Mass Strike - Workmates 2011 - Case Study Example

Mass Strike: Workmates The workmates experience involves many issues of interest to workplace activists. In the late Eighteenth Century, casualization and threat of outsourcing are some of the key issues that affected both the public and private sector workers. The workers used earlier poor working conditions and management to address current issues in their respective workplaces. Another issue was the question of how the workplace militants were related to the existing trade unions and their significance. The existing trade unions were established unable to execute their duties appropriately, since they were unwilling to fight for workers’ rights, and organize the workers to defend themselves. In this paper, the writer addresses several issues relating to Workmates 2011. It discusses how and why the 1990s London tube workers organized themselves against threatened privatization, and increasing precarity. It further discusses why the workers’ preferred using outside contractors at the expense unions. As part of this paper, the reasons for the growing ineffectiveness of the workers’ unions, the reasons of organizing outside them, and the new strategies the organizations have developed to address decrease in union power are also discussed in the paper. Introduction The decreasing power of track maintenance workers’ union of London in 1990s, threatened it being outsourced to a private contractor under Public-Private Partnership (PPP) scheme (Ellman, 2010 p7). This new strategy was introduced to cut production cost, by introducing competitive tendering by private contractors to perform the work, which was earlier done by the firms themselves. In addition, it was focused to replace relative job security with insecure and temporary employment that was widespread under “flexible labor market”, and undercut terms and conditions of London Underground staff (Gall, 2003 p79). The 1990s London Underground workers were organized under Rail, Maritime and Transport Union (RMT). Casual staff and third-party contractors were, however, typically not unionized. Private contractors such as RMT, anarchist, and Andy began to use anarcho-syndicalist tactics like on-the-job direct and mass meeting actions to counteract divisions between non-union and union workers, and build resistance to the increasing outsourcing and privatization on the London Underground (McIlroy, 1995 p97). This tactic was mainly focused to divide and rule workforce. Divide and rule of the workforce led to the formation of Workmates collective in late 1998 and early 1999. The first Workplace group was established in London maintenance depot. Policies of the Workplace group allowed all workers to join this group no matter of their union membership. It also set to organize meetings on shop floors, with the workers themselves as the members (Solidarity Federation, 2011 p4). The workmate collective took effect with a delegate council structure, which was set to function for 18 months. Within a period of 18 months, which ran up to mid-2000, members of the workmate collective organized several mass strikes, of which several ones were successful, and this created staff turnover. However, shop meetings were continued, and any worker was allowed to join this group despite of her or his union organization (Solidarity Federation, 2011 p4). Threatened Privatization London Underground drafted and introduced its “Company Plan” in the early 1990s. This plan was intended to bring a number of changes such as changing industrial relations structures, getting rid of some established perks, and reviewing worker’s terms and conditions (Eur, 2002 p608). Additionally, the plan brought recruitment of new workers into stop, since new staff requirements were brought in as outsourced contractors. The new policies were focused on incorporating private sector norms into the firm, so that they would become more attractive to private capital (Eur, 2002 p610). Workers union such as RMT strongly opposed the new Company plan, but they failed to fight it out. The introduction of Company plan even called for the privatization of London Underground infrastructure through a Public Private Partnership (PPP) (Dunwoody, 2008 p54). This was a government’s move to split off railway stations and trains from maintenance and infrastructure of the railways and signals among other maintenance practices. RMT began to resist this move when the first tender was put for private firms in 1998. This reaction was the union’s move to protest over RMT’s failure to deliver its duty efficiently, and members of RMT’s anger over their poor showing in the Company plan (Great Britain: National Audit Office, 2009 p12). Privatization of infrastructure and railway tracks on the London Underground began in late 2002 and early 2003, with almost two-thirds of the maintenance job delegated to the private consortium Metronet under Public-Private Partnership (Smethurst & Carter, 2009 p336). Privatization via anarcho-syndicalists was going to give the government no room for state ownership and, therefore, privatization through the tube was the only way that the government would undermine workers’ terms and conditions, while introducing a profit motive at the expense of workers’ rights, something that would significantly affect rail infrastructure (Smethurst & Carter, 2009 p336). This is clearly demonstrated by the Metronet claims after taking over track maintenance. What they promised is contrary to what actually happened. When taking over, they promised to upgrade 35 stations, but by 2007, when they joined the administration, they had only delivered 14 stations. Further, they estimated and set the initial budget at £2m, but it was afterwards increased by 375 percent to £7.5 million (White, 2002 p180). Further, only 65 percent of maintenance work had been achieved by the year 2006. However, from this unwelcoming act, Metronet was managing to raise £1 million weekly in the first year of its business operation. In 2007, when the consortium joined the administration, all the five private backers put up £70 million each. The government was also forced to put up £1.7 billion bailout so as to put infrastructure maintenance back into the house. During this process, large bonuses were pocketed by more than five departing directors; however, the exact amounts were not disclosed due to commercial confidentiality (Great Britain: National Audit Office, 2009 p10). Before Metronet was taken back into the house, they were managing two-thirds of the lines on the London Underground, with the rest of remaining, North, Piccadilly and Jubilee lines being managed by private firm tube lines. Metronet had its key employees, but depended on private contractors to make up the number of its staff members required. This was significant because it easily enabled them to increase their workforce when workload was high, and reduce it when workload was low (Klaus, 1993 p97). This strategy also minimized labor cost. Use of contractors by this firm is similar to outsourcing practiced by other organizations. Outsourcing was done on a contract basis, where tendering was announced, thereby creating a competition, and the firm that proved that it can perform the job effectively was awarded the contract. Use of Outside Contractors Contracting was highly preferred because it led to no lawful industrial dispute, since the contractors were self-employed, and they had no legal employer to enter into dispute with (McCarthy, 2004 p116). Undermining workers their legal rights, employment rights, effective trade unionism, and income security are some of the reasons why casualization and contracting attracted many employers. When the Company plan was introduced in the early 1990s, RMT did not strongly oppose it, because it was going to prepare grounds for privatization. However, when the private contract companies were invited to offer tenders in 1998, RMT began to resist the Company plan. RMT’s resistance was largely from the Unions’ reactions, protesting against RMT members over their union’s poor corporation to solve a previous dispute, the Company Plan (McCarthy, 2004 p115). During this time, there were about 100 full-time employees doing track maintenance for London Underground. For over two years, there were approximately 200 agency employees working together with London Underground staff members, who worked for a contracting company called Morsons (Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Transport Committee, 2005 p1). Most of London Underground employees were members of RMT, and contractors were non-unionists, and they were hired and fired by the company based on their job performances. Pressure from RMT union members, made the union to organize for mass strikes, in order to protest against privatization. However, they were suspicious that if they strike, the company will fire them, and rely heavily on non-union contract staff (Klaus, 1993 p97). The resolution to stop the strike was arrived at between the company and the union official, but not the workers themselves. This led to the beginning of all-worker shop meetings, which also paved the way for the formation of Workmates. Formation of Unofficial Workmates In order to bare non-unionized contractors from going to work as the first day of strike approached, RMT members threatened them that will not be crossing picket lines when the strike begins. It happened during that time that most contractors were commuting from far places outside London such as Wales. They, therefore, had to cross the picket lines every night when going to work. It happened on the first day of strike that, out of 100 key employees, only about six to seven came to work (Gall, 2003 p81). On that day, however, not a single contractor reported to the workplace, and this changed the attitude of permanent employees towards them. This led to the formation of some kind of workplace association between the union and non-union workers. The first associations were, however, not all that effective because the contractors were self-employed, and they had no employment rights to influence anything in the company like permanent workers. Several non-union workers showed less interest in joining RMT, since RMT operated under a legal framework, and means that it was of no use to them (Gall, 2003 p84). The only solution for an effective organization between the union and non-union workers was the formation of an interdependent body on the RMT, which is not totally dependent and independent on it. The new group was intended to benefit contractors and give RMT more power. This new group is referred to as Workmates (Gall, 2003 p84). Workmate was not formed as a parallel union from RMT, but it was some kind of democratic organization. Obtaining its membership was free and there were no monthly subscription fees. In addition, it did not directly engage the management in negotiations but used RMT as its representative (Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Transport Committee, 2005 p1). As stipulated by Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) guidelines, it is the responsibility of the union representatives to communicate reports back to the union members after negotiating with the management. Anytime Workmates wanted to hold a meeting, they would call upon RMT representative to negotiate with the management over an issue, and deliver the report back to them. This enabled workmates to hold regular meetings on work time without engaging the management (Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Transport Committee, 2005 p2). Effectiveness of Workmates One of the most significant legacies of Workmates is the culture of open mass meetings. This gave RMT power of helping to overcome the distinctions between casual and permanent employees, and holding its representatives accountable for their actions. Regular meetings and holding of mass strikes persisted even after all track maintenance work were outsourced to Metronet, and after PPP went ahead in 2003 (Smethurst & Carter, 2009 p337). New Organizing Strategies to Address Decline in Union Power Workmates, unlike RMT, was structured in accordance to anarcho-syndicalist principles. This group was mainly focused on addressing workers’ interests, and most decisions were arrived at by a show of hands during mass meeting (Solidarity Federation, 2011 p11). Through these actions, RMT representatives transformed to delegates, who were responsible of taking mandates from mass meetings, and presenting them to the management. Workmates mandates were not only to make RMT representatives democratically accountable, and extend representation to contractors; its next step was to form a delegate council (Solidarity Federation, 2011 p12). This decision was arrived at, since it was not in order to represent all agendas through mass meetings. Both union and non-union workers were grouped into gangs comprising of 8 to 16 members, where each gang was to elect their delegate. The delegates then report back to their respective gangs. This allowed Workmates to raise issues confidentially, and strategies could be made democratically without leaking information to the management. Formation of delegate council did not kill mass meetings. Mass meetings continued, and most of the general decisions were made in the open air. Only confidential issues were discussed in the council and gangs (McCarthy, 2004 p116). London Underground also wanted to end “job-and-knock” system. The new system was to allow work done between 11pm and 2am (McCarthy, 2004 p121). The old system allowed workers to go home ones job was done. The management claimed that this system was not in accordance with the private sector norms, and ones the job was done, the workers were supposed to report back to their depots and wait until 6:30 am. The new system gave the delegate council a few chances to hold meetings, and this meant that mass meeting was the only way to address issues regularly (Solidarity Federation, 2011 p15). Conclusion The Workmates association originated from anti-privatization struggles that were underway during late1990s and early 2000s. Workmates was mainly formed as a result of decreased power of the trade union, and to give the workers power at workplace. The principles of the trade unions were rigid, and this gave them little chances of adapting to the new changes brought about by neo-colonialism. The introduction of outsourcing work to private contracting firms significantly destabilized unions. Most contractors were self employed, but some worked for private agencies. They, therefore, had no legal disputes with the management, unlike members of trade unions. Workmates partially incorporated non-union workers into RMT. It is, therefore, a tool that brought union and non-union workers together, despite of earlier attempts of union members to protest against privatization. Workmates, therefore, shows that, even radical workers can be tuned to do a lot of work, and trade unions are not effective to address workers grievances appropriately, they only show solidarity at workplace. References Dunwoody G. The London Underground and the Public-Private Partnership Agreements: Hc 45, Second Report of Session 2007-08 - Report, Together With Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office, 2008. Ellman L. Update on the London Underground and the public-private (PPP) partnership agreements: seventh report of session 2009-10, report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence. London: The Stationery Office, 2010. Eur. Western Europe 2003. New York: Routledge, 2002. Gall G. Union organizing: campaigning for trade union recognition. New York: Routledge, 2003. Great Britain: National Audit Office. The failure of Metronet: Department for Transport. London: The Stationery Office, 2009. Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons Committee. Transport. The performance of the London Underground: sixth report of session 2004-05. London: The Stationery Office, 2005. Klaus G. H. Tramps, workmates and revolutionaries: working-class stories of the 1920s. London: Journeyman Press, 1993. McCarthy W. E. The closed shop in Britain. California: University of California Press, 2004. McIlroy J. Trade unions in Britain today. Manchester: Manchester University Press ND, 1995. Smethurst J. B, Carter P. Historical directory of trade unions, Volume 6. Vermont: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2009. Solidarity Federation. "The Workmates Collective on the London Underground ." Theory and Practice Series, 2011: 2-16. White P. Public transport: its planning, management, and operation. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2009. Read More