Justice Scalia's Supreme Court Rulings - Research Paper Example

?Insert Is Justice Scalia wise enough in his Supreme Court rulings? Since 1986, Justice Antonin Scalia has delivered differentrulings on various high profile cases in the United States Supreme Court. In his rulings, the justice has been inclined toward the advancement of conservative philosophies in the corridors of justice. In his 26 years of service on the highest court in the land, Scalia has significantly promoted conservatism ideology in his verdicts, rooting for textualism in constitutional analysis and originalism in the interpretation of laws of the country (Scalia and Ring 8). The jurist is a fervent champion of the authority of the executive arm of government; he believes that the original ideology of the authors of the American constitution was to establish and protect a powerful presidency to ensure stability of the nation. In his rulings the judge rejects double standards in the application of the law such as policies aimed to empower minority groups. Talbot (43) avers that Scalia often files separate minority verdicts in which he criticizes the majority decision. This paper explores the philosophies of Justice Scalia as evident in some of the Supreme Court rulings he has made on discrimination and criminal procedure. Justice Scalia is widely described as a conservative figure on the bench, implying that he offers the Constitutional interpretation in letter and spirit of its key architects of the eighteenth century (Bramwell 370-375). In his rulings, the justice captures the philosophies that inspired the Amendment to the Constitution. Scalia believes various constitutional changes to the US laws should be interpreted with respect to their essence at the period of amendment. Nevertheless, the justice is at pains to explain his judicial approach relative to the verdict of Brown v. Board of Education of 1954, which declared segregated learning facilities illegal. The ruling also cited the Fourteenth Amendment, which the justice interprets otherwise, as a deciding factor in the case. The enactment of the Amendment contradicts Scalia’s observations as it allowed corporations some rights under the constitution (Niose 16-21). It is arguable that the architects of the Fourteenth Amendment wanted to enhance school segregation. Scalia however, says he would have rejected school segregation in America, an opinion which is driven by the need for a real united America. According to Scalia and Ring, the justice enthusiastically rejects the notion of an evolving society guided by an “adjusting” set of laws (9-11). Scalia’s ideology implies that it is beyond the mandate of the court to adapt the constitutional interpretation. The justice sounds an alarm that if Americans accepted the fact that constitutionalism should be modified to suit an evolving society, the dangers of evaluating changing standards may be tantamount to believing that the evolution has boiled down into one's personal opinion. Nevertheless, by comparing the Constitution with original statutes, which should be bequeathed future generations in its letter and spirit, the philosophies advanced by the justice may fail to enable the modern American society to manage new cultural trends, some of which may be good and promote peace and stability in the world (Lakin 47). Additionally, due to the fact that laws are crafted to serve justice, the evolution of the values of the American society may turn the people into “slaves” of their forefathers’ ideologies if Scalia’s philosophies are anything to go by. Plaintiff has an upper hand Scalia’s philosophy on criminal procedures is largely in favor of the plaintiff. For instance, he rejected the Court's landmark ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, which offered guidelines on the treatment of criminal suspects. The ruling held that a testimony by a suspect in police custody who is ignorant of his rights was unconstitutional. Scalia’s verdict to judicially review Miranda in the Dickerson v. United States case of 2000 hit a snag, when he found himself in the minority, with Justice Clarence Thomas. Although, criminal suspects should be treated humanely at the court and be informed of their rights, Scalia and Ring indicate the justice viewed Miranda ruling as an act in which the Supreme Court arrogated itself powers, which are beyond its mandate (18-41). Additionally, Scalia’s decisions at the Court on criminal procedures seem to be based on likelihood that criminal defendants are more likely to be found guilty by the Supreme Court, when they have been declared so by state courts. Whereas Scalia believes that justice begins in detention: that detainee should be treated with respect to the gravity of the charge(s) they are facing, he insists he prefers thorough investigation of detainees facing heinous crimes before he examines their cases and hands them justice (Bramwell 374-375). Scalia considers the plight of the people affected by terror attacks across the world, especially the American citizens battling terrorists in Afghanistan in his take on the suspects. For instance in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ruling of 2006, in which Hamdam sought to reverse defense operations at Guantanamo Bay, the justice, in dissent, indicate that any action by the Court to hear the plea was a nullity under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. Owing to the suspected links of Hamdam to Al-Qaeda, Scalia’s opinion may have been informed by the need to impose upon suspected terrorists the harshest penalty possible. Prefers the Confrontation Clause According to Bramwell, the justice invokes the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to empower criminal defendants in the cases and ensure a delicate balancing act plays out during trial and in the ruling (372-374). The clause guarantees criminal defendants the authority to face their accusers head on and test the evidence tabled for any inconsistency, hence achieving a lively debate in the quest for justice. This lively debate addresses any unclear areas during trial. In several cases, the justice rejects the testimonies recorded in camera including those involving cases of suspected victims of child abuse. According to Lakin (47-48) his philosophy is based on the fact that defendants must be allowed to confront forensic experts and get a satisfactory explanation from them, because documents alone may not amount to water-tight evidence needed to determine cases at the Court. He understands the court is of last resort and must be seen by both sides to be fair. His ruling on Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts of 2009 is an example of a case in which he invoked the confrontation clause to deduce the lab report findings in relation to the case. Justice Scalia prefers that the Supreme Court acts on cases that are within the United States jurisdiction, because an extension of the Court’s mandate across the border could water down its independence and reputation. Such actions could present the Court as a partial organ used by the executive branch to advance American foreign policy. For instance, in Rasul v. Bush case of 2004, the justice defied the majority decision, that it was not within the Court’s jurisdiction to determine habeas corpus cases filed by detained terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay. Even though the Court overruled his minority decision, Scalia saw the executive hand in the decision or more clearly, the Court would be used as rubberstamp on similar cases in future (Zylberberg 1). His mentioning of the fact that the Court had not issued any such rulings before was a clear indication that the justice is an avid follower of previous rulings delivered by the Court, which helps to strengthen the claims on Scalia’s conservative ideology. For Talbot, Justice Scalia is a vehement advocate of the meticulous interpretation of the law and discards generalized assumptions when delivering justice (44). For instance, in 2004 he together with Justice Stevens found themselves on the minority side correcting the grey areas in Congressional laws that authorized the use of military force to crack down on terrorists. Whereas the verdict in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld held the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) by Congress lifted habeas corpus, thus legally providing for the legal detention of Yaser Hadi on claims that he was a soldier on the enemy’s payroll, Scalia offered a dissenting opinion that the congressional law could not be interpreted to lift habeas corpus and that the Supreme Court was attempting to correct the executive goofs and irregularities in policy-making. Hates discrimination Justice Scalia has generally contributed toward the elimination of discrimination based on ethnicity, sexual orientation and gender in the US (Scalia and Ring 45-69). In his rulings at the helm of the country’s Supreme Court, the justice has declared unconstitutional laws which divide the society along social lines. His impartial opinions on discrimination has been informed by the need of the society to be united as provided for in the constitution and symbolized by an all-powerful presidency. In 1994, for instance, Scalia’s opinion supported the majority ruling in this respect. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena he reaffirmed the need for the elimination of double standards in the country by supporting the Court's verdict with the idea that even various federal programs should be subjected to strict scrutiny in order to eliminate any such cases. The justice indicated that it is beyond the government mandate and control to correct past cases of racial discrimination: that America is one country that advances unity in diversity. Talbot (42) indicates that Scalia’s quest to dispense justice without mentioning any form of discrimination in his verdict came to be in 2003 on a case involving University of Michigan. The university’s law school had played the racial card to determine who qualified for the course. In the petition dubbed Grutter v. Bollinger, the justice in a dissenting opinion differed with the majority ruling, which established that the institution was within the legal confines to carry forward the technique as a factor in the selection process because it was using it in good faith, to enhance diversity and unity across races. Conversely, Scalia noted that this process, irrespective of its proper use, would still lock out some qualified students from the institution if their ethnicity had been represented in the law school in “adequate” numbers. He added that the practice was not of any educational advantage, especially in terms of the overall grading of the students. Scalia rules it had nothing to do with law or legal practice either. Justice Scalia has in his rulings affirmed that women and men are equal before the law. His firmness in blurring the line between gender issues has seen him order that legislations that increase the gender gap be taken through intermediate scrutiny and instead preferring that the classification based on gender be inexorably linked to vital government goals (Niose 16-21). For instance, in the 1996 ruling on United States v. Virginia, the justice found himself alone in the minority ruling, trying to advocate a sense of equal treatment before the law. In the ruling, Scalia observed that the Court, in asking Virginia to table any proof of credible justification for the presence of single-sex recruitment policy, had put up stringent measures that could be seen to transform intermediate scrutiny into strict scrutiny. The wording of the Court directive may have persuaded the justice to resent in the ruling. This paper explores the philosophies of Justice Scalia as evident in some of the Supreme Court rulings he has made on discrimination and criminal procedure. Conclusion Although, Scalia's work as evident in the rulings have affirmed the supremacy of the constitution and preserved the powers of the president, his verdicts are mainly driven by conservatism ideology. Nevertheless, he disagrees on this opinion and says his rulings are based on meticulous observation of the letter and spirit of the original constitution. It is arguable that in various Scalia’s rulings it may be easily pointed out that the justice only notes in the American laws that which reinforces his individual beliefs. Additionally, Scalia's actual campaign seems to be based on striking out the landmark rulings delivered by the Warren and Burger Courts, which contributed immensely toward the transformation of America into a liberal society in the second-half of the twentieth century. For instance, his unsuccessful decision to overrule the Miranda ruling serves to reinforce the claim. On the contrary, the justice’s philosophy to preserve the American legal tenets is unparalleled. Justice Scalia observes common-law philosophies based on statutory understanding. His take on the law puts him at odds with those advancing the common notion of interpreting a legal provision using legislative spirit. Nonetheless, the pitfall behind his inclination is that unlike the notion of a legislature, the “originalist” perspective of the law becomes a fodder for a stubborn arbiter to incorporate his personal perceptions into the judicial process. Conversely, buoyed by the convincing reason of the likelihood of the passage of an illegal Congressional statute, the justice’s originalist philosophies perhaps could come in handy to check a rogue legislature if it is overrun by mob. This way, Scalia could place the Court above reproach. The justice also incorporates his textualism to the understanding of the statutes: his interpretation of the Constitution is exactly the same as his take on a statute. He tends to stick to the original gist of the content, not what inspired the draftsman. Scalia indicates that when it comes to constitutional interpretation, judges differ on the original meaning of the text and its understanding relative to the current environment. In a nutshell, even though laws are meant to serve justice to the people and be modified from time to time in letter and/or spirit in order to accomplish this worthy cause, Scalia’s weakness is that he derides the backers of evolving constitutionalism. And despite the justice’s philosophy that the application of a changing sense of the statutes could lead to “injustices” caused by flexibility, there are claims that the justice may be taking the current America centuries back to its early years of constitutionalism. Regardless, the justice offers a rare opinion on various cases, which makes the rulings more balanced and unique. Works Cited Bramwell, Austin W. Justice Scalia as Judicial Statesman. Modern Age, 48.4(2006): 370-375. Laskin, Sheldon H. Justice and American Particularism. Tikkun, 20.5 (2005): 47-48. Niose, David. No Agenda? A Humanist View of Justice Scalia. Humanist, 70.2(2010): 16-21. Scalia, Antonin and Ring, A. Kevin. Scalia Dissents: Writings of the Supreme Court's Wittiest, Most Outspoken Justice. New York: Regnery Publishing, 2004. Talbot, Margaret. Supreme Confidence. New Yorker, 81.6 (2005): 40-55. Print. Zylberberg, Nadine. Justice Scalia Dissents. The NewYorker, 25 June, 2012. Web 21 July 2012. Read More