Why Liberals Should Hate the Hate Crime Legislation - Research Paper Example

Why Liberals Should Hate ‘Hate Crime Legislation’ While many arguments have been put in place to support or criticize the harsher penalties that are attached to hate crimes compared to regular crimes, there is, in fact, a justifiable course to making hate crime penalties even harsher. While trying to understand Hurd’s arguments that increased penalties for hate crimes are unjustifiable in liberal societies, there is a need to assess the plausibility of three different views regarding high penalties for hate crimes. Increased penalties for hate crimes are, in fact, justifiable. First, it is essential to put into perspective the view that increased penalties for hate crimes are in fact justifiable, with a view to assess its plausibility. The major reason for having increased penalties for harsh crimes is because, as opposed to regular crimes, hate crimes normally hurt a whole social group (Hurd 215). Whenever an individual commits a hate crime, it is evident that they are not doing it against the victim only, but as a matter of expressing their dislike and contempt for the whole social group. This being the case, therefore, a hate crime is not a crime against an individual, but a crime against a social group, of which, if the perpetrator of the crime could have the ability, he/she would harm the whole group. It, therefore, follows that even when a perpetrator of hate crime would seek to be charged equally with a regular crime perpetrator, doing so would be injustice to the regular perpetrator of crime since one crime is definitely weightier than the other, owing to the number of individuals it hurts. Thus, there is a general agreement that hate crimes are crimes of a higher magnitude compared to regular crimes, in regard to the number of individuals hurt by such crimes, and thus should carry a higher penalty. Even when Hurd disagrees with the higher penalties attached to hate crime compared to regular crimes, there is a general agreement that owing to the number of people hurt by hate crimes, such criminals deserve a higher penalty. The second argument in support for higher penalties for hate crimes is the fact that hate crimes represent significantly greater culpability on the part of the perpetrator (Hurd 216). This is because the committal of a hate crime is a display of a long pre-meditated course of action, as opposed to inadvertent cause of crimes. This places the perpetrator of such crimes in a more culpable position since those who plan to hurt others are more culpable than those who commit incidental crimes, without any pre-meditation (Hurd 219). While an individual commits a hate crime, it is an indication that he/she has been harboring the hatred and resentment towards such a social group for some reasonable time and thus opted to perpetrate such a crime in expression of such hatred. This forms the basis of justifying higher penalties for hate crimes, compared to regular crimes. Hate crimes should be punished to the same degree as regular crimes This is the second perspective regarding the justification of penalties for hate crime perpetrators, which is assessed with a view to determining its plausibility based on the arguments advanced by Hurd. Hurd argues that increased penalties for hate crimes are unjustifiable in liberal societies. In doing this, he disagrees with the second justification for attaching higher penalties on hate crimes, based on the fact that they represent significantly greater culpability on the part of the perpetrator compared to regular crimes (Hurd 216). He observes that if greater culpability is to be attached to a bias or hate crime, on the basis that it is a premeditated and long-term held intention, then there is a higher tendency to focus on motivation for these crimes, in a way that has not been done in other forms of crimes (Hurd 217). This is because whenever a serious crime is committed, the law focuses on the actual crime act, as opposed to the motivation behind the committal of such a crime, unless it is on the basis of self-defense or mental instability. However, there is a tendency to attach more weight to motivation when it comes to assessing hate or bias crimes, which puts such crimes in a different position of their own, and that does not apply the normal due process of law (Hurd, 220). Thus, to avoid placing such crimes on a platform that does not apply to other forms of crimes, the crimes should be judged equally, without placing a higher emphasis on the motivation for actions in a hate or bias crime, which is absent in a regular crime. This proposes that all crimes should be assessed equally and thus penalized equally. Additionally, there is a tendency to judge hate or bias crimes on the basis of emotional states, which are construed to mean the character state of an individual, as opposed to the mental state of the individual at the time of committing a crime (Hurd 223). This is because while regular crimes are assessed on the basis of emotional state that motivated an action, which is construed to represent the mental state of the perpetrator of a crime at the time the crime was committed, it is different with how the same emotional state is assessed in hate or biases crimes, where the emotional motivation is seen to indicate a long-term premeditated course of action (Hurd 222). This places the perpetrators of hate or bias crimes at a disadvantage since their character is judged based on their emotional state at the time of committing a crime while the same is avoided for the perpetrators of regular crimes. This bias in judging the emotional state of the hate crime perpetrators and the regular crime perpetrators indicates that a hate crime perpetrator is judged more harshly than a regular crime perpetrator, which is not legally justifiable (Hurd 224). Therefore, to establish equality in the judgment of hate crimes and the regular crimes, it is essential to take the emotional state that motivates an action to represent the mental state of the individual at the time of committing a crime, as opposed to representing the character of that individual. In so doing, hate crimes should be punished to the same degree as regular crimes. Hate crimes in fact merit lesser penalties than regular crimes While arguing that hate crimes merit lesser penalties than regular crimes, there is a need to first of all analyze the emotional state interpretation that punishes hate crimes more harshly than the regular crimes. When the emotional state that motivates a course of action for a crime perpetrator is interpreted to represent the character of the individual involved, then it is clear that the law punishes bad character, as opposed to perpetration of a crime (Hurd, 225). This being the case, it therefore follows that judging bad behavior instead of the crime that is committed by an individual constitutes some injustice on the part of the individual involved. This is because while it could be natural to observe that an individual can opt not to commit a criminal act since it is within his/her ability to wish away such criminal intents, it is not the case with bad character. Bad character arises from certain emotions, beliefs and dispositions that individuals have been exposed to during their lifetime, making it impractical to wish such character away (Hurd 228). Therefore, it is justifiable to judge an individual on the basis of a crime they committed as opposed to their bad character, and if the aspect of bad character is to be applied in judging the perpetrators of a crime, then they would warrant less penalties than the perpetrators of regular crimes since hate crime perpetrators act on the basis of beliefs and dispositions that they cannot control (Hurd 230). This justifies why hate or bias crime merit less penalties since the perpetrators of such crimes are motivated by factors beyond their control. The “character theory of the criminal law” provides that the noble course for criminal law is to punish vice and cultivate virtue (Hurd 229). However, when an individual is punished for bad character, rather than for a crime that is committed, the law takes a totally different course, other than to punish vice and cultivate virtue since bias, hate and prejudice are learnt vices which can easily be done away with, as opposed to other vices that are innate in individuals (Hurd 231). Thus, considering that such vices are the ones that constitute bias and hate crimes, the perpetrators of such crimes should merit lesser penalties since they can be easily transformed. Despite all the arguments presented in justifying higher, equal or lesser penalties for the individuals involved in bias and hate crimes, I am of the opinion that the perpetrators of hate crimes deserve a hasher penalty compared to the perpetrators of regular crimes. This opinion is informed by the facts that notwithstanding the motivation, the emotional state or the character of the perpetrators of hate crimes, one thing is apparent – their intent. The perpetrators of hate crimes commit a crime not against a single individual who fall victim, but against the whole social group against which they are prejudiced. This then warrants them increased penalties, to warn others who are prejudiced against other social groups to get rid of their hatred and prejudice. Works Cited Hurd, Heidi. “Why Liberals Should Hate ‘Hate Crime Legislation”. Law and Philosophy, 20 (2001): 215-232. Print. Read More