The Implication of the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree on the IV, VI, XIV Amendments of the Constitution - Research Paper Example

Understanding the Implication of The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree (Exclusionary Rule) on The Fourth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments Of The Constitution as illustrated In The Case of Mapp v Ohio I. Introduction The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is an important rule in the United States legal system. As early as 1914, the United States Supreme Court has already attempted to introduce this doctrine into the legal system through the case of Weeks v United States (232 US 383 [1914]). Under this case, the Supreme Court said that evidences generated through unreasonable searches and seizures which violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States constitution should not admissible in court. Unfortunately, this decisions of the Supreme Court only had binding effect on the federal level of government thus the legal systems of the individual states around the country were not required to following this ruling. However, some states did recognize what was then known as the “Weeks Rule” and this paved the adoption of the rule under the Eighteenth Amendment of the Constitution (Stewart, Potter (1983). In 1921, the Supreme Court decided the case of Silverthorne Lumber Co v United States (251 US 385 ([1920]). The main issue presented in this case was whether or not derivatives of evidence obtained illegally can be admissible in court. In this case, the Court ruled that permitting the admission in court of derivatives of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States is illegal following the “Weeks Rule.” This ruling is later on known as the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree doctrine which is an extension of the exclusionary rule for evidences (Long, Carolyn (2006). At the outset, the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree doctrine was not held as binding on the States. The states only acknowledge the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree doctrine some 40 years later when the landmark decision of Mapp v Ohio (367 US 643 [1961]) came out. According to the decision of Mapp v Ohio, the exclusionary rule is binding upon the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Note that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees due process thereby effectively prevents the presentation of tainted evidence that may deny the defendant in a criminal case of the right to due process. In the case of Mapp v Ohio, the court made an unequivocal statement about how evidences should be treated by both the State and the Federal legal system. According the Court in this case, “the exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments is not only the logical dictate of prior cases, but it also makes very good sense… a federal prosecutor may make no use of evidence illegally seized…” The court further said in this case that where there is a conflict between the rules of admissibility of evidence between the federal courts and the state courts, these courts should work together towards the proper delivery of justice. According to the court, “Federal-state cooperation in the solution of crime under constitutional standards will be promoted, if only by recognition of their now mutual obligation to respect the same fundamental criteria in their approaches.” Furthermore, the court reiterated the decision in the case of Lustig v United State (338 US 74 [1949]) which states that “Denying shortcuts to only one of two cooperating law enforcement agencies tends naturally to breed legitimate suspicion of working arrangements whose results are equally tainted.” II. Statement of the Constitutional Issues The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree doctrine as stated in the case of Mapp v Ohio presents clear constitutional issues that the courts must address every now and then. First, this case presents an issue of violation of the Fourth Amendment which guarantees the right against unlawful search and seizures. This right also specifically requires that for a search to be valid, it must be judicially sanctioned and properly supported with probable cause. Moreover, the Fourth Amendment clearly stated that the search and arrest connected to the search must be limited only to specific information stated under the warranted issued by the proper court. To some extent, the decision of the Court in the case of Mapp v Ohio broadens the scope of legal search and seizures. According the Court in this case, certain types of searches and seizures may violate the right afforded by the Fourth Amendment even if a warrant has been properly granted by the court. Note that original purpose of the search on the home of Ms. Mapp was the suspicion that a suspect of a recent bombing in the area is hiding inside her home. However, upon entering the premises of the Ms. Mapp’s home, the police officers seized evidence of lewd and lascivious books and pictures. She was later on convicted of “…knowingly having has in her possession and under her control certain lewd and lascivious books, pictures, and photographs in violation of 2905.34 of Ohio’s Revised Code.” Clearly, the arrest and subsequent conviction of Ms. Mapp of a different crime other than what was stated in the allege warrant is in violation of her rights under the Constitution. Another constitutional issue that we need to deal with in this case is the right to due process which is enshrined under the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to an attorney as enshrined in the Sixth Amendment. The facts of the case of Mapp v Ohio clearly stated that the law enforcement agents forced its way into the home of Ms. Mapp and arrested her without a warrant on suspicion that she is harboring a criminal in her home. The law enforcement agents were not able to present a warrant when asked by the defendant. The facts of the case also stated that Ms. Mapp demanded to see her attorney but the law enforcement agents prevented her from conferring with her attorney and instead, she was summarily arrested. The action of the law enforcement agents in this case clearly divested Ms. Mapp of her rights to an attorney and to due process of law. III. Research Discussions a. Methodology and Limitations This research was conducted through library work and evaluation of cases relating to the constitutional issues mentioned above. Furthermore, this research is limited to the examination of secondary sources and existing literatures. The researcher did not conduct interviews or court visits in the process. The outcomes, assumptions and conclusions incorporated under this research paper were deduced purely from the readings and understanding of the issues of the researcher. b. Research Discussions The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is closely associated with the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. The relationship between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is clearly illustrated in a number of cases decided upon by the Supreme Court of the United States. The landmark case of Mapp v Ohio clearly showed the relationship of these two rights whereby the Fourth Amendment protects the person from unlawful search and seizures while the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right of the person to due process. For purposes of discussion, let us first address the constitutional issue on the Fourth amendment as posted in this case. As early as 1855 in the case of Murray v Hoboken Land (59 U.S. 18 How. 272 272 (1856), the Supreme Court of the United States already ruled that the Fourth Amendment applies only to criminal cases and not on civil cases. Clearly, this amendment is only afforded to people who are accused of criminal offense. As it is, search and seizures connected to criminal cases are within the purview of this doctrine. Moreover, the contention of the law enforcement agents that they are not covered by the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine because this doctrine only applies to the federal enforcement agents is untenable. In this case, the Court reiterated the decision of Wolf stating that “…the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of unlawful seizure.” The application of the Fourth Amendment is quite narrow and strict at some point but there are exceptions to the narrow interpretation of the law. The case of Warden v. Hayden (387 US 294 (1967) reinforced the ruling of the court in the case of Mapp v Ohio (1961) that some searches and seizures may still violate the provisions of the Fourth Amendment even if a warrant has been properly issued for this purpose. According to the case of Katz v United States (389 US 347 [1967]), the Fourth Amendment covers the “reasonable expectation of privacy” of the person and not solely on whether the property of the person has been intruded upon by the law enforcement agents. In other words, if the reasonable expectation of the person as to the extent of his or her freedom from unlawful violation of his or her rights to privacy is breached, that person may invoke the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to exclude evidences gathered during the unlawful search and seizure. In the case of Ms. Mapp, the fact that what the law enforcement agents entered her home in search of a suspected bomber created a reasonable expectation on her part that these law enforcement agents will limit their search on the person in question and then exit her property immediately after they were certain that the person that they are looking for is not inside the premises of Ms. Mapp. Moreover, she has the right to expect the law enforcement agents to leave her personal effects be and not hold her liable for possession and control of lewd and lascivious books, pictures and photographs. While some jurisprudence provides strict interpretation of the law, there are also many decided cases which broaden the exceptions on the coverage of the Fourth Amendment. In the recent case of Devenpeck v Alford (543 US 146 (2004), the court diverted from the strict interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and ruled that the court may approve routine warrantless searches and seizures provided that certain conditions are met. In case of Tennessee v. Garner 471 US 1 (1985), the court said that the requirements for valid warrantless search also applies to seizures without search as in the case of evidences in plain view. However, in the case of Mapp v Ohio, the facts clearly showed that the police officers discovered obscene materials after they performed a thorough search of the house and opening drawers, dressers, closets and suitcases. The search also extend to the “child’s bedroom, the living room, the kitchen and the dinette.” Clearly, lewd materials were not in plain view so this could not have been what is intended by the courts when they decided to accept evidences for the prosecution. Search and seizure as defined under the law does not only apply to properties, it also applies to the person. The Fourth Amendment so states that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may apply to both persons and properties. In the case of United States v. Mendenhall, (446 U.S. 544, 551, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 100 S. Ct. 1870 [1980], the court ruled that the Fourth Amendment provides protection against unreasonable deprivation of liberty including brief detention. In the case of Mapp v Ohio, the defendant was arrested on the grounds of being “belligerent”. If we take a look back at the facts of the case, we see that the defendant is a woman and the offenders were trained male police officers. The police officers were not able to present a valid search warrant when asked by the defendant. When the defendant insisted on taking a look at the allege search warrant that the police officers waved in front of her, she was arrested for being “belligerent” and was handcuffed by the police. The temporary deprivation of the right of the defendant in this case is a violation of her rights under the Fourth Amendment. In the later cases decided by the Supreme Court, the court said that a person may be considered as under seized under the purview of the Fourth Amendment when his freedom of movement is restrained by means of physical force (see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 111 S. Ct. 2382 [1991]). The second constitutional issue presented in the case of Mapp v Ohio is violation of the Sixth and the Fourteenth Amendments which provide the right to an attorney and to due process, respectively. In the case in question, the defendant asked for her lawyers but the police officers refused to provide her access to her lawyer. In fact, she did call her lawyer and her lawyer arrived at her place while the police officers were still conducting their search. The police officers prevented the lawyer from entering the house and prevented him from seeing Ms. Mapp. In the case of Brewer v Williams (430 US 387 [1977]), the court ruled that the right to counsel arises as soon as a legal proceeding is started against the defendant. The court said in this case that the arrest of the defendant effective starts the legal process against him or her. According to the case of Stansbury v. California, (114 S. Ct. 1526 [1994]); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984), an arrest has been made when the person is taken into custody or when his or her freedom of movement has been restrained by the police through physical force. According to the case of Miranda v Arizona (consolidated with Westover v. United States, Vignera v. New York, and California v. Stewart) (384 US 436 [1966]), the court ruled that when a person is arrested he or she should be informed of his or her rights. The reading of the rights of the defendant is an important aspect of due process which should never be omitted by law enforcement agents (Bransdorfer, Mark S. (1987). Furthermore, when the defendant asked for a lawyer, he or she should be provided with one. The requirement for Miranda warning cannot be overlooked by the police officers conducting the arrest as it will affect the admissibility of evidences and statements gathered during the arrest (see Missouri v Seibert (542 US 600 [2004]). IV. Proposed Solution To Constitutional Issues At Hand There are at least three very important constitutional issues that need to be addressed in this research. First, there is a need to address the rules on the admissibility of evidence at the federal and state courts. Second, the scope of legal search and seizures need to be defined clearly to avoid confusions and possible violations of the rights of the accused. Third, the rights of the person should be read before search and seizures are conducted. On the first issue, the most suitable solution would be to establish clear protocols governing the relationship of the State and federal agencies. The States need to be governed by the same rules as the federal government. A well coordinated implementation of the law both at the State and the federal level could avert delays in the delivery of justice and at the same prevent waste of money and resources. We have to understand that elevating a case to higher courts cost money both on the part of the government and the defendant. If we can have clear cut legislations that will outline how the courts and the law enforcement agencies should go about in the task of gathering evidences, then we could do away with delays and waste of resources. As stated in the decision of the Mapp v Ohio, “The federal courts themselves have operated under the exclusionary rule of Weeks for almost half a century; yet it has not been suggested either that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has thereby been rendered ineffective, or that the administration of criminal justice…” This only goes to show that the use of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine or the exclusionary rule does not in any way weaken the ability of the law enforcement agency to uphold the law. In the same manner, the federal courts have been using this doctrine since the case of Silverthorne Lumber Co v United States (251 US 385 ([1920]). Since that time, there were no compelling evidences that will lead us to believe that the ability of the federal courts to deliver justice has been unduly impeded. Establishing clear protocols is very important even if there are already many decided cases that support the use of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine both at the federal and state levels. We have to understand that case laws can be overturned by the courts at some point and that judicial precedent is ever evolving. Clear examples of how judicial precedent evolve over time are the cases of Silverthorne Lumber Co v United States (251 US 385 ([1920]) and Mapp v Ohio. When the Supreme Court decided the case of Silverthorne, it did consider enforcing the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to the State Courts but more than 40 years later, the Supreme Court decided in the case of Mapp v Ohio that the State Courts should be bound by the same doctrine. Since the Supreme Court has the power to reverse its rulings from time to time, there is no guarantee that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine will not be weakened or reversed in the future. The fact that this doctrine is already closely associated with the Fourth Amendment may lessen the possibility that the force of this doctrine will remain but further exemptions from this doctrine may allow the circumvention of this doctrine. A clear example of how an existing doctrine can be circumvented can be seen in the case of Missouri v Seibert (542 US 600 [2004]). Under this case, the law enforcement agents extracted testimonies from the suspects before giving them Miranda warnings. The idea here is that since the suspects were not yet given Miranda warnings, their prior testimonies can still be admissible in court. Although the court ruled that this practice is illegal and punishable under the law, this does not eradicate the fact that law enforcement agencies, under the guise of doing their job, may attempt to take shortcuts and in the process undermine the rights of the accused. Second, issue that this research paper would like to address is the establishment of clear coverage and limitations on the scope of legal search and seizures. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution has already laid the principle of freedom from illegal and unreasonable searches and seizures but still, there are so many cases brought before the courts on this issue. Over the years, the coverage and exemptions on the right against illegal search and seizures have expanded and contracted as one case is decided after another. This is quite understandable considering the fact that law enforcement agencies must evolve and adapt to the needs of time. For instance, as people acquire speedy means of travel, law enforcement agents need ways to catch bad elements before they can get away. This means that they may have to apprehend and arrest violations in transit. Several cases illustrated the need to set up checkpoints around the country in order help law enforcement agents (see Michigan v Sitz (496 US 444 [1990]), Illinois v Lidster (540 US 419 [2004]). Since searches and seizures are often sensitive issues both for law enforcement and the courts, there is a need to establish clear cut guidelines as to when and how these warrantless search and seizures may be conducted. Since the requirements for searches and seizures are ever evolving and may differ from State to State, it may be difficult to establish hard and fast rules regarding their conduct. In this case, law enforcement agencies and the courts should follow the established rules and jurisprudence in their States. Moreover, rules and regulations of the States must be couched in certain terms that they do run afoul to the principles of the Fourth Amendment. Safe-nets such as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisoned tree doctrine should be made available to suspects to protect their rights for possible abuse of their freedoms. The third issue is the reading of the rights of the person during search and seizures. Although Miranda warnings are provided to the accused, there is no clear provision in the law that warrants the reading of the rights of the person during search and seizures. It cannot be denied that there are so many people out there who do not know their rights and when law enforcement officers asked to be let inside their homes with search warrants, many people do not have any ideas that they are unwittingly exposing themselves to possible self-incrimination. People need to be fully aware that they have to refuse the entry of law enforcement officers into their homes if these police officers cannot present a valid search warrant. Moreover, people need to be aware that even there are certain things that may be exempt from valid search and seizures. The reading of the rights of the person during valid search and seizures will not only prevent undue abuse, it can also serve as protection for law enforcement agents against possible legal backlash. When a person know his or her rights and he or she voluntarily waived his or rights, the law enforcement agents may now proceed with their task without fear that the evidence they gathered during the search and seizure will not be barred in court. V. Social Policy Implications Of Proposed Solutions The proposed solutions stated in this research may have both positive and negative social policy implications. First, the establishment of clear protocols regarding the relationship of the federal and state law enforcement agencies may smooth out some wrinkles in the system. Since there is unity of guidelines and policies in both areas there will lesser conflicts and delivery of justice could be hastened. On the other hand, the establishment of clear protocols may effectively bind the hands of these agencies and impede their movements. We know for a fact that States have the right to formulate their own laws and if the federal government unduly encroaches into the rights of the States to formulate their own laws, conflicts may arise. The same scenario may hold true in the second solution presented under this research paper. However, since we are merely suggesting in the second solution that states should formulate their rules and regulations on search and seizures in consonance with the Fourth Amendment, the conflict of interest may not be as pronounced in this case as in solution 1. You see, solution 2 in this paper gives enough room to the states to be more creative when it comes to determining the scope of the exclusionary rule in their areas of jurisdiction. As long as the rules on search and seizures in a certain state does not run afoul when established principles under the federal legal system, that State rule may be well accepted. When it comes to the third solution, the reading of the rights of the person during searches and seizures may have double sword effect. First, the reading of the rights can help both the person involved and law enforcement agents to work together and that is good. On the other hand, the fact that the person involved in the possible crime now knows about the exclusionary rule may lead him or her to circumvent the law. As stated by the Court in the case of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the constant invocation of the suspects of the exclusionary rule may impede the criminal justice system. In some instances, it may even generate disrespect for the law. VI. Conclusion The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is an ever evolving multi-faceted law. It involves basic rights including those enshrined in the Fourth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Over the years, it has changed a lot and its coverage broadened. The case of Mapp v Ohio heralded the incorporation of this doctrine at the State level and subsequent cases show how this doctrine has changed the way the State courts decide criminal cases. Yes, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is not an absolute truism. It admits a lot of exceptions which at some points may weaken its enforcement. However, since this doctrine is already deeply engrained in the legal system, this doctrine is bound to survive the test of time. References: Books 1. Bransdorfer, Mark S. (1987). "Miranda Right-to-Counsel Violations and the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine". Indiana Law Journal 62: 1061. 2. Long, Carolyn (2006). Mapp v. Ohio: Guarding Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures. University Press of Kansas 3. Stewart, Potter (1983). "The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases". Columbia Law Review 83 (6): 1365–1404  4. Zotti, Priscilla H. Machado (2005). Injustice for All: Mapp vs. Ohio and the Fourth Amendment. New York: Peter Lang. Cases 1. Brewer v Williams (430 US 387 [1977]) 2. Devenpeck v Alford (543 US 146 (2004) 3. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004) 4. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 111 S. Ct. 2382 [1991]) 5. Illinois v Lidster (540 US 419 [2004]) 6. Katz v United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 7. Lustig v United State (338 US 74 [1949]) 8. Mapp v Ohio (367 US 643 [1961]) 9. Michigan v Sitz (496 US 444 [1990]) 10. Miranda v Arizona (consolidated with Westover v. United States, Vignera v. New York, and California v. Stewart) (384 US 436 [1966]) 11. Miranda v. Arizona (consolidated with Westover v. United States, Vignera v. New York, and California v. Stewart), 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 12. Missouri v Seibert (542 US 600 [2004]) 13. Murray v Hoboken Land (59 U.S. 18 How. 272 272 (1856) 14. Murrays Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 18 How. 272 272 (1856) 15. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984) 16. Silverthorne Lumber Co v United States (251 US 385 ([1920]) 17. Stansbury v. California, (114 S. Ct. 1526 [1994]) 18. Tennessee v. Garner 471 U.S. 1 (1985) 19. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) 20. United States v. Mendenhall, (446 U.S. 544, 551, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 100 S. Ct. 1870 [1980] 21. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980) 22. Warden v. Hayden (387 US 294 (1967) 23. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) 24. Weeks v United States (232 US 383 [1914]) 25. Wolf v Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) Read More