Summit vs State Supreme Court of Nevada - Essay Example

?Question Facts In the case of Summitt v. Supreme Court of Nevada (1985), Summitt sought to reverse a previous jury conviction from two counts of sexual assault. In the previous case, Summitt was indicted for three counts of sexual assault, but because of the state’s failure to preserve evidence, one charge of sexual intercourse was dropped, and he was convicted for cunnilingus and fellatio. Summitt allegedly committed the assault on a six-year old, and the grand jury convicted him for two counts of sexual assault. Summitt tried to introduce the prior sexual experience of the victim, including intercourse, fellatio and fondling. This previous assault occurred in the same location to the same victim and a witness in both the previous and current case. This testimony was offered by the appellant by stating that the victim had previous knowledge of similar acts that formed a foundation for the current case. Summitt was convicted by the grand jury, and the current case is an appeal on grounds of the rape shield law under FRE 412. Issue The issue before the court in the current case is whether the rape shield law allowed the admission of prior sexual experience of the victim as evidence in the case. The court had to determine whether Summitt could introduce the prior sexual experience of his victim as a basis for his defense in the appeal of his conviction. Rule The rule in this case is defined by the Nevada Revised Statute Section 50.090.1, which limits the inquiry into the sexual history of a victim in a rape or sexual assault case. This rule reversed the common law statute of rape cases, where the morality of the victim could have led the assailant to infer consent for sexual acts. Analysis The rape shield law was designed to prevent the introduction of irrelevant evidence in sexual assault cases, evidence that had the potential to prejudice a jury against a victim in the case. The evidence that is usually barred includes opinions or apparent previous reputations of the victim and prior sexual experience. In the case of Summitt v. The State Supreme Court of Nevada, the rape shield law was used to prevent the appellant from introducing a previous sexual assault on the victim as basis for defense. The appellant tried to claim that since the victim had been subjected to the same assault previously, the victim had prior independent knowledge of the present case. According to common law, a defendant has the right to present witnesses in a case, cross examine them and introduce any history that pertains to the case. But in the case of sexual assault, this history might have no bearing on the case and just prejudice the jury. Therefore, the rape shield law is used to shield the victim from unfair testimony. In this case, the defendant tried to prove that the prior sexual experience of the child could have been used to formulate the evidence in the current case, indicating that the rape shield law should not have been applied. In dissenting, Steffen, a judge, stated that the previous sexual experience of the victim could have been used to make up statements in the current case, and that the lesser court was wrong in excluding reference to the previous assault. Conclusion The decision in the case to reverse the prior ruling and remand the case for a new trial was based on the error by the district court in not admitting the prior sexual experience of the victim in the case. This means that the rape shield law can sometimes act unfavorably for the defendant, since the victim could have prior knowledge that might have bearing in the current case. Discussion The rule in this case impacts different rape and sexual cases. From the decision, it is seen that the rape shield law can be circumvented by a jury if it is evident that the defendant needs the prior sexual experience of the victim in his case. Question 2 Facts Martin Weil unexpectedly passed away, and on investigation, his doctors could not explain the cause of death or the cause of several medical complications that he experienced before his death. One of his physicians, Dr. Seltzer, had been treating the patient and prescribing medication for him for 20 prior years. However, the prescription provided by Dr, Seltzer were antihistamines, yet he had been providing Weil with steroids. An autopsy done on Weil revealed that the cause of death and ailments was the steroids that he had been using. Through discovery, it was also learnt that eight other of Dr. Seltzer’s patients were on antihistamine and decongestant prescriptions yet they were being given steroids. Dr. Seltzer was found to have purchases more that 1.7 million pills of steroids and had gone as far as to alter the labels in his prescriptions for his patients. Issue The issue before the court was whether the testimony of the five former patients f the physician in the case was improperly admitted. The testimony was whether Seltzer’s prescription of steroids in the pretext that they were either antihistamines or decongestants was improperly admitted in the case as evidence of habit. Rule In this case, the rule is that evidence of the habit of an individual or professional body in regards to the issues that it is mandated to do is enough to prove that the conduct of the individual conforms to the habit. This rule is used regardless of the presence or absence of eyewitnesses or corroboration to the habit or routine practice. Analysis Under FRE 406, evidence can be admitted in a case if the evidence points to the level of habit of an individual. In this instance, the term habit refers to regular activity by an individual or organization. The non-volitional characteristic of an action makes a habit probative. This means that the activity under debate might not have occurred constantly enough, therefore, there is sufficient probability that it would be committed at most or many instances. In the case against Dr. Seltzer, none of his patients had observed him serving another patient, and before the evidence of the other patients could be admitted, it must be shown that the patients have some knowledge of the habit under question. The potential witness has to demonstrate their knowledge of the habit of the individual in question, and failure to demonstrate this knowledge would make their evidence inadmissible (Laszko v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 114 Mich. App. 253, 1982). If the court is to admit the evidence as probative, the witness must be able to show that the physician performed the same habit with the witness and the patient. Conclusion From the case, it is evident that the doctor’s actions in prescribing the wrong medication over a long time are consistent, and since he failed to contradict the testimony, it should not have been excluded from proceedings. Discussion The holding in the case decided that, according to FRE 406, the evidence was wrongly admitted, and from the above analysis, it is evident that this is right. The evidence should not have been admitted. FRE 404 forbids the admission of former patient evidence in such a case, and despite the fact that the witnesses could testify to the habit in the case, their evidence is still inadmissible. Question 3 Facts In October 1975, a man entered a tavern in Philadelphia and ordered everybody to lie on the floor while waving a gun. The proprietor of the tavern identified the man as the appellant in the case since he saw the man’s face for a few seconds. The man with the gun and an accomplice emptied the cash register, took money from the occupants of the tavern and walked out of the bar. Outside the tavern, an off-duty police officer saw the two men run out and get into a waiting getaway car, and identified the appellant as one of the two men. However, he saw the man for no more than fifteen seconds, in which he saw the man’s back for most f the time, only seeing his face for no more than few seconds. He managed to get the license plate of the getaway car and had a full face view of the driver. The officer later identified the driver as Moore, but could not see the faces of the other people in the car, who he stated were probably four. A detective interrogated Moore, who stated that one of the people in the robbery was the appellant. Farris, the appellant was charged with conspiracy to commit robbery, where he was apprehended based on the interrogation of Moore. He was convicted of the charge and appealed. Issue The appellant raised several issues in the appeal, but in the appeal, the only issue was the issue of substance and hearsay according to FRE 801. Rule The rule in this case is obtained from FRE 810 (a)-(c), where the definition of statement, declarant and hearsay are made. In this rule, a statement is described as an oral or written assertion of fact or the conduct of an individual that is intended by the individual as an assertion. The declarant is defined as the person who makes the assertion or statement and hearsay is defined as a statement not made by the declarant while testifying in court and is offered as evidence to prove an issue in court. Analysis From the case, the holding was that the failure to sustain one of the defense’s objection mandated the remanding of a new trial. The defense counsel objected to the hearsay testimony of the detective that led to him arresting the appellant. In this case, the detective testified that Moore made a statement implicating the appellant, and based on that statement, the detective arrested the appellant. The defense objected to this admission of hearsay evidence, and the judge overruled the objection. The judgment of sentence was vacated and a new trial granted based on this fact. In this case, the definition of hearsay as an out-of-court statement that is used to prove a fact implies that the statement is unreliable. The statement is deemed inherently unreliable since the declarant is not under oath at the time of making the statement, and that the fact is not subject to closer scrutiny. In this case, some exceptions are allowed to the hearsay rule, for instance in cases where the context of the statement corroborate the statement. Conclusion From the case, the error of the judge in allowing the admission of hearsay evidence to support the prosecution’s case was erroneous. In this case, the appeal adhered to the requirements of FRE 801 and 802 concerning hearsay evidence. Discussion The fact that the statement made by Moore that led to the arrest of the appellant in the case is being used to prove the presence of the appellant in the crime scene. From the fact that hearsay includes statements made out of court and not under oath, it is evident that the jury was right in allowing a retrial of the case. The judge in the first case erred, since he should have sustained the objection by the defense counsel, instead of allowing an overrule. Question 4 Facts In January 1984, Michael and Victoria Donovan were involved in a collision at an intersection in Dallas City. From the case, it is evident that a stop sign that should have been at the intersection was missing at the time of the accident, a fact that can be used as the main cause of the accident. The fact that the stop sign was missing caused Donovan to have an accident, and it was found that the city had prior actual notice that the stop sign was missing. It was also found that the city failed to replace the stop sign within reasonable time, and that this failure to replace the sign was a proximate cause of the collision. The actual notice was provided by a lady who informed Backhaus, a witness, that she had the informed the city that the sign was down. This conversation between Backhaus and the woman was had when she drove up to the accident scene, looking visibly shaken by the events. Backhaus stated that her facial expression and voice tone indicated that she was distressed by the accident. Issue The issue before the court is whether the statement made by the woman to Backhaus constituted excited utterance or hearsay. This issue is argued in whether the court erred in admitting the testimony of Backhaus concerning the statement made by the woman. The other issue was whether the court had reasonable evidence to believe that the city had actual notice of the downed stop sign. Rule The rule in this case is obtained from FRE 803(2), which describes excited utterance as a statement concerning a startling event and is made while the declarant was under stress or excitement from the event. Section 803(2) states three conditions for a statement to qualify as an excited utterance; that there must be a startling occasion, that there must be no time to fabricate the statement, and that the statement relates to the circumstances of the event. Analysis The admission of the testimony of Backhaus concerning the statement made by a certain woman after the accident was not erroneous. The city argued that the statement made was hearsay, but from the facts of the case, it is evident that the statement was excited utterance. The first requirement for excited utterance is a startling occasion, which, in this case, was the accident. Backhaus contends that the woman was visibly shaken, since she looked either very excited or very upset. She was emotional, had shaking hands and a crackling voice. The second requirement, that the statement be made before having time for fabrication is also met, since Backhaus states that she immediately volunteered the statement that days before the accident, she had reported the fact that the sign was down to the city. The third requirement is also met, that the statement relates to the circumstances or the startling events at the occasion. This is met since the woman made a statement that explained the reason for the proximate cause of the accident. Conclusion The best example of an exception to the hearsay rule is the excited utterance rule as stated in FRE 803(2). In the case of City of Dallas v. Donovan (1989), the holding, that the city had actual notice of the stop sign being down, based on the excited utterance f a witness is admissible. This means that the city had notice and reasonable time with which to replace the stop sign that was a proximate cause of the accident. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Discussion The holding in this case helps to consolidate the excited utterance rule, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The facts and decision point out that there must be a clear distinction between hearsay and excited utterance. References City of Dallas v. Donovan, Court of Appeals Texas (1989) Commonwealth v. Farris, Superior Court of Pennsylvania (1997) Summitt v. State Supreme Court of Nevada (1985) Weil v. Seltzer, United States Court of Appeals, D.C. (1989) Laszko v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 114 Mich. App. 253 (1982) Read More