The Wearing of Armbands in Public Schools - Research Paper Example

? Tinker v. Des Moines Tinker Et Al. vs. Des Moines case explores the issue on whether symbolic protest contravenes 1st Amendment freedom of speech protections. The validation for the regulation ought to be more than “a simple desire to evade the discomfort and conflict that flow from a detested standpoint.” The action of the school officials of banning the wearing of armbands can only be legally admissible if they demonstrate that the expression would yield a “material and considerable disruption” with the discipline and educational role of the school. For the State to validate proscription of a distinct expression of opinion, it ought to demonstrate that its action stem from something bigger than mere desire to avoid the distress and unpleasantness that mainly flow from unpopular viewpoint. Tinker v. Des Moines Facts In December 1965, a group of students and adult held a meeting and resolved to publicize their opposition to the Vietnam War by donning black armbands in school. The petitioners, as well as their parents, had beforehand involved in parallel activities, and they chose to partake in the program. The school had instituted a policy sanctioning students to put on arm bands carrying political symbols, but had prohibited the wearing of armbands disapproving the Vietnam War (Farish, 1997). The policy detailed that any student putting on an armband to school would be requested to remove it, and if the subject declined, he would be suspended till he resumed schooling without the armband. The petitioners wore black bands on December 16, to their school while John Tinker donned his armband the next day. The petitioners were told to go back home and suspended from school and advised to go back without their armbands (Thomas & Dale, 2009). The petitioners sought nominal damages and an injunction in opposition to a regulation that the respondents had transmitted prohibiting the wearing of armbands (Farish, 1997). The Court of Appeals aligned with the lower court making the petitioners appeal the ruling. The case was grounded in the assertion that the school district’s decision contravened the student’s rights of freedom of speech as safeguarded established in the 1st Amendment. In breaching rights of the 1st Amendment, the school district subsequently contravened the safeguards established in the 14th Amendment that guarantees that constitutional rights are extended to all citizens, inclusive of students and teachers (Gold, 2007). The Background and Issue of the Case The petitioners, John F. Tinker (15 years old) and the Christopher Eckhardt (16 years old), were High school students in Des Moines, Iowa. The other petitioner, Mary Beth Tinker, was a junior high school student and John’s sister. Subsequent to an evidentiary hearing, the District Court threw out the complaint and sustained that the prohibition was reasonable and constitutional so as to safeguard disorder of school discipline (258 F. Supp. 971 (1966). The case was discharged since the law allowed the Board to exercise its power, notwithstanding the absence of any finding of considerable intrusion with the conduct of school activities (Burnside v. Byars, 363 F. 2d 744, 749 (1966). The Court of Appeals confirmed by an evenly divided court by holding that: in putting on armbands, the petitioners were quiet and passive and were not upsetting and did not intrude on the liberties enjoyed by others. As such, their conduct was agreeable to the safeguards availed by the 1st Amendment, plus the 14th Amendment. The court also asserted that the 1st Amendment rights are applicable to teachers and students alike, subject to application within exceptional circumstances such as the school environment (Thomas & Dale, 2009). A ban on expression of opinion devoid of any evidence on the necessity to circumvent considerable meddling with school discipline or the liberties of others is not allowable under First and Fourteenth Amendments. Constitutional Question(s)/ Issue Raised by the Case The core issues centres on the question on whether a ban against the wearing of armbands in public schools as a mode of symbolic protest contravene 1st Amendment freedom of speech protections. The court brought to the fore the question on whether the 1st Amendment safeguards against symbolic speech within a public school and whether is safeguards against speech that express revulsion against an individual or group (Thomas & Dale, 2009). The dissenting judge also brought attention on the issue of whether an individual possesses the right to “award speeches or involve in demonstrations where he/she pleases and when he/she pleases.” The Arguments Presented The District Court highlighted that the donning of an armband for the rationale of expressing certain views is the form of symbolic act that is admissible within the Free Speech Clause of the 1st Amendment (see Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). The wearing of armbands in the circumstances presented in the case can be regarded as entirely divorced from essentially or potentially disruptive conduct by those engaging in it as it was intimately analogous to “pure speech” that warranted to broad protection under the First Amendment. (See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965). The 1st Amendment rights were admissible in light of distinctive characteristics presented by the school environment and were accessible to both teachers and students. In Bartels v. Iowa, 262 404 (1923), the court specified that the 14th Amendment bars states from outlawing the teaching of a foreign language to the young student. The court sustained that, statutes to this effect, unconstitutionally impede the rights of the teacher, student, and parent. See also Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (corresponding opinion); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960). The District Court concluded that the respondents’ (school authorities) action was reasonable since it was grounded in fear of a disorder from the wearing of the armbands. However, in line with the present system, indiscriminate fear or apprehension of disorder is inadequate to surmount the right to freedom of expression (Lane, 1995). Undoubtedly, where there is no demonstration that involvement in the proscribed conduct “significantly and considerably obstructs the claims of suitable operation of the school” the proscription cannot be maintained. In Tinker v. Des Moines (1969) case, the District Court did not make such a finding, and the court’s independent examination of the records failed to deliver evidence that the school authorities possessed a reason to foresee that the wearing of the armbands would impede on the operations of the school or encroach on the rights of other students (Lane, 1995). The action of school authorities remained primarily grounded in a desire to evade the controversy that might emanate from the expression, even the silent symbols of armbands embodying opposition to the U.S.’s part in the conflagration, in Vietnam. Holdings The Supreme Court voted (7 for/2 against) that the deeds of the Des Moines School District certainly contravened the rights of the 1st Amendment, overturning the decisions arrived at by the local District Court (Stocks, 2008). The Supreme Court concluded that the students retained the constitutionally granted right of speech while in public school and, as such, right to wear armbands to school to express their disapproval to the Vietnam War. Justice Abe Fortas first highlighted that students and teachers enjoyed their First Amendment rights even at school. Hence, students can exercise their constitutional rights, even in exceptional circumstances such as when in school (Alexander & Alexander, 2012). The judges noted that while schools have the right to institute rules regarding aspects such as hairstyle, violent, or upsetting action, the case before the court did not manifest any of the stated issues. There was a deficiency of evidence indicating petitioners’ interference with the schools’ operation or of conflict with the rights of other students (Lane, 1995). Consequently, the case does not relate to speech or action that encroaches on school operation and/or the liberties of other students. The court maintained that permitting the Tinkers to wear their armbands in opposition to the Vietnam War would not “significantly obstruct with the work of the school or encroach on other students' rights” (Alexander & Alexander, 2012). The court confirmed that donning the armbands was a “silent, reactive expression of the opinion” that did not entail any “anarchy or disorder,” and was improbable to render a “significant and considerable disruption” in the school (Gold, 2007). Furthermore, the justices noted that the school officials purposely targeted antiwar armbands, but failed to ban the wearing of any other symbols carrying a political message. The court concluded “the proscription of expression of a certain opinion is not constitutionally permissible,” the justices stipulated that school officials do not possess supreme authority over their students (Lane, 1995). One of the dissenting judges, Justice Hugo Black, noted that the case detailed several students who declined to abide by the orders given by school officials, and attested that tolerating this behaviour would render unconstructive impact on schools and the country at large (Eastland, 2000). Constitutional Significance of the Case Tinker remains a practicable and repeatedly-cited Court precedent such as in Morse v. Frederick; although, the court has frequently placed limitations on the extent to which students can exercise their free speech rights (Gold, 2007). In a case, Bethel School District v. Fraser, 1986, the Supreme Court maintained that a high school student’s sexual overtone-laden speech delivered in a student assembly was not constitutionally safeguarded. This case qualified Tinker in establishing an exemption for “indecent” speech (Stocks, 2008). Similarly, in Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier case, the Court concluded that schools possess the right to control, for justifiable educational reasons, the composition of school-backed newspapers, which, in essence, limits Tinker’s application. Conclusion This case certainly possess a considerable impact on all teachers, as frequently discussions may emanate in the classroom and students may sometimes express opinions that are contentious or provocative by nature. This raises the questions; on the degree can a teacher suppress the debate or persuade students to restrain any strong or even detestable opinions or beliefs. Does this translate to the notion that teachers can rest assured that the 1st Amendment can safeguard them from a punitive action for an expression of an opinion in the school? The seven judges, who voted to sustain the rights of the 1st Amendment that related to this case, were unwavering on the fact that the students’ freedom of speech could not be contravened. Since student expression remain safeguarded by the 1st Amendment even while at school, the authorities ought to avail constitutionally valid reasons for controlling student expression. References Alexander, K., & Alexander, M. D. (2012). American public school law. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning. Eastland, T. (2000). Freedom of expression in the Supreme Court: The defining cases. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Farish, L. (1997). Tinker v. Des Moines: Student Protest. Berkeley Heights, NJ: Enslow Publishers, Inc. Farish, L. (1998). The First Amendment: Freedom of Speech, Religion, and the Press. Hillside, NJ: Enslow Publishers, Inc. Gold, S. D. (2007). Tinker v. Des Moines: Free speech for students. Tarrytown, N.Y: Marshall Cavendish Benchmark. Lane, R. W. (1995). Beyond the schoolhouse gate: Free speech and the inculcation of values. Philadelphia, PA: Temple Univ. Press. Stocks, J. D. (2008). Supreme Court decisions: Scenarios, simulations, and activities for understanding and evaluating 14 landmark court cases. Waco, TX: Prufrock Press. Thomas, L. T. & Dale, A. H. (2009). Freedom of Speech in the United States, 6th ed. State College, PA: Strata Publishing, Inc. Tinker Et Al. vs. Des Moines Community School District Et Al. (393 US 503) (1969). Read More