Psychological Profiling and the Beltway Sniper - Essay Example

? Psychological Profiling and the Beltway Sniper: The Good, the Bad, and the Process HERE YOUR HERE In an attempt to understand what motivates a criminal, as well as where they will strike next, the field of psychological profiling comes into play. It is hoped that, by examining clues and looking for patterns in the crimes that have been committed, a means of somehow identifying what type of person would commit such a crime will emerge, thus helping law enforcement. Even though it has been shown to be employed as long ago as 1888, in the case of Jack the Ripper, it is still regarded as more of an art than a science, and at times scorned by law enforcement professionals. The fact that there are high-profile cases such as the Washington, D.C. Sniper (also known as the Beltway Sniper) in which the profile was more erroneous than correct, have not helped to gain any notoriety of the right sort for the profession. Throughout this paper, with the use of books and the internet, an attempt will be made to explain the steps involved in building a profile for a criminal, as well as what was correct and incorrect about the profile in the case of the Beltway Sniper. Psychological Profiling and the Beltway Sniper: The Good, the Bad, and the Process Introduction Psychological profiling, also known as criminal profiling and offender profiling, is the attempt to understand the mind of the criminal in order to predict what might happen next. In doing so the ultimate goal is, of course, to catch the criminal responsible and bring them to justice. Criminal profiling, though not widely publicized until recently, actually has a longer history than first thought; the first major case to use it was in the 1880s, when surgeon Dr. Thomas Bond delivered to Scotland Yard a profile on serial murderer Jack the Ripper (Ramsland, 2012). The process would gain in popularity over the years, into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, going from an experimental area of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to a recognized and somewhat respected branch called the Behavioral Sciences Unit (Ramsland, 2012). Formed in 1974, its members still relied on informal studies, intuition, and common sense to see patterns in some of the most heinous crimes throughout the country (Winerman, 2004). Though by no means were the other branches and areas of criminal investigation discounted, it was found that in delving into the psyche of a criminal, some attempt could be made to recognize a pattern, which could then be used in an attempt to discern what might happen next (Ramsland, 2012). The field continues to evolve and be of use to investigators today. It should be noted, however, that profiling is still considered more art than science. Part of the reason for this is the relative lack of scientific evidence surrounding profiling. It is still considered a field in its infancy, despite its history (Winerman, 2004). It has been made popular through the use of movies and television crime drama; however, that does not mean it has been wholly accepted, given that the patterns that some profilers rely on, at times, come down to nothing more than common sense and initiative (Winerman, 2004). Even the profilers themselves cannot agree on terminology to use nationwide, nor can they point to scientific studies that would help their case, as there have been few done to show the statistics of how profiling can actually aid in solving crimes (Winerman, 2004). The fact remains that profilers, for good or bad, are not quite readily accepted by the law enforcement community, and whether or not they are used can often depend on the judgment of the leading investigators. Building a Profile Regardless of any inconsistencies in terminology, there is a basic framework that is used by all qualified profilers in building a profile. It will belong to one of three schools of thought. The first, which is the criminal investigative approach, relies heavily on the knowledge of the investigator, developed over a series of cases to which they have been exposed (Davies, Davies & Beech, 2012). There is also the clinical-practitioner approach, which ironically is heralded as the “original FBI approach” and is not aimed per se at delivering an end result to a criminal case, but providing insight into its nature, therefore being able to make further predictions about future cases and actions (Davies, Davies & Beech, 2012. Instead of relying on the experience of the investigators, the experience of clients in a forensic mental health setting is used (Davies, Davies & Beech, 2012). The third approach is called the statistical approach, basing itself on the statistics of crimes past when placed in conjunction with clues found at a crime scene to determine the most possible and likeliest pattern (Davies, Davies & Beech, 2012). While in the past the clinical approach was used, the approach that is currently used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for example, consists of a series of four steps that are designed to produce a profile in a standardized manner, and belongs to the criminal investigative approach (Davies, Davies & Beech 2012). Step One: Data Assimilation This stage is characterized by gathering information. Profilers must gather all information that is available about the crime that occurred (Davies, Davies & Beech, 2012). Written materials such as statements and autopsy reports are included (Davies, Davies & Beech, 2012). Also included are visual materials such as photographs and other related materials that help the profilers to re-create the crime and see as much detail about the scene as possible (Davies, Davies & Beech, 2012). In this way, the profilers can attempt to re-create the crime and apply their own training to it. Step Two: Crime Classification Using the data gathered during the assimilation phase, the crime is then classified. Classifying the crime involves placing it into one or more categories consistent with the data found thus far (Douglas, Burgess, Burgess & Ressler, 2006). Doing so enables the profilers to narrow down the categories as well as what options are available to them (Douglas, Burgess, Burgess & Ressler, 2006). The classification process can in and of itself be quite extensive; for example, homicides are classified based not only on type, but by victim and by style as well (Douglas, Burgess, Burgess & Ressler, 2006). By placing the crime into a particular class, profilers are then able to determine what might happen next with possibly more accuracy. Step Three: Crime Reconstruction This step in the profiling process allows the profilers to re-create what happened. Using hypotheses, profilers attempt to determine what happened step by step (Davies, Davies & Beech, 2012). Profilers do not overlook any details in this step, and multiple scenarios may be acted out or hypothesized based on the evidence that is available to them (Davies, Davies & Beech, 2012). Primary factors in this step involve things such as victim and offender behavior in addition to sequence and determining what happened from one point to another (Davies, Davies & Beech, 2012). Though of course the profilers do not usually have a suspect to question during this time, by relying on past experience and other factors, they can try to determine what happened. Step Four: Profile Generation At this point, the profile is determined and is ready to be given to any interested party seeking it. Information has been gathered, sequences have been determined to the knowledge of the profilers, and the profile can be determined based on said hypotheses (Davies, Davies & Beech, 2012). Information included in the profile can include such factors as their habits and personality as well as social and demographic characteristics (Davies, Davies & Beech, 2012). Though it is important to remember that the profile is honestly at times nothing more than a series of educated guesses in an attempt to narrow down factors, it has at least possibly provided a starting point for investigators. The Profile of the Washington, D.C. Sniper In October of 2002, residents of Washington, D.C. went through their own month of terror. During that time, ten residents were killed and three more wounded by an assailant using sniper tactics, firing from a long range and virtually invisible to the world, until the sound of the rifle was heard (Censer, 2010). The first to be shot was James D. Martin in a grocery store parking lot, and over three weeks, more would follow, most within the twenty-four hours of Martin (Censer, 2010). The media did its own part in playing in to the fear that surrounded both the area and the nation, sensationalizing each story and keeping the residents up to date (Censer, 2010). By the time the month was over, national recognition would be gained, and ten people would be dead or wounded (Censer, 2010). The Behavioral Sciences Unit of the FBI also went into overdrive, hoping to give a psychological profile that would lead to an end of the events without further bloodshed. Various profilers declared various views on the Washington, D.C. Sniper, but agreed on some points. The suspect would be a white male, probably in his twenties or thirties (Turvey & McGrath, 2009). Most likely he lived or worked near where he was killing, and was heralded as a “weekday warrior” with a job (Turvey & McGrath, 2009). He was angry, without question, and his anger was what was causing the crimes to occur, as he felt the need to punish someone for the wrongs that he had felt were done to him (Turvey & McGrath, 2009). He was also most likely a loner, someone who preferred to work alone and be alone most of the time (Turvey & McGrath, 2009). Another point made in the profile suggested that the suspect would be driving a white van or a large box truck (Buchanan, 2002). These points formed the basis of the investigation and what the FBI would use to try and apprehend the person behind the attacks. The Reality of the Washington, D.C. Sniper The profile of the Washington, D.C. Sniper turned out to be erroneous in many factors. Largely described as an “angry white male” who was a “loner”, the truth could not have been further from the profile (National Museum of Crime and Punishment). Police eventually arrested two men, Jon Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo, both African-American males (Buchanan, 2002). Muhammad was forty-one, and Malvo was seventeen (Buchanan, 2002). According to the profile, again, the suspect was described as a “loner” (Turvey & McGrath, 2009). Muhammad and Malvo worked together; in exchange for a plea agreement, Malvo took the stand and testified against Muhammad, explaining that the shootings had been part of a bigger plan, in essence one that would force police to pay them in order to stop shooting people (National Museum of Crime and Punishment, 2008). There was no anger involved; on the contrary, it looked to be an elaborate scheme for extortion, with no means or method behind the choosing of their victims. On these points, the profilers were not only wrong but completely, 100% wrong. Another part of the profile almost immediately refuted was in regards to the type of vehicle that the suspect would be driving. Roadblocks had been set up to check vehicles, specifically being on the lookout for large white vans and box trucks, as given in the profile (Buchanan, 2002). Muhammed and Malvo, when arrested, were found in a Chevy Caprice, a vehicle far from the description of a white van (Buchanan, 2002). Evidence was also found in their car that linked them to the crimes, including a Bushmaster .223 rifle and bipod, which later proved to be a match with the ballistics found at the shooting (National Museum of Crime and Punishment, 2008). Again, the profile had failed. The final point of failure resolved itself around the fact that the sniper would live and work in the Washington, D.C. area. Muhammed was from Washington, but Washington State, and Malvo was a drifter from Jamaica (Buchanan, 2002). In his testimony, Malvo stated that the two practiced extensively in and around Washington, D.C. in order to gather intelligence on the sites that they would use (National Museum of Crime and Punishment, 2008). They would use predetermined routes and mapping techniques in order to be able to plot their getaways more easily (National Museum of Crime and Punishment, 2008). It was through this practice that the area was learned, not through a lifetime of living there. In short, the profile of the Washington, D.C. Sniper, who also came to be known as the Beltway Sniper, was not only erroneous, but almost 100% erroneous. It is hard to find any information in which the profilers, in this instance, were able to correctly deduce what was going on. Admittedly, far more profiling is the work of hypothesis and educated guesses than actual science and/or fact; however, it cannot be denied that being so far away from the truth in this case had a negative impact on those who were skeptical about profiling to begin with. How Much Did the Profile Help? The honest answer, in this particular instance, is that the profile did not help very much in apprehending the suspects, if at all. Even Washington, D.C. Police Chief Charles Ramsey was disgusted with the turn of events, saying that they had “been looking for a white van with white people, and found a blue car with black people” (Turvey & McGrath, 2009). The profilers, while admirably trying to do their best, had in fact caused more harm than good, due to the number of times that they had allowed the suspects to slip away because of an erroneous profile. The Chevy Caprice that the suspects were captured in had been seen, and in fact had its plates run, about ten times throughout the weeks of the sniper attacks, but police had seen no reason to link it to the events due to the profile (Turvey & McGrath, 2009). It also did not help matters that the profile had been on a working assumption made from a “stock profile” of characters such as Timothy McVeigh and Ted Kaczynski, hence the “angry white male who works alone” theory (Turvey & McGrath, 2009). The profilers, in their eagerness to help, had actually caused more damage. Most of the help in apprehending the suspects, in this instance, came from the actual suspects themselves. As it turned out, more victims belonged to the snipers than thought originally; in total there would be twenty-two by the time the whole case was pieced together (Censer, 2010). Muhammed and Malvo had made a detour into Alabama in late September of 2002, and a fingerprint connected Malvo with a robbery they had committed in that state (Censer, 2010). Also, in the woods had been found a tarot card with the image of death on it, containing the message of “call me God in handwriting on the top (Censer, 2010). Another shooting scene brought the existence of a note handwritten to police and enclosed in a plastic baggie, which police later found had been purchased mere hours before the shooting (Censer, 2010). In reviewing the security footage, Malvo showed up on camera (Censer, 2010). The pair had also made several phone calls to authorities, first using the national tip line that had been set up, and then speaking out to other police officers and even phoning a priest in an attempt to have their message “understood” (Censer, 2010). Eventually, their greed would get the better of them, and the two would be caught, but it would not be because of a profile that was generated. It would be because they had simply left too many clues for police to track them by. Conclusion Though the use of psychological profiles in criminal work is a useful and sometimes necessary tactic, it cannot be denied that it profiling is often nothing more than a series of educated guesses which can be either correct or incorrect. This is not to say that profilers are not trained, and do not know what they are doing; however they should also not be thought of as gurus to be followed with blind faith and undying devotion. Profiles and profiling can serve a valuable purpose in steering investigators in the right direction, but can also lead in the wrong direction, away from that which is actually true. This was without a doubt seen in the Washington, D.C. Sniper case. In some cases, just as with the Washington, D.C. Sniper, it can cause more harm than good, and almost allow the actual criminals to slip through undetected or without a second look, due to their “not fitting the profile.” It is important to remember that when working with a profile it is, indeed, nothing more than a series of hypotheses, and though it is based on the evidence given, nothing more than a “working theory” of what might occur. Profiles should be used with caution, and the mind kept open to pursuing every lead in order not only to make sure that the right criminal is tracked down, but that those who are innocent are not thrown in jail unnecessarily due to “fitting the profile.” References Buchanan, P. J. (2002, October 30). The Beltway Sniper and the media. Retrieved from http://www.theamericancause.org/patthebeltwaysniper Censer, J. R. (2010). On the trail of the D.C. sniper: Fear and the media. Charlottesville, NC: University of Virginia Press. Davies, G. G., Davies, G. M., & Beech, A. R. (2012). Forensic psychology: Crime, justice, law, interventions. (2nd ed.). West Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons Douglas, J. E., Burgess, A. W., Burgess, A. G., & Ressler, R. K. (2006). Crime classification manual: A standard system for investigating and classifying violent crimes. (2nd ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. National Museum of Crime and Punishment. (2008, October). The dc sniper: The beltway sniper attacks. Retrieved from http://www.crimemuseum.org/Washington_DC_Sniper Ramsland, K. (2012). Criminal profiling: Part one history and method. Retrieved from http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/criminal_mind/profiling/history_method/index.html Turvey, B. E., & McGrath, M. (2009). Criminal profilers and the media: Profiling the beltway snipers. In W. Petherick (Ed.), Serial Crime: Theoretical and Practical Issues in Behavioral Profiling (pp. 235-256). Burlington, MA: Elseiver Academic Press. Winerman, L. (2004). Criminal profiling: the reality behind the myth. Monitor, 35(7), 66. 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