Madisons views in the structure of the proposed constitution - Research Paper Example

Madison’s views in the structure of the proposed constitution Madison asserted that the republican remedy personified in the Constitution permitted the different sections adequate room to articulate their outlooks and to attempt to pressure the government. Rather than the majority suppressing minorities, the diverse concerns would confer their differences. This leads to a situation whereby the majority would rule but with appropriate care and consideration given to minorities. Consequently, the same number of sections would prevent any one from exerting dictatorial power over the rest (Federalist no. 10). He also argued that there must be a connection between the interests of the man and the constitutional rights of the place. He feels that when such tools are crucial to contain the exploitations of government, it becomes an expression on human nature. For instance, he argues that there would be no need of a government if men were angels. Moreover, neither peripheral nor interior pressures on government would be obligatory if angels were to rule men. A great complexity lies in structuring a government, to be governed by men over men. In this regard, one must first facilitate the government to have power over the governed and in the next place compel it to govern itself. The major control on the government is a dependence on the citizens. However, experience has taught people the requisite of supplementary safety measures (Federalist no. 51). He further indicates that if a section consists of less than a majority, the republican principle relieves it by enabling the majority to overcome its menacing views by standard vote. It might convulse the humanity and obstruct the administration. However, under the provisions of the Constitution, it will be incapable of carrying out and masking its brutality. When a majority comprises a faction, the structure of popular government, alternatively allows it to surrender to its ruling zeal or concern both the rights of other citizens and the public good. The greatest objective of the constitution is to protect the public good and personal rights from the threat of such a faction as well as to safeguard the spirit and the structure of popular government (Federalist no. 10). Moreover, diverse interests unavoidably subsist in different categories of citizens. The privileges of the marginalized would be in danger if a majority were in unity due to a common interest. This can be counteracted by realizing several divided depictions of citizens in the society. In effect, this will leave an unfair combination of a majority very dubious and impossible. The federal republic of the United States will illustrate this method in the proposed constitution. All power in it will originate from and rely on the society and the society itself will have numerous interests, divisions, and categories of citizens. Consequently, the rights of marginalized, or of the minority, will be less vulnerable from interested groupings of the majority. Madison further argues that, the safety for civil rights must be equivalent to that for religious rights in a liberated government. In the one case, it comprises the array of interests and the diversity of factions in the other (Federalist no. 51). Madison further argues that to facilitate guarding against the factions of a few, delegates must increase to a certain number however small the republic might be. In addition, to guard against the perplexity of a crowd, the delegates must be limited to a certain number however large it might be. The number of delegates in the two scenarios is comparatively greater in the small republic hence is not corresponding to that of the two components. In that case, the larger republic will offer a larger preference, and therefore a greater likelihood of a fit choice. Consequently, more citizens in the large than in the small republic will select each delegate. For that reason, it will be very hard for undeserving candidates to practice successfully the nasty arts, which often characterize elections. Madison feels that this is a very positive move in the structure of the constitution. This is because it would facilitate fair and just election of the representation of the people (Federalist no. 10). In the case of decentralization of power, Madison argued that the best protection against a steady concentration of the numerous powers in one section is complex. This is because it involves offering the required constitutional powers and individual drives to those who manage each section to oppose violations of the others. He stipulates that as in all other cases, the stipulation for resistance in this must be made equal to the threat of attack. In other words, he means, “ambition must be made to counteract ambition.” However, it is impracticable to give an equivalent power of self-protection to each section. In this regard, the lawmaking influence inevitably dominates in republican government. The solution for this inconveniency is to partition first the legislature into diverse divisions (Federalist no. 51). Secondly, is to cause them as less linked with each other, as the character of their general purposes and their common reliance on the society will admit. In addition, it might even be essential to safeguard against treacherous infringements by still further safety measures. Conversely, as the bulkiness of the legislative power necessitates splitting up, the fragility of the executive may necessitate its strengthening. At first view, this complete negative on the legislature emerges as the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed (Federalist no. 51). According to Madison, the pressure of factious leaders might stimulate a peril within their individual States, but would be not able to extend a general danger through the other States. In addition to this, a religious faction might disintegrate into a political group in a part of the alliance. However, the numerous factions scattered over the complete face of it must protect the national councils from any hazard from that foundation. The effect of this is to expand and improve the public outlooks, by conveying them through the means of a selected body of citizens. Their nationalism and love of justice will prevent them from sacrificing the public voice to temporary or incomplete deliberations. In addition, their wisdom might best represent the true interest of their country. This would render them good representatives and ambassadors of the public they represent. This is true because not all the citizens can be in a position to represent the interests of others and of their country. Such regulation stipulates that the public voice, articulated by the delegates of the people, will be more beneficial to the public than if conveyed by the people themselves, assembled for the function (Federalist no. 10). Madison further feels that in the comprehensive republic of the United States, a union of a majority of the entire society could rarely take place on any other standards than those of fairness and the common good. He asserts that if there would be less threat to a minor from the interest of a major party, there should be lesser excuses, also, to offer for the safety of the minor. This is by bringing about an interest not reliant on the majority into the government or, in other words, an interest free from the society itself. In effect, this would prevent the control of the majority hence encouraging the interests of the minority in to governing. It is also significant that the wider the society, the more accordingly probable it will be of sovereignty, provided it lie within a feasible sphere. Furthermore, a judicious amendment and mixture of the federal principle might largely bear the feasible sphere (Federalist no. 51). Conclusion Madison had strong views concerning the proposed constitution. His major concern revolved around the control of the minority by the majority. According to his arguments, the new constitution had embedded the specific mechanisms to ensure that the interests of the minority were secure. Madison also argued that it was very necessary for the representatives of the people to have power over the subjects in order to control them effectively. According to him, it would be better to entrust the public voice to the few selected representatives of the people. He felt that these representatives would represent the interests of the people. He was also concerned with the issue of decentralization of power and authority. According to Madison, it was paramount to partition the legislature into diverse sections and each department having its own power. Works Cited Madison, James. Federalist No. 10. . Madison, James. Federalist No. 51. . Read More