The More Things Change, The More They Stay the Same: Age-Old Conflicts in the Modern World - Coursework Example

The More Things Change, The More They Stay the Same: Age-Old Conflicts in the Modern World Introduction Do current forms of warfare and violent conflict represent fundamentally new challenges in terms of conflict resolution, or are they merely modern manifestations of an age-old problem? That question can be interpreted in a couple different ways. If one opts for a literal interpretation, the answer is a simple “no.” The form or methodology of warfare and pursuing violent conflict still has the same objective it has had throughout all of human history: simply to inflict harm on one’s enemy to obtain some advantage over him, be it the gaining of territory, control of a valuable resource, or to eliminate the enemy’s ability to pose a threat. This essay attempts to take a rather deeper view of the question, and examine whether or not the nature of conflicts themselves are fundamentally different now than at other times in history. If that is the case, then solving those conflicts – whether by preventing them in the first place, or by pursuing them by the modern forms of warfare – does present fundamentally new challenges. Unfortunately, perhaps, this does not seem to be the case. While globalism and the shared “sense” that the world is a different place may make it appear that conflicts now take place in a new context, the roots of those conflicts are still the same. The Over-optimism of Globalism The modern attitude is one in which it is assumed that the increasingly interconnected nature of Earth’s population leads to a broader, less parochial outlook. Undoubtedly, communication among people across physical and temporal boundaries – not only via the Internet itself, but by the particularly fast-rising Internet innovations of social networks – is faster and easier for more people than it ever has been in human history. People can share ideas personally to a degree that has never been possible, and there are a growing number of tangible material manifestations of this high degree of sharing, as Scholte (2010: 461) points out: “A number of languages (e.g., English), discourses (e.g. ‘‘development’’), symbols (e.g. the Nike insignia), and narratives (e.g. the soap opera) have global reach. Global spaces also host distinctive aesthetics such as fusion cuisine, computer-aided design, diaspora literature and hybrid music forms.” But on the very same page – actually, in the very next sentence – Scholte goes on to explain: “Meanwhile various non-territorial identities and associated solidarities stretch across the planet, with affective bonds based on caste, clan, class, disability, faith, gender, generation, race and sexuality.” (Ibid.) While Scholte chooses to look at these replacements for territorialism and nationalism as signs that the barriers between people – the event horizons of conflict – are breaking down, recent world experience indicates that they are not eliminating traditional conflict but simply shifting them into new areas. And some of these areas are not exactly new; the conflict between the Muslim and non-Muslim world is a good example. Recognising the challenges of changing attitudes and ending the conflict is not new, either. A well-known author opined, “The lies which well-meaning zeal has heaped round this man (Muhammad) are disgraceful to ourselves only.” Thomas Carlyle wrote that in Heroes and Hero Worship and the Heroic in History in 1840, but he might as well have written it yesterday. (quoted by Zahoor & Haq, 1997) That is not to say that globalism has entirely failed to reduce conflict at some level. The relationship between the US and China, for example, follows the classic pattern of prospect theory. The party with the advantage seeks to avoid conflict, while the party at a disadvantage takes greater risks. (Dai, 2009: 368) The net effect is that the two perspectives largely cancel each other, and serious conflict is avoided. Whether that will continue to be the case, however, is an open question. A large part of the ‘optimism of globalism’ is based on the idea of much broader, more diffuse, and freer markets; not only can people connect intimately with others all over the world, they can do business with them as well. Thus the rise of multi-national businesses which are presumed to have interests that transcend physical, political, and cultural boundaries should serve as a mitigating influence over potential ‘traditional’ conflicts. The trouble is that this neoliberalist view of the world as an open marketplace failed in a number of ways. The commercial perspective of globalism tends to aggravate inequality, and does so on a basis which is both very tangible and difficult to change without external influences. With the world as a marketplace, the judgment of the ‘value’ of discreet groups of people – whether it be citizens of a particular state or geographical area, or a distinct cultural group – is determined by the groups’ relative commercial value: their access to and control of resources and their buying power. In that respect, globalism, far from being a liberalising concept, is deeply rooted in imperialism – a root of conflicts for millennia. (Long & Mills, 2008: 404-405) Most multi-national enterprises are guided by prospect theory as well, and do little to mitigate conflicts while doing a great deal to avoid them; a conflict in one area “ties up the competition” and opens other areas for exploitation. (Dai, 2009: 368) This sometimes has the effect of creating or intensifying a new conflict; the intense competitive interest in recent history in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea, a potentially rich source of oil and gas and alternative to the unstable Middle East, is a good example. (Bandow, 2001: 3) Finally, the neoliberalist view failed functionally, as was spectacularly demonstrated to the entire world in the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The bright concept of “a totally privately-owned, self-regulated, competitive market system” turned out to be a myth as these systems virtually collapsed, while systems of “state capitalism” largely weathered the storm. (Wolnicki, 2010: 480) And with state capitalism come national interest and at least the hint of imperialism – old ideas in a very modern world. New Conflicts, Old Reasons Us vs. Them As the world has become increasingly ‘globalised’ over the past 10 to 20 years – or approximately since the break-up of the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War – the expectation has been that the sources of conflicts would change. The idea was that, with the dissolution of one of the world’s two superpowers, the tension between them that either led directly to conflicts or aggravated conflicts by the superpowers’ taking advantage of them had disappeared. On the one hand, this could lead to an overall more peaceful world, because after all, local conflicts would no longer bear overtones of global nuclear destruction. On the other hand, the lack of the controlling influence of the two superpowers over smaller conflicts could make the world a less peaceful place, because the forces that could ultimately control those conflicts no longer existed. The smaller conflicts had their own causes, but for the superpowers they became proxies for the clash of ideologies – Communism vs. Democracy. Afghanistan, the theatre of the world’s biggest current war, has had a troubled history filled with conflict; first against British colonisers, and then against each other. In the late 1970’s, a series of revolts brought Afghan Communists to power, sparking an uprising of Islamic traditionalists opposed to the radical reorganisation of Afghan society and institutions. The Soviet Union intervened to keep Afghanistan pro-Communist – a territorial consideration as well, since Afghanistan at that time lay along the USSR’s Central Asian border – and the US responded by providing only somewhat covert support for the Islamic mujahedin resistance. (Katzman, 2004: 1-2) Interestingly, at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, America was already facing its first resistance from Islamic fundamentalism in Iran, and thus was faced with two opposing ideologies – Communism and radical Islam – that it could use to advance its own interests. So for example, the US could use the spectre of Islamic fundamentalism to secure a military base agreement in Oman in 1979 – a country which, coincidentally, was only a few years removed from a serious Communist rebellion that had only been quashed with outside help (Petersen, 2004: 129-130) – and in the same period, play on fears of Communist expansion to invade the inconsequential Caribbean island nation of Grenada. (Katzman, 2005: 2; Bell, 2008: 38) With the Communist “threat” removed, the Islamic “threat” remains, which America has exploited to a comprehensive degree. To be fair, radical Islamists like the Al-Qaeda network have provided considerable justification for the American response; it is difficult to imagine any country letting the events of 9/11 or 7/7, or the Madrid train bombings, or any of the lesser terror attacks of the past decade go completely unchallenged. But having the opportunity to present such a viscerally-frightening enemy also presents the opportunity to pursue ulterior motives. The US government played on the fears of the public to claim that the hated dictator Saddam Hussein was hand-in-glove with America’s worst radical Islamic enemies to justify the invasion of Iraq, as well as using the spectre of terrorism to curtail the freedoms of the American people, claims that we now know were at best overstated and at worst, deliberate lies. (Bell, 2008: 39-40) The spectre of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism is even used to a degree to justify establishing an American presence in Southeast Asia, which the Bush Administration declared was the “second front in the war on terror” (Vaughn, et al., 2005: 2); only the most guileless would consider it coincidental that the region is close to America’s ‘next’ serious rival, China. The US “war on terror” and the ideology on both sides is the largest and loudest example, but it is a pattern that is found even in smaller conflicts, such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or between the government of Colombia and the FARC rebellion. (Ugarriza, 2009: 98) The ideology has become more flexible, but it is still very much “Us vs. Them,” and “they” will destroy our peace/prosperity/way of life if we don’t destroy them first. The “Us vs. Them” ideology can even be extended to rebut criticism of its being a thin cover for imperialist aims, as noted American conservative commentator and author Charles Krauthammer complained in 2004: Historically, multilateralism is a way for weak countries to multiply their power by attaching themselves to stronger ones. But multilateralism imposed on Great Powers, and particularly on a unipolar power, is intended to restrain that power. Which is precisely why France is an ardent multilateralist. But why should America be? Why, in the end, does liberal internationalism want to tie down Gulliver, to blunt the pursuit of American national interests by making them subordinate to a myriad of other interests? (Krauthammer, 2004: 8) Why indeed? The implication is that national interests are inviolate and above being questioned…but only “our” national interests, not everyone else’s. Roma Invicta. Rule Britannia. Deutschland über Alles. Pride and Persecution Some years prior to the American Revolution the great American statesman Benjamin Franklin wrote, “While the government is mild and just, while important civil and religious rights are secure, such subjects will be dutiful and obedient. The waves do not rise but when the winds blow.” (Dodson, 2009: 431) The “us versus them” conflict in terms of the disadvantaged against those with advantages is as old as history as well; what may be new is a better understanding of peoples’ reactions to change and perceived persecutions. Research within the past couple of years in the Baltic States, whose people went through significant social and political change after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, found that the willingness to outwardly conform to new social rules was the norm, but that people tended to become more egocentric and less socially-responsible. (Lakis, 2009: 209) Other research has found that a perception of the emotional role of the humiliated victim allowing for aggression against the persecutor – in a sense, a perception of striking back in self-defence – was likely to result in the person feeling himself to be persecuted to actually act aggressively, and that a key to this action was “rumination,” or “having some time to think about it.” (Coleman, et al., 2009: 126) So what are these insights into human behaviour describing? Put in different terms, when changes are imposed on people, they become more aware of their self-interests, and when those self-interests are threatened, and they have an opportunity to consider the threat, they are likely to lash out. Leaders at any level who provoke conflict may not necessarily under these behaviours in these terms, but the cues of “injustice” and “persecution” have long been used – fanning Franklin’s winds, as it were – to inflame one group or another to the point that conflict erupts. For example, in 1987 and 2000, the government of Fiji was overthrown by coup d’état, an action greatly aided by a large number of ethnic Fijians angered at the “prejudice” of their system against them – even though by 1987 and especially by the time of the 2000 coup, the successive Fijian governments had made great strides in correcting social inequities and creating a native middle class. (Prasad, 2008: 956-958) By the time of a third coup in 2006, the “ethnic prejudice” excuse had been worn out, and thus the coup plotters blamed the injustice on “corruption” and “bad governance,” a step up in a way because it included everyone in Fiji, and not just a particular ethnic group. (Prasad, 2008: 958-959) In much more recent times, we have seen much the same pattern in places like Sudan, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, with a variety of degrees of intensity and outcomes. Jingoistic rhetoric can sometimes achieve the same ends where real, tangible persecution does not exist. The appeal to “nationalism” and the importance of defending the state’s “sovereign rights” is used as justification for many conflicts. Consider the dispute between the nations of Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear Temple, which lies on the frontier between the two countries. Thailand acknowledges Cambodia’s territorial control over the ancient temple, a World Heritage Site, but a squabble over a few kilometres of disputed land surrounding the temple (land which is largely inaccessible, trackless mountain jungle) has occasionally led to both sides mobilising their armed forces and a few deadly skirmishes. In the point of view of the Thai government, “What worries Thailand is not the title over the Temple but rather the fact that the zonings, stipulated in the documents submitted by Cambodia to UNESCO for the purpose of inscription, include areas in the vicinity of the Temple which Thailand considers to be Thai territory. Until the boundary demarcation is completed, therefore, Thailand has to act to protect its legitimate rights, as this issue will affect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both sides. The rationale behind Thailand’s action is self-explanatory. Any country in Thailand’s position would do the same thing.” (“Understanding the Temple of Preah Vihear Issue”, 2008) Unfortunately, that latter assertion is probably correct. The concept of the nation as an inviolate entity is universal – recall the presumptive tone of Charles Krauthammer’s assertion earlier – and strongly unifying. One of the reasons given for America’s, and to a slightly lesser extent, Australia’s keen interest in maintaining close ties and some degree of physical presence with Asian countries like the Philippines is the threat of war in Asia, which beyond the damage it could cause to the Asian countries presents a serious risk to US and Australian interests. (Bandow, 2001: 6-7) Much of Asia has enjoyed a long period of unprecedented economic prosperity, and the Asian nations’ new importance to the rest of world signals a new order of international relationships. This evolution, however, will require some give-and-take, and it is not at all clear how inclined intractably nationalistic countries like China and Taiwan, and especially odd cases like North Korea will be to concede anything for a greater good. (Berger, 2000: 406; White, 2008: 87) Conclusion While the world may indeed be more ‘global’ in practise, it seems that it has a long way to go to become more global in spirit. Conflicts still occur with depressing regularity; the mere fact that the people of Earth have opportunities unprecedented in history to communicate with one another and become familiar with different cultures has not meant that the familiar old patterns of conflict, or the reasons for them, have changed at all. All the various ways in which people can be divided – ideologically, economically, socially, or as a function of lines on a map – are still used to divide people by those who seek some advantage. Even though more transnational organisations, bodies such as the UN, the EU, the ASEAN, and others, exist now than ever before, they are made up of individual member states which still have very old perspectives on global relationships, and whose collective actions tend to reflect that. (Long & Mills, 2008: 405) Thus “current forms of warfare” are not fundamentally different from the form of warfare invented when the first human angrily threw a rock at another, or hit him with his fist. Tactics change, the tools change, but the reasons for fighting in the first place remain the same, and resolving those reasons is, after all, the whole key to successful conflict resolution. As long as the fundamental reasons for conflict are the same, the fundamental methods for resolving conflicts are the same as well. Communication and striving to find some common ground are critical. Even in instances where mutual suspicion is justifiably high and mutual understanding non-existent, people on opposite sides of a conflict can find some exchange of values and begin to develop a relationship. (Nobel, et al., 2010: 221) It may not be perfect, but it’s a start. The best hope for conflict resolution, and possibly the only innovation from the modern world that will make a significant difference in resolving conflicts now and in the future, is the ability of ordinary people all over the world to communicate with one another. Knowing what motivates people to unhealthy self-interest or violent action can be misused, of course, and often is, but the inter-connected nature of the world now makes it much harder for the demagogue to incite the masses without being challenged. Using our connections to listen in to what the world is talking about, and using them to spread truth and reason will be using them to their best and most noble effect. References Bandow, D. (2001) “Instability in the Philippines; A Case Study for U.S. Disengagement”. Foreign Policy Briefing No. 64, 21 March 2001. Washington: The Cato Institute. Bell, W. (2008) “The American invasion of Grenada: a note on false prophecy”. foresight, 10(3): 27-42. Berger, T. (2000) “Set for Stability? Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation in East Asia”. Review of International Studies, 26(3): 405-428. Coleman, P.T., Goldman, J.S., and Kugler, K. (2009) “Emotional intractability: gender, anger, aggression and rumination in conflict”. International Journal of Conflict Management, 20(2): 113-121. Dai, L. (2009) “Caught in the middle: multinational enterprise strategy in interstate warfare”. Competitiveness Review: An International Business Journal, 19(5): 355-376. Dodson, E.J. (2009) “Benjamin Franklin’s principles of political economy: a speculative inquiry”. International Journal of Social Economics, 36(4): 428-446. Katzman, K. (2004) “Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy”. CRS Report RL30588, 25 March 2004. Washington: Congressional Research Service, US Library of Congress. Katzman, Kenneth. (2005) “Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy”. CRS Report RS21534, 28 June 2005. Washington: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Krauthammer, C. (2004) Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World. Washington: AEI Press. Lakis, J. (2009) “Social conflicts and the culture of cooperation in transitional society”. Baltic Journal of Management, 4(2): 206-220. Long, B.S., and Mills, A.J. (2008) “Globalization, postcolonial theory, and organizational analysis: Lessons from the Rwanda genocide”. Critical Perspectives on International Business, 4(4): 389-409. Nobel, O.B-Y., Campbell, D., Hannah, S.T., and Wortinger, B. (2010) “Soldiers’ negotiations in combat areas: The effects of role clarity and concern for members of the local population”. International Journal of Conflict Management, 21(2): 202-227. Peterson, J. E. (2004) ‘Oman: Three and a Half Decades of Change and Development’. Middle East Policy 11(2): 125-137. Prasad, A. (2008) “Moving beyond “ethnic” conflict in Fiji: from colonization to the coup of 2006”. International Journal of Social Economics, 35(12): 951-962. Scholte, J.A. (2010) “Governing a More Global World”. Corporate Governance, 10(4): 459-474. Ugarriza, J.E. (2009) “Ideologies and conflict in the post-Cold War”. International Journal of Conflict Management, (20)1: 82-104. “Understanding the Temple of Preah Vihear Issue”. (2008) Statement of the Thai Government, 19 March 2008. [Internet] Available from: www.mfa.go.th/internet/information/19648.pdf. Vaughn, B., Chanlett-Avery, E., Cronin, R., Manyin, M., and Niksch, L. (2005) “Terrorism in Southeast Asia”. CRS Report RL31672, 7 February 2005. Washington: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. White, H. (2008) “Why War in Asia Remains Thinkable”. Survival, 50(6): 85-104. Wolnicki, M. (2010) “The day after neoliberal triumphalism”. International Journal of Social Economics, 37(7): 476-487. Zahoor, A., and Haq, Z. (1997) “Quotations From Famous People”. [Website] Available from: http://www.cyberistan.org/islamic/quote1.html#montet. Read More

) While Scholte chooses to look at these replacements for territorialism and nationalism as signs that the barriers between people – the event horizons of conflict – are breaking down, recent world experience indicates that they are not eliminating traditional conflict but simply shifting them into new areas. And some of these areas are not exactly new; the conflict between the Muslim and non-Muslim world is a good example. Recognising the challenges of changing attitudes and ending the conflict is not new, either.

A well-known author opined, “The lies which well-meaning zeal has heaped round this man (Muhammad) are disgraceful to ourselves only.” Thomas Carlyle wrote that in Heroes and Hero Worship and the Heroic in History in 1840, but he might as well have written it yesterday. (quoted by Zahoor & Haq, 1997) That is not to say that globalism has entirely failed to reduce conflict at some level. The relationship between the US and China, for example, follows the classic pattern of prospect theory.

The party with the advantage seeks to avoid conflict, while the party at a disadvantage takes greater risks. (Dai, 2009: 368) The net effect is that the two perspectives largely cancel each other, and serious conflict is avoided. Whether that will continue to be the case, however, is an open question. A large part of the ‘optimism of globalism’ is based on the idea of much broader, more diffuse, and freer markets; not only can people connect intimately with others all over the world, they can do business with them as well.

Thus the rise of multi-national businesses which are presumed to have interests that transcend physical, political, and cultural boundaries should serve as a mitigating influence over potential ‘traditional’ conflicts. The trouble is that this neoliberalist view of the world as an open marketplace failed in a number of ways. The commercial perspective of globalism tends to aggravate inequality, and does so on a basis which is both very tangible and difficult to change without external influences.

With the world as a marketplace, the judgment of the ‘value’ of discreet groups of people – whether it be citizens of a particular state or geographical area, or a distinct cultural group – is determined by the groups’ relative commercial value: their access to and control of resources and their buying power. In that respect, globalism, far from being a liberalising concept, is deeply rooted in imperialism – a root of conflicts for millennia. (Long & Mills, 2008: 404-405) Most multi-national enterprises are guided by prospect theory as well, and do little to mitigate conflicts while doing a great deal to avoid them; a conflict in one area “ties up the competition” and opens other areas for exploitation.

(Dai, 2009: 368) This sometimes has the effect of creating or intensifying a new conflict; the intense competitive interest in recent history in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea, a potentially rich source of oil and gas and alternative to the unstable Middle East, is a good example. (Bandow, 2001: 3) Finally, the neoliberalist view failed functionally, as was spectacularly demonstrated to the entire world in the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The bright concept of “a totally privately-owned, self-regulated, competitive market system” turned out to be a myth as these systems virtually collapsed, while systems of “state capitalism” largely weathered the storm.

(Wolnicki, 2010: 480) And with state capitalism come national interest and at least the hint of imperialism – old ideas in a very modern world. New Conflicts, Old Reasons Us vs. Them As the world has become increasingly ‘globalised’ over the past 10 to 20 years – or approximately since the break-up of the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War – the expectation has been that the sources of conflicts would change. The idea was that, with the dissolution of one of the world’s two superpowers, the tension between them that either led directly to conflicts or aggravated conflicts by the superpowers’ taking advantage of them had disappeared.

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