Applying Human Rights Theory in Defense of Animal Rights - Essay Example

?Beyond “Bunny-Hugging Applying Human Rights Theory In Defense of Animal Rights The rhetoric of animal rights protection has often been dismissed as first world, middle-class rhetoric, invocations of those who live in conditions where human beings are not confronted daily by mind-numbing realities of gnawing hunger, poverty and marginalization. In a world of gross inequality, the advocacies in the Global North for the humane treatment of seals may have little resonance at best, or be labeled as callousness at worst, by those living in Africa or the impoverished regions of Asia. This paper argues, however, that this anthropocentric approach to justice – that approach which gives primacy to human beings before all other species in the ecosystem – are not only repugnant to basic principles of rights, but they may in fact be revisions of old and cherished values. Corollary to this, modern theories of rights that seek to apply “human rights” standards to animals do not represent a new paradigm but are in fact simply new articulations of  old and accepted ideas. Indeed, the major theme of this exposition that the animal rights movement is founded on the same principles that inform and lend credence to the human rights movement. So many things are taking place now that put animals in danger. Big cosmetic and pharmaceutical companies engage in animal testing1. The constant pillage of endangered species for food, jewelry and potions has not abated. Animals that are to be eaten are left to suffer in horrendous conditions. They are forced in dark and constricted cages, they are force-fed beyond capacity to provide delicacies for the rich, they are put to a slow and harrowing death for human sport and enjoyment. According to Friend, “neglect, torture and destruction of helpless and usually inoffensive animals is so widespread and chronic in both history and contemporary society that one is tempted to conclude that cruelty to animals is a basic human instinct2.” But the question must be asked is this: aside from decency and compassion, is there an intellectual basis or firmament for the animal rights advocacy? Can defending the rights of animals as a moral imperative be founded on the same principles as human rights? This paper will take on three parts. The first part will look at the inescapability of animal rights and how it is inextricably intertwined with human rights, flowing as it does from the same logical predicate. The second part will review the literature appurtenant to the issue of animal rights vis a vis human rights, and explore the debates and discourse surrounding the subject matter. The third part will discuss the argument that animal rights should be seen in the same plane as human rights, because in contrast to the belief of many that it is an avant garde concept, it is deeply rooted in the same theoretical foundations that underpin human rights.   The Inescapability of Animal Rights Animal rights can find justification in theories of right that are embedded in time. It is interesting to begin this exposition by looking at the fairly recent debate between Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and Animal Rights activist Peter Singer. At the heart of the debate was a statement made by Posner, that “human beings prefer their own. If a dog threatens a human infant, even if it requires causing more pain to the dog to stop it, than the dog would have caused to the infant, then we favour the child. It would be monstrous to spare the dog.3" In response to this, Singer argues that this kind of reasoning has only been used to justify inequality and discrimination. If we analyse the statement made by Judge Posner even further, the inescapability of animal rights comes out. The statement that “human beings prefer their own” should in itself be subjected to critical scrutiny. Indeed, the phrase “preferring one’s own” denotes a value choice in favour of an entity or a construct that hews closely to how one perceives him or herself and possesses many of the same characteristics that he or she has. Indeed, the very same moral intuition that drives the argument of Posner is the same so-called moral intuition that has been the basis for the discrimination on the basis of gender (e.g., the discrimination against lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgenders), of race (e.g., the discrimination against blacks) and of religion (e.g., the discrimination against Islam.) History has amply demonstrated the folly of taking that statement, “human beings prefer their own”, as justified and benign. We now draw a parallelism between the paradigm forwarded by Posner – that the curtailment of animal rights is justified by the moral assumption that human being prefer their own and should defend their own in a conflict of interest between animal rights and human rights, even if the danger to animals is possibly greater than the danger to human beings – and the issue of racism, particularly in the context of cultural filters. Frantz Fanon’s writings provide reflections on racism viewed from a cultural perspective, the “systematized oppressions of a people” that is embedded in structure and is not targeted towards “the individual man but to a certain form of existing.4” What does this mean? Fanon asserts that racism has undergone an evolution, a mutation if you will, that seeks to justify or rationalize itself by appealing to the superiority of one way of life or thinking against the other, a “cultural racism” as it were5. Race, which is a social construct and not a biological reality6, becomes the basis for consigning whole populations to servitude and slavery. Why this extended treatise on race? The point being made is that there are stunning similarities in the logic being deployed by people like Judge Posner and the logic that supports Occidental superiority. Judge Posner suggests that it would be, to use his words, “monstrous” to take the side of the entity more different than the entity making the decision to take sides, as it were, even if the harm to the allegedly different entity were greater than the harm to the entity perceived to be similar. The question that arises is: who makes the decision as to who is different and who is similar, and what is the basis for such a decision? In the 18th century, blacks from Africa were considered to be of such inferior species that they were more akin to monkeys than to human beings. Georges Cuvier, a French naturalist, described Negros as follows: The Negro race... is marked by black complexion, crisped of woolly hair, compressed cranium and a flat nose, The projection of the lower parts of the face, and the thick lips, evidently approximate it to the monkey tribe: the hordes of which it consists have always remained in the most complete state of barbarism7. In contrast, he described the Caucasian race (to which he belonged) as follows: The white race, with oval face, straight hair and nose, to which the civilised people of Europe belong and which appear to us the most beautiful of all, is also superior to others by its genius, courage and activity8. During these times, Cuvier’s thinking was not marginal. It was a scientific expression of the prevailing sentiment at the time. It was used to reaffirm biases and prejudice against the black Africans by White Europeans. Another striking point to notice – and this becomes very relevant to the discussion on animal rights – is that the basis for the discrimination are physical characteristics. Christopher Meiners, for example, claimed to have studied the anatomy of the Negro and claimed that he has “no human, barely any animal feeling”9. In ascribing virtues to physical characteristics, he said that “The more intelligent and noble people are by nature, the more adaptable, sensitive, delicate and soft is their body; on the other hand, the less they possess the capacity and disposition towards virtue, the more they lack adaptability; and not only that, but the less sensitive are their bodies, the more can they tolerate extreme pain or the rapid alteration of heat and cold.”10 We see here how the judgments made on race and the difference between races, aside from being flawed, are filtered through the personal experiences and vantage point of the person casting judgement11 – in these extreme examples, white and presumably educated men. Of course, whiteness will be assigned a premium not because of any factual evidence that a white color of skin translates to intellectual superiority, but because he himself possess white skin. In a similar vein, human beings’ assumptions on animals may be based on criteria favourable to human beings, e.g., ability to speak a human language, ability to make rational human choices, etc. These criteria are then used to make judgments on whether or not animals are deserving to be beneficiaries of rights. In the context of race, the beliefs of racialists like Cuvier and Meiners have long been critically interrogated and in fact refuted by overwhelming evidence that there is no biological difference between blacks and whites to warrant the inferior treatment accorded on the former. New factual data has since emerged demonstrating that race is but an arbitrary marker that has been used as a means to confer or deny privilege. In similar fashion, it is not difficult to conjecture that there may be data demonstrating similarities between animals and human beings that mainstream anthropocentric approaches have tended to ignore. If the conferment of rights is based on the principle that there should be no difference in treatment of like entities, then it stands to reason that there may be no basis for denying rights to animals as perceptions on difference are evolving notions and not static realities. In fact, the evidence increasingly demonstrates that animals are capable of intelligence and human qualities as well. Dolphins have proven to be capable of logical thought, dogs have human characteristics like loyalty and trust, ants arrange themselves into hierarchies that approximate human social arrangements. And this is only when we use human intelligence as basis. It is intellectual arrogance to suggest that intelligence is not susceptible of multiple strains. Literature Review on Animal Rights The literature on animal rights can be divided into three: indirect theories, direct but unequal theories, and moral equality theories12. The first set argues that animals should be denied rights because they do not have human agency or autonomy. If animals are to be protected, it is only because doing damage to them does damage to human morality. The second set holds that animals should be given some moral consideration, but in a conflict between the interests of animals and the interests of humans, the latter interests should prevail. The third set, moral equality, affords equal treatment and equal moral status to animals and human beings. We discuss that thinkers and contributors in each set one by one. Indirect theories Indirect theories trace their origin to the classical philosophers such as Aristotle who argued that there is a natural hierarchy of living things, with the humans at the top because of the ability to use reason to guide their conduct, animals second because of their capacity to have conscious experiences, and plants last because they have neither13. This was refined by Rene Descartes, who argued that animals are “automata” who are incapable of conscious experience at all, and simply respond to stimuli. Their behaviour, Descartes reasons, are mechanically-induced behaviour that cannot be independent, spontaneous and expressive. Carruthers on the other hand, argues that human beings are capable of “higher order thoughts”14 – that is to say, thoughts that can take as its object another thought, while animals are incapable of them. Hence, only human beings should have rights. He states however, that cruel acts to animals must not be condoned not because they violate any rights but because they are cruel. He argues about torturing a cat for fun: Such acts are wrong because they are cruel. They betray an indifference to suffering that may manifest itself…with that person’s dealings with other rational agents. So although the action may not infringe any rights…it remains wrong independently of its effect on any animal lover.15 Immanuel Kant argues that the duty to be kind to animals or refrain from hurting them is only an extension of our duty not to offend human beings, or our duty not to do damage unto the property of another. For example, one should not kick someone else’s pet because one has a duty to the human owner of the pet. He states, as quoted by Broadie and Pybus: Our duties towards animals are merely indirect duties towards humanity. Animal nature has analogies to human nature, and by doing our duties to animals in respect of manifestations of human nature, we indirectly do our duty to humanity…. We can judge the heart of a man by his treatment of animals16. Direct but Unequal Theories Under this theory, animals have direct moral status – that is to say, they have a right not to be subjected to cruelty, not to be harmed, etc., regardless of possible impacts on other human beings. The main reason being propounded by those who invoke this theory is that animals are sentient beings, in that they are capable of receiving pleasure and pain. Sentience, according to Wilson “refers to the capacity to experience episodes of positively or negatively valenced awareness.17” However, those subscribing to this theory also believe that animals are not on the same plane as human beings because unlike human beings, they follow blind instinct18 and are incapable of deliberative action or ponderous thought19. Also, only human beings can enjoy things such as art, music, literature, and can have refined tastes. To quote John Stuart Mill, ““Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast’s pleasures”20 Following the logic of these theorists, while animals are afforded moral consideration, when it comes to a conflict between the rights of humans and the rights of animals, the rights of humans will be superior because human beings are more superior than animals. Moral Equality Theories Finally, the moral equality theorists argue that there must be an equal consideration of the interests of human beings and animals. Peter Singer is perhaps one of the leading lights of animal ethics. He states the principle of moral equality as follows: The essence of the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests is that we give equal weight in our moral deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by our actions.21 The main defense for this theory is that the properties that we ascribe to humans that distinguish them from animals are not properties that all human beings have, and thus, the logic deployed by those who distinguish humans from animals as a means to justify unequal treatment of humans and animals may give rise to a case of discrimination. For example, not all human beings are capable of rational thought – an example would be infants. Some humans have dementia or schizophrenia. Does the argument then suggest that they should be treated like animals? Because we are morally repulsed by the idea of treating babies or sick people like animals, it stands to reason that the argument must fail. Singer also argues, as explained in great detail in the first part, that the argument that human beings are smarter, more rational, more cognitive than animals and therefore deserve more by way of rights are structurally similar to the argument that makes racism and sexism permissible22. Regan takes this argument further and asserts that animals have rights because they have an inherent value. They must, therefore, never be used as means to an end. He defines a being that is a subject-of-a-life as one that will: have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychological identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others, and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else’s interests23. He proceeds to argue that animals are imbued with these characteristics. Hence, animals must be accorded the rights that are accorded to human beings. Human Rights and Animal Rights: Complementary, not Contradictory This paper had argued that the principles that underpin human rights are also the principles that underpin animal rights. Indeed, there is an almost indisputable consensus on the principle that innate attributes should not be made the basis of conferring or withholding privilege or rights. The folly of trying to find a property or facet that distinguishes human beings from animals is that if we invoke concepts such as intelligence, rationality, capacity for restraint, there are human beings who will not be able to meet those standards. On the other hand, if we invoke more “simple” barometers like capacity to feel pain or pleasure, then necessarily, some animals will be able to meet these requirements. Thus, defending animal rights is not a nouveau concept, nor is it something that we invented out of nothing, but rather it is a moral imperative arising from the very same principles that underpin human rights and rights in general. What appears to be more important to remember, it seems, is that we constantly use human standards to weigh, judge, evaluate and determine whether animals are “deserving” of rights, when we shouldn’t. To quote Colin McGinn, “it is important to see that animals are not defined by their relation to us. Most animals, after all, have lived out their spans in sublime indifference to the habits of those odd chattering bipeds with the removal plumage. Even if we had never existed, they would still be here. We are just as accidental to them as they are to us.”24 WORD COUNT: 3,291 References A. Broadie and Pybus, E. ‘Kant’s Treatment of Animals’, (1974) 49 Philosophy 90, p 375. P. Carruthers. The Animals Issue: Morality in Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). G Cuvier, Tableau elementaire de l'histoire naturelle des animaux (Paris, 1798) p.71 G Cuvier, The Animal Kingdom: Arranged in Conformity with its Organization, Translated from the French by HM Murtrie T Das Gupta, Race and Racialization: Essential Readings, 2007. F Fanon, ‘Racism and Culture’ in Towards the African Revolution, 1967, p31 R Frankenberg, ‘Growing Up White: Feminism, Racism and the Social Geography of Childhood’. Feminist Review, Vol. 45, p 51 L. Francis and Norman, R. ‘Some Animals are More Equal than Others’,(1978) Philosophy 53, 507. C. E. Friend, ‘Animal Cruelty Laws: The Case for Reform’ (1973) 8 U. Rich. L. Rev. 201 S May, Critical Multiculturalism: Rethinking Multicultural and Anti-Racist Education, London, Falmer Press. J. S. Mill. Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishers, 1979), originally published 1861. Posner-Singer Debate, Slate Magazine. Available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/dialogues/features/2001/animal_rights/_2.html T. Regan. The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1983) P Singer. Animal Liberation (New York, Avon Books, 1990). H. Singh, ‘Confronting Colonialism and Racism: Fanon and Gandhi’ Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge, p 341. B. Steinbock. ‘Speciesism and the Idea of Equality’ (19780, Philosophy 53: 247-56. S. Wilson, ‘Animals and Ethics’ (2001) Available at http://www.iep.utm.edu/anim-eth/ J. Zurlo, D. Rubacille and A. Goldberg, Animals and alternatives in testing: History, science and ethics (Mary Anne Liebert, New York 1994). Read More