Media and Its Effect on Terrorism - Essay Example

Media and Its Affect on Terrorism Accordint to Raphael governments, terrorists, and the media view the function, roles as well as the responsibilities of the media when covering terrorist incidents from different and often competing standpoints. Such viewpoints persuade behavior during terrorist events- frequently resulting in both strategic and tactical gains to the terrorist operation as well as the terrorist cause in general. The challenge to both the press and governmental communities is to comprehend the dynamics of terrorist activities and to make policy options intended to serve the interests of the media, government, and the society (Raphael, 1). The Government uses the media in attempts to limit the harm terrorist inflict to society and in attempts to punish or arrest those responsible for terrorist acts. The Government wants coverage to press forward their agenda and not the terrorists’ agenda. It uses the media to present terrorists as criminals and prevent glamorizing them so as to promote the perspective that blowing up a building, kidnapping a well-known individual, or hijacking an airplane are criminal acts despite the terrorists reasons (Raphael, 1). According to Joseph (1), well-known terrorist groups are adapting strategies and tactically progressing out because of comprehensive, global counterterrorism operations overseas. They are becoming expert at making use of homegrown terrorists, regional operatives, and communication technologies to the fullest, within reach for a long-term terror campaign against the United States. Nowadays, terrorist groups are enlisting, instigating, and guiding international strategies not just through Internet operations but by the use of a well planned, constant blend of propaganda videos as well as call-to-action messages disseminated via social media platforms, for example Face book, blogs, Twitter and YouTube (Joseph, 2). The social media framework of the terrorists is aiming disenfranchised youth with complex, fictional information and forming grassroots terrorists inside the borders of United States. thus, foreign jihadists are amplifying their chances of attacking the United States using a mix, multimedia community participant tactic intended to persuade citizen extremists to violence, organize ideological movements, create opportunities to enlist within the United States from relating world incidents, and promote domestic terrorists to lay down their own objectives and take direct action in the company of open-ended and open-source jihad at home. The tactic of getting together like-minded individuals through conversational media to amplify radicalism as well as the combined technical skills of jihadists, in unison with greater dependence upon local criminal activities for instance, selling narcotics and committing robberies for proceeds, is drastically altering the domestic threat image and accumulation the difficulty of conquering borderless terrorism. This strategy has done away with the need for direct financial support from famous terrorist groups as well as global supporters for the reason that home-based jihadists are able to fund their personal operations, as in recent times displayed via the disrupting and damaging improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in England; Spain, Madrid; Sweden; Scotland, Glasgow; Stockholm, London,; and many frustrated plots within the United States. Out of the thirty-two plots inside the United States scrutinized from open-source material, just a small number confirmed proof of foreign funding. Moreover, virtual classrooms have narrowed the operational impact of eradicating key bomb-making experts, since comprehensive instruction for constructing improvised explosive device is available via global networks (Joseph, 3). Many terrorists have been arrested or murdered following 9/11, including crucial operational leaders as well as well skilled bomb makers. These events have yielded reduced tradecraft in constructing improvised explosive device and decreased operational strength in planning and executing large-scale, fatal, impressive attacks with far-reaching outcomes. Even so, there still remains an abundant use of improvised explosive devices worldwide, and improvised explosive device still remains to be the most extensively utilized weapon by jihadists to wound and kill people both inside as well as outside of combat zones. The utilization of the tools of social media to openly talk with target audiences, for instance prospective recruits in the states jihadists desire to attack, is encouraging the rising spread of the skills of building a bomb and improvised explosive device operations worldwide, including within the United States. This all-encompassing, asymmetrical threat is thriving via the use of the tools of social media; generating life-long security challenges for domestic police force and intelligence organizations; and increasing the domestic threat of random, low level surgical strikes from the home-based terrorists using person-borne, vehicle-borne, and leave-behind improvised explosive(Joseph, 3). Violent Islamist extremism is described as the ideology campaigning for establishment of a worldwide state that would force the most radical version of Islamic law and the utilization of violence not in favor of non-Muslim military persons as well as civilians and also against those Muslim who are opposing this ideology. To enlist supporters, violent Islamist extremism makes use of a storyline that the West, guided by the United States, is at warfare with Islam. Radicalization refers to the process by which persons take on violent Islamist extremism. Earlier in 2007, media arm of al Qaeda, the Global Islamic Media Front, made public over the Internet on different social media sites a bomb making manual translated in English. The training material inside this manual derived from Abu Khabbab al Misri’s teachings, a famous Egyptian bomb creator within the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) community who gave teachings in terrorist training camps inside Afghanistan and was murdered by a missile strike of the United States in Pakistan years ago. This all-inclusive explosives training manual educates general chemistry; kitchen laboratory operations; comprehensive instructions for manufacturing primary, secondary, as well as improvised explosives from ordinary ingredients; and guidelines for manufacturing improvised explosive devices and detonators.. This tendency of utilizing social media as a platform where people learn how to nurture technical capabilities is generating new ways for home-based jihadists to bring together skills in manufacturing improvised explosive device and upgrading operational procedures for initiating deadly attacks inside the United States. Furthermore, social media has been seen to provide a larger geographical reach for well-known terrorist groups and their widely dispersed associates by providing skilled bomb makers as well as terrorist leaders’ opportunities to talk directly to supporters and make the most of home-based jihadists’ readiness to carry out martyrdom operations anyplace in the world or sacrifice life in jail, particularly in the West (Joseph, 4). This strategy sounds familiar on the surface; terrorists have been spreading improvised explosive devices instructions and propaganda through the internet for many years, however the function that social media plays in the communications means of today is much more active. For instance, one activist hailing from Egypt tweeted in a few words regarding why digital media is and was so significant to in the organizing of political unrest: “We utilize Face book to plan the protests, use Twitter to synchronize, and YouTube to inform the world.” According to Philip (4), this statement signifies the difference between the social media and Internet; extremists will not go and to look for the information in the Internet, rather than the social media will be the one come to the extremists (Joseph, 4). The police force should not be deluded that the theory of terrorism and guarding critical infrastructure is very dissimilar to what it was a decade ago. Officers constantly encounter new and unexpected threats. Traditional media, that is, newspapers, radio, television, and other print publications, are no longer capable of controlling the messages that terrorists aim to convey to disenfranchise population in regional or international areas (George, 5). These days, instant-messaging jihadists are able to converse with any person and amplify the drumbeat of violence through texting directly the extremists in their countries, linking videos, as well as editing foreign and domestic news stories to stimulate anger and generate feelings of power and self-importance. This type of social media usage makes grassroots radicalization even more possible and is escalating the possibility of enlisting facilitators or operatives legally living in countries which have been targeted. This continuous form of exploitation will most probably amplify the possibility of future improvised explosive device attacks inside borders of United States given that more individuals than ever seen before with national and cultural knowledge are able to access in depth instructions on manufacturing explosives and making improvised explosive devices, backing from within refugee communities, as well as virtual guidance for executing bombing attacks with very little to not even one warning signs for law enforcement agencies and intelligence to notice and interrupt plots (Joseph, 5). Even though there have been recent unsuccessful efforts by home-based jihadists to execute bombing attacks inside the United States, eighteen of thirty terror plots scrutinized between the year 2001 and 2010 entailed making use of improvised explosive devices. According to the New York State Intelligence Center (5), the security community must not make the mistake of gauging the lack of comprehension of explosives essentials and technical knowledge of constructing improvised explosive device as ordinary operational practices of home-based terrorists. Nor should the police force assume that since there were no bombs which had been detonated or no causalities in these events, the ability to construct deadly improvised explosive devices and execute successful attacks inside the United States have been forever lessened by the hunt and apprehension of terrorists all over the world. It’s most probable that main jihadists will get a long-term look at these failed operations- even though in their eyes this is not a failure - and create new, more comprehensive instructions on improvised explosive devices manufacture for social media circulation in an attempt to build upon the existing, low-level technical capabilities. Those community opposed to improvised explosive devices have in the past witnessed terrorist organizations post on the Internet top quality production instructional videos for making detonators, explosively formed projectiles, suicide vests, and improvised explosives to advance improvised explosive device strategies in overseas rebellion operations(Joseph, 6). This approach, whether deliberately planned or not, of self-made terrorists and lone-wolf individuals to opportunistically attack emblematic targets at anytime or anyplace they ascertain susceptibilities is proficiently generating open-source as well as open-ended conflicts inside the United States. Furthermore, this strategy has the potential to instill doubt into future threat frameworks of homeland analysis due to the lack of the ability to forecast with correctness the level of the technical skills being acquired as well as operational knowledge being shared by multidimensional, irregular actors residing within the United States. The outcome of this new threat example is that a nonentity can be converted into a somebody without being required to travel to Yemen, Pakistan, or areas in Northern Africa (Joseph, 6). The new reality of today is that those who aspire to be jihadists are not required to leave home to take part in lethal terrorist attacks not in favor of the United States or become radicalized. They can be converted into radicals in small steps with no need to ever travel overseas thus risk being recognized by intelligence agencies. Wannabe jihadists can individually brand themselves as radicals through logging into Internet discussions of unrestricted and unregulated speech, and make a resilient effective terror cell where they are able to share as well as spread ideological beliefs, raise finances, distribute misinformation, validate and create for violence, become skilled at and share terrorist strategies from combat zones, praise and contrast notes on successful and also botched terrorists plots and prop up a jihad campaign against anything or anyone within the United States(Joseph, 7). The crisis of social media and improvised explosive device operations within the United States produces a mixture of challenges to the security organizations. Many terrorists have recognized the operational effectiveness and resiliency social media. It has become a big problem to protecting potential as well as favored targets from plots that originates from behind platforms of the media with numerous individuals able to access radicalization processes, where emotion eliminates reason and improvised explosive device capabilities are manufactured at home. This developing threat will need huge resources and different approaches from national, state, as well as local governments to continuously view media sites to grow to be familiar with strategies of interest and look out for increasing technical capabilities for executing improvised explosive device attacks within the United States. The ordinary susceptibility to this means of communication as well as open-source conflict will most probably make jihadists to amplify their use of the tools of social networks and, consequently, change the structure of terrorism and what the police force considers and knows regarding this worldwide incident (Joseph, 7). The fatal and psychological effectiveness of improvised explosive devices on the population of a country, together with the increase of the easiness to have access to information on how to build improvised explosive device, will make sure this threat still continues to linger for the projected future. The probability of home-based jihadists discovering the skills to position sophisticated improvised explosive devices within the United States from those who are well experienced in fighting as a result of fighting in foreign countries and who have the knowledge to create vehicle-borne or person-borne improvised explosive devices will test the effectiveness of the frontline as well as the security community’s prevention credibility. The deterrence credibility of an organization is gauged by the speed upon which stakeholders are able to recognize the new trends that are emerging, not by real events, but via the intelligence cycle, as well as devise security measures to delay or defeat those developing threats before they are utilized in a terrorist attack. This is the foundation of risk-based, security strategies that are driven by intelligence, a process that a good number of homeland security stewards have adopt and put into practice successfully (Joseph, 8) The multimedia tactic of well-known terrorist groups most probably mirrors what terrorists desire to grow to be at the beginning of this, the twenty-first century: a decentralized, an unpredictable, organic, networked, freelance-type organization that initiates risk as well as uncertainty inside the marketplace, draws upon technical field experiences from people across the world, and takes into consideration the activities as well as the contributions made from jihadist operations in all over the globe. This approach makes a long-drawn-out strategy that assumes the summation of terrorist attacks within the mother countries of Western nations to be greater when compared to a major attack by an individual (Joseph, 8). The outcome of the mixture of violent extremism, particularly violent Islamist extremism, the function of the Internet, and the increase of damaging technology is that the government along with the law enforcement agencies ought to increasingly put emphasis on deterrence of terrorism which is growing in homes. This task is very difficult due to the fact that, even though there exists a general four-stage model of radicalization meant for the violent Islamist extremism, those people who have been radicalized did not necessarily follow the models series of stages, and an investigation on the cases of homegrown terrorism does not disclose a profile to forecast who will be converted to radicals except for that homegrown terrorists are mostly male and approximately two-thirds are below the age of thirty. Conclusion For the past few years, social media has turned into a crucial operating juncture for permitting jihadists to function self-sufficiently and to scheme attacks within the United States from inside. It is difficult to verify to what degree the tools of social media are being utilized to radicalize persons and plan attacks inside the United States for the reason that it is difficult to gauge this process. The media has and will still continue to play a greater role in escalating radicalization as well as the spreading instructions for improvised explosive devices attacks inside the United States. In the near future, the police force will almost certainly continue to witness lone radicals setting up low-skill-level improvised explosive device attacks with a few causalities within the United States. Despite the fact that no one will oppose this situation, particularly the unsuspicious individuals being targeted or the Explosive Ordnance Disposal technicians are acting in response to these attacks, the police force should not permit these kinds of events to mislead its better judgment(Joseph, 9). The social media, at its best, has the authority to alter the existing state of affairs; it can make possible putting an end to authoritarian regimes and teach a society. The social media, at its worst, it can educate enough explosives fundamentals, general chemistry, electronics, surveillance operations, and improvised explosive devices operational planning to make possible for even beginners to create deadly improvised explosive devices able to produce mass murder and damage inside United States cities as well as transportation sectors (Joseph, 9). Works Cited General Ray. (2009). Be a Part of Intelligentsia: A Talk on Countering Terror. isb.edu, 15 January 2009. Web 22 April 2014. Joseph Kunkle. (2012). Social Media and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat. Policechiefmagazine.org, 4 June 2012. Web 22 April 2014. Philip Howard, (2011). The Arab Spring’s Cascading Effects. Miller-mccune.com, 23 February 2011. Web 22 April 2014 Raphael Perl. (1997). Terrorism, The Media, And The Government: Perspectives, Trends, And Options For Policymakers. Fas.org, 22 October 1997. Web 22 April 2014. . Read More