda warnings. In this case Alvarado, a 17 years old boy, was brought to the police station with his parents. He had waited in the police station for two hours with no Miranda Warning. The boy was asked for the incidence of robbery and murder. While this interrogation process was going on his parents were also waiting in the police room. At the end the boy accepted his involvement in this case and as a result the enforcement law officers allowed him to leave the police station finally. The US Supreme Court ordered that the trial court should solve the case by applying law of precedence and taking the example of Thompson v Kehone. According to the court Miranda Warnings will be applicable only when the suspect will be interrogated by the enforcement law officers in the police custody. Here Alvarado was accused for helping Paul Soto who tried to rob a truck and kill the truck’s driver. Alvarado was asked to give an interview with Los Angeles detective Comstock. At that time 17 years old Alvarado waited for 2 hours with his parents in the police station. The boy was kept into a small room by Comstock.Though there was no Miranda Warning he was kept under the police custody. From beginning the boy tried to avoid accepting his presence at the time of firing but he started to change his narrative gradually. Finally he admitted that he had helped Soto in case of stealing the truck and also in case of shooting the truck’s driver. He also tried to hide the weapon used for shooting. After the interrogation the police officer drove him home along with his parents. After California accused Alvarado on the basis of murder and attempted robbery, Alvarado appealed to the District Court against this acquisition on the basis of Miranda Warning. But Court dismissed the appeal for Miranda Warning. Court’s rationale for dismissal According to the court the surrounding situation should have been considered in the time of interrogation. On the basis of that it can be decided whether the concerned person could leave freely. The Federal District Court approved the decision of the state court on habeas corpus which justifies the custody of a child. But the Ninth circuit did not approve of the court’s decision and as the appellant was a youngster and inexperienced, he could be allowed leave the interview. The concerned court could not provoke him to do that. Moreover the Ninth circuit advised to consider the case under juvenile status. The court held that there should be stronger factors to reach significant conclusion that the appellant’s presence in the police custody did not need any Miranda Warning. AEDPA was required to justify whether the state-court judgment concerned an irrational application with respect to the convectional law. On the basis of case study of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (WILLIAMS V. TAYLOR, 2001) it can be said that the Miranda charge investigation is an object test. It is very important to find out the level of association between freedom of movement and formal arrest. Such tests differ from doctrinal ones where the real set of mind of psychology of the suspect is taken into account and in such cases only the age and experience of the individual should be considered. The Ninth Circuit ignored this fact that considering the age would make this a subjective inquiry instead of objective test. Also it is not expected that the police officials would know of the suspect’s past association with the law or interrogation and even if that is considered, one cannot determine the association between freedom to leave the interrogation based upon his rationality and his experience in order to consider the applicability of Miranda warnings. The strongest reason for not supporting Alvarado’s contention was that he was not in custody and hence no Miranda warning was necessary. Also, as per Alvarado’s statement no force or coercive measure was implemented upon him during the interrogation. These are considered as subjective inquiry. In this case Alvarado’s history was not a prime factor to the law enforcement officers. It is often seen that association between the suspect and the person who has a probable chance to be related with the suspect can be considered as speculative. Even they think that the issues are speculative they would not take these under consideration in the terms of the considered case. The police officers must not consider these provisional psychosomatic factors in the case of Miranda Warning. This decision was made on the basis of the case study 316 F. 3d 841, Federal Court of USA. JUSTICE KENNEDY conveyed the view of the court. According to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) an application for a court order on behalf of a person could be applied by the Federal Court. A person may not accept the state-court judgment when state-court decision is not similar to the judgment given by the Federal Court. This rule was based on the basis of the case study of 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).The State Court appeals against the rules of the Ninth Circuit. The law officers argued that Miranda Warning was not applicable in this case because the appellant was never in the lockup; he was just brought by the concerned law officer for the investigation purpose (Tushnet and Yackle, 1997). On the basis of all evidence it was said that Paul Soto and appellant Michel Alvarado tried to rob a car in the parking lot of a shopping mall in Santa Fe Springs, California. They were present in this mall with a larger group of teenagers on that night. Soto was the person who decided to steal the truck. After that Alvarado was decided to help him. Soto took out a .37 Magnum and loomed the driver. The driver was standing nearby the unoccupied truck. Soto wanted money and the start keys from the truck driver. At that time of the incidence five months were left for Alvarado to be 18 years old. So he was not adult with respect to his age. Alvarado not only helped Soto but also opened the passenger adjacent door of the concerned car. But the truck driver was not ready to give this truck as per as Soto’s demands. Then Soto shot the driver and he was found dead in later. After that the appellant tried to hide the gun. Cheryl Comstock was in the charge of this case. According to him Alvarado was bought to the Pico Rivera police station by his parents. They arrived in the station around lunchtime. The officer wanted to make an interview of him regarding the murder and robbery case. Alvarado requested the officer to give permission so that his parents could wait for him in the police station during interrogation bur his request was rejected. The officer asked him to sit in a small room and started interview at 12 noon. The officer recorded the whole two hours’ interview with objective purpose. During this interview no other police officer was present there. The appellant was not given a warning under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.A (1965). As discussed, Alvarado first ignored his involvement in this crime, but after that he accepted the same. He stated that he took alcohol with his some friends and colleagues. After that some of friends left the place and other rest of the people started walking nearby the roadside. In the meantime some of the people wished to use the local telephone located nearby a shopping mall. Gradually he started fumbling and that raised the notion of suspect for the officer on Alvarado. Then the officer influenced him to tell about the exact incidence. The officer asked him to tell the truth so that the actual killer will get legal punishment psychologically motivated him to be honest but there was no harsh treatment. Alvarado then explained the true story that Soto killed the truck driver by his gun. During the course of the interview the officer also asked the appellant to take a break but he declined the request. After the completion of the interview the officer brought Alvarado to his parents. After some months the State Court had made a charge against Soto and Alvarado on the basis of first degree murder and attempt to robbery. Then Alvarado moved to the Federal Court because his interview had been judged in a wrong way. He appealed for Miranda Warning. The trial court ignored the indication on the ground that the interrogation was not custodial. Both Alvarado and Soto tried to make their own defense.. He explained that on that he was just standing nearby the shopping mall like other customers. The government’s interview relied on Alvarado’s testimonial to Comstock. But Alvarado accepted some of these statements and denied rest of the part. While the appellant was trying to deny the particular part of the statement the prosecution in-charge wanted to hear the audio recording of the interrogation. For the duration of cross-examination Alvarado accepted that the meeting with Comstock was very agreeable discussion and he never felt any kind of threat from the law-enforcement officer. In later the trial judge accused Alvarado for second degree murder and attempted robbery due to his minor participation in the crime. The prosecutor gave Soto a punishment of life-sentenced in prison and Alvarado was punished for 15 years to life. Moreover the state court also rejected Alvarado’s appeal to the State Court in terms of Miranda Warning which was related to the conversation made by him and the concerned law officer. (Chen, 1999). The enforcement law officers could not bring him to the police custody. But the concerned officers argued with this view. Comstock stated that he never gave any threat or ordered him to be present in the custody. Moreover his parents were waiting in the lobby for all the time during the interrogation process. Also the officer interviewed Alvarado just for two hours. After the investigation the concerned officer did not ask the appellant to go home freely rather than he drove him home with his parents by his car. On the basis of these given incidence the state court’s claim was logical regarding the standard of the custody’s law. (Yarborough v. Alvarado, 2004). Court of Appeal’s argument It was already seen that the state-court did not consider Alvarado’s age and his ingenuousness. Without consideration of these things the court did not give any proper decision. As per Court of Appeals, the state court should have considered his age and inexperience since he did not have any previous experience and hence might have felt coerced under such processes – “it was “simply unreasonable to conclude that a reasonable 17-year-old, with no prior history of arrest or police interviews, would have felt that he was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. (Yarborough v. Alvarado, 2004)” Hence these conditions turned the process into custodial inquiry despite the fact that he was not in custody. On the basis of that the applicant’s claim was reasonable in terms of established law. According to the court the Miranda application is not mandated, it is a considerable fact. Miranda Warning does not consider the age of the suspect. It can only emphasize on the experience of the suspect from the incident. It always gives importance on the experience incurred by the suspect during the incidence. On the basis of this experience law will be imposed on the suspect. But in most of the cases the law enforcement officials do not want to take this experience under consideration. They mainly emphasize on their investigation and evidence related to the accident. Then it was improper for the Federal Court to allow the leave of the applicant with respect to the failure of the state-court. There always exists a difference between Miranda Test and the general case on the basis of the concept. This concept basically focuses on the consideration of the age and experience. According to Thompson the inquiry done by Miranda Custody is an entity test. This entity test is totally different from judicial test. The judicial test depends on the actual mindset of the meticulous deduce. It does not consider the know-how and age of the suspect or others who are related with the crime. The Ninth Circuit denied the importance of the object test on the basis of the argument that inquiry test was effective only for the police investigation. They basically considered the individual characteristics related with the crime. The Ninth Court basically emphasized on the role of individuals’ age. This stated that the court should always consider the state of affairs adjacent to the interrogation and then decide whether the rational person should leave the custody or not. The California Supreme Court was also deprived of the discretionary policy. After that the appellant filed a petition in the District Court of California to get a better judgment in favor of him. Here District Court also denied the importance of Miranda purposes for this case. But in case of Ninth Circuit the appeal was reversed. Their first argument was that the State Court never considered the youth age and immaturity of the appellant. On the basis of that the State Court could consider the importance of Miranda Purpose. The Ninth Court basically considered the juvenile status in the course of making judgment in this criminal case. Along with these facts the appellant had no crime history and was not an experienced adult. This evidence could be used as a guard of a juvenile evident. The Court of Appeals also stated that his age and understanding were so important that it could make the general interview into a custodial interview. Then the court of appeals discussed whether Alvarado could obtain relief or not with respect to the Federal Court’s decision. The appellant did not require any bar relief because on the basis of juvenile status he could automatically get relief from the punishment (Chen, 1999). Conclusion On the basis of the above principles it can be clearly stated that the application of the state court’s law was only dependent on the established law. Otherwise the above discussed all objective facts stated in favor of a free interrogation environment where a person could easily leave the interview. These different indicators lead us to hold that the Court of Appeal’s application for custody standard was reasonable. Hence, it is important to evaluate the concept of Miranda warning application more closely especially with respect to its applicability. References Chen, A. (1999) Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, and the Nature of Legal Rules, Buffalo Criminal Law Review, Vol. 2, 536-636 Dripps, D. (2003), About Guilt and Innocence, New Jersey: Greenwood Hensley, T.R. and C. Snook (2006), The Rehnquist Court, ABC-CLIO Legal Information Institute (LII) (2010) Exclusionary Rule, Cornell University Law School, New York, retrieved on July 29. 2013, from: http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/exclusionary_rule Stimson, F. (1908), The Law of The Federal and State Constitutions of the United State , New York, The Boston Books Company Steinman. A,(December,2001), Reconceptualizing Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: How Should AEDPA's Standard of Review Operate after William v. Taylor?, Wisconsin Law Review ,Vol 2001(1),1494-1593,retrieved on July 29 ,from: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=726422 Tushnet, M, Yackle, L, (1997) Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws, Duke Law Journal, Vol.47, Number 1, retrieved on July 29. 2013, from: http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/1372860?uid=3737496&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21102187281893 Yarborough v. Alvarado (2004), Case Law 4 Cops, retrieved on July 29,2013, from: http://www.caselaw4cops.net/cases_new/yarborough_v_alvarado_541us652_2004.html Read More